Contrary to the accountants and their like, economic science, like related functions of government, must define an increase in productivity as the outcome of the discovery and appropriate application of a universal physical principle, or what we term, in memory of the ancient Pythagoreans and Plato, as powers.

The best way to introduce the relevant conception, is to focus on the way in which technological progress, as embodied within the development of basic economic infrastructure, determines the levels of productivity which can be achieved and maintained within both agriculture and industrial and related manufacturing.

The role of powers so expressed, is then defined as the distribution of potential as Gottfried Leibniz defined potential. This view of potential, as the term is associated with Leibniz, brings into immediate view the way in which Carl Gauss and Riemann dealt, respectively, with what I have identified as Dirichlet’s Principle.

Notion of a Field
The only discovered manner in which we can deal rationally with the efficient relationship with a universal physical principle, is to express the relevant experimental expression of cause-effect connections in terms of the notion of a field.

The simplest first approximation of such a representation, is to treat, as Gauss does, the relatively simpler pedagogical problem of defining the distribution of the potential within the interior of an hypothetically circular area, by measuring the potential along the perimeter of that circle. Then, extend that first-approximation illustration of that notion to a multiply-connected Riemannian surface, as Riemann’s development of the notion of Abelian functions applies to such cases.

To trace the development of the notion of a field in modern European science, revisit Kepler’s development of the conception of universal gravitation, as from his *The New Astronomy* through the implications of his *World Harmony*, this time viewing the subject-area treated, in a pioneering fashion, by Kepler, from the standpoint of the work of such as Gauss and Riemann.

Then, apply the same approach to the notion of a physical-economic process encompassing a nation, such as the U.S.A., or our planet as a whole.

Fallacy of ‘Globalization’
The understanding of this point, enables us to understand why the transfer of the production of a product, even when the same technology of design and production is employed, from a developed economy, to a less developed economy, has usually resulted, during the recent quarter century, in a net collapse of the level of the rate of generation of per-capita productivity in the world as a whole! The transfer of production from a nation with advanced development of its infrastructure, to a nation of relatively poor people with a poor development of general infrastructure, tends to produce a collapse of the physical economy of the planet as a whole. The role of the field represented by basic economic infrastructure, has been ignored, with what tend to become ultimately fatal economic results for all concerned.

—Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. from *Science: The Power To Prosper*
Science: The Power To Prosper
Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

‘Nun kommt die Schillerzeit!’
What Is, and To What End Do We Study, Friedrich Schiller In the Year 2005?
Helga Zepp LaRouche

Friedrich Schiller’s ‘The Song of the Bell’
Marianna Wertz
36

Friedrich Schiller And His Friends
William Jones
54

Schiller’s Thought-Poetry: ‘The Artists’
Helga Zepp LaRouche
46

A Reader’s Guide To Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetical Education of Man
William F. Wertz, Jr.
80

Editorials
2 The American System or Fascism: A Celebration on the 200th Anniversary Of the Death of Friedrich Schiller
4 A New Bretton Woods Now!

News
105 U.S. Conference: ‘Make George Bush a Lame Duck’
107 Italian Parliament Calls for New Bretton Woods
108 Berlin Seminar Promotes New ‘Treaty of Westphalia’
109 Civil Rights Heroine Amelia Robinson Honored in Selma

Obituary
111 Norbert Brainin, Primarius of the Amadeus Quartet

Interview
116 Norbert Brainin

Commentary
124 In Defense of Christianity
The American System or Fascism:
A Celebration on the 200th Anniversary
Of the Death of Friedrich Schiller

With this special double issue of Fidelio, we celebrate the living memory of the great Poet of Freedom, Friedrich Schiller, on the 200th anniversary of his death. We have designed this issue to provide “the young friend of truth and beauty” with a collection of articles about Schiller that will whet his or her appetite to nourish their souls further, by re-experiencing the beauty and truthfulness of Schiller’s poetry, drama, historical, and aesthetical writings.

Two hundred years after Schiller’s death, the world as a whole has reached a punctum saliens. As in a drama composed by Schiller himself, the action has reached a critical “jumping-off point.” Whatever decision is made at this moment, will determine the future development of the world. The choice, as Schiller presented it metaphorically in such writings as Don Carlos and the “Legislation of Lycurgus and Solon,” is between the American System and fascism.

On May 23, the U.S. Senate acted under the influence of Lyndon LaRouche, to thwart an attempted coup d’état by the Bush Administration, by defeating Vice President Cheney’s attempt to change the rules of the Senate so as to outlaw use of the filibuster against judicial nominations. Had Cheney succeeded in preventing the Senate from exercising its Constitutional responsibilities to provide advice and consent, nothing would have been able to stop the Bush Administration in its drive to eliminate the legacy of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s commitment to promoting the General Welfare. Nothing would have stood in the way of the launching of more unjustified wars, according to the Cheney doctrine of preemptive nuclear warfare.

This victory in the U.S., which was designed by LaRouche, has opened the door to worldwide collaboration for the convening of an international conference to create a New Bretton Woods monetary system, to reverse the collapse of real physical production which has proceeded in an accelerating fashion globally since George Pratt Shultz convinced President Richard Nixon to abandon Roosevelt’s original Bretton Woods system on Aug. 15, 1971.

On April 6, the Italian Parliament passed a resolution calling for such a conference, and this issue of Fidelio contains a call issued by Schiller Institute founder Helga Zepp LaRouche, which is being circulated internationally in support of this effort.

In his poem “The Artists,” Schiller writes:

The dignity of Man into your hands is given, Its keeper be!
It sinks with you! With you it will be risen!

It is with this sense of personal moral responsibility for all mankind, past, present and future, that we must act now.

Forty years ago, Amelia Boynton Robinson, now vice chairwoman of the Schiller Institute in the United States, was beaten unconscious as she and others began to march across the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma, Alabama, towards the state capital of Montgomery. She and her husband, S.W. Boynton, had fought for years in rural Alabama to register Black Americans to vote. Amelia and Bill Boynton, who were both honored in Selma this past March, are examples of what Schiller had in mind when he wrote the above-cited lines from “The Artists.”

We hope that our celebration of Schiller in this issue of Fidelio will inspire the LaRouche Youth Movement to follow in the footsteps of Lyndon and Helga LaRouche and the Boyntons. Our celebration consists of the following items:
• “What Is, and To What End Do We Study, Friedrich Schiller in the Year 2005?” by Helga Zepp LaRouche
• A translation and commentary on Friedrich Schiller’s “The Song of the Bell” by Marianna Wertz, the late vice president of the Schiller Institute in the United States
• “Schiller’s Thought-Poetry: ‘The Artists,’ ” by Helga Zepp LaRouche, accompanied by a translation by Marianna Wertz
• A brief biography in letters and reminiscences, entitled “Friedrich Schiller and His Friends,” by William Jones, and

If you apply yourself to studying these articles as an introduction to Schiller’s writings, you will receive the greatest gift imaginable. You will gain access to the capacity to develop within yourself and others, what Schiller refers to as an “aesthetical state of mind.” In such a state of mind, as Schiller writes in his Aesthetical Letters, our humanity is recreated by beauty. It is for this reason that Schiller says that beauty is our “second creator.” Beauty makes it possible for us to be fully human. As Schiller writes: “Man plays only where he in the full meaning of the word is man, and he is only there fully man, where he plays.”

In his essay, “Science: The Power To Prosper,” Lyndon LaRouche elaborates on the science that underlies man’s capacity, through the power of creative play—or as the Russian scientist V.I. Vernadsky calls it, the realm of the Noösphere—to transform the physical universe, so as to increase the potential relative population density of the human species. This is the power which must now be unleashed, if mankind is to have any hope of reversing the systemic collapse of physical production brought on by the onrushing breakdown-crisis of the today’s Anglo-Dutch floating-exchange-rate monetary system.

This issue of Fidelio ends with two additional items: a memorial to, and interview with, the late Norbert Brainin, founder and primarius of the legendary Amadeus Quartet; and a review by Lyndon LaRouche of Pope John Paul II’s last book, Memory and Identity. We wish to leave the reader with the words with which Lyndon LaRouche concludes that review:

“There is a power in the universe, which the creative powers of the individual human mind can know. I have devoted most of my life to discovering such powers, and that with at least sufficient success to prove the point. Those who have the courage to recognize that power, and employ its instruction, express thus the continuity of the worthy institutions which mortal men and women inhabit. To become such a person within society, is the nature of what Leibniz identified as ‘the pursuit of happiness,’ the principle upon which the U.S. republic was founded. When men and women devoted to the work of such leadership pass, the survivors mourn. That mourning of such great men and women of institutions can be, in itself, a creative act by those who must then mourn; let it be so now.”

Hope

All people discuss it and dream on end
Of better days that are coming,
After a golden and prosperous end
They are seen chasing and running;
The world grows old and grows young in turn,
Yet doth man for betterment hope eterne.

’Tis hope delivers him into life,
Round the frolicsome boy doth it flutter,
The youth is allur’d by its magic rife,
It will not be interr’d with the elder;
Though i’th coffin he ends his weary lope,
Yet upon that coffin he plants—his hope.

It is no empty, fawning deceit,
Begot in the brain of a jester,
Proclaim’d aloud in the heart is it:
We are born for that which is better!
And what the innermost voice conveys,
The hoping spirit ne’er that betrays.

—Friedrich Schiller
As a follow-up to the Call launched in July 2000 for the reorganization of the world financial system, which Call was endorsed by many international leaders, including former heads of government, Members of Parliament, trade unionists, businessmen, and Civil Rights and church figures, Schiller Institute founder Helga Zepp LaRouche has now issued an updated appeal. The text is currently being circulated worldwide, and will be published both on websites and in newspapers.

Ad Hoc Committee for A New Bretton Woods Agreement

The paradigm shift of the last four decades, a period in which the world economy increasingly abandoned manufacturing and gave itself over to untrammelled speculation, is now drawing to an end. The world financial system is about to implode. Gross production worldwide stands at a mere $40 trillion, over which looms a gigantic debt bubble 50 times that size, viz., $2,000 trillion of speculative derivative contracts per year. The impending bankruptcy of General Motors and, potentially, of the entire U.S. automobile industry, is but one of many factors that could well lead to the collapse of the U.S. dollar, and thereby, the entire financial system.

To prevent the world’s people from suffering the untold harm that the breakdown of the system would unleash, we the undersigned demand that an emergency conference be convened, to agree upon a new financial architecture along the lines of the Bretton Woods System launched at Franklin D. Roosevelt’s initiative in 1944. We stress that Lyndon LaRouche is the economist who has best grasped the causes of the systemic crisis, and who has, moreover, put forward a package of measures that would adequately deal with it: a new New Bretton Woods agreement.

We the undersigned further stress that the Italian Parliament has taken up LaRouche’s proposal, and on
April 6, 2005, voted up a Resolution calling for “an international conference at the Head-of-State level, in order to lay the basis for a new and just world monetary and financial system.”

The following measures must be implemented if we are to alter the mistaken course that we have followed since President Nixon did away with fixed exchange rates in 1971, a course that has led to the present upsurge of a grotesque and predatory form of capitalism, thanks to unchecked “globalization,” after the fall of the U.S.S.R. The New Bretton Woods Conference shall decide as follows.

1. There shall immediately be re-established fixed exchange rates.
2. A treaty shall be enacted among governments, forbidding speculation in derivative products.
3. The debt shall either be cancelled, or reorganized.
4. New credit lines shall be opened by the State, to create full employment by investing in critical infrastructure and technological innovation.
5. The building of the Eurasian Land-Bridge, as the keystone for rebuilding the world economy, is the vision that will bring about not only a new Wirtschaftswunder (“Economic Miracle”), but peace in the Twenty-first century.
6. A new Peace of Westphalia will ensure that for no less than the coming half-century, raw materials shall be extracted and processed for the benefit of every nation on this planet.

We, the undersigned, believe that so-called “globalization,” this predatory form of capitalism, has shown itself beyond all doubt to be bankrupt on every front, whether economic, financial, or moral. It is Man who must stand at the center of the economy, and accordingly, the economy must serve the common weal. The purpose of a new world economic order is to guarantee the inalienable rights of Man.
To foster the development of mankind, we must look to improving the conditions under which nations live.

Work must be conceived as a true universal, as what society does to increase its power in and over the portion of the universe which society inhabits. It is that universal quality of transformation which supplies the criteria for defining the universal implication of both the work of the individual, and the individual’s appropriate moral motivation for that work.

Such is the goal of happiness.
How Most of Today’s Economists Became Illiterates

Science: The Power To Prosper

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.
April 16, 2005

This report is about economics as that form of science without which no recovery from the presently onrushing world-wide monetary-financial collapse were possible. However, in science, as in preparing a decent meal, it is necessary to clean the kitchen of noxious debris.

However, the intention of this report is not simply to haul out the garbage. Consider that removal of noxious elements of currently widespread opinion as a necessary attack on certain groups of economists who continue to play the role of charlatans, at public expense. These predatory fellows need to be denounced for reason of the damage they would continue to do to the U.S.A. and other nations through the widespread influence of their deceits upon governments and others.

I include this attack on them at the outset of this report, if only as a secondary feature of this report as a whole; I do so, because it would be virtually fatal negligence not to attack those dogmas for what will surely be their increasingly desperate frauds at this time. Unless they are denounced for their frauds, on exactly the issues I pose again here, the damage their erroneous opinions have already caused would not only continue, but worsen.

On this account, back in 1971, I accused many among those influential professors of economics of being “quackademics”; over the decades since then, that has been repeatedly proven to have been not only a correct, but necessary choice of language. In retrospect, it is now clear, that had more people heeded my warnings then, the U.S.A., and the world generally, would not be in the ugly mess it is today.

However, the principal topic which I address here, is the fact that, presently, even honest and otherwise intelligent people in government, business, and academia, simply do not have certain knowledge of a type which is absolutely crucial for choosing competent policies under the present crisis-circumstances confronting our government, businesses, and the general public. The principal topic of this report, is the presently urgent necessity of the study and practice of economics as a science, as essentially a branch of experimental physical science.

Under present circumstances, I am therefore obliged to supplement the memorandum which I have recently addressed to the members of the U.S. Senate and their

Scientific discovery transforms society, as it is transmitted to industrial production through the machine-tool process.
Top to bottom: Institute of Applied Sciences, Mexico City; Marie Curie in her laboratory; engineering classroom, Bombay, India; installation of computerized machine-tools, Cincinnati Milacron; Ford assembly plant, Hermosillo, Mexico.
The present collapse of the auto industry. What was the timely example of urgent need to diagnose and cure this crisis?


In earlier locations I have pointed out some of the essential kinds of related causes, and cures, for the failure of General Motors and other managements today. Here, in this report, I focus on the scientific principles which should be applied, instead of those flawed policies which have caused the present collapse of that industry. On the latter account, I shall direct attention in the body of this report to some extremely relevant, essential principles of economics, principles which were generally unknown to leading economists in universities and elsewhere, up to the point of their study of this report. I supply selected examples of this general ignorance, examples which I choose because they are ones more readily understood among the audience I have selected for this occasion.

I have also pointed, below, to the nature of the still deeper, scientific principles which must govern the way in which we pass down education in the principles of economy from the university level, into the secondary school curriculum, and the public generally.

To speak bluntly, the virtual “brainwashing” of the upper echelons of business leaders and elected members of government on the subject of economy, has carried matters to the extreme, that a crash of enterprises as significant as the present collapse would not have been possible, had these professionals and their followers not either ignored, or even defied, the previously well-known principles of that American System of political-economy which defined a durably successful design of modern economy, beginning more than two hundred years ago.

Therefore, given the immediate peril of the world’s economy today, the continued influence of the ideology of those misguided economists in the policy-shaping of governments including our own, must be considered the poisonous, habit-forming drug which lured the world monetary-financial system into a form of degeneration which should have been foreseen, or, at least recognized, decades ago, as being a recipe for the kind of state of a monetary-financial system into a form of degeneration which should have been foreseen, or, at least recognized, decades ago, as being a recipe for the kind of state of a general catastrophe which we have actually experienced, more and more, in effects experienced during the recent quarter-century.

Therefore, to overcome the present crisis of our national and the world economy, we must do two things. First, rid ourselves of those specific kinds of diseased thinking about the subject of economics, which have dominated the U.S.A. and other governments’ policy-shaping, and caused the ruin of our economy during the recent three and a half decades. Second, circulate the missing, urgently needed true knowledge of how a successful modern economy works, not only among professionals and businessmen, but, to provide a competent grounding in this essential knowledge, through our secondary schools and universities. The latter, second purpose is the principal concern of this report.

To make those two points in this report, I have chosen the timely example of urgent need to diagnose and cure the present collapse of the auto industry. What was wrong? What should we now do instead? How must we think about economics if we are to succeed in overcoming this challenge? How must we think about a successful rebuilding of both the U.S. and world economy over the coming fifty years and more?

So, whereas, among relevant trade-union leaders from those industrial categories, the reaction to the presently onrushing collapse of an industry, tends to be rational, healthy, and realistic, the same information presented to the political figure who one might presume represents those trade-unionists’ political interests, is too often a change of the subject of discussion, to asking about “the market.” That “market” has been the same phenomenon which has continued to suggest that the relevant sector of the physical economy is on the road to prosperity, at the same time that the relevant industry has been preparing to crash. It is that latter kind of avoidance of physical reality rather typical of today’s so-called “white collar class,” which is expressed by their turning from reality to the subject of “the market” whenever reality frightens...
them. That syndrome among them is the most likely influence which might set off the moral failure among politicos which virtually destroys our nation.

A study of the way in which the automobile industry, in particular, has been building up its over-ripeness for the presently onrushing collapse of its relevant corporate institutions, that over years to date, typifies the evidence of the need to shift discussion of the policy-making of our economy from the monetary-financial realm, back to viewing the actuality of the monetary-financial processes from the vantage-point of primary emphasis on the processes at work within the physical economy as such.

That said thus far, the first subject the thoughtful reader should wish to take up, now, is the subject of the quality of my expertise. I now preface the body of this report, chiefly, with a few necessary remarks on the most relevant parts, for today, of my background in this field, and after that, turn, in the body of the document, to the crucial point of science to which this report is dedicated.

Some Relevant Personal Background

Often, the instances of either notable success, or ugly failures in the policy-shaping behavior of adult leaders in society, reflect some critical turning-point in development of that personality during childhood or adolescence.

Looking backward from today, it is fairly said that my present career as, in fact, a leading economist, reflects a process which began during my adolescence, in an incident which occurred my first day in attendance at the then standard first secondary school class in Plane Geometry. On that occasion, when the students were challenged by that teacher to suggest why we should study geometry, I volunteered a subject which had fascinated me since some earlier visits to the nearby Charlestown, Massachusetts Navy Yard. I replied to her challenge by posing the subject: *To study why leaving those holes in girders strengthens the structure of which they are a supporting part.* It is the kind of question a boy in my circumstances then would have asked his father. I did ask, but I was never satisfied with the answer he gave me, which was that I should learn the answer in school when the time for that came. School had come, and I had asked.

Despite some prompt, foolish, and also vociferous ridicule from some classmates on that account, my reflections on what I recognized as their irrational reaction, showed me why I could never accept the idea of a geometry, or physics, premised upon allegedly self-evident definitions, axioms, and postulates of a so-called Euclidean or kindred doctrine in geometry. I never did.

Already, before that classroom incident, I had been prompted by similar questions, to begin a reading of representative writings of leading names in English, French, and German philosophy of the Sixteenth through Eighteenth centuries. I remained fascinated by that study of philosophies as systems, rather than opinions, from that same standpoint, up through the present day. The pattern of that experience in studying philosophy, initially, during the remainder of my adolescence, showed the significance of that incident in the geometry class to have been, that I was then already on the road to becoming an adolescent admirer of Gottfried Leibniz, over all the other authors of my explorations in those modern European philosophies. These explorations among the history of ideas turned gradually to translations from, and disputed commentaries on the work of the pre-Aristotelian Greeks.

Within two years after that classroom incident, I had become, in effect, a convert to that science of physical geometry which I would come to recognize, more than a decade later, as a Riemannian anti-Euclidean geometry.1

The relevance of that seminal classroom incident from my adolescence to this present, brief report, is not only that most professionally trained persons whom I have known from my own, and later generations, developed into adulthood along an intellectual pathway which was systemically contrary to my own. As a result of my adopting the kind of views on geometry which I expressed in that classroom, I have developed what were to be proven to be my superior methods applied to the subject of economy.

So, since my adolescence, my contentious view on the subject of physical geometry, which I had expressed in that geometry classroom, led me to follow the essentially Leibnizian, specifically American track in economics associated with the tradition which Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton had identified officially as that

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1. The term “anti-Euclidean,” rather than “non-Euclidean,” dates in fact from a time prior to the writings of Aristotle or Euclid. It dates in European culture, from the influence of the Egyptian astronomy known as *sphaerics* among the Pythagoreans and Plato. Although a return to “anti-Euclidean geometry” is implicit among Nicholas of Cusa and his principal followers, in physical science, the term “anti-Euclidean” originates with one of the principal teachers of Carl Gauss, Abraham Kästner. The concept is developed, although not under that name, in Gauss’s published work, beginning his 1799 doctoral dissertation against D’Alembert, Euler, and Lagrange; but appears, frankly stated, in its own right, with Riemann’s 1854 habilitation dissertation and his *Theory of Abelian Functions*. Riemann’s conceptions played a decisive role in shaping the development of my own anti-Euclidean notions in physical economy. The term signifies the rejection of all notions of “self-evident” (*e.g.*, *a priori*) principles in mathematics.
A mere mathematician reports statistically on the motion observed; a physical scientist, by contrast, not only discovers what has moved the observed object, but bases his presumption on discovering the specific ‘power’ which generates the kind of observable motion which could not have been predicted by the methods of the mere mathematician.

American System of political-economy; whereas, most of what passes for generally accepted doctrine, even in the U.S. universities today, is premised on that British East India Company’s Anglo-Dutch Liberal school of economy, the doctrine against which the American War of Independence had been fought.

My affinity for the American System, even during adolescence, expressed a non-accidental coincidence with those aspects of my childhood family legacy as a descendant of circles associated with the early Nineteenth-century American Whigs and their Abraham Lincoln legacy. The outcome of the confluence of that part of family history with the evidence of science, was that I have remained personally comfortable with the agreement between the two influences to the present day.

That experience was the origin of what became my repeated successes as a long-range economic forecaster over decades, during a time when the schools of thought represented by my putative rivals in this field of forecasting have usually failed, often miserably.

Today, the most essential kind of principled significance for science generally, and economics emphatically, of that philosophical difference which I expressed in that classroom incident nearly seventy years ago, can be usefully restated as: A mere mathematician, such as René Descartes, reports statistically, as did Copernicus, on the motion which has been observed; a physical scientist, by contrast, follows such precedents as Johannes Kepler. The latter not only discovers what has moved the observed object, but bases his presumption and proofs of professional competence on discovering the specific power— the specific universal physical principle—which generates the kind of observable motion which could not have been predicted by the methods along such main lines of development as the direct followers of Cusa, Luca Pacioli, Leonardo da Vinci, Johannes Kepler, and Leibniz. The reaffirmation of this notion of powers, against the empiricists’ so-called Enlightenment and the followers of Descartes, occurred under the influence, in Germany, of the mathematician Abraham Kästner, Kästner’s pupil Carl Gauss, the École Polytechnique of Lazare Carnot, Arago, et al., and the circles of Alexander von Humboldt, which gave us the work of Bernhard Riemann, and the defense of Kepler and Riemann made by Albert Einstein later in his own life.

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2. The term power, as I employ it here, as distinct from the reductionist’s mistaken notion of energy as elementary, is the customary English translation of Leibniz’s use for science of the German term Kraft. Those terms have the same significance as the use of the term dynamis by opponents of the reductionist schools, such as the Pythagoreans and Plato. The modern form of this Classical Greek usage of the notion of power, is traced from such relevant writings as Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa’s De Docta Ignorantia, which, with related later writings by him, launched modern experimental physical science
of the mere mathematician. We observe the movement of the planet. Galileo said that it moves; Kepler asked, and discovered that which moves it.

So, from the beginning of what became my professional successes as a working economist, I had been led to define competent economics, as Leibniz did, as a science of physical economy, whose most characteristic practice is long-range forecasting. The statistician, in his attempted role as forecaster, seeks to predict the movement so; the scientist working in the footsteps of Kepler, Leibniz, Gauss, and Riemann, asks what moves it, even to produce a state of motion which had never been known to have existed before? It is the latter sort of motion, forecasting successfully something which had never occurred before, which is inevitably excluded by reductionists’ statistical methods, which is the motion which expresses all of those developments which correspond to the most important of all developments. These are the developments which the statistician must necessarily fail to foresee as likely. That discovery of a principle whose application generates a category of phenomenon never experienced before, is the experimentalist’s definition of a universal physical principle. That is the true definition of scientific method; that is the power of progress. This same notion of power is the essential principle of any competent economic science.

The prompting of my first formal step from being a youthful admirer of the concept of physical geometry, toward becoming a professional economist, occurred at the beginning of 1948, when I had received loan of a Paris pre-print of Professor Norbert Wiener’s *Cybernetics*. Much of that book I found to be fun; but I could not swallow Wiener’s frankly absurd, radically reductionist doctrine of “information theory.” I was promptly determined, from that moment on, to elaborate my strict disproof of Wiener’s cleverly seductive “ivory tower” intervention into economics.

At a later point, during my repeated, 1952-1953 rereading of the opening paragraphs of Bernhard Riemann’s 1854 habilitation dissertation with the subject of physical economy in mind, my earlier work in arriving at a thesis refuting Wiener (and, similarly, John von Neumann) for economics, came into focus. In the leisure imposed by a process of convalescence from a serious bout with hepatitis, I had my “Eureka” experience; I acquired a sure-footed sense of my special competence as an economist, a competence which was later demonstrated in my first general forecast on the economy, which I made several years later, in 1956.

The first working forecast actually made by me on the basis of those studies, which was made during 1956, took shape when I insisted to my rather astonished, and chiefly disbelieving colleagues of that occasion, that we, as consultants to business firms, must foresee a major U.S. recession to erupt approximately February of 1957. That forecast collapse into recession came on time, and for the reasons I had forecast. The effects of my success as a forecaster were much disliked in those circles. Obviously, my doubts of the wisdom of the automobile industry had not caused that recession; but, it is not atypical of the perils of the successful forecaster, that for some associates and others, I must nonetheless be blamed, emotionally, for the effects which reality, not I, had created and delivered to their doorsteps. The typical poor fellow clung to his earlier delusion about the economy, by saying of me, “He talked us into a recession!”

The study which led to my crafting of this forecast had been prompted, initially, by my attention to economically pathological patterns in the marketing practices of leading automobile manufacturers. This observation had turned my attention to broader, correlated other, related factors of virtual fraud by lenders, then, as now, in the misuse of consumer credit by the U.S. economy at that time. Hence, the forecast.

All forecasts of that type which I crafted then, and later, have been premised on the discovery of a characteristi-
cally systemic feature of the economic process. Often, as in the case of my 1956 and later forecasts, this systemic feature corresponds to recognition of some influential, usually false, axiomatic-like assumption by some controlling interests in the current system. Like the 1954-1957 process leading into the February 1957 turn, most important forecasts are premised upon a discovered element of systematic delusion of that type, like the “Pyramid Club” frenzy of the late 1940’s, or the consumer-financing frenzy leading into the 1957 recession, each of which, like the John Law “bubble” of the early Eighteenth century, had been induced in relevant mass-behavior.

Then, as in the case leading into the present General Motors crisis, the tendency of the relevant foolish folk is to see apparent short-term monetary-financial advantages in “the market,” while putting aside concern for medium- to long-term physical-economic factors. The latter are the factors which will ultimately take their revenge, as now, upon the wishful monetary-financial thinking which has temporarily seduced prevalent opinion.

For example, the fact that the population of the U.S. has been transformed, as a whole, from a nation of savers, into wildly over-extended borrowers, seeing today’s money to spend, rather than tomorrow’s debt to be paid, is worse than typical of the way short-term delusions of public opinion, lead into medium- to long-term catastrophes. Such are the cases of the 1990’s “IT” bubble, the mortgage-based securities bubble, the automobile-sales-financing bubble, hedge funds generally, and the U.S. fiscal debt and current accounts deficit today. In all bubbles, and most boom-bust cycles, there is a systemic element of popular delusion operating axiomatically within induced mass-behavior.

Ironically, we witness the same kind of blunder as then, repeated on a grander scale today, as a key part of the onrushing crash of the automobile industry, and other key sectors. However, while forecasting disasters is not only important, but necessary, it is forecasting ways to bring about a recovery from a presently onrushing disaster, which touches the heart of a scientific quality of professional practice of physical economy. As an illustration of the latter point, take a key feature of my just-issued report on the prospects of a recovery, which I have just issued as a motion presented to the members of the U.S. Senate. This present report is crafted as a technical supplement to that report.

Not accidentally, the systemic error in mismanagement whose effects have exploded to the surface of the world’s automotive interest today, was the same type of error, but on a grander scale, speaking of types of systemic errors, which had attracted my attention in the automobile industry of 1956. General Motors’ financier management of today has obviously learned less than nothing from the industry’s mistakes of fifty years ago.

As I have noted above, my 1956 forecast of a deep 1957 recession had been crafted in a professional capacity as an executive of a firm by which I was employed at that time. However, the study and its specific success prompted a deeper, intense, and far-ranging private study of the trends which I later forecast, beginning 1959-60, as a current trend in our nation’s policy-shaping ideology of the mid-1950’s. It was clear to me then, that if that ideology were continued in effect, this would set off a series of international monetary crises during the latter half of the 1960’s, and, beyond that, presented the added danger of a breakdown of the presently ongoing world monetary system as a result. It actually happened as I had forecast this, over the course of the middle 1960’s, through 1971 and beyond. That more widely circulated forecast is that for which I have become known around the world, since the middle to late 1960’s. This forecast was realized as the 1967-68 pound sterling and U.S. dollar crises, and the subsequent, 1971-72 collapse of the original Bretton Woods monetary system.

My post-August 16, 1971 statements on this action of the Nixon Administration, which were issued during the remainder of that year, then defined the long-term basis for the series of subsumed, medium-term forecasts, which I later issued at various points during the decades up to that which I delivered through mass media shortly before the 2001 U.S. Presidential inauguration. None of those forecasts of that interval has ever been wrong.

It is the method associated with that general forecast which stands as completely vindicated in the international crises erupting today.

This is not to deny that there are many specialists in various aspects of the economy, who speak with the actual authority of experts in making valid, and sometimes also very valuable statements on the partial significance of current developments. There is often a notable coincidence of opinion between my work and theirs, and some consultation on such matters among us. Nonetheless, my forecasting has the indicated unique quality of significance, as providing the scientific basis for long-term policy-shaping which my success in long-range forecasting expresses. It is the scientific basis for my distinctive successes on that account which must, finally, be learned among those who will be qualified to lead the world into the future, especially those future leaders who emerge from the generation typified by the program of education in certain fundamentals of both science and Classical culture being con-
As in the case leading into the present General Motors crisis, the tendency of the relevant foolish folk is to see apparent short-term monetary-financial advantages in ‘the market,’ while putting aside concern for the medium- to long-term physical-economic factors which will ultimately take their revenge upon the wishful monetary-financial thinking which has temporarily seduced prevalent opinion.

Abandoned GM plant, Danville, Illinois.

ducted by my LaRouche Youth Movement.
I work to inform and educate the present leaders from older generations, but also seek to develop a new cadre of leaders of nations who will come to know what I already know far better than I do today. Also, they will still be here to lead in generations which have come to lead after mine has been long gone.

1. What Is Economics?

To discuss the ills and cures of our modern international and national economic systems as such, we must first define what economists and others ought to mean when they use the term “economics.” The problem has been, that among presently leading economists and textbooks, very few provide a valid definition for their use of the term “economics.” Most debates on the subject itself break down at the beginning, usually after turning quickly into a Babel of murky confusion over fundamentals. To avoid that confusion over definitions themselves, I begin my treatment of the technical problems raised by the present General Motors catastrophe, in this chapter, with the following corrected definition of the term economics itself.

The crucial historical fact from which to begin any competent study of economic practice today, is, that no science of economy, in any meaningful sense of the way that term is used today, existed prior to the birth of the modern nation-state in Europe’s Fifteenth century Renaissance. The first actual economies, otherwise known as commonwealths, were founded during the second half of the Fifteenth century, by, first, France’s King Louis XI and, later, his follower, England’s Henry VII. Any discussion of the principles which must be recognized if we are to deal competently with the causes and cure of the presently onrushing, global breakdown-crisis of the world’s present floating-exchange-rate monetary system, must begin with an understanding of the scientifically principled differences among the various types of European society which existed prior to, during, and after the Fifteenth-century Renaissance.

The cases of Louis XI’s France and Henry VII’s England are crucial for sorting out that historical evidence needed to locate the causes and cure for the global crisis expressed by the General Motors and kindred cases today. It would be impossible to grasp what the term sovereign nation-state, or its synonym, the commonwealth, should mean to the competent economist, until the history of mankind, prior to Europe’s Fifteenth century Renaissance, is seen in a clear-headed way. Until that
point is clear, no competent understanding of any the relevant principles of modern economy were possible.

I proceed accordingly.

First of all, although any meaningful definition of the idea of a constitutional republic is traced to the work of Solon of Athens, no actual republic, in that sense, existed, in practice, prior to crucial developments during the course of the Fifteenth-century Renaissance. The relevant synonym for a true republic, as founded by France's Louis XI and his follower Henry VII of England, is a commonplace; a nation-state whose constitutional law, based on the triple principle of perfect sovereignty, the defense of that sovereignty, and the obligation of society to promote the general welfare of all of the people and their posterity. The examples are each equivalent, functionally, to the Pre-amble of the Federal Constitution of the U.S.A., and to the congruent, principled notion of natural law central to the 1776 U.S. Declaration of Independence, a formulation copied from Leibniz's attack on John Locke's folly, "the pursuit of happiness."

No form of society meeting the standard of that definition existed in any known place prior to that European development of that Fifteenth-century reform.

This Fifteenth-century development did not spring up spontaneously. It had developed as an outgrowth of a long process focussed within European civilization and adjoining areas, that over a period beginning, chiefly, within the geography of Europe and near Asia since approximately 10,000 B.C.

This is the period which began with a catastrophic event, a great flooding, which occurred as a continuation of an already ongoing great melt, which signalled the end of a long period of glaciation in the northern hemisphere.

During the whole period of that melt, a process of post-glacial change had unfolded to the accompaniment of profound successive changes in climate and other contextual factors over the period preceding the events associated with surviving historical accounts, a period of the history of the territory of Europe and Southwest Asia dating from about 4000 B.C.

The way in which European civilization generated the functionally precise conception of the sovereign nation-state, requires us to look at the way in which monotheism shaped that evolving conception of mankind and society out of which the sovereign nation-state emerged in the Fifteenth century.

The known development of human cultures within the area of Southwest Asia, Africa, and Europe during the approximately four thousand years preceding the birth of Jesus Christ, was the cauldron of conflict, out of which a specific development constituting European civilization emerged, a process of development which came to be centered within what is known today as Classical Greek civilization.

The central factor of that process is birth of mankind's conscious knowledge of a universe and a willful universal deity. The notion of a monotheistic God as a personality conceived as in the image echoed by the mind of man, is a notion buried somewhere deep within the pre-history of the world known to the Egypt of

8. The founding of the modern nation-state by Louis XI and Henry VII was most immediately an outgrowth of the new juridical order in Europe established in the context of the Fifteenth century's great ecumenical Council of Florence, in which later Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa performed an indispensable key role. Two works by Cusa, his Concordantia Catholica and his founding of modern experimental science with his De Docta Ignorantia and later scientific works, and his role in launching the policy of great trans-oceanic exploration and development typified by the actions of Christopher Columbus, were key features of the way in which the immediate conditions for founding of modern nation-states were crafted. The earlier, medieval history of the efforts to establish sovereign states as the replacement for both Roman and ultramontane imperial rule, has been documented from the standpoint of modern international law by Professor Friedrich A. von der Heyde in Die Geburtsstunde des souveränen Staates (The Birth of the Sovereign State) (Regensburg: Druck und Verlag Josef Habbel, 1952). Forerunners of this great Renaissance reform include, most notably, Solon of Athens, Plato, St. Augustine, Charlemagne's opposition to ultramontanism, Abelard, and Dante Alighieri.

9. The reports on ancient astronomical calendars, as this was emphasized by India's Bal Gangadhar Tilak and others, show a highly developed astronomy existing in Central Asia more than 6,000 years ago. Related evidence points to the outstanding importance of maritime cultures based on sophisticated astrogation during times preceding historical times. The evidence indicates that the development of civilization proceeded from the oceans and seas into settlements along principal rivers, rather than the reverse. Traces of settlements along present coastlines, at up to several hundred feet below today's ocean surface, especially where great ancient rivers intersected likely regions, are now submerged, on or near the coastal regions of those ancient times. Therefore, study of relevant, presently submerged off-shore locations, especially off the coasts of India, whose maritime culture of the early historic period played a known important role in the history of adjoining regions, have great importance for our knowledge of the prehistoric conditions of mankind. Such studies would help us greatly to understand the prehistoric development of relatively advanced forms of culture which probably left a crucially significant imprint on the relevant cultures of historic times, such as those of lower Mesopotamia.
Moses’ monotheism. However, the obscurity of the origins of knowledge of the monotheistic principle is not only a feasible challenge; the recognition of a more rigorous, precise notion of the concept itself, is scientifically necessary for the healthy functioning of the modern world. It is essential to focus attention on those creative powers, unique to the human mind among known species, by means of which we are able to sort out clues pointing to the way the human mind, as we know it, could actually know of the provable existence of such a God. This notion of God, as argued by Plato’s Classical *Timaeus* dialogue, is the emergent foundation on which the development of European civilization has depended from its beginning.

Typical is the argument for an actively creative God by Philo of Alexandria and the Christians, who argued with the same form and degree of exactness we might rightly associate with scientific certainty, rather than in some anecdotal blending of legend and chronicles. Plato’s *Timaeus*, when situated in the context of the work on the subject of the methods for conceptualization of universals, as by the Pythagoreans, and within his own dialogues in general, points toward such a scientifically precise knowledge of God and the associated principled notion of society.

Curiously, but not merely coincidentally, Riemann’s insight into the implications of Dirichlet’s Principle, as I shall treat this afresh in the next chapter of this present report, shows the way in which the human mind can actually know of, and define the notion of an ontological quality of existence of such a monotheistic God with a systematic sense of scientific certainty. As I shall emphasize in the next chapter of this report, all rational notions of science and of modern economy depend upon the special ability to conceptualize the notion of a universal principle as a definite, and efficiently ontological object of human consciousness. Riemann’s rigorous redefinition of such universals, as stated first in his revolutionary 1854 habilitation dissertation, and as this notion was elaborated in the form of Dirichlet’s Principle in his *Theory of Abelian Functions*, enables us, today, to look back with insight to the preceding development of physical science, back to the Classical Greeks, and also, still further, not only to Egyptian astronomy, but notions of astrophysics implicit in Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s report on pre-4,000 B.C. astronomy in Central Asia.

This elaboration, as by Riemann, of the notion of Dirichlet’s Principle, is a crucial quality of modern improvement in our ability to conceptualize those universals which the relevant ancient Egyptians, and the Pythagoreans and Plato, defined as powers (i.e., *dynamis*), or what modern Classical science and art know as universal physical principles, as absolutely distinct from the merely descriptive quality of mathematical formulas. A clear understanding of this notion, seen in that way, is crucial for defining a notion of economic science, for a science of physical economy. This conception is also indispensable for achieving a definite, ontological notion of creativity and of the personality of a Creator. This conception is also indispensable for understanding more adequately the qualitative specificity of the modern European civilization which first appeared within the context of the Fifteenth-century European Renaissance.

What we know of the relevant roots of European civilization, is the central role of this idea of a Creator in defining that current of thought which has adopted those special aspects of European civilization as a whole, aspects which are relevant for understanding the long struggle, through ancient and medieval times, for the modern birth of the sovereign nation-state republic. Plato’s *Timaeus* is the key example of the relevant connections. The conception of man and woman as made in the image of the Creator, all within a continuing process of universal Creation, is the notion which separates Christianity, for example, from those depraved forms of Venetian-Norman-ruled, medieval society, forms from which the revolutionary Fifteenth-century founding of the modern sovereign nation-state republic largely freed mankind at that time.10

That theological conception of man, as typified by such seminal works as Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa’s *Concordantia Catholica* and *De Docta Ignorantia*, is the basis for the generalization of both the kind of physical science later typified by Riemann’s work, and the notion of man in society on which the principled organization of the relations among the citizens of a modern European republic is premised. It is the same Cusa, proceeding

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10. Philo is notable for his attack on the fallacy of the Gnostic’s syllogism, that if God were Perfect, then his Creation had been Perfect, such that even He could not interfere with a predetermined dramatic script once the Creation had occurred, as that of the mechanistic, dispensational dogmas of the modern Gnostic Darbyites teach. That Gnostic dogma is also characteristic of the sorcery paganism of the cult of the Olympian Zeus of Aeschylus’s *Prometheus Bound*, which forbids man’s knowledgeable use of the discovery of universal physical principles. Philo’s argument on that account, typifies the general method also expressed by competent forms of modern physical science. Creation was not an event, nor a closed drama, but a process of endlessly continuing Creation, in the sense of Heraclitus’s famous aphorism as adopted by Plato. The “history” of the evolution of the solar system out of a fast-spinning, solitary sun, is an illustration of the point. V.I. Vernadsky’s concept of the Noösphere is both an essential conception of physical science, and a theological statement about mankind’s role in the organization of our universe.
from the same basis, who led in organizing what became the great explorations across the Atlantic, and from the Atlantic into the Indian Ocean, out of which a modern notion of developing a truly universal civilization emerged.11

Contrary to the doctrines of the empiricists and kindred reductionists, these issues of the history of monotheism are not only formally theological. They pertain, unavoidably, to those conceptions of man in the universe, man as in the image of the Creator, which also have distinctly secular implications, implications which have to do with the categorical distinction of human beings from beasts. Without understanding the roots of modern European civilization as located in the notion of man as in the image of the Creator, nothing essential, nothing truthfully practical concerning human existence and modern society could be understood.

The Crucial Conception of Man

This conception of man as a creator in the likeness of the personality of God the Creator, is the essential foundation of both competent physical science and any competently systemic conception of the modern sovereign state and economy. The recent century’s most important additional contribution to the development of an integrated view of economy and man as a creator in the likeness of the Creator, was the Twenty-first-century development of the concept of the Noösphere, by Russia’s V.I. Vernadsky.

Vernadsky, the Russian nuclear scientist and founder of the branch of science known as biogeochemistry, presented to the world his Riemannian conception of the physical organization of the universe, as composed of three multiply-interconnected universal phase-spaces, the abiotic, the Biosphere, and the Noösphere.12 This was premised on crucial experimental evidence showing that the living processes expressed by the production of the relevant fossil aggregations of our planet, were the product of a universal principle not encountered in defining non-living processes, and that the fossil aggregations produced by mankind’s discovery of universal principles (the Noösphere) were the result of a power not otherwise found among living processes. This latter, modern notion of the term power, which is the centerpiece of a competent economic science, is identical with the original Greek designation of that term, as used by the Pythagoreans and Plato, and by Leibniz later.

The implication of that notion of powers is that the universe, like Vernadsky’s Noösphere, is a system. That means a system in the sense that the way in which the universe works is not merely acted upon by, but determined by a set of discoverable universal physical principles provided by the Creator. Thus, to the degree that we discover those universal principles (powers), we have gained a partial amount of the total power which the Creator’s universe represents.13

So, in that way, what we know—or, in the alternative, what we believe that we know of such principles—is also a system, not exactly the Creator’s system, but including some part of that. That, of course, leaves us with some errors we have produced, or adopted, and, insofar as what we actually know, leaves much that we have yet to discover.

As the case of Kepler’s discovery of gravitation shows, or Leibniz’s discovery of what he termed vis viva (i.e., powers) which he presented to refute Descartes’ blunder, the universe in which we actually live, is not a world of our naive sense-perceptions, but a universe of universal physical, and related kinds of principles; a universe which can not be sensed directly, but which we can not only know through experimental methods, but which we can nonetheless prove, experimentally, is an image of the real universe: whereas the universe we tend to infer by mere sense-certainty, is only a shadow which the real universe casts upon our senses. The concept of the complex domain, as elaborated by Gauss, Riemann, et al., is typical of the way competent modern physical science represents both the difference and connection between the real universe and the shadow-world of sense-perception.

The characteristic physical-scientific distinction of man from the beasts, is this power which we associate with discovered universal physical principles, principles expressed as the transmission of such discoveries from the sovereign mind of a single individual discoverer to his, or her society, and to future generations.14 This power of the individual mind, so expressed, is the immortal aspect of the human biological individual, the expression of his, or her participation in the same creative principle which resides in the monotheist’s Creator.

11. Some of Cusa’s writings proposing these explorations fell into the hands of Christopher Columbus. Columbus followed up his study of those documents by Cusa by a correspondence with the scientist and Cusa collaborator Paolo dal Pozzo Toscanelli, who provided Columbus, in 1480, the map which Columbus used in designing the policy for his later voyage into the Caribbean.
13. This is Riemann’s then-revolutionary argument in the opening of his 1854 habilitation dissertation.
14. LaRouche, op. cit.
The characteristic physical-scientific distinction of man from the beasts, is the power which we associate with discovered universal physical principles, principles expressed as the transmission of such discoveries from the sovereign mind of a single individual discoverer to his or her society, and to future generations. This power of the individual mind is the immortal aspect of the human biological individual.

It is the notion that we live in a universe ordered, in this way, by the will of that single Creator, which is the foundation for competent modern science, and is also the moral principle upon which the crafting and existence of the modern sovereign nation-state and its economy depend.

However, the process of establishment of the modern commonwealth, even up to its present, imperfect form, has been a long struggle, a struggle between the notion of man as made in the image of the Creator, and the contrary view of man expressed by a phenomenon called the oligarchical model of society. Typical of the oligarchical model are the systems associated with ancient Babylon, with Sparta, with the image of the Olympian Zeus, with the Roman Empire, and with the medieval ultramontane system under the alliance of the Venetian financier oligarchy with the Norman chivalry. The modern sovereign nation-state, the commonwealth, as defined in Cusa’s *Concordantia Catholica*, is, on the contrary, a conditional realization of the goal of establishing a form of society consistent with the notion of the human individual as made in the monotheistic image of the Creator.

The chief adversary of that conception of man, still today, has been the oligarchical models of society which exist still as outgrowths of the medieval ultramontane tyranny under the Venetian financier oligarchy.

The characteristic of the commonwealth, is the transmission of those discoveries of universal physical, and of congruent principle, from one generation to the next, which is the essential functional, and spiritual distinction of the human individual and species from the beasts. It is the conscious participation in the universal process so defined, which is the unique expression of specifically human happiness to which Leibniz and the U.S. Declaration of Independence refer, in opposition to the specific bestiality of John Locke and Locke’s pro-slavery followers in the doctrine of “property.”

The issue between the republican and oligarchical system is posed, still for today, in the elementary form presented famously by the Classical Greek tragedian Aeschylus’s *Prometheus Bound*. Prometheus is presented there as the advocate of mankind as a species capable of receiving and employing the discovery of those universal physical principles through which man distinguishes his society from that of apes. For that Olympian Zeus, Prometheus’s alleged crime was giving usable knowledge of the principle of fire to mankind.15 It is the denial of the

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15. The same contempt for the people was expressed in the time following the outlawing of slavery in the U.S.A., by those who insisted that the children of former slaves not be educated above their intended station in life, a doctrine expressed today in such forms as the “no child left behind” doctrine.
right of human beings generally to have access to knowledge of those universal physical principles typified by Prometheus Bound’s notion of the power of fire, which is typical of the way the oligarchical principle of usury operates as the enemy within a modern commonwealth such as the U.S.A. today.

The most influential modern adversary of the Promethean principle of truthful universal principles, has been the reductionist ideology of Venice’s Paolo Sarpi and such of his followers as Galileo Galilei, René Descartes, Sir Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and the Eighteenth-century empiricists generally, as the latter are also typified by Immanuel Kant. Hence, the significance of the 1799 doctoral dissertation of Carl Gauss, in which Gauss presented a conclusive proof against the empiricism of D’Alembert, Euler, and Lagrange. On the one side, empiricism as a rationalized replacement for Aristotelean reductionism, we have modern Liberalism’s utilization of discoveries in scientific progress by the Sarpi-led faction of Venice’s financier oligarchy, and by the Anglo-Dutch oligarchy later. They permit the utilization of discovered new technologies, while denying society the right to be governed by its own choice of a commitment to the continuation to such notions of progress as the expression of truth.

The conflict between the interests of the people of the U.S.A. and the financier interests which have savaged the automobile industry, is an expression of the conflict between the common good and the principle of financier oligarchy carried over into modern European society as a legacy of the ultramontanism of the awfully ungodly medieval Venetian financier-oligarchy.

The Moral Purpose of Man’s Work

The oligarchical concept of man, man as a subject of the government acting as an instrument of financier-oligarchical power, is the manner in which work is treated as the assigned purpose of man’s existence. This is a notion of work which is often applied with a poor distinction between the work of the man and of the ox. For the oligarchy, it is work to produce financial and related profit and pleasure for the members of society, especially the owners, and work done to secure the income on which the sustenance and pleasures of individual and family life largely depend.

Those who live on a higher moral plane than that, define work differently. They echo the New Testament parable of the talent. This is the notion that work must somehow produce some improvement in the condition of life within the society of those who will be living after the doer of that good has passed on, ending life with something equivalent to a smile on his or her face. The principle is that we must make the universe which has “employed” us better for our having lived. Those of us dedicated to that kind of outcome of our mortal existence, spend the entire span of our lives, working to, as it is said, “improve ourselves” as people with an enhanced potential to be useful, that for no other motive than that the opportunity to do so already exists, or could be discovered.

Contrary to the idea of work associated with the definition of the generality of mankind as human cattle, as by the Physiocrats and Liberals, the sublime notion of the purpose of work pertains to a specific distinction of man from beast, the available option of cognitive immortality available to the mortal human individual. We are, in that sense, the “fire-bringers” of our society, or, the tool-maker of the automotive plant.

Look at the miserable condition still imposed upon most of the living people of this planet! Is it the meaning of our lives that they and their descendants should live so, or perhaps even worse, over successive generations yet to come? We see more immediately, the wretchedness of the conditions of life by which they are circumscribed. That is the lowest, almost contemptible level of compassion we might experience. Look at the inner misery their circumstances promote. Shall they live, from generation to generations yet to come, in that or a comparable condition? Is not the worst betrayal of mankind, and of the Creator, the willingness to leave our fellow-creature in that internally impoverished condition of knowledge and of spirit?

It is the development of mankind, as in the likeness of the Creator, the commitment to do that kind of good, which is the essential form of the work which should motivate us.

Yet, to foster the development of mankind, we must look to improving the conditions under which nations live. We must improve the planet, and also the solar system, on that account.

To contribute to those ends, we require relevant conditions of life, for ourselves, as for others. We must therefore produce the improved conditions in our society which make possible that enhancement of the conditions of family life and work itself.

This definition of the notion of work has a reciprocal implication in the uniqueness of modern European civilization, as qualitatively distinct from all known forms of society before it. It is the way in which the notion of work is situated as a systemic characteristic of that new form of
society, which supplies us the crucial distinction of modern European society from all known earlier forms of society. It is in this context, this definition of modern civilization as emergent from the Fifteenth-century Renaissance, that we are rendered capable, as a society, to conquer the immediate challenge which cases such as the crisis of General Motors poses today.

Work must be conceived as a true universal. Work is defined as what society does to increase its power in and over the portion of the universe which society inhabits. It is that universal quality of transformation of the society's quality of work, which, in turn, supplies the criteria for defining the universal implication of both the work of the individual, and the individual's appropriate moral motivation for that work, the motivation associated with the individual's relative satisfaction with his or her choice of profession, and the society's practical satisfaction with the benefit of that individual's profession.

Such is the goal of happiness, which Leibniz specified in his objection to the inherent bestiality of that notion of "property" (e.g., "shareholder value") admired by Associate Justice Antonin Scalia and others.

That notion, rooted in the concept of true universals, is the difference which defines the Fifteenth-century birth of the sovereign nation-state. Instead of society conceived as in congruence with the Olympian Zeus of Aeschylus's Prometheus Bound, as the reign of a ruling oligarchy and its appendages, over a mass of human cattle, the emergence of the new form of society, the commonwealth, from the Fifteenth-century Renaissance, changed the relationship of the individual to society, and, therefore, the notion of work, that in a fundamental way. It is that conception of man, as reflected in the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the Preamble of our Federal Constitution, which is the essential feature of the necessary intention of modern European civilization. It is consciousness of that difference by the institutions of society, and by the individual citizen, that attitude, which is the key to the cure of the awful crisis descending upon world civilization at this moment.

2. Work and Its Organization

As Power

Mere financial accounting, or the related practice of cost accounting, employs the term productivity to refer to a very poorly understood, but perceived effect. Contrary to the accountants and their like, economic science, like related functions of government, must define an increase in productivity as the outcome of the discovery and appropriate application of a universal physical principle, or what we term, in memory of the ancient Pythagoreans and Plato, as powers.

The best way to introduce the relevant conception into the modern layman's experience with the increase of the productive powers of labor in society, is to focus on the way in which technological progress, as embodied within the development of basic economic infrastructure, determines the levels of productivity which can be achieved and maintained within both agriculture and industrial and related manufacturing. This connection may be restated, and most simply illustrated, as the interaction with the universal physical principles embodied in basic economic infrastructure, with the universal physical principles expressed in production of physical goods.

The role of powers so expressed, is then defined as the distribution of potential as Gottfried Leibniz defined potential. The principal expressions of this distribution of potential are as basic economic infrastructure and as the application of powers in the manner of technology applied to production, or expressed by a product which has been produced for consumption or other use.

This view of potential, as the term is associated with Leibniz, brings into immediate view the way in which Carl Gauss and Riemann dealt, respectively, with what I have already identified here earlier in this report as Dirichlet's Principle.

Take Dirichlet's Principle as addressed implicitly by Gauss in two locations which are most notable examples for our subject-matter here. First, his general treatment of Earth magnetism, and, second, his related collaboration with Wilhelm Weber in defining the experimental principle known as the Ampère-Weber principle of electrodynamics. Contrast these accomplishments in Nineteenth-century physical science to the reductionists' blunders of the Clausius-Kelvin-Grassmann-Helmholtz-Maxwell circle. See that principle at a higher level of conception, in Riemann's treatment of Abelian functions.

The only discovered manner in which we can deal rationally with the efficient relationship with a universal physical principle, is to express the relevant experimental expression of cause-effect connections in terms of the notion of a field. The simplest first approximation of such a representation, is to treat, as Gauss does, the relatively simpler pedagogical problem of defining the distribution of the potential within the interior of an hypo-
In the sequence of productive cycle of the society as a whole. This includes consideration, once again, of the effect of a relatively lowered, or merely unimproved technology of basic economic infrastructure, upon the effective productivity (per capita and per square kilometer) of the relevant economy as a whole. In general, rapid advances in technology in basic economic infrastructure and the machine-tool sector of production, have the optimal outcome for the economy as a whole.

The argument will be made in attempted rebuttal of what I have just written here, that since most people in management and the employed labor-force do not understand what I just said, what I have just written could not, even possibly, be of any relevance to the way production actually works. I reply: “Ignorance is no excuse for the awful results of ignorant management which are expressed in the undeniably actual collapse of General Motors and kindred enterprises today.” The field in which production occurs, a field in the sense implicit in Riemann’s references to Dirichlet’s Principle, is the principal determining consideration in shaping the productivity and growth, or collapse of productivity in a modern economy as a whole.

The rule is, do not put relatively scientifically illiterate persons, such as the typical corporate managements of today, into controlling positions in the economy, including banking, as we have done, increasingly, over the course of the recent several decades of corporate Europe and the Americas.

I treat this matter here in two distinct, but interacting contexts: the way in which basic economic infrastructure defines the variability of potential productivity of the economy (e.g., national physical economy) as a whole, and the way in which the field of application of principle

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16. Note that the challenge of mapping a system of higher order relations into the perimeter and interior of a circular area is the first step of pedagogical approach to clarifying the general implications of the notion of Dirichlet’s Principle as defined by Riemann.
Look at the miserable condition still imposed upon most of the living people of this planet! Is it the meaning of our lives that they and their descendants should live so, or perhaps even worse, over successive generations yet to come? Is not the worst betrayal of mankind, and of the Creator, the willingness to leave our fellow-creature in that internally impoverished condition of knowledge and of spirit?

An Example: Leibniz and Bach

Knowing what I know of such matters as that, I prescribed the crafting of the common educational program of the LaRouche Youth Movement on the benchmarks of Gauss’s 1799 exposure of the frauds of the empiricist fanatics D’Alembert, Euler, and Lagrange, and, also, the implications of the same type central to J.S. Bach’s founding of the principles of Classical musical composition and its performance. The first pole, the implications of Gauss’s exposure of the hoax of Euler et al., pertains to the relationship of the individual human mind to the universe around that individual. The second, Classical musical composition, pertains to the field of the social process, as in Classical modes of choral works, through which the individual acts to effect the cooperation on which the realization of discoveries of physical principles depends.

For example, in the case of Classical composition and its performance, the well-trained, brain-dead musician thinks in terms of chords laid out like a sequences of corpses. The actual follower of Bach’s system of well-tempered counterpoint defines the relevant composition as a field in which development of a unity of conceptual effect of the performance of the individual composition as a whole, is located primarily in the more complex modalities of the cross-voice relations of the counterpoint, through which an appropriate unity of effect is achieved. The object is the same as in Riemann’s approach to the notion of Dirichlet’s Principle, the notion of detail as subsumed by a single, universal conception, a conception, in the case of a relevant Beethoven performance, such as of the Opus 131 or 132 quartet, as a single,

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17. For example, what conductor Wilhelm Furtwängler sometimes identified as “performing between the notes.” In a Classical polyphonic work of many performers, unlike the case of the accomplished string quartet, the individual performing voice does not hear the functional interaction of his, or her own voice within the array of voices as a whole. What is heard is the impact of the polyphony upon the volume of the region in which the work is performed and heard. This is heard not as a collection of voices, but as a field, as I have identified the notion of a field in reference to the case of Kepler’s principal discoveries and Dirichlet’s Principle. The exceptionally able conductor, such as Furtwängler, hears the whole in a way which the performers do not, thus seeing and shaping those subtleties which craft the effect of the field of the performed composition, in that acoustical setting, as a sensed indivisible whole.
essentially individual idea of a principle of composition. The role of the same Lydian progress of cross-voice development met in Mozart’s *Ave Verum* as compared with Beethoven’s Opus 132, is an example of the unity of a field expressed through a unified process of development according to a principle.

As the famous aphorism of Heraclitus emphasizes, as Plato after him: in the real universe, nothing really exists except constant change. It is the changes in a field, as I have indicated the implications of the term “field” so far here, which are the *efficiently determining* primary reality, rather than, as is often mistakenly assumed, a derived experience.

The same which is to be said of the composition and performance of Classical musical works after J.S. Bach’s revolution, is true of all Classical artistic composition, including poetry and drama. In place of Furtwängler’s apt use of the expression “performing between the notes,” we encounter the often wildly misunderstood terms, poetic, or dramatic irony.

The dullard, idiot, or pedant, which are usually only different costumes for the same kind of fool at heart, wishes a neat, dictionary meaning, or the equivalent, for every term in the vocabulary used. Not a single competent artist, as composer or performer, would ever do such a disgusting thing as reducing everything to attempted literal meanings, as the unfortunate Associate Justice Antonin Scalia does with his implicitly Satanic dogma of “text.” The proper use of words by literate, actually thinking people, is to employ known terms and other images to convey a meaning which the words used have never conveyed on any occasion before that. This reality of Classical irony, too painful to be discussed at a grammarian’s funeral, is the typification of the way in which the creative powers of the human mind are expressed in communication.

Only a half-brain-dead pedant could have dreamed of the invention and use of a pseudo-language such as Esperanto as a proposed replacement for living languages of actual peoples living in actual cultures. This was the problem of Latin, which Dante Alighieri exposed and remedied by design in the course of defining the pathway to development of the cultures of a sovereign nation-state republic. The same idea, when expressed in one language, can be replicated by appropriate modes applied to a different language; but this translation of actual ideas can not be competently effected by a mechanical process of translation according to standard dictionaries and grammars. The meaning lies not in the words as such, but in the reality to which the words are intended to allude. The music of any use of language lies, as Furtwängler emphasized, “between the notes.” In other words, in the ironies of the *field*, as Riemann’s reference to Dirichlet’s Principle implies.

**Take ‘Energy,’ for Example**

Energy, as defined by the reductionist circles of Clausius, Grassmann, and Kelvin, does not actually exist. It is a footprint, not the foot, *power*, which produces the imprint. One important effort to clarify this distinction, was the suggestion that we employ the term “energy-flux density” as a replacement for the crudely scalar notion of “energy” of the usual suspects of reductionism. We used this, for example, in the work of the international scientific association known as the Fusion Energy Foundation. We have used it in our professional practice of economics, to impart a sense of the way in which relatively higher and lower orders of sources of heat-equivalent are ordered as we go up, or down the scale of the ordering of relatively more effective technologies. Thus, we have the ordering of burning of wood, charcoal, coal, petroleum and natural gas, nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, and matter-antimatter reactions as successively higher, relatively more effective, and more efficient orders of technology. These rules of thumb have distinct meanings for practice within the generalities of chemistry and nuclear and sub-nuclear domains of physics. They are in rough, but meaningful correspondence with the notion of a relatively higher, or lower ordering of technologies.

So, in the effort to understand the principled nature of the processes which govern the universe, and its adducible technologies, in the large, we are obliged to plumb into the domain of that which is ever-tinier. To understand the tiniest, we must conceptualize the process in its largest astronomical aspects imaginable, as the paradoxes of the Crab Nebula tease us so. Kepler already thought like that.

The relative weight of power and related potential is greatest in the development of basic economic infrastructure, which should represent about half of the total capital investment by a modern economy such as the U.S.A. Most of this development must occur within the public sector of the economy, rather than private entrepreneurship, just as the achievements of rural electrification show the way in which increased potential over wide areas will have a relatively most powerful multiplier effect on net productivity and quality of product. Improved quality of investment in public education, is among the most powerful multiplier effects, with smaller class sizes (generally not in excess of 15-25
pupils), upgraded goals in technology and Classical culture, and higher ratios of preparation to teaching time for teachers in the system. The advantages of mass transit over individually operated motor vehicles are to be featured, and the organization of territory to minimize travel time, with emphasize on shortening the cost, time, and effort associated with the most frequently required functions of economy and personal life within the territory.

The U.S.A., for example, would benefit greatly, especially over periods spanning a generation or more, from a more dense development of land-areas, such that food supplies are produced locally, as much as possible, and other measures which decentralize, as much as possible, the production and services required by each local area and region of the nation, as distinct from the narrowed concentration and process of globalization today.

Virtual “clever idiots” of contemporary corporate management have sought to eliminate actual toolmaking, by resort to the brain-dead effects of linearization of design and testing of product, through emphasis on computer-synthesis of technologies, with a resulting sharp contraction in the rate of development of power and distribution of potential _per capita_ and _per square kilometer_ in both production and the economy as a whole.

Generally, the higher the rate of turnover effected through technological progress, and the accompanying greater emphasis on science-driven research-and-development as a percentile in the composition of the employment of the labor-force, will provide a relatively optimal effect on productivity in generating and realizing technological progress. The highest rates of benefit come usually from concentrating on the front-end of the process-sheet cycle, in basic economic infrastructure and product and process design, always moving up-scale in what is, in effect, higher energy-flux-densities.

Once we begin to apply the notion of powers and potential to the structure of the national economic process-sheet, it becomes obvious that the U.S.A. today is virtually bankrupt in many respects. The included causes for this effect include the following features of employment and investment patterns.

The composition of employment is way off whack. Much too little employment (and education) in science, engineering, and machine-tool specialties at the front-end of the national production process-sheet. Much too high a ration of so-called “white collar” services employment, relative to so-called “blue collar” employment. Far too low a ration of employment in basic economic infrastructure, especially in the higher technology categories of investment.

The ration of the total labor-force employed in the physical development of basic economic infrastructure is far too low. We must bring investment back up to about half of total employment for combined public and private investment and employment of the labor-force in basic economic infrastructure as a whole. We must get out of emphasis on so-called “soft” technologies, into capital-intensive technologies at the high end of energy-flux densities.

The same general objective stated in another way, is the following.

The general objective of our national reconstruction program must be priority on raising the potential expressed as powers concentrated in the “front-end” of the national process-sheet cycle. The point is to build up the base-line of our national productive potential in the long-term investment cycles associated with the front-end of the cycle represented by the process-sheet of our national economy as a whole. It is the rate of advance of technology (as power, as potential) in this base-line category of the economy, which must have the relatively highest priority, since this affects the base-line of the economy as a whole over the longest period and the broadest base. This is the category in which long-term investment-cycles of basic economic infrastructure are dominant. The complementary area of high priority is the machine-tool sector, as that bridges both basic economic infrastructure and the so-called private sector.

This, which I have just summarized, is sufficient indication of what we must do in the way of changes in investment and budgetary polices otherwise. As recent experience should have shown us, that change is necessary, but is not sufficient by itself. We must rid ourselves of the mental state based on those false but axiomatic assumptions associated with the empiricist premises of modern Anglo-Dutch Liberalism. We must think of a universe which is essentially a system of universal physical principles, a universe in which more and more among us recognize that only those principles associated with the potential of powers are reality in the functional sense of potential, a universe in which we must replace the mechanical way of thinking about economic and related reality, by putting the highest priority on increasing our command of that potential as Riemann’s notion of Dirichlet’s Principle implies. We must change our ways, to thinking of potential in ways consistent with man as made in his potential as in the likeness of the Creator of our universe.
The most beautiful heart that has ever lived and suffered in Germany. . . . He wrote on behalf of the great ideas of the revolution; he destroyed the Bastilles of the mind, and labored at constructing the temple of freedom—by which I mean that supremely great temple which is to embrace all nations, as if in one single brotherhood.” That is what Heinrich Heine wrote about Friedrich Schiller—and how right he was! “All men become brothers . . . this kiss from the entire universe!” Still today, this youthful enthusiasm of Schiller cannot fail to infect the unprejudiced reader, snatching him from the narrow world of sense perception, and lofting him high above, into the visionary world of beautiful humanity. And, we must add on a modern note, it’s a good thing, too, because that’s precisely what is most lacking in our own decadent times.

Now, there’s also a mighty chorus of people, who will have no truck with Schiller’s ideals, or with anyone today who might be filled with unbounded enthusiasm for Schiller. They range from Adorno-
For Schiller, the theater’s high purpose was nothing less than the ‘moral education of the human being, and of the nation,’ and the ‘fostering of general happiness.’ And by ‘happiness,’ Schiller meant this term in Leibniz’s sense, and also as it is embedded in the U.S. Declaration of Independence.

There is, in fact, nothing—absolutely nothing—about Schiller that is “outmoded” or “fuddy-duddy.” Schiller continues to communicate the most magnificent image of man ever presented by a German-speaking poet. He was, and is, the world’s best psychologist, because he had a sublime idea of what it means to be a human being, and because he had very precise knowledge of what prevents human beings from realizing their true potential, and of what holds them back from being “beautiful souls.” And because he uniquely united poetry and philosophy into a new and higher species of endeavor, he possessed, as Wilhelm von Humboldt rightly observed, an “infallible key to the innermost entrances to the human soul.” He was unmatched in his ability to raise people out of “the narrow confines of everyday life,” and to array before them the great issues confronting all humanity.

What Carlo Schmidt said at the celebration of Schiller’s 200th birthday, is equally true now, on the 200th anniversary of his death—and it is a question of still greater urgency, namely: The question isn’t what Schiller “can still say” to us, but rather, it is “how we measure up against Schiller today.” It’s not Schiller who needs to be interpreted anew according to the changing times; on the contrary, it is his critics who must permit themselves to be measured against the standard set by him. And against this standard, the great majority of his modern reviewers—and also, unfortunately, most of the theater directors who have staged his works over the past few decades—are small fry indeed.

Today, 200 years after Schiller’s death, Germany’s situation is catastrophic. Its economy is in free-fall: With 5.4 million officially unemployed, and the real figure at over 9 million, the social moorings of the state are beginning...
to break up. Germany’s government is being subjected to enormous pressure from supranational institutions to brutally dismantle the social welfare state as it has been nurtured since the time of Bismarck’s reforms, and which is anchored in Article 20 of our Basic Law. All institutions which citizens have taken for granted as unshakeable and permanent, are now in various stages of dissolution. The very ground of our republic seems to be trembling beneath our feet.

Even though this existential crisis has many causes—and quite a number of them are not home-grown—the more profound reason why we Germans, up to now, have been so manifestly incapable of reacting adequately to these threats, and of finding solutions, is because we have distanced ourselves almost completely from our cultural roots, and from our own best traditions. Want an example? Let’s read the opening of an article by Jens Jensen, appearing in Die Zeit’s special section celebrating the Schiller Year:

“It’s easy to see Schiller as a fuddy-duddy. All this high-flying and highfalutin language, all this talk of beauty, of freedom, reason, all these great and long-empty-tied-out generalities, this great droning rush of words, speaking of now-extinguished hopes for grace and dignity, and of educating the human species. It’s easy to pick out from his writings entire passages which signify, for us today, nothing, and even less than nothing. ‘A noble desire must glow in us to also make a contribution out of our means to this rich bequest of truth, morality, and freedom which we received from the world past, and which we must surrender once more, richly enlarged, to the world to come.’ And so forth and so on.”

One possible reaction to this, might be for us to have pity for poor Mr. Jensen, because beauty, freedom, and reason have no meaning for him; because he has no hope of achieving grace or dignity; because he has so evidently failed to inherit a scintilla of truth or ethical values from generations past; and because he is incapable of making any contribution to the future development of human society. And, we might therefore say, he is a perfect fit for Schiller’s term “stunted plants,” which Schiller uses to describe people whose mental and spiritual capacities are completely undeveloped. Or, we could also make a joke at Mr. Jensen’s expense, by observing that he is intent on loudly proclaiming his miserable state of mind to the world at large, instead of, as Heine would put it, having the decency to conceal his “little webbed feet.”

Let it be said in Mr. Jensen’s defense, that he subsequently does admit that Schiller anticipated, and continues to influence, all of the great debates of recent times, ranging from human rights to freedom of the will. Yet Jensen remains, sad to say, all too typical of our Zeitgeist: For him, as for many of our contemporaries, the terms beauty, freedom, reason, and truth have no meaning whatsoever. And precisely therein lies the problem.

It was not all at once, but rather in many phases, that we distanced ourselves from the most fundamental ideas of our over-2,000-year-old Western Platonic-humanist tradition—one example being the idea that through Socratic reason, truth is knowable. This tradition reached its absolute high-point during the Weimar Classical era, and it is especially prominent in the works of Schiller, who knew how to clothe Platonic ideas in the raiments of poetic beauty. But soon there came the Romantics, beginning, at the very latest, with the “political Romanticism” that was firmly in the pocket of the post-Napoleonic Restoration, and whose chief theoretician was the fascist Joseph de Maistre. These Romantics launched a systematic attack against the ancient Greeks’ idea of the unity of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. The next major assault came via Nietzsche, who hated Plato, Schiller, and Beethoven, and who denigrated the times when Socratic reason prevailed, in favor of the “Dionysian” phases of human history. Next, the National Socialists initially sought to mold Schiller according to their own agenda (“Cleave, O cleave to our dear Fatherland!”); but they soon began to fear that Schiller’s freedom drama Wilhelm Tell would be interpreted as a call for the assassination of tyrants, and so, on June 3, 1941, Hitler caused the play to be banned, by means of a secret memorandum signed by Martin Bormann.

But the far more systematic attack on the Classical tradition only got under way during the postwar period, through the combined influence of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) and the advice which the Occupying Powers were taking from representatives of the Frankfurt School. The CCF was the biggest operation ever run by the forerunners of today’s U.S. “neo-conservatives.” It was run under the pretext of stemming the Soviet Union’s influence over cultural life in Europe and the United States, whereas in reality, its assignment was to systematically attempt to extirpate from the population, the axiomatic basis of thinking which had made it possible for Franklin Delano Roosevelt to implement his New Deal and Bretton Woods policies—i.e., a policy oriented toward the general welfare.²

During World War II, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and other denizens of the Frankfurt School worked at the Institute for Social Research at Columbia University on the “authoritarian personality” project, and defined their so-called criteria, by which, they claimed, one could recognize whether a given person was predisposed to adopting or advocating authoritarian systems such as national socialism or communism. These criteria
included the person’s assertion that truth was knowable—this was fascistic *per se*. And thus, in one stroke, they threw the entire Socratic method of truth-seeking out the window.

In 1950, Adorno and Horkheimer were shipped back into Germany, in order to assist High Commissioner John J. McCloy—a direct forerunner of today’s neo-cons—in the “denazification” of Germany’s education system and cultural institutions. Adorno went about putting into practice his conviction that if one wanted to extirpate the authoritarian impulse from the population, it would be necessary to completely dissolve the existing structure of society in postwar America and Europe. And in order to do that, any and all forms of beauty had to be removed; and in their place, there must spread a primitive mass culture which, in turn, after a while, would cause the population to suffer a complete mental breakdown.3

Adorno, in his capacity as chief representative of “critical theory,” which casts everything and everyone into doubt, was convinced that the very idea of progress in history, according to which humanity can gradually approximate a society based on reason, is not only false, but is, in fact, extremely dangerous. Adorno believed that all social theories, and all historical periods which had ever taken as their point of departure a claim that they fostered man’s liberation from his own self-imposed shackles, so that he could also free himself from the shackles imposed upon him by nature, have always ended up as totalitarian dictatorships. He insisted that any idea of development in the name of reason, was inevitably doomed to failure. Or, to put it another way: Adorno believed that the mere attempt to educate people in the principles of reason, already betrays, in principle, a fascist intent.

It will therefore come as no surprise, that he had special contempt for Friedrich Schiller, the man who had dedicated his entire life’s work precisely to this idea of freeing human beings from the prison of their own sensual existence, and not only elevating people to the level of reason, but bringing people’s emotions up to that level as well. Adorno wrote about Schiller that his verbal *habitus* is reminiscent of the young man who comes up from the lower classes, and, embarrassed, starts writing things in high society in order to make an insolent spectacle of himself. His German blustering and sententiousness he borrowed from the French, but he perfected it at the German dinner-table. The petit-bourgeois, in his never-ending, relentless demands, plays himself up, identifies himself with the power that he himself does not possess, and, in his arrogance, does it one better, all the way into the absolute

*After World War II, Frankfurt School existentialists like Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Hannah Arendt (counterclockwise from right) led an all-out assault on Classical culture, coordinated by the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) under the pretext of combatting Soviet influence in Europe and the U.S.*

*Below: Founding conference of the CCF, West Berlin, June 1950.*
spirit, and absolute horror. ... Within humanism's innermost sanctum, there rages, as its true soul, the imprisoned maniac who, as fascist, would make a prison out of the entire world.

So, humanism is the harbinger of fascism? That's exactly what Adorno is saying. And therefore, he claims, any transposition of the sublime into the political realm, is to be prevented at all cost, because the outcome would be either terror, or fascism.

Adorno's Kulturkampf against the humanist tradition, Classical music, and Schiller personally, was only one aspect among the many others involved in the extremely lavish propaganda operation that was mounted in collaboration with the C.I.A., the U.S. State Department, the CCF, and the Frankfurt School. In the subsequent Cold War years, up through 1967, when the nature of this operation blew up in a huge scandal, there was nary a concert, nary a cultural event which the CCF didn't have its fingers in—or its money.

Without this background, it is impossible to understand Germany's cultural situation today. Because it has been a very long time—perhaps 30 or 40 years—since Schiller's works have actually been performed on the German stage. What we have had instead, were stagings by the so-called Regietheater ["director's theater"], which, even in the best of cases, only offered what Schiller would have described as maniert ["contrived"] performances—i.e., it was the personal opinions of the director, the producer, and sometimes of the actors themselves, which governed their Schiller "interpretation." And if you add to this, the fact that beginning in 1970 with the Brandt school reforms, the very idea of the Humboldt educational ideal, and the study of the Classics, has been removed from the standard curriculum, then it becomes clear why two entire generations of people in Germany have great conceptual difficulty understanding Schiller.

And even though Schiller's dramas have continued to appear frequently on our program listings, these have not been the real Schiller, but instead, they have been either "alienated" performances à la Bertolt Brecht, or deliberate falsifications in Adorno's vein, or else they have simply been outbursts of mental flatulence from some theater director, intent on tacking one more "cool" novelty onto his production. One director gets the idea of cutting Act V of Tell, another one cuts Act IV, and yet another doesn't like the mass scenes in Wallenstein because they provide historical context. And so, performances are typically distorted so far beyond recognition, that we wouldn't even know that Schiller was being performed, had we not read the title on the program booklet.

With only a small handful of exceptions, all we have had, has been Regietheater. Since the mid-1960's, the chief culprit—but by no means the only one—has been Hans-Günter Heyme, whose father was some sort of cultural officer attached to the American occupation authorities, and who has been a veritable cornucopia of new ways to bowdlerize Schiller's plays. Heyme is quite open about his refusal to to be faithful to the play's original intent:

For us, as for Adorno, we have an obligation to keep an even better faith. And this faith ... means that no longer must we perform old plays according to the written text, but rather we must go against the grain. To perform plays according to the text, means no longer to take them seriously for today's world. ... In my view, our task is to rework the texts anew, while remaining responsible to the circumstances under which these works were created. ... Nothing should be changed in the text itself, in its versification, its rhythm, or underlying poetry. But undoubtedly, you often have to alter the scenic production, in order to make plays important for us today, and, ultimately, to rescue them for us.

One such "rescue" effort was a performance of Wilhelm Tell in Wiesbaden in 1965, in which the Swiss citizenry appears on stage as a rowdy, fascistic mob—in keeping, as always, with Adorno's thesis that wherever there's humanism, fascism will soon follow. Tell comes across as a cowardly murderer lurking within the ambush party; and to ensure that the point is not missed, the Rüthi Oath is accompanied by a melody remarkably similar to the Nazis' "Horst Wessel Song."

The theater critic Peter Iden commented on this performance, that, "To my recollection, and up to the present day, this particular production of Schiller's Tell by Heyme is a great milestone, indeed a caesura, in the history of German theater. I call it a caesura, because it launched an entirely new way of formulating the Classics. Previously, we had been obliged to deal with forms dating back to the 1930's. But now, young Heyme comes along and overturns absolutely everything." Even back then, Heyme's production came as a powerful shock, because the paradigm shift associated with the 1960's generation was still not yet firmly in place. One Mr. Rühle, for example, wrote against Heyme in the daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: “Do this one more time, and I’ll do everything in my power to make sure you’ll never put anything on the stage again.” However that may have been, it was not enough to forestall similar performances of other Schiller plays. Heyme, Zadek, Steiner, and other directors continued to revise Schiller according to their own whims, and, as Heyme put it, "to disengage from the old brown [i.e., fascist] sauce that had gotten sloshed in.”

What Peter Iden correctly recognized as a caesura, was but one part of a much more comprehensive para-
digm shift that had been launched in the United States and Europe with the 1960’s generation—the generation whose mentors were these same Frankfurt School ideologues. It was part of a systematic transformation away from a society of producers still oriented toward Roosevelt, Adenauer, and de Gaulle, and into a society of consumers and speculators. On the economic side, for example, some years later this paradigm shift resulted in the demise of the Bretton Woods system and the introduction of floating exchange rates; and thus began the bubble economy which has now reached its bitter, fag end. On the cultural side, this shift went hand-in-hand with a massive attack on the values of Christian humanism, and of Classical culture.

It was also during this time that Hans Neuenfels started up his theater “happenings,” which made headlines, and also got him fired from the Trier Theater. In an interview with Niels Negendank, Neuenfels reminisced about those heady days:

It was a time when opinions were being reshaped—even in Trier. Young people couldn’t entirely reconcile themselves with these failed laws of prosperity. . . . And we said to ourselves: We’ve got to do something entirely different. And then we brainstormed on it. And then we hit on the idea of making a happening with bathtubs, with music, lyrics, and texts from the B Generation, and stuff like that. And each person had to draft a leaflet. And then I set myself up on the Marktplatz in Trier, and handed them out. People read it. And you could see from their reaction, that they were totally at a loss. Some of them were open about it, and asked, “What do you mean when you write: ‘Yes, you, too, you old Nazi, are welcome to come’? And what does this mean, ‘Help us tear down the Trier Cathedral’?”

Even if that might have been a new idea the first time around—though not a very profound one—such “brainstorms,” which every Tom, Dick, and Harry have been coming up with variations on for the forty years since then, really ought to be quite worn-out by now.

Neuenfels came to realize as much in the meantime, and said so in a recent interview. In a lecture he gave in March 2002, he recapitulated his relationship to Classicism:

The title “The Idle Dream of Classicism” [a show broadcast by Deutschlandradio Berlin–HZL], if I understand it correctly, proceeds from a yearning, a hope, and not from an assertion or a distinction. From a yearning, a compulsion even, an instinct to resort to deliberately fixed, even artificially forced forms and values, as a means of dealing with the nightmares of our accidental existence. . . . The wholesome world which we associate with the Classical idea, which allows Mozart to be turned into Mozartkugeln [Mozart Chocolate Balls], which propels Verdi into open-air arenas and pop concerts, which banishes the real Goethe, the real Shakespeare, and even the real Kleist, into mere statues—all this stems from the secretly cherished delusion that somewhere, in the here and now, there must exist something that is cordoned off from real life—indisputable, unassailable, coldly comforting values, which separate us from the chaos, from banality, from happenstance. Many people believe that is beautiful . . . .

But clearly, Neuenfels does not see it that way. He treats Classical works as if they were a warehouse which anyone is free to plunder at whim: “The Classics are sitting there like an inexhaustible raw thematic material, always usable, always accessible, ’round the clock. So-called necessity stands there—irritating, oppressive, seducing us to storm its gates in battle, with wins and losses on both sides. That’s the attraction. That’s fair. Here we all have a chance to win.” So, the Classics are a department store where anyone can pick and choose whatever strikes their fancy.

Now, in Germany we live in a more or less democratic republic, and so these folks are free to do as they please. But since they so clearly don’t understand the first thing about the Classics, there remains the nagging question: Why don’t they just write their own plays? Or, to put it another way: Why aren’t the Regietheater fans beating down the doors to see performances of plays such as Neuenfels’ Stuttgart oder die Fahrt nach Neapel (Stuttgart, or the Trip to Naples)? Might it be because those plays just aren’t “usable, always accessible, ’round the clock”? Or
perhaps because their content gets exhausted after the very first reading or performance, and after that, all that they elicit is one great big yawn? Well, in that case, these writers ought to work on becoming better playwrights; but in the meantime, let them leave Schiller and the Classics alone!

Fresh from his attempted massacre of Wilhelm Tell, Hans-Günther Heyme proceeded in 1969 to inflict the same on Wallenstein. He took this trilogy, which requires two evenings to perform, and cut it down to three and a half hours. And in what can only be described as a deliberate falsification, he ignored Schiller’s own explicit instructions on how Wallenstein’s personality was to be portrayed, instead arbitrarily lifting one single aspect of his characterizations, completely out of context.

Schiller’s masterful method of reflecting the full complexity of the conflict between Wallenstein and the Viennese court through the eyes of the soldiers in Wallensteins Lager (Wallenstein’s Camp), as a way of setting the stage for the dramatic action to come, was completely destroyed in Heyme’s version; instead, brief encampment scenes keep popping up as interludes during the later course of the play. Some other scenes were mercilessly shortened, and many passages were spoken by different characters than in the original, so that all that remained was not the characters, but merely “sonic tapestries”—similar to the festival that was once held in Bonn, where each resident was asked to play a recording of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony on their home stereo, and to leave the window open, while everyone else did the same.

Since the time of Heyme’s production, this idea of not presenting Wallenstein’s Camp in its historically specific situation in the Thirty Years’ War—and of changing its venue from the Nuremberg camp to somewhere else—has been repeated many times and with many variations—for example, in a performance in Mannheim a few years ago, where the soldiers were clad in uniforms dating from every war imaginable, from the German Wehrmacht to Vietnam-era GI’s, and, as with Heyme’s version, confronted the audience head-on, as a tramping horde. But that’s simply not Schiller. In his Prologue, Schiller says quite explicitly:

His encampment explains his crime.
So, pardon the poet, if he takes you
Not all at once, with quick steps,
To the nub of the action, but dares
Instead to unroll, before your eyes,
This momentous subject
In a series of vignettes.

Schiller says that experiencing the camp is crucial for understanding Wallenstein’s actions—and so, what can justify Heyme when he simply removes this as a coherent unit, and breaks it up into little pieces? And when Heyme simply cuts out the role of Duchess Terzky altogether, and then puts some of her lines into Wallenstein’s mouth, this was an entirely deliberate, intentional falsification of Wallenstein’s character. Because Wallenstein was not just the cold, power-hungry general who failed; that historical fact is simply not open to “interpretation.”

Why did Schiller write historical dramas in the first place? Why was he so involved in studying history, and why did he proceed to use the material he garnered from those studies, as the basis for his dramas? Because for him, both of these—history and drama—pointed out routes whereby the simple reader or viewer, caught up in his web of daily cares, could be lifted out of his littleness by the “great historic moment,” a “little people” were incapable of seizing this opportunity to improve the political situation—of how this problem could be overcome. For him, the theater’s high purpose was nothing less than the “moral education of the human being, and of the nation,” as Schiller wrote in his essay “Theater as a Moral Institution,” and also nothing less than the “fostering of general happiness”—and by “happiness,” Schiller meant this term in Leibniz’s sense, and as it is also embedded in the U.S. Declaration of Independence.

Schiller describes the theater’s mission and function: “The theater is the common channel through which the light of wisdom streams down from the thoughtful, better part of society, spreading thence in mild beams throughout the entire state. More correct notions, more refined precepts, purer emotions flow from here into the veins of the population; the clouds of barbarism and gloomy superstition disperse; night yields to triumphant light.” But if the message which the poet intends to convey with his play is perverted into its opposite, as typically occurs with Regietheater, then the theater’s purifying effect is absent, and the audience is dragged down even lower than they were before they entered the hall.

Countless passages from Schiller demonstrate that this was his ultimate, and his sole aim. In his Aesthetical Letters, there can be no misunderstanding his expressed conviction that all improvement in the political sphere, is contingent on the ennoblement of the individual, and that this is the special function performed by art. And in his preface to Die Braut von Messina (The Bride of Messina), entitled “On the Use of the Chorus in Tragedy,” he writes:
True art, however, does not aim merely at a temporary play; it seriously intends not to transpose a person into a merely momentary dream of freedom, but to make him really and in fact free, and to accomplish this by awakening in him a force, exercising it and developing it, to thrust the sensuous world, which otherwise only presses upon us as crude material, bearing down upon us as a blind power, into an objective distance, to transpose it into a free work of our mind, and to achieve mastery over the material with ideas.

To awaken this power within the listener—that was Schiller’s overriding concern. In the Prologue to his Wal- lenstein trilogy, which refers to the reopening of the Weimar Theater in October 1798, and which is, quite literally, a set of stage directions for the plays, he talks about the lofty spirit which speaks out from the redesigned hall, and which excites the audience’s mind “to solemn and profound emotions,” thus fostering that special mental disposition which is the precondition for the sublime. The events about to unfold on the stage, are aimed at precisely this: to elevate the audience.

A grand exemplar awakens desire to emulate, And to our judgment dictates higher laws.

But not only the audience is to experience more elevated sentiments; the actor, too, is called upon to do justice to the high demands placed upon him, and, be his artistry on stage ever so fleeting, “to completely fill that moment which is his own.”

For who has done sufficient for the best Of his own time, has lived for all the ages.
The modern era, which for Thalia’s art Begins today upon this stage, doth make
The poet also bold, the old course leaving,
To transfer you from out the narrow sphere Of bourgeois life unto a higher scene,
Not undeserving of the sublime moment Of time, in which we’re moved aspiringly. For only subjects of great import can Excite the deep foundation of mankind;
I’th’ narrow sphere the mind becomes more narrow, But man grows greater with his greater aims. And now upon the century’s earnest end, Where actuality itself is turned
To poetry, where we see potent natures In battle for a goal of great importance. And for great issues of humanity, For masterdom and freedom struggles waged— Now art may too engage in higher flight Upon its shadow stage, indeed it must, Lest it be put to shame by life’s own stage.

With these lines, Schiller leaves no doubt about his intent: The “goal of great importance,” the “great issue” of humanity, is nothing less than the struggle for humanity’s freedom; and the events on stage must not be permitted to sink below the level of present history as it stood in the year 1798. He calls this “present,” this moment, “sublime,” and says that the task is to lead the audience out from the confines of daily life, and into the “great issues” which will enable human beings to grow in tandem with their own greater goals. You couldn’t ask for stage directions more explicit than that.

To conclude this point: It is no coincidence that Schiller became world-renowned as the “Poet of Freedom,” because for him, human freedom—external freedom, but especially internal freedom—was an inalienable human value. In his Aesthetical Letters, he writes that the construction of true political freedom is the greatest of all works of art. He defines beauty as “freedom in the domain of phenomena”—a condition in which the object is entirely in correspondence with its own inherent lawfulness, without need for external compulsion. And his chief criticism of the Kantian categorical imperative, was that it was insulting to his sense of freedom, to see how a person acting in accordance with Kantian maxims had to forcefully suppress his contending emotions, in order to be a moral person; instead of this, Schiller set forth his notion of the “beautiful soul,” for whom freedom and necessity, passion and duty, coincide.

In his essay “On the Sublime,” Schiller elaborates on the significance of this idea for world history:

Freedom, with all of its moral contradictions and physical evils, is for noble souls an infinitely more interesting spectacle than prosperity and order without freedom, where the sheep patiently follow the shepherd and the self-commanding will is degraded to the subservient part of a clockwork. The latter makes man merely into a spirited product and a more fortunate citizen of nature; freedom makes him into the citizen and co-ruler of a higher system, where it is infinitely more honorable, to occupy the nethermost place, than to command the ranks in the physical order.

Considered from this point of view, and only from this one, world history is to me a sublime object. The world, as historical object, is at bottom nothing other than the conflict of natural forces amongst one another and with the freedom of man, and history reports to us the result of this contest.

That is also precisely the point of Wallenstein; and any production which seeks to suppress this chief concern, by portraying Friedländer (Wallenstein) as merely a cold, power-hungry military official, is suppressing Schiller’s primary idea—the sublime aspect of history which is being addressed here: the struggle for human freedom—a struggle which, in this case, is inseparably bound up with the struggle to end the war, and to achieve peace. Schiller writes in the Prologue:
Confused by the favor and the hate of parties,
In history our image of him wavers;
But art should bring him humanly more closely
Before your eyes and also to your heart.

And thus, if a production fails to bring Wallenstein
closer to the audience’s heart, it will be a failure. So, what
could Schiller’s motivation possibly be for portraying
Wallenstein in a differentiated way, creating space for a
real human being, so that we might even conceivably
come to sympathize with his intentions?

As is well known, Schiller did extensive research on
the Thirty Years’ War, and published his results in five
volumes. He visited Eger and other historic sites, and
immerssed himself in questions of military strategy, before
sitting down to write his *Wallenstein*. Over the course of
his work, his own views on Friedländer underwent con-
siderable change. At the beginning of his *History of the
Thirty Years’ War*, he describes Wallenstein as a bound-
lessly ambitious and ruthless warlord, obsessively bent on
revenge against the Emperor who has deposed him. In
order to carry out his plan to obliterate the Hapsburg
Empire, and to arrogate imperial power to himself, he
had to regain his command over his army. And in that
effort, Wallenstein was obliged to make all sorts of seem-
ingly contradictory chess moves, even going so far as
facilitating the advance of Gustavus Adolphus’s army, in
order to exert so much pressure on the Emperor, that he
would have no choice but to re-install Wallenstein as a
ruler with virtually sovereign powers. Schiller then pro-
ceeds to describe the various military battles, Wallen-
stein’s attempted conspiracies, and the counter-conspir-
acies launched by the court in Vienna.

But by the end of his fourth volume, Schiller writes a
passage expressing a new insight:

Thus Wallenstein, at the age of fifty, ended his active and
extraordinary life; elevated through ambition, ruined by
ambition, with all his failings he was still great and
admirable, unequalled, if he had kept moderation. The
virtues of the *ruler* and of the *hero*, prudence, justice, firm-
ness, and courage are colossally prominent in his character;
but he lacked the gentler virtues of *man*, which adorn the
hero, and make the ruler beloved.

And then, suddenly, Schiller puts yet another dimen-
sion of these events into play, one that sheds an altogether
different light on all that he had written up to that point:

His free mind and clear understanding elevated him above
the religious prejudices of his century, and the Jesuits never
forgave the fact that he saw through their system. . . .
Through the intrigues of monks he lost the command of
the army at Regensburg and his life at Eger; through the

It is a testament to Schiller’s genius as a historian, that
despite the relatively poor quality of resources available
to him in comparison to today, he nevertheless succeeded
in putting his finger on the crucial dynamic behind the
Thirty Years’ War. The actual subject, both of the history
and of the drama, was not a question of fealty to the
Hapsburg Empire, but rather, the question was how to
find a way out of this awful war. And Schiller, who men-
tioned that he had been considering writing a book on
the Peace of Westphalia, described the peace treaty which
ended the warfare, as “the greatest of all triumphs of
statecraft.” For Schiller, this question of peace was, of
course, not confined to the issues in *Wallenstein*, but was
one of the “great issues” of his own day. One has but to
consider Schiller’s description of the anarchy of the
French Revolution in his poem “Das Lied von der
Glocke” (“The Song of the Bell”),* and its concluding
verse: “Peace be the first chime she’s ringing.”

If, on the other hand, one permits the historical situ-
ation of the Thirty Years’ War, and Wallenstein’s attempts
to find peaceful solutions, to recede into the background,
or if one causes it to disappear entirely, thereby present-
ing it as mere psychodrama, or as the power-hungry
Wallenstein getting his revenge, then one is depriving
the drama of precisely that historical specificity that holds
lessons for us today. Or, put another way: The reference
to present times is not established by the fact that the sol-
diers in the camp sing “Cheer up, my brave comrades,
mount up, mount up!” as they mount their Harley
Davidsons; rather, its relevance for today lies in perform-
ing *Wallenstein* as truly as possible to Schiller’s intent, to

* See translation, page 41, this issue.
the best of one’s abilities, and in portraying Wallenstein, “confused by the favor and the hate of parties”—and also in portraying him through the eyes of Max. Only then does it yield lessons for us who, once again today, are confronted with the real prospect of another Thirty Years’ War, but this time on a worldwide scale.

It is fascinating from a methodological standpoint, to see how it was only through his dramatic reworking of the historical material, that Schiller discovered the scientifically precise key for understanding the real, historical Wallenstein. The impressive thing, is that in the course of his dramatic reworking, he arrived at a picture of Wallenstein which it took historians another 150 years, on the basis of better source materials, to recognize as as the only valid one. Working in the realm of ideas, Schiller anticipated the historical truth, because, as Wilhelm von Dilthey has written, he grasped the “subjectiveness [Innerlichkeit] of history.”

Schiller found himself confronted with the difficulty that the General per se did not appear as a figure whom one could bring closer to “the heart” of the audience in any straightforward way—a General, in the thick of battle:

Some verses that illustrate Wallenstein’s efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the Thirty Years’ War had immediate relevance in Schiller’s day. Left: Portrait of General Albrecht Wallenstein. Below: Scene from “The Piccolomini.”

How would it be possible to present such a figure, while remaining true to Schiller’s requirement that the theater enable the members of the audience to ponder for themselves, how they would have made the same decisions of war or peace—decisions that would determine the weal or woe of many generations to come?

Schiller solves this problem by introducing two characters who were not taken from the historical record: Max, the son of Octavio Piccolomini, and Thekla, daughter of Wallenstein. They are “children of the house”—one of Schiller’s other terms for “beautiful souls.” These two characters were an expression of what one might describe as Schiller’s own “philosophy of childhood”—his idea that children and adolescents are still in a relatively naive state of innocence, in the sense that he used that latter term in his essay “On Naive and Sentimental Poetry.” Despite the tribulations of war, they had not yet suffered the damage to the soul so frequently visited upon the lives of adults, leaving them bent and crippled.

Schiller wrote that “All peoples have a history, have a paradise, a state of innocence, a golden age; yes, every individual man has his paradise, his golden age, which he remembers with more or less enthusiasm, according as he has more or less of the poetic in his nature,” and in every person’s youth and adolescence, Schiller saw a source of power which could be tapped throughout their lives, if only they could recover their consciousness of it. Connected to this, was his idea that every human being harbors a unique seed, a soul, a pure being, which tends to be frittered away in the course of life’s adversities, but which can be re-created, in more mature form, through sharpening one’s consciousness, and through aesthetic education.

Max and Thekla are beautiful souls, and their love for each other enables them to preserve the purity of their hearts, even amid the chaos of war. They represent the ideal of beautiful humanity. Schiller creates these characters, so that through them, he can portray the world after the end of the war, the hope for a better future, and the idea of the Peace of Westphalia.

Max, Wallenstein’s alter ego throughout all three plays...
of the trilogy, also represents the noble ideas which Wallenstein cherished in his own youth—ideas which he then sees personified in the young Max.

For he stood beside me, as in my youth.  
He made me see reality as but a bad dream.

And conversely, Max speaks of his vision, in which he sees himself standing at Wallenstein’s side:

Soon will his dismal realm come to an end!  
O Blessed be the prince’s earnest zeal,  
He’ll intertwine the olive branch i’th’ laurel  
And donate peace to a delighted world.

Then his great heart has nothing more to wish,  
He has performed enough for his renown,  
Can live now for himself and for his own.

To his estates he will retire. At Gitchin  
He has a lovely seat, and Reichenberg  
And Friedland Castle both lie happily—  
Up to the Riesenberge foothills stretch  
The hunting ranges of his wooded lands.

With his great drive for glorious creation,  
Can he then unrestrainedly, freely comply.  
As prince he can encourage all the arts  
And give protection to all worthy things—  
Can build, and plant and watch the stars above—

Yes, if his daring power cannot rest,  
Then he may battle with the elements,  
Divert a river, and blow up a rock  
And clear an easy path for industry.

Our histories of war will then become  
The stories told on lengthy winter nights—

Max paints a picture of what Wallenstein, in Schiller’s view, envisioned for the future after the war’s end. Had Wallenstein not, at some point in the play, articulated his vision to Max, then he would never have been able to win over the young man to his aims—and these were quite explicitly the ideas of the Peace of Westphalia, making the rivers navigable again, and rebuilding anew atop the war-scorched earth.

Over the course of the six years which Schiller devoted to Wallenstein, repeatedly interrupted by bouts of illness, he also continued to develop his aesthetic and dramatic theory in a series of groundbreaking essays, including the Aesthetical Letters, “On Grace and Dignity,” the “Kallias Letters,” “On Naive and Sentimental Poetry,” a critical review of Bürger’s poetry, and more. One basic conviction that grew in Schiller’s mind over this period, was the necessity to “idealize” his dramatic material and his dramatis personae.

For Schiller, the challenge for the Classical poet, lies in extracting and refining the human being’s innermost core, as bequeathed to him from childhood on—to liber-
the elite. There can be no greater value to his poetry, than that it is the perfected imprint of a truly interesting disposition of a truly interesting, perfected mind.

Only when the poet, at least during those moments when he composes, and the director as he directs, and the actor as he acts, is able to personify his species-existence, can his play, his poetry, have the beneficent effect which Schiller speaks about in his “Theater” essay. The Regietheater proponents are unable and unwilling to do that, because their intentions lie elsewhere. But Schiller places nothing less than this heavy responsibility squarely onto the artist’s shoulders. In his poem “Die Künstler” (“The Artists”),* he says:

The dignity of Man into your hands is given,  
Its keeper be!  
It sinks with you! With you it will be risen!

Now, the dignity of man has fared quite badly in the hands of the Regietheater proponents, and in the hands of the poor actors who have been forced to work under their dictates in order to eke out a living. (There are, the poor actors who have been forced to work under their political connections enjoyed by such people as Adorno and the Congress for Cultural Freedom, then we must conclude that, in a perversion of Schiller’s preface to *The Bride of Messina*, they were aiming not at a “temporary play,” but rather, by seeking to eliminate precisely what makes Schiller special—i.e., his determination to raise his audience to the level of the sublime—they are doing their part in the effort to “make men really and in fact unfree.”

What we need to do today, is precisely what Adorno and his consorts wanted to prevent, namely, to convey the idea of the sublime into the political domain. Because it is only on that level, that any way out of today’s existential crisis, comes into view. Political life in Germany today is the best demonstration for Schiller’s thesis that, “In the narrow sphere, the mind becomes more narrow.” And who today would dispute the fact that we are once again dealing with the “momentous issues facing humanity”? And there is no better teacher of how to think and act on the level of the sublime, than Schiller.

The 200th anniversary of the death of our beloved poet, is a good occasion to chase the Regietheater rabble out of the temple of culture, to boycott their productions, or else to give our vegetable farms a good incentive to expand their tomato crops. And if the PISA students, or Mr. Jensen still don’t understand Schiller at that point, then we can only echo what Wilhelm Furtwängler would tell his orchestra when they bungled a piece they were rehearsing, “Once more, from the top!”:

All preceding ages, without knowing it or aiming at it, have striven to bring about our human century. Ours are all the treasures which diligence and genius, reason and experience, have finally brought home in the long age of the world. Only from history will you learn to set a value on the goods from which habit and unchallenged possession so easily deprive our gratitude; priceless, precious goods, upon which the blood of the best and the most noble clings, goods which had to be won by the hard work of so many generations! And who among you, in whom a bright spirit is conjugated with a feeling heart, could bear this high obligation in mind, without a silent wish being aroused in him to pay that debt to coming generations which he can no longer discharge to those past? A noble desire must glow in us to also make a contribution out of our means to this rich bequest of truth, morality, and freedom which we received from the world past, and which we must surrender once more, richly enlarged, to the world to come, and in this eternal chain which winds itself through all human generations, to make firm our ephemeral existence. However different the destinies may be which await you in society, all of you can contribute something to this! A path toward immortality has been opened up to every achievement, to the true immortality, I mean, where the deed lives and rushes onward, even if the name of the author should remain behind. (*from “What Is, and To What End Do We Study, Universal History?”*)

* See translation, page 49, this issue.

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Friedrich Schiller’s
‘The Song of the Bell’

by Marianna Wertz

Marianna Wertz was vice-president of the Schiller Institute in the United States until her untimely death in January 2003. Of her many translations of Schiller’s poetry, two philosophical poems, “The Song of the Bell” and “The Artists,” are included in this issue of Fidelio. This introductory essay to “The Song of the Bell” first appeared in The New Federalist in December 1987.

November 10, 1987 was the 228th anniversary of the birth of the “Poet of Freedom” Friedrich Schiller, the great German poet and playwright, who should also be known as the “Poet of the American Revolution.”

In this bicentennial year of the U.S. Constitution, it is only fitting and just that a new translation be made of Schiller’s great tribute to the American Revolution, “The Song of the Bell,” to reawaken in Americans a love for this great republican poem, as we reawaken our commitment to the principles of the Revolution which inspired it.

In a July 1987 essay, “The U.S. Government Is in Chaos,” Lyndon LaRouche drew the parallel between the crisis in Washington and developments of the French Revolution of 1789. LaRouche’s purpose in making this comparison was to warn against following the economic policies of the Swiss-Venetian banking crowd, which, under French Finance Minister Jacques Neckar, led to the horrors of the French Revolution, and under “Reaganomics” is leading the United States, and the rest of the world, rapidly to an even worse hell.

Ten years after the French Revolution began, in 1799, Friedrich Schiller composed “The Song of the Bell,” to draw the lessons of the failed French Revolution for his native Germany. Germany, then still a series of feudal principalities, was in the throes of the Napoleonic Wars and seeking a republican revolution of its own. Schiller, whose reputation as “the Poet of Freedom” had been established with his earliest play The Robbers, written while a student at the Karlschule Military Academy, sought in “The Song of the Bell” to educate a republican leadership in fundamental lessons of statecraft.
Schiller’s poem is particularly cogent for Americans today, as it addresses, with biting sarcasm, those who have all but lost the principles of their own Revolution, in their object fixation and quest for immediate sensual gratification, and under the influence of a brainwashing media. In this poem, Mr. and Mrs. Babbitt will see themselves mirrored as Sinclair Lewis himself could never have done. By holding up this mirror to the soul of his compatriots, Schiller sought, as Lyndon and Helga LaRouche seek today, to bring about a fundamental change in the culture of the nation, as the sine qua non and necessary precondition for a successful republican transformation.

Friedrich Schiller’s sympathies for the American Revolution were those of a German republican, who longed to see the same transformation in his country. As early as 1783, in a letter to his good friend Henriette von Wolzogen, Schiller writes, “. . . so great a desire I have, to see the New World. If North America will be free, as it is certain, then I might go there. In my arteries boils something—I would so like in this rough world to make some fissures, about which one should report.”

Schiller composed “The Song of the Bell” over a period of at least two years. In a letter to the poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, dated July 7, 1797, Schiller remarks that he has just begun his “Bell Founder’s Song,” and had been studying the technology since the day before in Kreinitz’s Encyclopedia, “where I very much profited. This poem lies very close to my heart,” he continues, though it will “cost me many weeks,” because “I need for it so many different voices (Stimmungen) and it is a great mass (Masse) to work up (verarbeiten).” It was not fully completed until September of 1799.

A Fugue in Four Voices

The poem is a fugue in four principal parts, which interact and jointly develop, much as voices do in a fugal composition by Bach or Mozart. The first voice is the technological process of forging a great bell. The second voice, for which the bell is also a metaphor, deals with the development and life of the individual. The third voice concerns questions of statecraft and the French Revolution, in which the subjects of the first and second voices are placed in the larger, universal context. The fourth voice, which enters for the first time in the person of the poet, introduces Schiller’s method to ensure the success of republican revolutions.

Schiller’s choice of a great bell as his subject could hardly have been accidental. The opening Latin invocation betrays Schiller’s thinking: “I call the living, I mourn the dead, I break the lightning.” The leading symbol of the American Revolution in Schiller’s time was the great Liberty Bell of Philadelphia, which pealed in 1776 to proclaim the signing of the Declaration of Independence. And Benjamin Franklin, known throughout Europe as the man who “broke the lightning”—the American Prometheus—was the living symbol of that Revolution for all European republicans.

Franklin was the single most important link between the American Revolution and those French republicans, like Lafayette, Turgot, Carnot, and Lavoisier, who attempted to bring into being a constitutional monarchy in France, as the mediation for a constitutional republic. Turgot wrote of Franklin, in words which echo Schiller’s, “Eripiut coelo fulmen sceptrumque tyrannis” (“He has snatched the lightning from the heavens, and the sceptre from tyrants”).

But the bell is more than a metaphor for the American Revolution. The reader is struck from the outset of the poem with Schiller’s meticulous description of the actual
technology of bell-founding. Was his purpose to educate his readers about how to forge a bell? Hardly! His purpose was to forge a republican citizenry.

Schiller points to the underlying purpose of the bell-founding metaphor in the second stanza:

This it is, what all mankind graceth,  
And to this end to understand  
That he in inner heart so traceth,  
What he createth with his hand.

For Schiller, man is the creator of his own destiny, “though the blessing comes from higher.” The forging of a bell, like the forging of a republic, will succeed only when man uses his “understanding” to be like the Creator. The bell itself, therefore, is not just a poetic metaphor for the American Revolution. Much more fundamentally, Schiller uses the bell as a metaphor to demonstrate that a republican revolution is only possible through the application of the same noetic processes that go into the creation of new technologies.

Schiller’s Meter

Schiller employs meter in this poem perhaps more skillfully than in any other composition. While he demonstrates his great skill with meter in a poem like “The Worth of Women,” where he uses two contrasting meters—a mellifluous meter for the woman’s voice, a martial meter for the man’s—here the meter is not only varied by voice, but carries the reader from one mood to another, as integral a part of conveying Schiller’s meaning as the words themselves.

Thus we see in the first stanza, the voice of the Bell is introduced with its distinctive meter: the eight-line trochaic stanza, comprised of four lines in an abab rhyme scheme of four feet each, followed by a rhymed couplet of two-and-a-half feet, and completed by a second rhymed couplet of four feet. This stanza form is used throughout, from opening to close, every time work on the Bell is introduced. It serves as a sort of shock wave, increasingly through the poem, breaking the preceding train of thought and lifting it to a higher conceptual plane.

This function of the Bell is actually described by Schiller in the fourth stanza:

What here below to son terrest’ral  
The ever-changing fate doth bring,  
Doth strike the crown which made from metal  
Uplifting it doth sound its ring.

The second voice or theme, the development of the individual, is introduced by, and indeed flows directly from, the Bell voice, in the sixth stanza. In the closing two lines of the fifth stanza, the Bell is introduced as a metaphor for the voice of the newborn child, whose birth is greeted, in the sixth stanza, by the Bell’s ringing. This is the first irregular stanza—i.e., we’ve had three regular Bell stanzas and two intertwining introductory 12-line stanzas of even length and meter.

Here in the sixth stanza, Schiller captures with one masterful stroke the entire process of youthful development and young love. He captures also the sharp break in that development process between childhood and adolescence with the most economical means possible: a sharp break in the meter and an unrhymed line, “The years they fly like arrows fleet.” The original German, “Die Jahre fliehen pfeilgeschwind,” actually conveys, onomatopoetically, the sound of fleeting years.

This break jars the reader from the romantic spell Schiller has been craftily casting. Schiller uses this trick throughout. One can almost hear him laughing as he catches his reader, time and again, in a romantic setting of what might be called “earthly paradise,” only to be jarred out of reverie by harsh reality.

This jarring, biting sarcasm, directed at the “fair delusion” of complacent “burghers” who seek an earthly paradise yet refuse to see the coming storm clouds of war and revolt, is fully unleashed in the next stanza. Using a sing-song meter, to ridicule the immorality of the man out to “ensnare” his fortune, Schiller mocks the shortsightedness of the family whose only concern is their earthly possessions. This stanza might fairly be dedicated to all the lovers of “free enterprise” who still believe the United States is in the “59th straight month of recovery.”

The woman’s mindlessness he shatters with the string of ten lines beginning with the word “And,” building the picture of a completely manic fool, and then crashing down with the sharp concluding line—“and resteth never.” The husband’s pride in possession is taken even harder to task, in the next verse, as Schiller completes his picture of the futility of seeking an earthly paradise: “Misfortune strideth fast.”

Having shown that family fortune is not immune to the ravages of “mighty fate,” Schiller introduces the third voice or theme—the development of a republican state—which is dependent on the development of a republican citizenry for its existence.

Battle for Nations

The battle for the development of a republican state is the most important theme of “The Song of the Bell.” That battle is encapsulated in the eleventh stanza, where Schiller introduces the third voice.
Ben’cent is the might of flame,
When o’er it man doth watch, doth tame,
And what he buildeth, what he makes,
For this the heav’nly powers he thanks;
Yet fright’ning heaven’s pow’r will be,
When from its chains it doth break free,
Embarking forth on its own track,
Nature’s daughter, free alack.

In this stanza, Schiller introduces the Promethean conception of mankind, the keeper of the “heavenly” flame, source of man’s creative powers. This Promethean purpose—what Genesis identifies as “subduing the earth”—is the basis for the creation of a republican citizenry, and for Western Judeo-Christian civilization.

In contrast, Schiller also identifies here the Dionysian conception of man—that which ruled in the French Revolution—where “nature’s daughter” was “set free” by British agents Danton, Marat, and Robespierre, to behead and destroy science itself. In the course of the French Revolution, as in its modern equivalent, the Cambodian Revolution of the 1970’s, every leading scientist was either guillotined, or silenced through fear, in The Terror of 1793-94, which killed 35-40,000 Parisians, and imprisoned another estimated 300,000 French citizens.

The following stanza is perhaps one of the greatest single poetic compositions in modern literature. No translation can do credit to Schiller’s onomatopoetic skill, his power to convey the terror and horror of a nation which has defied God’s law, and is facing the consequences. The result of “freeing” nature, rather than tending to and developing her, is here portrayed in its terrifying fullness:

Riesengross!
Hoffnungslos

No German reader could forget these two one-word lines (literally, “Giant tall! Hopeless”), which, with the utmost economy, bring the reader to a full understanding of man’s smallness relative to God’s law, and the consequence of violating it. The lines also bring a pause to the frenzy, an opportunity for the reader to reflect, to collect his thoughts, and to prepare for the battle ahead.

The next Bell stanza introduces the actual fight for the republican state. The “mould is happily made,” but what if it should break? How shall man develop in the face of the vicissitudes of life?

The “mould” that holds the family together is “broken,” with the death of the mother. Her “faithful rule now ceases,” but what is to replace it?

Schiller starts his answer in the pastoral passage, where he establishes the reason men built cities. “Heaven’s daughter” has erected the “holy order”—the city—in order to bring the “uncivil savage” of the countryside to “gentler customs.” And the key to his civilizing is the “dearest band” of all—love for the fatherland. Under the “freedom” of the fatherland, master and workman, king and subject, are finally equal in blessing; finally peace and “charming concord” are established, through the “busy hands” which bring their own reward to mankind.

Schiller’s View of the French Revolution

This picture of what Schiller’s Germany could be is beautifully painted, only to be ripped apart, as Germany itself was being ripped apart under Napoleon’s troops. The once-revolutionary armies of the French Republic had become the conquering armies of France’s next emperor.

Be warned! Schiller exclaims. Woe to any state which
allows the tinder of the Dionysian mob to grow unchecked in its womb. Schiller is referring directly to the central problem of the French Revolution in this passage: France’s leading republicans, men like Lafayette and Carnot, lost control of the process of creating a republic.

Once the “wizen’d hand” of the “Master”—the master craftsman or skilled artisan—is removed, “the people do themselves set free,” unleashing the “murdering swarms” to rule in the “Master’s” place. Concretely, the possibility of a constitutional monarchy, which could grow into a constitutional republic, was lost in France, once the idea of “democracy” took over, and that “democracy” beheaded the royal family and the scientific elite of the nation.

Here, it is useful to reflect on what Benjamin Franklin said of France’s guillotined “master,” Louis XVI: “Perhaps no sovereign ever born to rule had more goodness in his heart or possessed more of the milk of human kindness than Louis XVI.” Of the mob which beheaded Louis, Franklin said, “A mob’s a monster. Heads enough, but no brains.”

As Schiller earlier developed in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, “liberty” does not come without duty, and “equality” does not come without shared responsibility. Contrast to this the motto of the French Revolution, as enunciated by the murderous British agent Marat, in 1793, on establishing the “Committees of Public Safety”: “It is by means of violence that liberty must be established, and the moment has come for organizing instantaneously the despotism of liberty in order to crush the despotism of kings.”

The consequences of basing a society on such “liberty and equality,” are evident in Schiller’s picture of the women of the French Revolution:

Then women to hyenas growing
Do make with horror jester’s art,
Still quiv’ring, panther’s teeth employing,
They rip apart the en’my’s heart.

Women, who for Schiller should ideally personify the concept of Grace, become “hyenas” in a state where “all the vices govern free.” Even worse than a beast, Schiller declares, is “man in his deluded state.” Schiller might well be describing Hollywood or New York today, or better yet, Elizabeth Taylor or Jane Fonda.

The Path to Reason

Once Schiller completes his picture of the destructive power of man unleashed from reason, he again jars the reader forcefully, using the Bell voice to show the path back to reason.

Schiller proclaims,

Joy unto me God hath given!
See there! like a golden star
From its husk, so blank and even,
Peeleth out the metal core.
From the crown to base
Like the bright sun plays,
And escutcheons’ decoration
Builder’s skill gives commendation.

In this stanza, Schiller uses the first person singular—“me”—for the first time. This is the fourth voice, the voice of the real master, the poet. Here, for the first time, the poet establishes that it is through the concrete labor of the “builder” that man participates in the “divine spark”—Joy.

In Schiller’s “Ode to Joy,” the concept “Joy, thou beauteous godly lightning,” later made famous by Beethoven’s setting in his Ninth Symphony, is fully developed. It is only through this “joy”—or what Lyndon LaRouche has recently identified as the Greek concept of agapē, or love (translated as “charity” in the King James Bible), that man can access the divinity in himself and, indeed, become like God. This concept was central to the founding of the United States, whose Declaration of Independence proclaims “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” to be the “unalienable rights” of all human beings.

The pursuit of joy to uplift and transform the individual, as Schiller develops it, is precisely the perspective adopted by Lyndon and Helga LaRouche and their associates, to regain for humanity the republican government of which it has been robbed. In “The Song of the Bell,” we find a fellow teacher:

Alone to grave, eternal singing
Her metal mouth be consecrate . . .
So let her teach, that naught is lasting,
That all things earthly fade away.

The Bell, christened Concordia at the conclusion of the poem, is a teacher of mankind, imparting the most valuable lesson of all: The longed-for joy can only be attained when man learns, like the Bell, to “sing”—to find his own immortality, not in “earthly paradise,” but in “the Heavens’ air.” For no truth is greater than Schiller’s concept, that it is only through beauty that man is led to political freedom. “The Song of the Bell” was Schiller’s great contribution toward that end.
A Lesson for Americans

In a letter composed after “The Song of the Bell,” Schiller expressed this concept in terms which Americans should take firmly to heart today:

This effort of the French people to establish their sacred rights of humanity and to gain political freedom has only brought to light their unworthiness and impotence; and, not this ill-fated nation alone, but with it a considerable part of Europe and a whole century have been hurled back into barbarism and servitude.

Of moments this was the most propitious, but it came to a corrupt generation, unworthy to seize it, unworthy to make profit by it. . . . That he is not yet ripe for civil liberty, to the attainment of whose human liberty so much is still missing.

Freedom, political and civil, remains ever and always the holiest of all possessions, the worthiest goal of all striving, the great rallying point of all culture; but this glorious structure can only be raised upon the firm basis of an ennobled character and before a citizen can be given a constitution, one must see that the citizen be himself soundly constituted.

As Schiller Institute founder Helga Zepp LaRouche writes in the Foreword to the first volume of Friedrich Schiller, Poet of Freedom: “Reading Schiller’s poetry, as well as his historical, philosophical, and aesthetic works, has precisely the effect on the sensitive reader of which Schiller informed us in the preface to his drama The Bride of Messina and in other places in his work—to produce in the reader an ennobling power which then continues to exist long after the reading is done.” In “The Song of the Bell,” Schiller has given us the knowledge, the “ennobling power,” to reforge a republican citizenry, even at this late hour. It is our responsibility to use it.

The Song of the Bell
(1799)

I call the living • I mourn the dead • I break the lightning

Walled up in the earth so steady
Burned from clay, the mould doth stand.
This day must the Bell be ready!
Fresh, O workmen, be at hand!
From the heated brow
Sweat must freely flow,
That the work may praise the Master,
Though the blessing comes from higher.

Take the wood from trunk of spruce tree,
Yet quite dry let it abide,
That the flame compressed so tightly
Strike the gullet deep inside!
Cook the copper brew,
Quick the tin in, too!
That the glutinous bell-metal
Flowing rightly then will settle!

What in the dam’s dark cavern dour
The hand with fire’s help did mould,
High in the belfry of the tower
There will our story loud be told.
Still will it last as years are tolling
And many ears will it inspire
And wail with mourners in consoling
And harmonize devotion’s choir.

Our work in earnest preparation,
Befitteth well an earnest word;
When joined by goodly conversation,
Then flows the labor briskly forw’d.
So let us now with care consider,
What through a frail power springs forth:
The wicked man one must have scorn for,
Who ne’er reflects, what he brings forth.
This it is, what all mankind graceth,
And thereto his to understand,
That he in inner heart so traceth,
What he createth with his hand.
Bubbles white I see creating,
Good! the mass doth flow at last.
Now with potash permeating,
Let us hasten quick the cast.
And from lather free
Must the mixture be,
That from metal pure abounding
Pure and full the voice be sounding.

For with its joyful festive ringing
It doth the child beloved greet
On that first step his life is bringing,
Which starts in arms of slumber sweet;
For in the womb of time’s attesting
His fortune black or bright is resting,
The mother’s tender cares adorning
With love, to guard his golden morning.—
The years they fly like arrows fleet.
From maiden breaks the lad so proudly,
And into life so wild doth roam,
Throughout the world he wanders widely.
As stranger, seeks his father’s home,
And glorious, in youthful splendor,
Like creature from the heav’nly land,
With cheek so modest, shy and tender
Sees he the maid before him stand.
Then seized by nameless longing, aching,
The young lad’s heart, alone he leaves,
From out his eyes the tears are breaking,
His brothers’ ranks so wild he flees.
Her steps he blushingly doth follow
And is by her fair greeting blessed,
The fairest seeks he in the meadow,
With which by him his love is dressed.
Oh! gentle longing, sweetest hoping,
The first love’s time of goldenness!
The eye doth see the heavens op’ning,
So feasts the heart in happiness—
Oh! that it last forever greening,
The beaut’ous time of love’s beginning!

How indeed the pipes are browning!
This small staff do I dip in:
When its glaze to us is shining,
Will the casting time begin.
Now, men, lively be!
Test the mix for me,
If the brittle with the nimble
Join together ’tis good symbol.

The ringing will be good and strong.
So test therefore, who join forever,
If heart to heart be found together!
Delusion is short, remorse is long.
In the bridal locks so lovely
Plays the virgin’s modest crown,
When the churchbells pealing brightly
To the festive gleam call down.
Ah! Life’s fairest celebrating
Doth the May of life end, too,
With the girdle, with the veiling
Tears delusion fair in two.

The passion doth fly,
Love must be enduring;
The flowers fade by,
Fruit must be maturing.
The man must go out
In hostile life living,
Be working and striving
And planting and making,
Be scheming and taking,
Through hazard and daring,
His fortune ensnaring.
Then streams in the wealth in an unending measure,
The silo is filled thus with valuable treasure,
The rooms are growing, the house stretches out.
And indoors ruleth
The housewife so modest,
The mother of children,
And governs wisely
In matters of family,
And maidens she traineth
And boys she restraineth,
And goes without ending
Her diligent handling,
And gains increase hence
With ordering sense.
And treasure on sweet-smelling presses is spreading,
And turns ’round the tightening spindle the threading,
And gathers in chests polished cleanly and bright
The shimmering wool, and the linen snow-white,
And joins to the goods, both their splendor and shimmer,
And resteth never.

And the father with joyful glance
From the house gable’s view oh so vast
Surveying his fortune’s enhance,
Seeth the posts of trees that are tow’ring
And the rooms of his barns o’erflowing
And the silos, bent low from the blessing,
And the billows of corn unceasing,
Boasting with haughty mouth:  
"Firm, as the soil o’th’ earth,  
’Gainst all misfortune’s pow’r  
Splendid my house doth tow’r!"—  
Yet with mighty fate supernal  
Is entwined no bond eternal,  
And misfortune strideth fast.

Good! now be the cast beginning,  
Finely jagged is the breach.  
Yet before it start to running,  
Let us pious verses preach.  
Make the tap eject!  
God our house protect!  
Smoking in the handle’s hollow  
Shoots with fire-brownéd billow.

Beneficent is the might of flame,  
When o’er it man doth watch, doth tame,  
And what he buildeth, what he makes,  
For this the heav’ly powers he thanks;  
Yet fright’ning Heaven’s pow’r will be,  
When from its chains it doth break free,  
Embarking forth on its own track,  
Nature’s daughter, free alack.  
Woe, when it is liberated  
Growing such that none withstand,  
Through the alleys populated  
Rolls the monstrous firebrand!  
For by elements is hated  
The creation of man’s hand.  
From the heavens  
Blessing’s teeming,  
Rain is streaming;  
From the heavens, unforeseen,  
Strikes the beam!  
Hear in belfry whimpers form!  
That is storm!  
Red as blood  
Heavens broil,  
That is not the daylight’s flood!  
What a turmoil  
In the roads!  
Steam explodes!  
Climbs the fire column glowing,  
Through the streets’ long rows it’s going  
Forth it goes with wind’s speed growing,  
As in jaws of ovens cooking  
Glows the air, the beams are cracking,  
Pillars tumble, windows quav’ring,  
Children wailing, mothers wand’ring,  
Whimp’ring cattle  
Under rubble,  
All is running, saving, flying,  
Bright as day the night is shining.  
Through long chain of hands, not resting  
As contesting  
Flies the bucket, lofty bowing  
Spouts the fountain, water flowing.  
Howling comes the storm a-flying,  
Which doth seek the roaring flames.  
Crackling in the well-dried grains,  
Falls it, in the roomy silo,  
On the wood of rafters hollow,  
And as if it would by blowing  
With itself the earth’s full weight  
Drag it, in its vi’lent flight,  
Into Heaven’s summit growing  
Giant tall!  
Hopeless all  
Yields the man ’fore God’s great powers,  
Idle sees he all his labors  
And amazed to ruin going.

All burnt out  
Is the setting,  
Of the savage storm’s rough bedding;  
In the empty window op’ning  
Horror’s living,  
And high Heaven’s clouds are giving  
Looks within.

Just one peek  
To the ashes  
Of his riches  
Doth the man behind him seek—  
His wanderer’s staff then gladly seizes.  
Whatever fire’s rage has cost,  
One solace sweet is e’er unmovéd:  
He counts the heads of his belovéd  
And see! not one dear head is lost.

In the earth it is receivéd  
Full the mould is happ’ly made;  
Will its beauty be perceivéd,  
So be toil and art repaid?  
Should the cast not take?  
Should the moulding break?  
Ah! perhaps, whilst we are hoping,  
Harm is us already gripping.

To holy earth’s e’er-dark’ning bosom  
Do we entrust our hands’ true deed,  
The sower doth entrust his seed
And hopes, indeed, that it will blossom
To bless, as Heaven hath decreed.
Still costlier the seed we’ve buried
With sorrow in the womb of earth
And hope, that from the coffin carried
’Twill bloom to fairer fortune forth.

From cathedral,
Anxious, long,
Bell is sounding
Funeral song.
Earnestly its doleful toll doth carry
Some new wanderer on the final journey.

Ah! the wife it is, the dear one,
Ah! it is the faithful mother,
Whom the swarthy Prince of Shadeland
Carries off from arm of husband,
From the group of children dear,
Whom she blooming to him bare,
Whom she on her breast so true
Watched with pleasure as they grew—
Ah! the bonds of home so giving
Will forevermore be loose,
For in shadowland she’s living,
Who was mother of the house,
For her faithful rule now ceases,
No more keepeth watch her care,
Henceforth in the orphaned places
Rules the foreign, loveless e’er.

Till the Bell be coolly laying,
Let no stringent work ensue;
As the bird in leaves is playing,
May each person goodly do.
Nods the starlit sky,
Duty’s all foreby,
Hears the lad the vespers sounding,
For the Master toil’s abounding.

BRISKLY hastens he his paces
Far in forest wild the wand’rer,
To the lovely cottage-places.
Bleating homeward draws the sheep herd,
And the cattle
Broad-foreheaded, flocks so glossy,
Come in lowing
To accustomed stalls they’re going.
Heav’ly in
Shakes the wagon,
Harvest-laden,

Colored brightly
On sheaves sightly
Garlands lie,
And the young folk of the reapers
Dancing fly.
Street and market-place grow stiffer,
Round the social flame of lighting
Gather those in household dwelling,
And the town gate closes creaking.
Black bedighted
All the earth be
Yet the burgher is affrighted
Not by night,
Which the wicked has excited,
For the watchful law’s clear eye keeps sight.

Holy Order, blessèd richly,
Heaven’s daughter, equals has she
Free and light and glad connected,
City buildings hath erected,
Who herein from country dwelling
The uncivil savage calling,
Ent’ring into human houses,
Gentler custom she espouses,
With the dearest band she’s bound us,
Love for fatherland weaves ’round us.

Thousand busy hands in motion
Help in cheerful unity,
And in fiery commotion
Will all forces public be.
Master and the men take action
Under freedom’s holy care,
Each is pleased with his position,
Scorn for every scoffer share.
Work’s the burgher’s decoration,
Labor’s prize is to be blest;
Honor kings by royal station,
Busy hands us honor best.

Peace so gentle,
Charming concord,
Tarry, tarry
Friendly o’er this city be!
May the day be ne’er appearing,
When the rugged hordes a-warring
Through this quiet vale are storming,
When the heavens,
Which the evening’s blushing pretty
Paint so fine,
From the village, from the city
Wildly burning frightful shine!
Now for me break up the building,
Its intent is filled a-right,
That our hearts and eyes be feasting
On the most successful sight.

Swing the hammer, swing,
'Til the mantle spring!
If the Bell be now awoken,
Be the frame in pieces broken.

THE MASTER can break up the framing
With wizen'd hand, at rightful hour,
But woe, whenc'e'er in brooks a-flaming
Doth free itself, the glowing ore!

Blind-raging with the crash of thunder,
It springs from out the bursted house,
And as from jaws of hell asunder
Doth spew its molten ruin out;
Where senseless powers are commanding,
There can no structure yet be standing,
When peoples do themselves set free,
There can no common welfare be.

Woe, when in womb of cities growing,
In hush doth pile the fiery match,
The people, chains from off it throwing,
Doth its own help so frightful snatch!

There to the Bell, its rope-cord pulling,
Rebellion, doth it howling sound
And, hallowed but for peaceful pealing,
To violence doth strike aloud.

Liberty, Equality! Men hear sounding,
The tranquil burgher takes up arms,
The streets and halls are all abounding,
And roving, draw the murd’ring swarms;
Then women to hyenas growing
Do make with horror jester’s art,
Still quiv’ring, panther’s teeth employing,
They rip apart the en’my’s heart.

Naught holy is there more, and cleaving
Are bonds of pious modesty,
The good its place to bad is leaving,
And all the vices govern free.

To rouse the lion, is dang’rous error,
And ruinous is the tiger’s bite,
Yet is most terrible the terror
Of man in his deluded state.

Woe’s them, who heaven’s torch of lighting
Unto the ever-blind do lend!
It lights him not, ’tis but igniting,
And land and towns to ash doth rend.

Joy unto me God hath given!
See there! like a golden star
From its husk, so blank and even,
Peeleth out the metal core.

From the crown to base
Like the bright sun plays,
And escutcheons’ decoration
Builder’s skill gives commendation.

COME IN! Come in!
Ye workmen all, do come ye close in,
That we commence the Bell to christen,
Concordia its name be given,
To concord, in an intimate communion,
The loving commons gathers she in union.

And be her purpose thus fulfilled,
For which the Master did her build:
On high above low earthly living,
Shall she in heav’ns blue tent unfurl’d,
Be thunder’s neighbor, ever-pending,
And border on the starry world,
A single voice from high she raises
Like constellations’ band so bright,
Which its creator wand’ring praises,
And leads the wreathed year a-right.

Alone to grave, eternal singing
Her metal mouth be consecrate,
And hourly with all swiftness winging,
Shall she be moved by time in flight,
Her tongue to destiny is lending,
Herself has heart and pity not,
With nothing but her swing attending
The game of life’s e’er-changing lot.

And as the ring in ears is passing
Sent by her mighty sounding play,
So let her teach, that naught is lasting,
That all things earthly fade away.
Schiller’s *Thought-Poetry*: ‘The Artists’

by Helga Zepp LaRouche

Schiller’s poem “The Artists” appeared four years before *The Aesthetical Letters*, and it is one of the most magnificent examples of a species of poetry in which Schiller establishes a standard previously unattained. Schiller’s thought-poetry demonstrates not only the identity of the origin of poetry, rather it expresses the most profound philosophical ideas with such poetic beauty, that they are much more gripping than the most beautiful philosophical treatise could ever be. Here he treats poetically the same fundamental idea of the role of beauty in the development of the individual human being, which he later discusses in the *Letters* philosophically.

Wieland, who corresponded with Schiller during the period he was writing “The Artists,” and who published the poem in the *Teutschen Merkur* when it was completed, wrote on March 4, 1789:

> Truths can be just as exciting as emotions, and if the poet not only teaches, but communicates his excitement, he still remains in his own domain. That which the philosopher must prove, the poet can state as a bold thesis, and can throw out as an oracular statement. The beauty of the idea has the effect, that we take him at his word.

In a letter to his friend Körner on March 9, 1789, Schiller formulated it this way: “It is a poem, and not philosophy in verse; and for that it is not a worse poem on account of that which makes it more than a poem.” In the same letter, Schiller states the leading idea of “The Artists”: “Cloaking truth and morality in beauty.”

The first twelve-line strophe is an appeal to the people of his time, and at the same time a triumphant description of the ideal of humanity, with which Schiller shaped Germany’s Weimar Classical period:

> How fair, O Man, do you, your palm branch holding
> Stand at the century’s unfolding
> In proud and noble manhood’s prime
> With faculties revealed, with spirit’s fullness
> Full earnest mild, in action-wealthy stillness,
> The ripest son of time,
> Free through reason, strong through law’s measure,
> Through meekness great, and rich in treasure,
> Which long your breast to you did not disclose,
> Nature’s own lord, she glories in your bridle,
> Who in a thousand fights assays your mettle
> And shining under you from out the wild arose!

In the following strophes, the man of the present time is no longer praised, but admonished, followed by a hymn of praise of the universal value of beauty, with whose help alone can truth be revealed to the human
spirit and senses. The third strophe begins as follows:

The land which knowledge does reside in
You reached through beauty's morning gate,
Its higher gleam to now abide in,
The mind on charms must concentrate.
What by the sound of Muses' singing
With trembling sweet did pierce you through,
A strength unto your bosom bringing
Which to the world-soul lifted you.

"Beauty's morning gate" here stands as a metaphor for the leading idea of the poem, that the path toward truth leads through beauty; the "morning gate" signifies both the beginning of a process, as well as the entrance into a new domain, proceeding through a gate.

This is followed up to line 90 by a glorifying address to the artists who have created this beauty, an address which is recapitulated again and again in the main body of the poem, and which peaks finally in the famous lines:

The dignity of Man into your hands is given,
Its keeper be!
It sinks with you! With you it will be risen!

The entirety of the main part elaborates the fundamental theme, through which Schiller, in continuously escalating images and metaphors, demonstrates how beauty and art are capable of raising the human being to ever new stirrings of the heart and heights of reason. And by describing this development, he creates himself the idea of which he speaks. The reader is caught up by the excited power of imagination of the poet, and thus leaps over the chasm which apparently lies between the different steps on this path, so that the reader can relive how art becomes the "second Creator of man."

Strophe 14 says:

Now from its carnal sleep did wrestle
The soul, so beautiful and free,
By you unchained sprang forth the vassal
Of care in lap of joy to be.
Now limits of the beast abated
And Man on his unclouded brow rang out,
And thought, that foreign stranger elevated,
From his astonished brain sprang out.
Now stood Man, and to starry legions
Displayed his kingly countenance,
Then to these lofty sunlit regions
His thanks conveyed through speaking glance.
Upon his cheek did smiling flower,
His voice, by sentiments now played,
Unfolded into song's full power,
Emotions moistened eye betrayed,
And jest, with charm in graceful federation,
His lips poured out in animation.

Only when he is touched by art, and thus by the experience of the power which is also the source of his own creativity, does the "slave of sorrow" become free, which means happy. One may presume that Schiller would come to the conclusion, that Kierkegaard or Heidegger remained chained to "sorrow" only because they never came to know creativity, and were never truly happy.

The "thought, that foreign stranger elevated," is a beautiful image for what is new, the spirituality of human beings, which has become possible through art. It is this capacity for reason which lets him stand; thus, it is that which distinguishes him from that which is limited, the stifling limits of animality. The idea, "And jest, with kindness in graceful federation," is a genuinely Schillerian notion, for, on the one hand, the jest is itself an expression of freedom, and on the other hand, it must be with kindness, which means that it can not be injurious; and, if the jest and kindness are to be bound together by grace, then Schiller here provides one of the many possibilities of the aesthetical condition.
Here are the first four lines of strophe 19, as merely one example:

Yet higher still, to ever higher stations
Creative genius soared to be.
One sees already rise creations from creations
From harmonies comes harmony.

And from strophe 20:

So Man, now far advanced, on pinions elevated,
With thanks does Art transport on high,
New worlds of beauty are created
From nature richer made thereby.

And once the human being has already achieved a high degree of enoblement through the works of beautiful art, and fulfills his necessity with joy, the poet writes in strophe 21 the magically beautiful lines:

With destiny in lofty unity,
Sustained in calm on Muses and on Graces,
His friendly breast exposed obligingly,
Is struck as threat’ning arrow races
From gentle bowstring of necessity.

It is thus possible for the human being to overcome inner fragmentation, if he has become calm through beauty (the Graces) and art (the Muses): he will even approach death calmly. And the poet then addresses the task of the artist again: “You imitate the great Artist”—which means nothing else, than that the artists, through their art, imitate the creativity of the Creator.

To quote strophes 28 and 29 in their entirety:

The richer satisfied his fleeting vision,
The loftier the orders which the mind
Does fly through in one magic union,
Does circumscribe in one enjoyment blind;
The wider ope are thoughts and feelings growing
To richer play of harmonies now showing,
To beauty’s more abundant streaming van—
The lovelier the pieces of the universal plan,
Which now, disfigured, tarnish its creation,
He then sees lofty forms bring to perfection.

The lovelier the riddles from the night,
The richer is the world that he embraces,
The broader streams the sea in which he races,
The weaker grows his destiny’s blind might,
The higher are his urges striving,
The smaller he himself, the greater grows his loving.

So lead him, the hidden pathway show
Through ever purer forms, through music clearer,
Through ever higher heights and beauty fuller
Up poetry’s beflowered ladder go—
At last, at epoch’s ripest hour,
Yet one more happy inspiration bright,
The recent age of Man’s poetic flight,
And—he will glide in arms of Truth’s full power.

If one reads or recites “The Artists” as a whole, but especially the two strophes cited here, one will sense the excitement Schiller felt about his own vocation as an artist, and in this poem he succeeds in playfully convincing us of the truth of the significance of beauty and the role which the artists play in the development of humanity, because he lets the idea dissolve into the poetic representation, and, in the composition as a whole, he lets his material be transformed into the domain of the Infinite.

He paints an image of the unfolding of the potentialities of the human species, and makes clear how art produces ever new and better levels of the existence of human beings, which did not exist previously; but he does it in such a way, that the powers of knowing Reason coincide with those of poetic metaphor.

Whereas the first strophe is still a hymn-like praise of man, on account of everything man has created over the centuries, this is still represented in a simple way; but in the course of the poem, a stream develops, which becomes ever richer in beautiful features and density of singularities. The poem describes nothing less than an infinite sequence of revolutions, higher levels of development of man, unleashed by beauty and art; it is a poetic celebration of the capacity of man, mediated by beautiful art, to bring forth ever new hypotheses, which are united by the hypothesis of the higher hypothesis, in the sense that Plato gave the idea.

The last lines of the poem summarize in a magnificently poetic way the idea of the Parmenides dialogue. The poet initially praises art as the most free activity of man. He presupposes that all artists raise themselves high above their own age and time, and impress their own time with the ideal they have generated. If they all agree upon this high conception of art, however different the various artists may be, then art, in all of its manifold creations, permits us to see the One, the eternally true, the Divine:

On thousand twisting pathways chasing,
So rich in multiplicity,
Come forward, then, with arms embracing
Around the throne of unity.
As into gentle beams of seven
Divides the lovely shimmer white,
As also rainbow beams of seven
Dissolve into white beams of light—
So, play in thousandfolded clar’ty,
Enchanted ’round the heady sight,
So flow back in one band of ver’ty,
Into one single stream of light!
The Artists
(1789)

How fair, O Man, do you, your palm branch holding
Stand at the century’s unfolding
In proud and noble manhood’s prime
With faculties revealed, with spirit’s fullness
Full earnest mild, in action-wealthy stillness,
The ripest son of time,
Free through reason, strong through law’s measure,
Through meekness great, and rich in treasure,
Which long your breast to you did not disclose,
Nature’s own lord, she glories in your bridle,
Who in a thousand fights assays your mettle
And shining under you from out the wild arose!

Besot with vic’try operose,
Let not the hand be now forgotten,
Which on life’s desolated strand
The whimpering abandoned orphan,
A savage fortune’s booty, found,
The spirit’s future dignity did early
To your young heart in silentness display,
And sullied concupiscence surely
Did from your tender bosom turn away,
The good one, who in lofty duty
Did playfully instruct your youthfulness,
And the elevated virtue’s myst’ry
In easy riddles left for you to guess,
Who, more mature to see him on returning,
In foreign arms her darling one she laid,
O fall not to degenerated yearning
To be her abject serving woman’s maid!
In labor is the bee your master,
In skillfulness the earthworm has your teacher grown,
Your knowledge you do share with spirit minds far vaster,
’Tis Art, O Man, you have alone!

The land which knowledge does reside in
You reached through beauty’s morning gate.
Its higher gleam to now abide in,
The mind on charms must concentrate.
What by the sound of Muses’ singing
With trembling sweet did pierce you through,
A strength unto your bosom bringing
Which to the world-soul lifted you.

What, after many thousand years’ expiring,
An aging reason first did find,
In symbol great and beautiful was lying
Revealed before unto the childlike mind.
To virtue’s love her sweet form has us drafted,
A softer sense did bold depravity restrain
Ere yet a Solon legislation crafted,
Whose languid blooms did slow constrain.
Oh! Ere the thinker’s spirit daring
Had of e’r lasting space conceived,
Who to the starry theater staring,
Ne’er its presentiment perceived?

She, with Orions circling her visage,
To glorify her majesty sublime,
As purer spirits contemplate her image
Consuming, o’er the stars does climb,
Upon her sunny throne upraising,
Urania, so dreadful yet so grand,
Unburdened of her crown ablazing,
Does there—as Beauty ‘fore us stand.
The belt of grace ‘round her receiving,
That she, as child, the children understand:
What here as Beauty we’re perceiving,
Will first as Truth before us come to stand.

When the Creator from out His living presence
All mankind to mortality expelled,
And to the light, a later reappearance
To find on senses’ heavy path compelled,
When all of Heaven’s beings turned from him their faces,
She chose, alone, with man to be,
With the forsaken, banished races,
Magnanimous, in their mortality.
Here she in sloping flight does hover,
Around her love in land of senses’ thrall,
And paints, deceiving as a lover,
Elysium upon his prison wall.

When in this nurse’s arms so tender,
The frail mankind still reposed,
There holy bloodlust stirred up not an ember,
There guiltless blood was not exposed.
The heart, which she directs in gentle binding,
The servile retinue of Duty does disdain,
Her light’s path falling, lovelier but winding,
Onto morality’s sunlighted plain.
They who her service chaste abided
No baser urges tempt, no fates affright,
As under holy power they resided,
Then with pure spirit lives they are united
Again into sweet freedom's right.

The blissful, whom from millions, to her serving
The purest, she did consecrate,
Within whose breast she deemed her throne deserving
And through whose mouth did mightiness relate,
Whom she selected at e'er-flaming altars
To see her holy fire never falters,
Without a veil appeared she only 'fore their eye,
Whom she in tender union would ally!
Rejoice then in the honorable standing
Wherein high order has uplifted you:
In the exalted spirit world 'tis true,
You held of man the highest standing.

Till you proportion to the world brought back,
Which serve with joy all things created,
A boundless form, arrayed in evening crepe of black,
Close 'round him here, by feeble beams illuminated,
A shape of troops pugnaciously,
Which held his sense in slav'ry's bands restrained,
And rough, unsocialized as he,
At him their thousand powers trained,
—So stood creation 'fore the savage.
Within blind appetite's complete control,
By mere appearances now hidden,
Flies by him, unenjoyed and ever hidden,
So beautifully fair Nature's soul.

And as she fleeting overhead now stole,
You caught the friendly spirits up in tether
With tender sense, with quiet hand,
And learned how in harmonious band
To bring them socially together.
So lightly floating felt the view
Of slender shapes of cedar cultivated;
The crystal of the billows radiated
The quiv’ring image back to you.
How could you miss the lovely intimation,
With which, benevolent, fair Nature toward you drew?

Then Art, to steal her shadow forth in imitation,
The image swimming on the wave displayed to you.
Her very being parted from her,
A phantom of herself, as dream,
She jumped into the silver stream,
Herself to offer to her robber.
The beaut’ous plastic art awoke within your heart.
Too noble not at rest to be conceiving

In sand, in clay—did you to shadow life impart,
In outline its substantial self receiving.
The sweet desire for action lively woke—
From out your breast the first creation broke.

Held under careful observation
And captured by your watchful view,
The private forms betrayed in revelation
The talisman, which captivated you.
The wonder-working laws, the measure
Of charm's investigated treasure
In gentle bond were by inventive mind
Into your handiwork combined.
The obelisk and pyramid ascended,
The herm arose, the column sprang on high,
The forest's melody from reedy pipe flowed by,
And heroes' deeds in singing never ended.

The sampling of a flow'ry bed
Is bound in nosegay with a sage selection,
And thus did Art from Nature first e'er tread;
Then nosegays were into a wreath wound in collection,
And thus a second, higher Art began
From the creative hand of Man.
The child of Beauty, needing no more,
Perfected as if from your hand departed,
The crown does forfeit, that it wore,
Once actuality's imparted.
The column must, unto proportion bent,
Close ranks with all its sisters in formation,
To Maenad's harp in acclamation,
The hero in the hero host is blent.

Soon gathered near barbarians, astounded,
To see the new creations forth they ran.
Look, the delighted crowd resounded,
Look there, all this was done by Man!
As happy and more social pairs abounded,
They seized hold of the singer's lyre,
Which titans, giant battles celebrated
And lion-slayers, who, while singers did inspire,
From out their hearers heroes had created.
Then, first time, did the mind partake
Of joys more peaceful, reassuring,
Which are but from afar alluring,
Which won't its creature greed awake,
Which though enjoyed are still enduring.

Now from its carnal sleep did wrestle
The soul, so beautiful and free,
By you unchained sprang forth the vassal
Of care in lap of joy to be.
Now limits of the beast abated
And Man on his unclouded brow rang out,
And thought, that foreign stranger elevated,
From his astonished brain sprang out.
Now stood Man, and to starry legions
Displayed his kingly countenance,
Then to these lofty sunlit regions
His thanks conveyed through speaking glance.
Upon his cheek did smiling flower,
His voice, by sentiments now played,
Unfolded into song's full power,
Emotions moistened eye betrayed,
And jest, with charm in graceful federation,
His lips poured out in animation.

ENTOMBED in instincts worms inherit,
In carnal pleasure full entwined,
You recognized within his mind
The noble seed of loving spirit.
Though love did instinct base inherit,
That better seed from out did bring
He thanks that shepherd first did sing.
Unto thought's level elevated
Desire more modest then cascaded
Melodiously from singer's mouth.
The cheeks from dew drops softly burning,
The steadfast, unextinguished yearning,
The union of all souls set forth.

THE wisdom of the wise, the mild's mildness,
Nobility's grace, the strong one's power
You wed into a single likeness
And placed it into glory's bower.
The man who 'fore the unknown trembled,
Its mere reflection came to love;
Great heroes burning he assembled,
To equal that great One above.
From all archtypal Beauty the first ringing
You made in Nature to resound in singing.

THE passions' frenzied, wild stress,
The lawless whims of fortune,
The instincts' and the duties' press
You set with your acute emotion
On straight-edge to their destination.
What Nature in her great and grand procession
In widespread distances has torn apart,
Becomes in play, in song's expression
Coherent, easy to impart.
By Furies' singing much affected,
The murder draws, though not detected,
The fate of death from out their art.
And long ere sages venture with a finding,
An Iliad is fortune's mysteries unwinding

For young antiquity unfurled;
From Thespis' chariot descending
Came Providence into the world.

BUT in the great course of the world
Too early was your symmetry ascending.
When swarthy hand of destiny,
What she before your eye had raveled,
Would not before your eye untie,
Then life to the abyss did fly,
Before full lovely circle traveled—
Then you did draw, with bold, audacious might,
The arc still further into future's night;
Then hurled yourself and never quivered
Into Avernus' swarthy ocean wave
And there the life that fled discovered
Beyond the urn, beyond the grave;
And then appeared with torch o'erturned the image
Of blooming Pollux, who on Castor leans so nigh:
The shadow that completes the Moon's full visage,
Before the silver circle fills on high.

YET higher still, to ever higher stations
Creative genius soared to be.
One sees already rise creations from creations
From harmonies comes harmony.
What here delights the drunken eye alone,
Is there in service to the higher beauty;
The charms which do this nymph adorn,
In a divine Athena soften gently:
The forces which in wrestler's muscle rage,
Must seek in godly Beauty silence tender;
The figure proud of Jove, the wonder of his age,
Does in Olympus' temple homage render.

THE world, transformed by labor's hand,
The human heart, by new impulses greeted,
And exercised in battles heated,
Do your creation's scope expand.
So Man, now far advanced, on pinions elevated,
With thanks does Art transport on high,
New worlds of beauty are created
From nature richer made thereby.
The bounds of knowledge melt away,
The mind, in your light vict'ries sharpened,
In mere enjoyments quickly ripened
To race through all the artificial powers,
Does set its sights on Nature's distant towers,
And overtakes her on her dusky way.
He weighs her now with human calculations,
Does gauge with measures she herself has lent;
Much better versed in Beauty's obligations,
To pass before his eye she now is sent.
In self-contented, youthful joy he raises
In loan unto the spheres his harmony,
The universal edifice he praises
And shows it off as symmetry.

Now everything that he discovers
Does tell him of proportion fair.
Fair Beauty’s golden belt uncovers
In his life’s course her weaving there;
While blest Perfection ’fore him hovers
In all your works victoriously e’er.
Wherever joy unblemished hurries,
Wherever silent sorrow flees,
Where contemplation thoughtful tarries,
Where tears of misery he sees,
Where thousand frights at him are ’raying;
Do follow seas of harmony,
He sees the Graces three in playing,
And, his emotions soft-refined displaying,
He strives to join the lovely company.
Soft, as the lines alluring coil together,
As all phenomena around
In softened contour blend in one another
Just so, his life’s light breath is bound.
His spirit melts in Harmony’s great ocean,
Which ’round his senses lustfully now flows
And quietly his thoughts, enraptured, close
On ever-present Cytherea, in devotion.
With destiny in lofty unity,
Sustained in calm on Muses and on Graces,
His friendly breast exposed obligingly,
Is struck as threat’ning arrow races
From gentle bowstring of necessity.

The trusted favorites of blessed Harmony,
Companions who to gladden life have striven,
The noblest and the dearest, those which she,
Who gave us life, that we might live has given!
That man unshackled of his duty now takes heed,
The fetters loves which him do lead,
Not prey to iron scepter of contingency,
This thanks you—your eternity,
And a sublime reward is your heart’s treasure.
That ’round the cup in which our freedoms run
The gods of joy do joke with pleasure,
The charming dream is lovely spun,
Embraced for this be, in full measure!

The Spirit glittering and bright,
Who cloaked Necessity with grace, does order
Unto his starry vault, unto his ether,
To serve us graciously and right,
Who in destruction still adorns himself, delights us

With the sublime where he affrights us,
To be like this great Artist seek.
As on the brooklet mirror-sleek
The bright-hued banks a-dancing glimmer
With sunset’s glow and flow’ry field,
So on our barren life does shimmer
The poet’s lively shadow-world.
You have to us, as bride garments,
The frightening unknown presented,
Our destiny without relent.
Just as your urns the bones do cover,
You put a magic, sweet sheen over
The dreadful sorrow’s choir lament.
Throughout millenia I’ve hurried,
In boundless realm of ages past,
How Mankind laughs where’er you’ve tarried,
How dreary when you’re gone at last.

What once with feathers soaring upward
Full force from your creating hands did climb,
Again itself within your arms discovered,
When silent victory of time
From off his cheeks life’s rosy flower
The strength from out his members stole
And sadly, steps now lacking power,
The old man staggered on his pole.
Then you from fountain freshly rendered
The wave of life to thirsty tendered;
Twice did the epoch gain its youth anew,
Twice from the seed which you yourself did strew.

By savage hordes expatriated,
The last of off’ring brands you snatched away
From Orient’s fair altars desecrated
And brought it to the Occident to stay.
There dawned the lovely fugitive much feted,
The new day, from the East, now in the West,
And on Hesperia’s meadows germinated
Ionia’s renewed and blooming best.
Into men’s souls now cast a Nature fairer
Soft mirroring, a fair reflection bright,
And in these souls bejewelled there came aglitter
To reign the goddess great of light.
One saw the falling of a million shackles,
And for the slaves the rights of men now heard,
As brother peacefully with brother travels,
So mildly has the young mankind matured.
With inner lofty joy inspired
Of fortune’s gift you take your part,
And in humility attired
With silent merit you depart.

If on the paths of thought without obstruction
Now roams th’investigator, fortune bold,
And, drunken with the paeons’ loud eruption,
He reaches rashly for the crown to hold;
If now it is his rash conception
To noble guide dispatch with hireling’s bread,
While by Art’s dreamed-for throne’s erection
The first slave office to permit instead:—
Forgive him—th’crown of all perfection
Does hover bright above your head.
With you, the spring’s first blooming flower,
Fair Nature’s soul-formation first arose,
With you, the harvest’s joyful power,
Does Nature’s self-perfecting close.

EMERGED from humble clay, from stoney traces,
Creative Art, with peaceful victories embraces
The mind’s unmeasured, vast domain.
What but discoverers in knowledge’s high places
Can conquer, did for you its conquest gain.
The treasures which the thinker has collected
Will only in your arms first warm his heart,
When science is, by beauty ripened and perfected,
Ennobled to a work of art—
When he up to the hilltop with you sallies
And to his eye, in evening’s shining part,
Is suddenly revealed—the lovely valleys.

The richer satisfied his fleeting vision,
The loftier the orders which the mind
Does fly through in one magic union,
Does circumscribe in one enjoyment blind;
The wider ope are thoughts and feelings growing
To richer play of harmonies now showing,
To beauty’s more abundant streaming van—
The lovelier the pieces of the universal plan,
Which now, disfigured, tarnish its creation,
He then sees lofty forms bring to perfection.
The lovelier the riddles from the night,
The richer is the world that he embraces,
The broader streams the sea in which he races,
The weaker grows his destiny’s blind might,
The higher are his urges striving,
The smaller he himself, the greater grows his loving.

So lead him, the hidden pathway show
Through ever purer forms, through music clearer,
Through ever higher heights and beauty fuller
Up poetry’s beflowered ladder go—
At last, at epoch’s ripest hour,
Yet one more happy inspiration bright,
The recent age of Man’s poetic flight,
And—he will glide in arms of Truth’s full power.

AND she, the gentle Cypria,
By fiery crown illuminated,
Before her son-grown-man now elevated,
Unveiled—as Urania;
So much the sooner by him sighted,
The lovelier, from her now flown!
Thus sweet, thus happily delighted
Stood once Ulysses’ noble son,
When she, divine, who shared his youth as partner,
Was then transfigured to Jove’s daughter.

THE dignity of Man into your hands is given,
Its keeper be!
It sinks with you! With you it will be risen!
The sacred magic of poetry
A world-plan wise is serving
To th’ocean, steer it e’er unswerving,
Of lofty harmony!

FAIR Truth, by her own time rejected,
By Poetry now be protected,
And refuge find in the Muses’ choir.
In highest and abundant splendor,
More fright’ning in her veil of wonder,
Then let her rise aloft in singing
And vengeance win with music ringing
Upon her persecutor’s ear.

YOU free sons of the freest mother,
Swing upward with a constant face,
And strive then after no crown other,
To highest Beauty’s radiant place.
The sisters who from here departed
In the mother’s lap you soon will see;
What souls of beauty have imparted
Must excellent and perfect be.
Uplift yourselves on wings emboldened
Above your epoch’s course be drawn;
See in your mirror now engoldened
The coming century’s fair dawn.
On thousand twisting pathways chasing,
So rich in multiplicity,
Come forward, then, with arms embracing
Around the throne of unity.
As into gentle beams of seven
Divides the lovely shimmer white,
As also rainbow beams of seven
Dissolve into white beams of light—
So, play in thousandfolded clar’ty,
Enchanted ’round the heady sight,
So flow back in one band of ver’ty,
Into one single stream of light!

—translated by Marianna Wertz
Friedrich Schiller in Weimar, reciting to the intellectual elite of the Weimar Classical period, including the poets Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Christoph Wieland, and Karl von Knebel, and the philosophers Johann Gottfried von Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte. (Lithograph after a painting by Theobald von Oer)

Top left: Schiller letter to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Bottom left: Goethe letter to Schiller.
For over a quarter of a century, from the publication of his first major dramatic work, *The Robbers*, in 1781, until his premature death at age 45 in 1805, Friedrich Schiller was at the very heart of a republican network of intellectuals which, under his guidance, profoundly transformed the intellectual and political climate in the German states, providing the cultural and intellectual context for the fight for German unification. Moreover, through the rapid proliferation of his writings into other languages, in some cases almost simultaneous with their appearance in German, Schiller had a decisive impact on the spread of republican ideas throughout Europe and in the United States.

His poems and dramatic works, in particular, incorporated the highest expression of the republican ideals of human liberty and the dignity of man. These literary works formed the basis of the German language of the great Classical period. It was the works of Schiller, both literary and historical, which helped inspire the movement that would unite the numerous German territories against the tyranny of Napoleon, and create the basis for the development of the German nation later in the Nineteenth century.

Witnessing the depraved conditions of the countries of Europe, which by and large were ruled by a coterie of petty oligarchs who treated their subjects like cattle, Schiller sought to use his poetic gifts to transform the outlook of these subject populations, who had adopted the oligarchy’s view of themselves. A native of the German state of Württemburg, working almost exclusively in his native tongue, Schiller selected from the histories of the European countries, those events and leading individuals whose dramatic elucidation could inspire and elevate audiences to a higher standpoint, from which they might break the ideological chains that kept them in bondage. The inspiration of the American Revolution provided him with a successful example of just such an effort.

Aghast at the effects of the French Revolution, Schiller made a conscious decision to avoid direct involvement in political agitation, but rather, to devote himself to shaping the general cultural environment in which any sound political life might take root. The devastation wrought by the revolution in France gave proof of the bankruptcy of the Enlightenment philosophy that had infused the thinking of its authors. As Helga Zepp LaRouche describes the situation: “The French Revolution represented a radical collapse of the philosophy of the Enlightenment which had dominated France in the Eighteenth century, despite some republican tendencies here and there. This collapse was no less dramatic than the failure of Communism in our time, i.e., it confronted the thinking people in the population with the fact that, obviously, the entire system of axioms upon which the thought of the Enlightenment had been based since
Schiller’s Youth

Johann Christoph Friedrich Schiller was born in the town of Marburg, in the duchy of Württemburg, region of Swabia, on Nov. 10, 1759. His father, Major Johann Kaspar Schiller, had served as a soldier in the army of the Duke of Württemburg, having seen action in The Netherlands as well as in Bohemia during the Seven Years’ War. Schiller would later joke about how he was almost born in an army camp, since his pregnant mother began feeling the birth pangs while she was visiting her husband at one of them. Young Fritz, as he was affectionately called by his father, often accompanied him to the various military installations where he served. In a letter to Friedrich in 1791, Kaspar wrote: “That I would be plagued with rheumatism in my advanced years is not surprising. I have been on eight major campaigns, and even that side on which I now suffer most has always had to withstand the worst. Twice I was thrown from my horse, and once I had to have a bullet removed from that side.” After the unsuccessful battle of Lissa in Silesia, in which the forces of Württemburg were arrayed against the Prussian forces of Frederick the Great, Kaspar lay outdoors beside the fire, and when he fell asleep, it began to freeze. In the morning, one side of him was frozen to the ground, and he had to be pried loose with hot water!

Although largely self-taught, Kaspar had studied mathematics and the natural sciences, helping during the war with the medical care of the troops, and developing a keen understanding of crop cultivation. When the Württemburg Duke, Karl Eugen, established an agricultural military school at Solitude near Ludwigsburg in 1770, Kaspar was named superintendent. He would later write a book entitled *Tree Cultivation in Germany*, which his son would publish.

Fritz was his father’s “golden boy.” Kaspar used the classical principles of Quintillian, with its emphasis on rhetoric, for his early education. The family were also God-fearing Lutherans. For most of his childhood, Friedrich dreamed of becoming a minister and preaching the Gospel to his flock. He would dress up in a frock and cassock, choose a passage from Scripture, and elaborate on it for his family and friends. Once, he preached on the visit of Christ to the wedding feast at Canna, which brought forth tears from his sisters. “It was always a very moving event,” his sister Christophine later wrote, “to see the expression of meditation on the beautiful face of the child, his pious blue eyes directed to heaven, the light yellowish hair that surrounded his fair features, and the small hands folded in prayer giving the appearance of the face of an angel. His obedience, and his naturally tender feeling for everything good and beautiful, were compelling. Always generous to his sisters and to his friends, always ready to excuse their faults, he was a favorite with all.”

Even later in life, according to his friend Georg August Pape, Schiller expressed a keen desire to “stand before a congregation and to proclaim the most sublime truths.” But by then, he had found his true pulpit in the stage, telling his sister-in-law Caroline that “the theater and the pulpit are the only places where the power of the word rules.” Both theater and pulpit were places from which the word would go forth, as he later would say, to “make people more spiritual, stronger, more loving, which would dissolve the narrow views of egoism, strengthen the spirit for greater sacrifices, and raise one's entire existence into a more spiritual sphere, in which virtue stands as the achievement of a higher splendor.”

Schiller’s spontaneous generosity, which remained with him his entire life, was placed under strict restraint by his father. The young boy would often give away items which he felt he could do without, if someone else had need of them. Once, his father discovered that the buttons on his shoes had disappeared, and that he was tying his shoes with a string instead, a result of generosity to some friend. When he started giving away his books, however, his father made him promise not to do it again, a promise which the young boy dutifully obeyed.

Schiller’s first poem is thought to have been composed
when he was fourteen, on the day before his confirmation. His mother had admonished him not to engage in frivolous pastimes as he approached that important event, and the admonitions inspired Schiller to his first poetic endeavor. He had already worked on small dramatic pieces as a child, cutting out paper figures as characters in these little dramas. At the time of his confirmation, two of these were titled “The Christians” and “Absalon,” although no trace of either has been preserved. His little sister Nanette, who died young in 1796, took after her brother, and, hiding from her father (who frowned upon girls participating in such games), worked on small pieces, too. Later, she often recited her brother’s poems, and pestered him to get her into the theater as an actress; her death at age nineteen prevented this.

In 1773, the young Schiller was taken into the Duke’s military academy, the Karlschule. His father informed Duke Karl Eugen that the boy wished to be a minister, but the Duke said this was impossible, as there was no such training at the academy, and that Friedrich would have to study law instead. Much against his own inclination, Schiller entered the academy to study law. Although the Karlschule had been established by the Duke to provide education for promising children in the province, the environment of a military academy must have been terribly oppressive for someone of Schiller’s sensitive nature. The young men lived an almost cloistered existence, shut up behind iron doors, in a regimen of strict military discipline, receiving visits from family or friends only at certain prescribed times of the year.

Resistance to Autocracy

More than a century earlier, the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia had secured peace and stability in Europe after the Thirty Years’ War. The principle of “the advantage of the other” espoused in the Treaty, had laid the groundwork for the long period of reconstruction, required in the German states after years of devastation. The Treaty guaranteed religious freedom in the German states, or, at least, the private expression of religion. The power of the House of Habsburg, the true authors of the war, was significantly curtailed. But the territory of the Holy Roman Empire, which was composed of today’s Germany, a number of territories now part of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the whole of today’s Austria, was a jumble of over three hundred relatively independent, petty principalities situated between the Alps and the Baltic Sea, each with its own laws, its own courts, its own little army, its separate coinage, its tolls and custom-houses on the frontier, as well as its crowd of meddlesome and pedantic officials, presided over by a prime minister who was usually the unworthy favorite of his prince and, all too often, in the pay of a foreign court.

Nefarious deals would be struck among the princes of the realm, or between the princes and foreign powers. In one perfidious example, 30,000 young men in the state of Hesse were conscripted to fight for the British in Britain’s war against the American colonies, a policy which would be castigated in one of Schiller’s early works, Kabale und Liebe (Love and Intrigue). In 1757, Duke Karl Eugen of Württemburg agreed to sell France the services of 6,000 soldiers to serve in her war against Prussia. There was an uproar in the state, and many soldiers deserted. The Duke had sixteen of them summarily executed. Karl Eugen also sent 2,000 men to serve as a military guard for the Dutch East India company, for a price of 400,000
gulden. This regiment served for 24 years.

There was strong resistance in many of the states to such autocratic rule. One of those who strongly protested was the poet and publicist Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart, also a native of Württemburg. Schubart used his pen to protest the feudal order, and to promote the republican ideals of the American Revolution. When he was forced to leave Württemburg because of his political agitation, Schubart went to Bavaria, where he had to tangle with the Jesuits, who were intellectually hegemonic in the Catholic territories. Between 1774 and 1777, Schubart published the *Deutsche Chronik*, a combination of cultural and political magazine. In it he offered a running commentary on the progress of the Revolutionary War in America, based on regular reports received from German correspondents in Philadelphia and New York. This republican firebrand was becoming a real thorn in the side of the princes, and the Secret Consistory of the ducal courts devised a plan to deal with him. On the assurance of a safe passage, Schubart was lured back to Württemburg, where he was immediately apprehended and charged with blasphemy. He was locked away, without a trial, in the fortress of Hohenasperg, where he would remain for ten years. Karl Eugen and the other princes of the realm wanted Schubart’s example to send a message to anyone wishing to follow in his footsteps.

Schubart was kept in solitary confinement for the first year, but Karl Eugen never succeeded in subduing his irrepressible republican spirit. While in prison, he penned one of his most powerful poems against despotism, “Die Fürstengruft” (“The Nobles’ Tomb”), a work that had a strong effect on Schiller. After his release, Schubart went on to become the director of the Stuttgart Theater, where he staged for the first time in that city a Mozart opera, the strongly anti-oligarchical *Marriage of Figaro*, with libretto by the French republican and agent of the American Revolution, Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais. Schubart would later compose a musical setting for Schiller’s poem, “An Die Freude” (“Ode to Joy”).

In 1775, the Karlschule was transferred to the city of Stuttgart, and the curriculum was expanded. Schiller was then able to transfer from the hated law school to the medical faculty, finding medicine a more appealing way to earn his living, one which would perhaps give him more time for his true loves, drama and poetry. During his student years, he also began his study of philosophy, devouring the works of Gotthold Lessing, Moses Mendelssohn, and Johann Gottfried Herder. Leibniz became one of his favorite authors. He read extensively from his works, including the recent, posthumously published work, *New Essays on Human Understanding* (1765), Leibniz’s polemic against British empiricist and Enlightenment ideologue John Locke. At one point in his life, Schiller considered writing a poetical work titled “Theodicy,” which would be a philosophical poem written along the lines of Leibniz’s philosophical treatise of the same name. He was also well acquainted with contemporary German literature, with Klopstock, whom he loved, Goethe, and Heinrich Wilhelm Gerstenberg. By this time, Schiller had also developed a keen interest in history, a subject that he would later pursue professionally, and whose spirit would imbue all of his works. Plutarch’s *Lives*, a staple of the curriculum of the day, was already a great favorite of his.

Schiller’s interest in Shakespeare was first aroused in a class on psychology, where his teacher, Jakob Friedrich Abel, used characters from Shakespeare’s *Othello*, recently translated by Christoph Wieland, to underline the psychological conflict between passion and duty. After graduating from the Academy, Schiller was appointed regi-mental doctor in the service of the Duke of Württemburg. It was also at this time that he wrote a number of poems, one of which, “Die Abend,” was published in the local *Schwäbischen Magazin*.

Many of the other students at the Karlschule, dissatisfied with the narrow confines of the studies offered them, were also imbued with a love of literature and wished to engage in literary pursuits. Friedrich von Hoven, a lifelong friend of Schiller’s, describes how Schiller and his friends would venture into the woods to compose their works: “We composed in all stillness, each working in the area which he had chosen and as often as we found time and opportunity to do so; we passed the compositions amongst ourselves, mutually criticizing, reproaching and praising each other’s works, certainly doing more of the latter than the former.” Schiller, who was most attracted to the dramatic art, had composed a tragedy, “Cosmus von Medici.” Thoese to whom Schiller had read the fragmentary work, said that it contained some very moving scenes and beautiful poetry, some of which would later find its way into *Die Räuber* (The Robbers). Schiller’s friend Gottfried Körner relates that, in 1773, Schiller had also worked on an epic poem entitled “Moses.” It was during this period that Schiller began writing *Die Räuber*, his first major dramatic work.

### The Literary Rebel

The subject matter of *The Robbers*, a study in skulduggery and treachery, was suggested by an article penned by Schubart, which appeared in the *Schwäbischen Magazin*, and was brought to Schiller’s attention by von Hoven. Schubart presented a story line, and issued a challenge to young authors to give it dramatic shape. In Schubart’s story, a man has two sons, Wilhelm and Karl, one of
whom is quiet in manner and pious, and the other of whom is spirited and raucous. They go to the university, where Wilhelm keeps tight control over himself, while Karl engages in a riotous student existence with wine and women. In a free-spirited and generous manner, however, Karl gives away his money to other students, ending up in debt.

An unhappy duel leads to a final break with his father, and Karl joins the Prussian Army. His stint in the army, serving in the wars of Frederick the Great, causes Karl to reflect on his own life. When peace comes, he returns to his native province, much changed in appearance and character. He adopts an assumed name and goes to see how things are with his father. Under his new identity, he becomes a great favorite in a village not far from his home. One day, he comes upon his father being robbed by highwaymen. He attacks them, killing all but one, and saves his father’s life. The surviving robber reveals that Karl’s brother Wilhelm had masterminded the crime, hoping to more quickly inherit his murdered father’s estate. The father wants to send Wilhelm to his well-deserved punishment, but Karl protests such treatment. Acquiescing to Karl’s plea, the father allows Wilhelm to live on an isolated part of his estate, supported by a small pension, and makes Karl his heir.

At the end of this recitation of events, Schubart issued the following challenge: “When will there then appear the philosopher who will penetrate into the depths of the human heart, tracking down each deed to its very fount, and then, writing the history of the human heart, will tear away the deceptive veil from the face of the hypocrite, and against him proclaim the rights of the guileless heart?” Schiller accepted the challenge, and went far beyond any before him in creating an entirely new genre of tragic hero.

Schiller’s Karl was a far more powerful spirit than that envisioned by the fiery Schubart. Instead of joining the army, Schiller’s Karl Moor, after a profligate student life, organizes a band of his friends to become highwaymen. The robbers, particularly their leader Karl, attain a reputation as “noble bandits,” in the style of Sherwood Forest’s Robin Hood. While his deeds are often bloody, Karl’s spirit is one of noble rebellion against an oppressive system, which he is committed to combat. The band’s forays terrorize the local tyrants, who are deprived of their goods through the party’s brigandage.

Karl’s younger brother, Franz, follows Karl’s activities through the newspapers, and endeavors to paint an even bleaker picture of his brother’s doings for his father, in the hope of driving his father to transfer his affections—and estate—from the elder brother to himself. Schiller also adds a love-interest for Karl, Amalia. Deeply in love with Karl, and hardly conscious of his new life of brigandage, Amalia helps to keep the fire of love for his prodigal son burning in the heart of the despondent father.

Hesitating to commit patricide, Franz has his father imprisoned. Karl returns and discovers the treachery of his brother, who kills himself before Karl is able to inflict vengeance upon him. All might be well—after all, Amalia still loves Karl, and Karl, Amalia. But rather than converge on a “happily ever after” ending, Schiller’s tragedy remains true to his concept of “shaking up” his audience, in order to bring them to a higher understanding.

Karl’s robber band intends to hold him to his oath of always being their leader, and refuses to allow him to withdraw into the easy existence of a landed proprietor. They had remained true to him rather than accept an amnesty, and Karl can not bring himself to forsake them now. Unwilling to break his oath, Karl proceeds to kill Amalia, because they can never return to the earlier, illusory happiness she dreams of, and prepares to turn himself over to the authorities. “Grand and majestic in his misfortune, and through misfortune, rendered better, returned to the path of excellence,” Schiller wrote. “Such a man in Robber Moor will be mourned and hated, despised and loved.” Schiller drew inspiration for Karl Moor, his own “Don Quixote,” as he called him, from another noble character penned by Cervantes, the gentleman-robbber Roque.

The Robbers was a difficult play to digest. Even Schiller, in his more mature years, when he was happy to leave his youthful works behind him, admitted that his own situation in the tightly regimented existence of the Karlschule may have more than affected his shaping of the robber-hero Karl Moor. The cause of the wild revolt of a Karl Moor, that “prodigal son,” as Schiller first called him, who becomes an outlaw from the oppressive conditions of a feudal society in which a conniving Franz Moor could so well succeed, was not lost on Schiller’s contemporaries, especially young people, who themselves felt the oppression of the feudalistic social order. Even Goethe, who never warmed to this youthful work, had to admit that it would always find popularity among the young. Once freed from the regimented life of his military academy, however, Schiller would never again write anything quite like it. As he himself explained in the introduction to the Rheinische Thalia in the fall of 1784: “Unacquainted with people and with human destiny, my brush, of necessity missing that balance between angel and devil, had to bring forth a monster, which, to the happiness of the world, does not exist, and for which I would only wish immortality in order to establish forever the example of a birth, which brings into the world that
unnatural combination of subordination and genius. I mean The Robbers.”

As a boyhood friend, Georg Friedrich Scharffenstein, explained, Schiller “wrote Die Räuber less for the sake of literary acclaim, than to express to the world his strong, liberal feelings against the ruling conventions of society. While in such a mood, he would often say to me: ‘We have to write a book that will have to be burned by the hangmen.’” Schiller composed the play secretly at night, often in the infirmary, since all other buildings were dark after lights-out had been sounded. In discussions with his friends, Schiller decided that the printed edition of Die Räuber would carry an engraving of a springing lion, with the caption “In Tyrannos” (“Against Tyrants”). This engraving did appear in the second printing, in 1782. Schiller had to have the first edition of the work printed in secret, bearing the cost himself, in 1781.

As the text was circulating, it came to the attention of the imprisoned Schubart, who was totally excited by it. He asked his prison warden, General Philip Rieger, to make contact with the author, with the idea of setting up a meeting. Rieger suggested that Schubart write a review of the play. Rieger arranged for Schiller, travelling under the pseudonym “Doctor Fischer,” to meet with Schubart, but did not tell the prisoner who his visitor was. When they were together in the fortress, Rieger turned to Schubart and asked him to read aloud his review of The Robbers. Schubart read it, and expressed the wish to some day meet the author. Rieger clapped him on the shoulder, and said, “Your wish is fulfilled, here stands the author before you.” “Is it possible?” Schubart cried with joy. “This is the author of The Robbers?” He then embraced Schiller warmly, kissed him, and tears of joy welled up in his eyes.

The play soon came to the attention of Wolfgang Heribert Dalberg, the director of the Mannheim Theater, who expressed interest in having it performed. The premiere was to take place in January 1782, and Schiller was invited to attend. Schiller knew that he would never be able to get permission from the Württemburg authorities for such a trip. The play had been written without their knowledge, as they would never have approved of such activity by the regimental doctor. Only Dalberg and one other person were aware of Schiller’s presence at the Mannheim performance.

The play was a rousing success. According to one eyewitness, “The theater was like an insane asylum, eyes rolling, fists shaking, feet stamping, impassioned shrieks in the theater. Strangers found themselves falling, sobbing, into each others arms, women staggered, close to fainting, towards the door. There was a general uproar that approached pure chaos. Out of this fog a new creation was born.” Although Schiller was able to keep his unauthorized absence hidden from the Duke, the authorship of The Robbers did not long remain a secret. Karl Eugen thought some of it downright subversive. The play featured characters who bore a marked similarity to well-known Württemburg figures, which caused
tongues to wag against the poet.

When Schiller went a second time surreptitiously to Mannheim, he was discovered by the Duke, who ordered him incarcerated for two weeks. While not wishing to stifle the talent of his young regimental doctor—who he thought might be reined in to become of service to, and perhaps an ornament of, the duchy—Karl Eugen did intend to maintain strict oversight over the upstart's work. In a meeting with Schiller, the Duke demanded that he show him all the products of his Muse as they developed. If Schiller violated this requirement, the Duke warned, he could be faced with imprisonment, like Schubart. This was totally unacceptable to Schiller. The success of his first dramatic effort had given him confidence that he could earn his livelihood with his pen. Rather than submit to the Duke’s strictures, Schiller decided, rather like Karl Moor, to take flight from his oppressive conditions. Late in the night of Sept. 22, 1782, under cover of darkness, and after a final visit to his patients at the hospital, Schiller mounted his horse and, with a friend accompanying him, crossed the border from Württemburg to the neighboring state of Baden.

Republican in Exile

It was not clear where exactly Schiller was to go, and it would be some time before he could find a more permanent home. The decided advantage of the decentralized nature of Germany at the time was that Schiller had merely to find a well-intentioned prince in one of the three hundred petty states, willing to give him the freedom to follow the lead of his creative Muse. Nevertheless, if Karl Eugen wished to wreak vengeance on his absent officer, strings could be pulled within the extended family of the German princely elites to do just that. Schiller’s initial concern was that the wrath of the Duke not fall upon his family. He was relatively confident, however, that despite the Duke’s autocratic nature, he was not one to punish the father, who had been the his loyal servant for many years, for the sins of the son.

In his wanderings, Schiller drew upon many friends, and acquired many more. One was Henriette von Wolzogen, two of whose sons, Wilhelm and Ludwig, Schiller had befriended at the Karlschule. After marrying Schiller’s sister-in-law, Wilhelm would later introduce Schiller’s work to the Russian court at St. Petersburg, and Ludwig, as an adjutant to the Russian Czar during the German War of Liberation, would later play a role in implementing the strategy that ultimately doomed Napoleon during his ill-fated invasion of Russia. Henriette offered to provide Schiller refuge while she attempted (in vain, as it turned out) to achieve a reconciliation with Karl Eugen. Meanwhile, Schiller lived under the alias “Doctor Ritter.”

Seeking a permanent place of refuge, Schiller considered the newly created United States of America, which had recently won its independence from Great Britain, an event followed closely by republican circles in Germany. In a letter to Henriette on Jan. 8, 1783, Schiller wrote: “I have made a major change in my plans, and as I initially wanted to go to Berlin, now I will perhaps turn to England. But it’s still not certain, such a great desire I have to see the New World. If North America is free, then it is just the place for me to go.” But such was not to be.

Closer to home, Schiller cast his lot with the theater at Mannheim, where he had first achieved success with The Robbers. He had two new dramatic works in progress, one of which, The Conspiracy of Fiesco at Genoa, A Republican Tragedy, was near completion. The theater director Dalberg, however, was never satisfied with the work, no matter how often Schiller complied with his demand for changes. Most likely, as would happen repeatedly with Schiller’s writings, Dalberg’s reticence had more to do with the republican politics of the play, than with literary concerns. Delays in production led a frustrated Schiller to accept the hospitality of Henriette at her country house at Bauerbach, in the Franconian woods. It was here that he read the story of the Spanish prince Don Carlos, by the Abbé St. Real, which was to become the subject of his most beloved work. Schiller began working on Don Carlos. He had already acquired two books that were of great interest to him, one on the Inquisition, which would have relevance to the period of Don Carlos, and the other, a memoir of a prisoner in the Bastille, that horrible repository of human misery, soon be thrust upon the world’s attention by events in Paris. Also during this period, his interest was drawn to the high court drama of Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, who had been executed by her cousin Queen Elizabeth in 1587.

It was only recently, in 1779, that Nathan the Wise, the last drama by Schiller’s mentor in aesthetic questions, Gotthold Lessing, had been published. Schiller considered Lessing’s great work on art, Laocöon, “a Bible for the artist.” While staying in Bauerbach, Schiller became engaged in a discussion with a local Lutheran pastor, Johan Pfranger, over this latest Lessing work. Pfranger complained that the play had denigrated Christianity, while placing Judaism on a pedestal. Pfranger then commented that, of course, Schiller was probably an adherent of that group of free thinkers who deemed Christianity somewhat superfluous. “Not at all,” Schiller said. “Quite to the contrary. I’m just annoyed that so many Christians make so little out of their religion, while, as I see in Bauerbach and Walldorf, the Jews are very fervent in
their religious devotions!” Schiller would later edit Nathan for a new production at the Weimar Theater, and for a highly acclaimed revival of the play in Lessing’s own Hamburg. Later, in 1792, Schiller’s father would recommend that he consider writing a history of the Jewish people, “a masterly presentation of which would be of great interest for Christianity.”

Even while he was impatiently awaiting the opening of Fiesco, Schiller was well advanced on a “bourgeois tragedy,” as he characterized it, his Kabale und Liebe. The play is set in a German state whose ruler supports the extravagant costs of his court and mistress, by hiring out his soldiers as mercenaries to the British, to help put down the American Revolution—a reflection of the issue that had so incensed Schubart. (In an ironic plot twist, the mistress reacts by secretly selling her jewels to aid the families of the conscripted mercenaries.) Then, in July 1783, Fiesco was finally given its first performance in Mannheim, and Schiller received a one-year contract, which included the performance of two new plays. In the spring of the following year, Kabale und Liebe was performed both in Mannheim and in Frankfurt.

Schiller’s position remained uncertain despite his growing renown. His contract with the Mannheim Theater was for one year only, and he was never quite satisfied with the performers there, nor with the working conditions. He was, however, expanding the circle of friends that could provide a more secure position in society, and a more permanent place from which to continue his creative work. His most significant new friend was Christian Gottfried Körner, a young lawyer living in Dresden. Unlike Schiller, Körner had chosen the law as a means to support himself (what Schiller would call his “Brotwissenschaft,” “bread-scholarship”). But Körner’s intellectual interests stretched far beyond the musty world of jurisprudence, and during a friendship that would last until Schiller’s death, Schiller continually encouraged his friend to spend more time in writing about the great political and cultural issues of the day. Körner, in turn, worked to help secure a livelihood for his poet friend.

The next major step which would propel Schiller into the arena of the leading political circles of Germany, was the publication of Don Carlos. Although it would not be completed for another three years, and first performed in 1787 in Hamburg, it began to be serialized in a new journal, Thalia, in 1786. The Thalia was the first of a series of publishing ventures that Schiller undertook during his lifetime, to raise the intellectual and cultural level of the German-speaking world. It was also with Don Carlos that Schiller, in an attempt to enhance the dramatic effect of the unfolding action, decided to write in the iambic meter of Shakespeare, which had been pioneered in Germany by the playwright Lessing, instead of the prose of his previous works—redrafting into poetic meter the earlier, already-published prose scenes. His immense satisfaction with the initial results of this attempt spurred him to create a drama of unprecedented beauty and power, which would inspire generations with its display of idealism and self-sacrifice.8

While The Robbers had quite abruptly awakened the literary public to this new star on the horizon of German drama, Don Carlos established Schiller’s permanent place in the literary firmament. Although the subject had been suggested to him by Karl Theodor Dalberg, prelate brother of the Mannheim Theater director, the setting of the play had been with him for a long time. Schiller had made a serious study of Fifteenth-century Spain, and was keenly interested in the history of the Inquisition and the unsuccessful revolt of The Netherlands against Spanish rule. In Don Carlos, Schiller’s hero, the Marquis of Posa, is a nobleman, a Knight of Malta, who is imbued with a love for the people of The Netherlands and their republican spirit. He returns to Spain in the hope of recruiting the young heir to the throne, his friend Don Carlos, to lead The Netherlands in revolt. Inadvertently detecting what he believes to be sparks of humanity in the autocratic King, Carlos’s father Philip II, Posa conceives a short-cut to the liberation of The Netherlands, and shifts his attention to recruiting Philip to his project. Big mistake! The autocratic King, whom Schiller for dramatic reasons made more humane than he was in reality, would remain subservient to the Inquisition, and the Inquisition would brook no resistance. Meanwhile, Don Carlos becomes confused by Posa’s shifting interest in his father, and the entire project starts to unravel from there on, leading to the tragic outcome, the martyrdom of Posa and the handing over of Carlos to the Inquisition. In the course of the drama, Schiller presents the young Queen, Elisabeth, as the one sublime figure not driven by conflicting passions, whose emotional life proceeds from the elevated standpoint of reason.

Unlike The Robbers, or even Fiesco or Kabal und Liebe, Don Carlos became a favorite within German court circles. Friedrich Wilhelm II of Prussia, who was deeply moved by the famous confrontation scene between the Marquis of Posa and Philip II—where the Marquis daringly demands of Philip, “Give them freedom of thought!”—gave explicit orders that the play be performed at the National Theater in Berlin. Thus, with Don Carlos, Schiller began to exert a direct influence on the higher political circles of the realm.

One of the individuals to whom Schiller had a chance to read the initial sections of Don Carlos in early 1785 was
Duke Karl August of Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach, who was visiting his cousin in Darmstadt. The Duke was well known as a patron of the arts, and had established in his ducal seat at Weimar some of the most important figures in the cultural life of Germany, including Goethe, Herder, and Wieland. The reading of Don Carlos greatly increased Karl August's admiration of the young dramatist, and Schiller soon found himself under the Duke's benevolent patronage. Karl August bestowed on Schiller the honorary title of Weimar Court Councillor.

In April 1785, at the bidding of Körner, Schiller decided to move first to Leipzig, and then to Dresden, to complete work on Don Carlos, and to seek a more permanent means of support for his hitherto vagabond-like existence. His contract with the Mannheim Theater was now over, and there seemed little danger that his old nemesis, Duke Karl Eugen, had any interest in apprehending the “deserter.” Dresden was also in the province of Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach, where he knew he had some hope of patronage.

Körner helped finance Schiller's trip to Saxony by having the publisher Georg Joachim Göshen buy the Thalia, and pay Schiller an advance. In Dresden, Schiller stayed at Körner's home, in a cottage near a vineyard. It was here that he completed Don Carlos. These days were amongst the happiest of Schiller's life up to that point, as attested by his writing the famous “An die Freude,” the “Ode to Joy,” in which the joy of these happy days and his friendship with Körner were elevated and transformed by the poet into a paean to the universal brotherhood of man.

The Elusive Cultural Icon

In 1787, Schiller made his first journey to Weimar to celebrate the birthday of Johann Wolfgang Goethe. Goethe, who was ten years older than Schiller, was the unofficial poet laureate of the German-speaking world, and Schiller had been an admirer of his since his school days. In fact, Goethe had visited the Karlschule when Schiller was a student there. Schiller had also been an enthusiastic admirer of Goethe's works, in particular, his “Gotz von Berlichingen,” which was based on a theme from medieval German history. Unfortunately, the renowned poet was in Italy during the birthday celebration.

By this time Goethe was already something of a cultural icon, around whom a sycophantic cult had formed which Schiller found highly repulsive. Schiller commented in a letter to Körner on August 12 that, “Goethe's spirit has shaped all those who belong to his circle. A proud philosophical spite towards all speculation and investigations, an attachment to nature even to the point of affectation, and a resignation to the five senses, in short, a sort of childish simplicity of reason characterizes him and his local sect.” Schiller was quite put off by this aspect of Weimar cultural life, and his own developed view of the elevating role of art and culture was not immediately compatible with the far less rigorous and often downright sensualist conception of the court camarilla around Goethe. It would take time before there was any warming in the relationship between the two men.

Schiller did, however, have the opportunity to establish a warm relationship with the aging Wieland, now
the poet emeritus of Germany, and with Johann Gottfried Herder. Wieland opened the pages of his own magazine, *Die Deutsche Merkur*, to Schiller’s writings.

Traveling through Thuringia with his old school chum Wilhelm von Wolzogen, the two young bachelors decided to visit an old acquaintance of theirs, and a cousin of Wolzogen, Luise von Lengefeld, who had two daughters their age. The family had met Schiller briefly in 1784, and were already enthusiasts for his poetical works, although somewhat frightened by the raw energy of *The Robbers*. They were pleased to find that the author did not have the same abrupt character as Karl Moor, but was a gentle, affable young man. The first meeting was somewhat frosty, according to one of the sisters, Caroline von Beulwitz (later married to Wilhelm von Wolzogen), who became one of Schiller’s first biographers. “It amazed us that such a violent and untamed genius could have such a tender exterior,” she wrote. “Fiesco and many poems from his anthology had a great appeal for us. When we joked often later about the coldness of that first meeting,”9 Needless to say, the second encounter was much more successful, and Schiller remained with the family for several months, in quiet writing and intellectual exchanges. With the younger daughter, Charlotte, he would develop a much closer relationship, marrying her in 1790.

This was, of course, not the first time that Schiller had fallen in love. Earlier in Mannheim, he had had serious designs on Louisa Schwan, the daughter of a bookseller in Mannheim. When Schiller sought her hand in marriage, Louisa’s father was agreeable, provided that Schiller find a more promising profession than that of poet and playwright. Faced with this impossible demand, Schiller had to withdraw the offer. Also, an unhappy infatuation with the beautiful Henriette von Arnim led only to the impoverished poet spending more than he could afford on gifts for this aristocratic paramour. With Charlotte von Lengefeld, the situation was different. Here was a kindred spirit, for whom his poetic works helped kindle the fire of love.

With a view to marrying Charlotte, Schiller had now to think of supporting a family. He was also not concerned by the fact that his fiancée was a member of the nobility, while he remained a commoner—and, for the time being, without any visible means of support. Rejecting a return to his medical career, Schiller mooted the possibility of a professorship. Since his school days, he had been an ardent student of history, pursuing an intense study prior to his writing *Don Carlos*. Schiller now began to work on the *History of the Revolt of The Netherlands*, as an entrée into the academic world, a work which definitively established his reputation as an historian.

In September 1788, Schiller met Goethe for the first time. Through his aid, Schiller received an appointment to a professorship at the University of Jena, also within the territory of the Weimar Duke Karl August. The relationship was otherwise still cool. Goethe himself admitted later that he kept away from Schiller. “I avoided Schiller, who, visiting Weimar, lived close by,”10 he would write. Goethe was particularly incensed by *The Robbers*, which he said was “hateful” to him.

But neither was Schiller attracted to the personality of his older colleague, whose poetic genius he nevertheless admired. He wrote to Körner in February 1789: “Being around Goethe on occasion would make me unhappy. He has not a moment to give of himself even with his closest friends. You can’t get a grip on him. I think, in fact, that he is egoistic to an unusual degree. He possesses the talent to enthral people, and by means of small and great solicitudes, binds them to himself; but he knows how to always maintain his own independence. He makes himself known as a benefactor, but only like some deity, without giving of himself. This seems to me a consistent and systematic manner of operation. One should not let such a person in one’s presence. To me he is completely hateful, although at the same time I love his spirit with my whole heart, and think great things of him. I view him as an arrogant prude, who must be made into a child in order to be humbled before the world . . .”

And yet, recognizing that Goethe’s literary genius could be tapped for a higher purpose, Schiller began to formulate a long-term plan. Writing in September 1788, he said: “On the whole, that grand idea I had of him has not been diminished after making personal acquaintance. But I doubt if we will ever grow closer. Much in him which is of interest to me, that for which I still wish and hope for myself, has for him already run its course. He has not a moment to give of himself even with his closest friends. You can’t get a grip on him. I think, in fact, that he is egoistic to an unusual degree. He possesses the talent to enthral people, and by means of small and great solicitudes, binds them to himself; but he knows how to always maintain his own independence. He makes himself known as a benefactor, but only like some deity, without giving of himself. This seems to me a consistent and systematic manner of operation. One should not let such a person in one’s presence. To me he is completely hateful, although at the same time I love his spirit with my whole heart, and think great things of him. I view him as an arrogant prude, who must be made into a child in order to be humbled before the world . . .”

**Storm Clouds on the Horizon**

By 1788, however, storm clouds had already gathered over Europe, with major convulsions about to hit France that would have serious repercussions throughout the Continent, not least in the nearby states of Germany. Schiller was a keen observer of events occurring across
the border. Writing to Körner, he said, “If you don’t read the Moniteur, I would highly recommend that you do so. There you have before you all the details of the negotiations in the National Assembly, and can observe the French with their weaknesses and their strengths.” But he was fast losing hope of any positive outcome of this revolution. In a letter to Körner on September 1787, he wrote: “[August] Bode has brought back a rather dire picture of Paris. The nation has lost all its energy and at a rapid pace approaches its destruction. The convocation of the Notables itself was only a trick by the Government. Had they been convened five years earlier, it would have provided a counterweight. But five years later, there’s no chance. Parliament has no significance. Its sole activity consists in school exercises, which they engage in and are quite happy when they go well, just like school boys. The Stamp Act is a measure that must find 1,000 obstacles in its implementations. In Paris, Beaumarchais is held in contempt by the better people.”

He corresponded regularly with friends in France who were able to give him an on-the-ground reading of events, and they were not encouraging to one who had hoped that the raising of the banner of liberté would lead to the opening of a new era of Reason. Reports from his friend Wilhelm von Wolzogen, in Paris to study architecture, while cautiously optimistic, portrayed a dire situation. In a letter to Charlotte in November 1788, Schiller expressed his own profound skepticism over events in France: “Wolzogen’s estimate of Paris under present circumstances couldn’t be otherwise. The object is still of such a magnitude for him, his inner sense has yet to adjust to it. He has brought a yardstick in order to measure a colossus. I certainly believe that he may, after a longer stay in Paris, ultimately come to the exact same conclusions, but he will do so from completely different motives and from another standpoint. Whoever has a sense and an instinct for the great world of mankind must certainly be plunged into this wide, grandiose element; how small and insignificant our own civic and political conditions are in comparison. Mankind, when it is united, is always a grand being, however small the individuals or the details may appear to the eye. And even because of this it seems to me to be of import that each detail and every individual be viewed from the standpoint of the whole of which it is a part or, what is the same thing, to view it with a philosophical spirit.” In comments to his sister-in-law Caroline, who had remarked on some of the beautiful speeches given in the National Assembly, Schiller said: “It is impossible that anything reasonable can come out of a gathering of six hundred people.”

When the Bastille fell in July 1789, there was some joy expressed among Schiller’s circle of friends. Caroline wrote: “An acquaintance read to us with enthusiasm about the storming of the Bastille. We often remembered later, that when these conditions of tumult and turbulence were being followed closely by all of Europe, revolution inserted itself into everyone’s life, as the crumbling of this monument to a sinister despotism appeared to our young eyes as a prelude to the victory of freedom over tyranny, and we were joyful that it occurred at the beginning of a beautiful relationship of the heart for us.”

Others, including Schiller and Körner’s mutual friend Ludwig Huber (later the editor of the Allgemeine Zeitung, which was owned by Schiller’s publisher Johann Friedrich Cotta), also waxed enthusiastic. In a letter to Körner dated July 23, 1789, Huber wrote: “I don’t believe that we could experience a more interesting time than the present, and I will no longer forgive the anti-Gallicans, if they maintain their contempt for this nation.” A recent addition to Schiller’s circle, who became a great friend and patron, and would later play a key role during the War of Liberation, the prelate Karl Theodor Dalberg, was much more skeptical. He urged much caution with their enthusiasm for the events of France. “Kids,” he told them, “don’t be so certain that this will unfold well. Many
a storm can disrupt everything.” Körner, as well as Schiller, was also skeptical about any good coming out of this revolution. “What do you think about the latest events in France? Now nothing is impossible there, and I wouldn’t be surprised if France gets carved up into several smaller republics,” Schiller wrote to Körner. With the increasing atrocities carried out by the British-manipulated revolutionaries, Schiller’s skepticism was soon transformed into a feeling of horror. In a letter to the Lengefeld sisters on Oct. 30, 1789, he wrote: “Schulz observed the King on the occasion when he was to put on the cockade [symbol of Revolutionary France–WJ]. He held it in one hand and had the other in his vest, clutching his hat under his arm. When suddenly there was applause, and he thought that he had to clap with them, but he didn’t know what to do since both hands were full. At once he made a decision, took the cockade in his mouth, and applauded heartily. Isn’t that a noble presence of mind for a King of France?”

Later, in 1792, when Louis XVI stood under threat of execution, Schiller, the staunch republican—who ironically would be granted citizenship by the new French Republic later that year—considered writing on his behalf. In a letter to Körner on December 21, Schiller asked, “Do you know anyone who can translate well into French, in case I would have need of such a person? I can hardly withstand the temptation to get involved in the dispute regarding the King, and to compose a treatise on the subject. It seems to me that such an undertaking is important enough to occupy the pen of a reasonable person. And a German writer who with liberty and eloquence pronounced on the dispute, would probably make some impression on these misguided souls. Even if one individual from another country made a public judgment on the matter, the first impression, at least, would be to consider him a spokesman for his class, if not for his country; and I think that precisely in this matter the French are not completely insensitive to foreign opinion.” Körner had a translator in mind, and urged Schiller that such a step had to be taken quickly, before the King’s fate was decided. But it was already too late. Before Schiller could complete the memoir, the King had been condemned to death, and was executed on Jan. 21, 1793. Later, when Charlotte von Stein, another friend, still confident of a positive outcome of the French events, lauded the National Assembly as “the Robbers,” Schiller became incensed at this comparison to his early work.

The Historian’s Craft

By this time, Schiller was already settled in an academic niche at the University of Jena. His presence there was something of a sensation. Even before his first lecture in May 1789, he had completed his major historical work, the History of the Revolt of The Netherlands. Originally conceived as a contribution to a series of essays that Schiller was editing, titled the History of Remarkable Rebellions and Conspiracies from the Middle Ages to Recent Times, his own contribution became much too long to be included in the anthology, and was published as a separate book.

For his inaugural lecture at Jena in May 1789, the lecture hall could hold only 80 people, with standing room for 100 more. But, by the time Schiller arrived, the hall was full, and people were lining up at the door. He
agreed to move to a larger hall down the street, which could seat 400 people. As the mass of students marched through town to the other hall, the townspeople thought that a fire had broken out, and the fire-guards were alerted! When they finally settled into the new hall, there were still people standing outside the door. Schiller read his lecture “What Is, and To What End Do We Study, Universal History?” He had been nervous about lecturing, and later wrote to Körner: “With the first ten words that I firmly pronounced, I was again in control of myself, and I read with a strength and certainty of voice that surprised me. Even those standing beyond the door could hear me quite well. My lecture made an impression, and the whole evening you could hear people in the town talking about it, and it really gained the attention of the students, the first example of this being done by a town talking about it, and it really gained the attention of the students, the first example of this being done by a professor.”

Schiller followed this with several other public lectures, initially writing out the lectures in advance. Later, feeling that this was taking up too much of his time, and feeling more confident, he began to lecture freely. Although he considered these history lectures to be his “Brotwissenschaft,” he plunged into the work with his usual gusto. Subsequent lectures included such subjects as “Thoughts on the First Human Society,” “The Mission of Moses,” and “The Jesuit Government in Paraguay.” His interest in the ancient Greeks was reflected in his renowned lecture contrasting the laws of Solon’s Athens with those of Lycurgus’s Sparta, as a paradigm for the conflict between republican and feudalist societies. These lectures used their historical subjects to inspire the students to participate in the fight for human progress. And yet, some of his friends, like Körner, criticized him for concentrating so much energy on the study of history, to the detriment of poetry and drama.

In response, Schiller wrote to Körner in January 1788: “Your low opinion of history seems to me unfair. Certainly, it is arbitrary, full of gaps, and very often barren, but even the arbitrariness in it might stimulate a philosophical spirit to master it; the empty and barren challenges a creative mind to bring it to life and to give it a skeleton, nerves, and muscles. Don’t imagine that it is much easier to develop material you give yourself, than that which is prescribed by certain conditions.” Even when he returned to the field of drama, his subjects would be drawn from that same living sense of history which he had breathed into his purely historical works. He mused about writing a dramatic work on the great Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus, the hero of the Thirty Years’ War. Later, he would fasten on a less heroic figure, the general Albrecht Wallenstein, in order to portray that momentous period in the history of the German people. He also considered writing a series of historical plays on the kings of France, similar to what Shakespeare had done for the English kings, with his hero, Henry IV of Navarre—the paradigm of a monarch who had successfully overcome the religious strife that had devastated Europe during the previous century—as a central figure. And then, with a view to his beloved Germany, he played with the idea of an epic drama based on the feats of Frederick the Great, against whose armies his father had fought as a young man.

Schiller’s criteria for historical works were not limited to nationalist themes, however. In a letter to Körner in October 1789, he explained his concept: “It is a poor and petty ideal to write merely for one nation; for a philosophical spirit such a limit is completely intolerable. Such a spirit cannot remain fixed on such a transitory, accidental, and capricious form of humanity, on such a fragment (and what more than that is even the most important nation?). He can only warm up to the task to the extent that this nation or national event has importance for the progress of humanity. If this can be applied to an historical event, from whatever nation or period it may arise, if it can be connected to the species, then it has all the requirements to be of interest to the hand of the philosopher, and this interest thus needs no further embellishment.”

In 1790, Schiller negotiated with his publisher Göschen to write a major work on the history of the Thirty Years’ War, intended for a broader audience than his History of the Revolt of The Netherlands, and to be serialized in the Historical Calendar for Ladies for the Year 1792. Although written for a journal aimed at the “gentler sex,” it was anything but light reading. Schiller dealt here with the most fundamental event of modern German history, and he wished to pull from his study all the important lessons for the present. The successes, and flaws, of the present system of government in the German states, were all the result of the resolution of this conflict of three long, bloody decades. The importance of this story made itself felt when Schiller a few years later would turn to a new tragedy, the Wallenstein trilogy.

It was probably also at this time that Schiller developed a keen interest in the life and work of Benjamin Franklin. Körner wrote Schiller in May 1790, that Franklin’s Autobiography had been published, and might be appropriate for inclusion in the Universal Collection of Historical Memoirs he was then editing. Although a collaborator on that project, Schiller had left the editorship in others’ hands. A German edition of the Autobiography would be published in 1792, translated by Gottfried Burger. In November 1794, the publisher Cotta sent Schiller a copy of a new biography of Franklin, especially designed to introduce Franklin to young readers. Cotta
felt that the biography would "meet with Schiller’s approval." Schiller would incorporate Franklin’s experiments with electricity into his poetical works, the famous example being the “Götterfunken”—divine sparks—in his “Ode to Joy.” Knowledge of Dr. Franklin’s experiments was widespread in Germany at the time. Goethe would later note, in a letter to Schiller, that Franklin’s lightning rod would be a subject of his own scientific inquiry. In 1798, Cotta offered to pay to install a lightning rod on Schiller’s house, with the comment: “I would like to draw away the physical lightning from you and yours, so that you might divert from me the moral lightning of worry and distress.” Cotta’s comments may well have influenced the passage in Schiller’s Death of Wallenstein, where Wallenstein comments on the death of Max Piccolomini: “On his pure head, the lightning was drawn off, which would else have shattered me.” Schiller was very fond of the new German word “electrisieren,” which he used frequently in his poetry and letters.

Even in Don Carlos, the influence of the American Revolution made itself felt. Posa’s famous statement, “I cannot be the servant of a king,” reflected many of the concepts that had been formulated in the rebellion in America. The figure of the Marquis of Posa, the aristocrat who demands liberty of thought, could not but have been modelled on the real-life aristocratic lover of liberty, the Marquis de Lafayette, who had travelled to America to help the colonies free themselves from British tyranny.

As Schiller’s spirit remained focussed on the grand historical vistas unfolding before him, his academic duties, and the petty conflicts inevitably associated with university life, grew more tedious for him. If he could find some philanthropist to support him, so he could do his own writing, he wrote to Körner, he would tell the university authorities to “kiss my ass.” Even though he always attracted great crowds, and was a favorite of the student body, he felt that his student audience was not always capable of assimilating his more fundamental message.

Then, in December 1791, Schiller, whose health had always been frail, became seriously ill. It appears to have been a form of tuberculosis, and it would continue to plague him for the rest of his life. The illness forced him to abandon his university lecturing, and gave him a forced leisure, which he spent in intense study of philosophy. In a letter to Körner in January 1792, Schiller wrote that, thanks to his confinement, he would begin a study of the works of Locke, Hume, and Leibniz. Schiller had already made a study of Leibniz’s polemic against Locke’s empiricism in the posthumously published New Essays on Human Understanding.

It was a few months later that Schiller began a serious study of the recently published works of the Königsberg philosopher Immanuel Kant, the prime German representative of the British “Enlightenment” philosophy. He launched into a study of Kant’s primary philosophical work, the Critique of Pure Reason. This would be followed by, as they were published, the Critique of Practical Reason, and then the Critique of Judgment. It was primarily in his grappling with the conundrums posed by Kant, that Schiller was able to develop his own radically different ideas about the nature of man’s intellect and its relationship to nature. As Helga Zepp LaRouche describes Schiller’s use of Kant: “The conclusion which Schiller drew from this collapse of the Enlightenment, was that he had to develop a completely new conception of Reason, one based on his ideal of Art and aesthetics, and thus a notion of Reason with a qualitatively different meaning. For Kant, who wrote his Critiques of pure and practical reason at approximately the same time, the Enlightenment was the release of individuals from their...
cumbered minority.' Schiller, to the contrary, connected his notion of aesthetic Reason once again directly to the tradition in which Reason is the source of creativity."^{12}

‘Create Citizens for a Constitution’

Schiller’s inability to lecture created serious financial difficulties for him. He had been so ill that rumors of his death were circulating widely throughout Europe. It was then that the two Danish noblemen, Friedrich Christian of Augustenborg and Count Ernst Schimmelman, informed of Schiller’s predicament by the Danish poet Jens Baggesen, and with a growing enthusiasm for Schiller sparked by Baggesen’s reading to them from Don Carlos, sent Schiller the offer of a three-year stipend, to enable him to continue his writing. They even proposed he relocate to Copenhagen for the conduct of his literary activity.

Schiller was overjoyed, both by their offer, and by their enthusiasm for his work. He determined to dedicate to the Augustenborg duke a series of letters, in which he would develop his ideas for launching a program for the moral education of the population, which had shown itself to be so degraded during the recent French events. Later, Schiller decided to thoroughly rework these letters for publication. These became the celebrated Letters on the Aesthetical Education of Man, his fundamental commentary on the state of political affairs in Europe, and the solution in the realm of philosophy to the unfolding crisis.*

While the published Aesthetical Letters are much more widely read, and his thought more rigorously developed, than the original letters to Augustenborg, the originals provide a rather frank commentary on the events of the day. “The attempt by the French people, to assert the sacred rights of man and to win for itself political freedom, has only revealed their inability and unworthiness, and has plunged not only that unhappy people, but a significant part of Europe and an entire century, back into barbarism and slavery,” he wrote. “The moment was most favorable, but it found a depraved generation, which was not equal to it and did not know how to appreciate it, nor to make use of it.” He deemed out of the question the possibility of any important political change coming any time soon: “Indeed, I am so far from believing in a beginning of a regeneration in political life, that the events of our time rather rob me of all hope of such for centuries to come.”

And yet, it was in the realm of culture that the seeds had to be laid for an eventual rebirth of a genuine political movement dedicated to human freedom. “Should one now cease to strive for this? Should even the most impor-

* See “A Reader’s Guide to Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetical Education of Man,” page 80, this issue.
nature). The magazine was to mobilize all the great minds of the age. By September, he felt that he had already organized Goethe and Herder, Johann Gottlob Fichte, Körner, the poet Friedrich von Matthison, Johan Jacob Engel, the teacher of the Humboldt brothers, as well as the Humboldt brothers themselves, Wilhelm and Alexander, and a group of lesser lights, including the bright but treacherous Schlegel brothers, August Wilhelm and Karl Wilhelm Friedrich, who were later instrumental in the creation of the Romantic movement. Schiller thought the elder brother August Wilhelm possessed some talent; the younger brother had already become a better critic of Schiller, and would soon bring his brother over to his side. The two Schlegels would become the center of a massive campaign to try to destroy Schiller while he lived, and to besmirch his reputation after his death.

Most dramatic of all was the conquest of Goethe, which established the most solid and fruitful collaboration in German—perhaps in world—literary history. Schiller had sent to Goethe some of his latest productions, the poem “Die Götter Griechenlands” (“The Gods of Greece”) and “Die Kunster” (“The Artists”) in which an attentive mind could find certain allusions to Goethe. The Weimar cultural patriarch had also a great interest in the study of the natural sciences. In July 1794, he came to Jena to attend the monthly meeting of a natural science association of which both he and Schiller were honorary members. Schiller, perhaps knowing that Goethe would be there, also attended the meeting. The two began to discuss Goethe’s ideas on the metamorphosis of plants. Schiller, trained in medicine, showed himself to be well-versed in the subject, much to Goethe’s surprise. They became so involved in the discussion that they decided to continue back at Schiller’s house. “I expounded enthusiastically on the metamorphoses of plants, and with many characteristic strokes of the pen, I traced before his eyes a symbolic plant,” Schiller wrote. “He listened and observed all this with keen interest, and with a decisive power of comprehension; when I finished, he shook his head and said, ‘But that is not empirical, that is an idea.’ I stopped short, a bit annoyed. For the point that divided us was thus indicated in the most rigorous manner.”

And so the conversation led to a more philosophical discussion of fundamental questions. Although Goethe never accepted Schiller’s philosophical standpoint, he was won over by the force of Schiller’s personality. Goethe went on in his description: “The first step was thus taken, Schiller’s power of attraction was great, he captivated all who came within his purview; I partook of all his views and promised to contribute to Horen many things which still lay hidden within me; his wife, whom I had been accustomed to love and to admire since she was a child, played her part to create a lasting understanding; all our mutual friends were overjoyed, and so we sealed, by that grand, and perhaps never quite settled struggle between object and subject, a pact that remained unbroken, and which for us and others has effected much good.”

Schiller was also pleasantly surprised with the results. In a letter to Körner on Sept. 1, 1794, he wrote: “On my return I found a warm letter from Goethe, who had now finally taken me into his confidence. Six weeks ago we had a long and wide-ranging discussion about art and the theory of art and had each explained the quite different ways we had come to our main concepts about art. Between these concepts there was an unexpected agreement, that was all the more interesting in that they actually proceeded from the greatest differences in our points of view. Each could give the other something that it lacked, receive something in return. Since that time, the ideas disseminated by Goethe have taken root, and he now feels a need to rely on me, and the road, which he had until now has traveled alone and without encouragement, he will continue in company with me.”

Raising the Banner of Freedom

Schiller now set about his most ambitious publishing project yet. He had been at the helm of at least six journals prior to this, but Die Horen was intended to create a revolution in thought in Germany, and throughout Europe overall. This was the culmination of the political task Schiller had set himself in the Aesthetical Letters. He intended to involve all the serious and committed intellectuals in the German cultural world. Even Immanuel Kant, sitting in his cozy little world in Königsberg on the Baltic Sea, was invited to participate. But the psychologically blocked professor had not quite gotten over the attacks made on his system by Schiller in “On Grace and Dignity” and, more rigorously, in the Aesthetical Letters. Although cordial and formally encouraging, Kant, who had mentioned Schiller’s critique of him in his Religion in the Light of Reason, never contributed anything to the magazine. Schiller would later say of this German representative of the so-called “Enlightenment”: “There is always something in him which, like Luther, reminds you of a monk. He has opened the gates of the monastery, but can never quite escape its imprint.” He also commented that Kant could “never free his wings from life’s muck.”

Writing in September 1794 to Cotta, whom he wished to recruit as the publisher of the new journal, Schiller...
was enthusiastic. “For our part, there is no longer any difficulty, and already we have pulled together a society of writers, which no other journal has yet been able to exhibit. Goethe, Herder, Garve, Engel, Fichte, Friedrich Jacobi, Matthison, Woltmann, Genz in Berlin, and still four or five others, whose names are not yet known by the general public, but who will yet play a role in the literary world, are, in addition to myself, participants in this project,” he wrote. One of the contributors, Wilhelm von Humboldt, had even decided to take up residence in Jena, in order to be close to Schiller, and to assist him in the undertaking.

Schiller’s prognosis about the French Revolution—that it would have consequences far outside France itself—proved to be all too accurate. Already in 1792, the great European powers, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain, had invaded France on several fronts. Believing that resistance would collapse within a matter of weeks or months, they were astounded by the ability of Revolutionary France to create entire armies almost from scratch. None of them had yet experienced the tremendous organizational capabilities of the great Lazare Carnot through his famous levée en masse, mobilizing the entire population as a “people in arms,” which not only allowed France to foil the attacks from abroad, but permitted it to expand outside its own borders. In July 1793, the city of Mainz, seat of the Archbishop of Mainz, one of the Electors of the Holy Roman Empire, was occupied by the French. In 1794, French troops occupied several German states on the left bank of the Rhine. In 1797, these regions would be formally annexed to France. The French presence also placed significant political pressure on all the states of southern Germany. The German nation was fast becoming occupied territory.

Patriotic Germans now found themselves in a dilemma. Those who were favorable to the ideals of the Revolution, not yet aware of how those ideals were being perverted at that very moment, had to choose between these revolutionary ideals, and the occupation of their country by a foreign power. Some, like Schiller’s friend Georg Forster, for example, felt it fitting to serve in what was effectively a puppet government set up by the French in Mainz, a move condemned by Schiller.

It was in this atmosphere that Schiller launched his new publication, true to the commitment he had expressed in his letter to Augustenborg, “to arm Truth and Virtue with that victorious energy which brings hearts under its sway.” Writing in the announcement of the first issue of Die Horen, he wrote: “At a time when the near sounds of war frighten the Fatherland, where the battle of political opinion and interests renews this war in almost every circle, and all too often frightens off the Muses and the Graces, where neither in the conversation nor in the writings of the day is there refuge from this all-persecuting demon of political criticism, it is perhaps a bold, as well as useful task to invite the much distracted reader to a diversion of a completely opposite character. But the more the restricted interest of the present puts the human spirit in a state of tension, confines it and subjugates it in thralldom, the more urgent will be the need for that which is purely human and elevated above the popular themes of the day, to place the spirit again in freedom, and to unite the politically divided world under the banner of Truth and Beauty.” The correctness of Schiller’s view would not be manifest until it came to fruition after his death in the War of Liberation, when a generation educated by his work was prepared to wage an effective fight against the armies of Napoleon, using Schiller’s republican ideals to mobilize the population in their effort.
The Power of the Greeks

It was at this time, when he had finally succeeded in establishing a close relationship with Goethe, that Schiller also benefitted from his intimacy with Wilhelm von Humboldt. Humboldt’s wife, Caroline von Dachero-den, had been a friend of the Lengefeld sisters. In 1792, Schiller had published in Thalia, the chapter of a book Humboldt was writing on The Limits of State Action, under the title “How Far Should the State Extend Its Concern for the Well-Being of Its Citizens?” This was the result of Humboldt’s experience while serving in a diplomatic position in Paris at the height of the revolutionary events. Humboldt’s great love, however, was Classical Greece, an interest which he shared with Schiller. Humboldt had gained proficiency in Ancient Greek, even translating Aeschylus’s Agamemnon and works by the Greek poet Pindar.

In 1793, Humboldt moved to Jena to be with Schiller, and thus expand his own horizons. He brought Schiller a great deal of comfort and stimulation: “In the most lively exchange of ideas,” Caroline von Wolzogen wrote, “and the most intimate friendship, life for [Schiller] would be more graceful and richer in a thousand different spiritual aspects. Every evening the two would become engrossed in philosophical and aesthetic discussions, that would often drag on till late in the night.” The correspondence between the two during times when Humboldt was away, or after he moved from Schiller’s side to become involved in the requirements of day-to-day political and diplomatic life, indicate the great breadth and depth of their relationship.

Humboldt was certainly not much of a poet, and his writing was often too dry for Schiller’s taste. But his profound knowledge of Greece, its literature and its language, was for Schiller an invaluable resource, on which he drew to perfect his art. Humboldt was also a rigorous critic, and he would offer his comments on Schiller’s works as they were being produced, often leading to changes, and always with a depth of understanding and high appreciation that few others possessed. Humboldt truly loved Schiller, ranking him as the greatest of poets, above Goethe or Shakespeare, whom he admired most among the moderns.

In an August 1797 letter to Körner, after Humboldt had moved from Jena and was about to visit Körner in Dresden, Schiller explained the importance of Humboldt for him: “He is highly qualified to keep company with, he has that unusual purity of interest in the subject at hand, he awakens every slumbering idea, forces one to the sharpest clarity, but avoiding any one-sidedness, and he repays any effort that is expended in making your ideas clear, through the rare ability to grasp them and examine them.”

Later, in 1803, after many years of physical separation, Schiller would write nostalgically to Humboldt about their days together: “It is strange how we were so galvanized by each other during those years 1794 and 1795, when we could philosophize together and feel the jolt of that intellectual friction that each generated through the other. Those times will always be unforgettable for me, and if I presently find myself transposed into that joyous poetic activity, and feel on the whole much better, I can assure you, dear friend, that the lack of such an encounter of the spirits as existed between us at that time, has made me feel that much older.” Even with Goethe the relationship was never quite so close as it was with Humboldt.

Stimulated by Humboldt, Schiller decided to master the Greek language, of which he had learned the rudiments at the Karlsruhe, although he never had the leisure to seriously pursue that desire. He did pursue a study of Greek drama, however, which was to exert a major influence on his next dramatic undertaking, the Wallenstein trilogy.

Schiller was closely involved in editing the Horen. He saw his task as establishing a new cultural paradigm, looking back to the Greeks not merely to blindly imitate them, but to create new works for the present which stood on their shoulders. As he wrote in marginal comments on Humboldt’s “On the Study of the Ancients, Especially the Greeks”16: “In the first period there were the Greeks. We stand in the second. The third is still to be hoped for, and then we will not need to wish the Greeks to return.”

Schiller applied his rigorous ideals to the editing of the new journal. He counselled many young poets, encouraging them in their work, criticizing their mistakes, and publishing them when they came up with suitable contributions. This included a flurry of young woman poets, like Amalia von Imhoff and Sophie Moreau, many of whom, unfortunately, would later be sucked into the vortex of the Romantic movement fomented after Schiller’s death, particularly after the passage of the Carlsbad decrees in Germany in 1819. Although the Schlegel brothers were already his sworn enemies, Schiller always attempted to bring the elder brother August Wilhelm back to the path of Reason, publishing his translations of Dante and Shakespeare, as well as some of his theoretical works. The later Romantic poets Friedrich von Hardenburg (Novalis), Jean Paul Richter, and Friedrich Hölderlin, as well as the philosophers Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, who would come to found the so-called Idealist philosophy—the complement in philosophy to Romanti-
cism in the arts—all came within Schiller’s purview, and he attempted to give them all some direction.

Fichte was invited to contribute to the Horen, but his first submission was far below what Schiller was willing to accept. Schiller attempted to reject the article gently, but Fichte was unreconcilable. In a draft of a response to Fichte which he never sent, Schiller expressed his concerns about Fichte’s comportment in words that reveal Schiller’s own attitude toward the Romantic “Zeitgeist”: “Nearly every line that has in recent years flowed from my pen, bears this character [disdain of contemporary opinion—WJ], and if I likewise for ulterior reasons which I have in common with other writers, can not remain indifferent over whether I have a large or small readership, I have at least captured it in the only way that is consistent with my nature and my character; not through cozying up to the spirit of the age do I win over the public, but by seeking, through a lively and daring exhibition of my manner of representation, to surprise, intensify, and agitate it. That a writer who travels this path cannot be the darling of the public, is in the nature of things; for one loves only what releases one, not what causes tension; but for all that, he has the satisfaction of knowing that he is hated out of wretchedness, and envied out of vanity, attacked with enthusiasm by spirits with verve, and adored in fear and trembling by slavish souls. I have never really sought to inquire about the good or bad effects of my literary activity but examples of both have obtruded upon me uninvited—and this happens to this very day.”18 [Emphasis added.]

The Spirit of America

Although Die Horen was devoted primarily to art and literature, Schiller also encouraged historical articles of advantage to the reader. In July 1795, he wrote to the historian Johan Wilhelm von Archenholz, asking him to contribute an article on the American Revolutionary War: “Have you ever considered putting together a short, concise picture of the American Revolutionary War? I know nothing in recent history that, under the hand of a master craftsman, would have such a universal attraction.” Archenholz was a prominent military historian, who had already published in his own history journal, Minerva, an article on the unjust imprisonment of the Marquis de Lafayette. In 1793, from his prison at Magdeburg, Lafayette had written to Archenholz, explaining his actions during the heyday of the French Revolution. Although critical of the Marquis for not being more aggressive in attempting to gain control of events in Paris, Archenholz became instrumental in the movement to mobilize public opinion in Germany to free him. In 1796, Archenholz published in Minerva a letter to Lafayette from Lafayette’s son, George Washington Lafayette, who had gone to live with George Washington in Philadelphia after his father’s arrest.

Lafayette had been captured in Germany by Prussian troops and placed in a Prussian prison. In October 1794, Schiller himself had received an anonymous letter relating the capture of Lafayette, comparing the French Marquis to Schiller’s own Marquis of Posa, and urging Schiller to help obtain his release, or at least, an amelioration of the conditions under which he was held. Several months earlier, however, the Prussians had turned Lafayette over to the Austrians, who threw him into a dungeon in Olmutz, where he was imprisoned for five years.

Schiller’s keen interest in the American Revolution was well known to his friends. In 1797, he was given by the German engraver Johann Wilhelm Muller, an engraving commemorating the death of the American General Joseph Warren at the Battle of Bunker Hill. The engraving was based on a painting by John Trumbull, the artist son of the Revolutionary War-era Governor of Connecticut, who had served in the Continental Army. The engraving was a topic of discussion between Schiller and Goethe, who appreciated the artistic qualities of the painting upon which the engraving was based.

It was at this time that Schiller was beginning to work on Wallenstein. He was greatly assisted by the advice and criticism of Goethe. By now, the two men had developed a close working relationship, unprecedented in the history of culture. Schiller had been Goethe’s primary critic and consultant as Goethe developed his Wilhelm Meister trilogy, often incorporating Schiller’s observations, or making changes suggested by him. In turn, the elder man performed the same function for the younger. When Schiller wrote the first draft of his poem “Ibykus,” for example, Goethe pointed out that cranes never fly alone, but always in flocks. Schiller then rewrote the poem to reflect that important point, changing the title to “The Cranes of Ibykus.” Later, in 1797, the two men would embark on a poetry competition of sorts, with each engaging the other in reviving the medieval ballad form, leading to new and wonderful creations from the hands of both.19

In 1795, the two poets decided to launch a direct provocation, by jointly issuing a collection of couplets, titled “Xenien,” under both their names, with no indication of which poet had authored which of the epigrams. These witty and often biting couplets lampooned specific individuals of German culture and art, causing an uproar in the German intellectual world, which delighted the authors, who were happy to see the well-aimed barbs hit their mark. In that vein, Schiller would comment to Goethe in a letter of June 1799, that “the only relationship
with the public that can’t be a source of regret, is that of war, and I am also very much in favor of attacking dilettantism with every weapon.”

It was Schiller who first saw the overriding importance of Goethe’s work on the drama Faust, which he thought would become the elder poet’s greatest masterpiece. But Goethe had a myriad of interests, both artistic and romantic, that pulled him in all directions, and he could never maintain concentration on it. Schiller’s prodigious work put Goethe back on track, only to be soon diverted by some other interest. This trait of Goethe’s always infuriated Schiller. Goethe did not finish the first part of Faust, with which Schiller was familiar, until 1808, three years after Schiller’s death. The second part would not be completed until 1832, and was published posthumously.

**A Call to Arms**

The Wallenstein trilogy was the culmination of many years of study begun by Schiller when preparing his historical works, and it would prove to be one of the longest and most difficult to compose. Schiller had not written a dramatic work since the completion of Don Carlos in 1787. Now, his study of the Thirty Years’ War, an historical event which had become of central importance to him, as it was for the German nation, rekindled his interest in that period as the setting for a new drama.

The central figure was not to be the heroic Gustavus Adolphus, whom Schiller so much admired, but rather a far less heroic—and, therefore, more difficult—figure as the subject of tragedy: General Albrecht Wenzel Wallenstein, the Duke of Friedland. Wallenstein was the one commander in the service of the Habsburg Emperor who had proven his skill against the Swedish armies. But, after fifteen years of fighting, he was prepared to throw in his lot with the forces of Sweden and the German Protestants to end the devastating religious warfare.

Schiller was at the time engaged in his study of the works of Sophocles and the Greeks. He wished with Wallenstein to replicate the epic proportions of the Greek tragedies, in which the tragic outcome has less to do with the miscalculations of the hero, than with the grand laws of destiny. In Wallenstein, the awesomeness of the task that Wallenstein set for himself—to lead the army of the Emperor against the Emperor, and thus end the wars of religion—only served to magnify the horror of the deed, when Wallenstein ultimately failed and was assassinated. Schiller explained the difficulties of dealing with the subject in a letter to Goethe on Nov. 28, 1796: “Fate still plays too small a role, and the actual missteps of the hero too large a one, in his misfortune. But I comfort myself somewhat with the example of Macbeth, where also destiny has much less to do with his destruction, than the man himself.” However, Schiller’s learned friend Humboldt assured him that, in the final product, he had achieved his goal: “You have transformed Wallenstein’s family into a House of Atreus [of Aeschylus’s Oresteia trilogy—WJ], in which destiny abides, where the occupants are put to flight, but where the onlooker lingers long and willingly at the desolate scene.” With the death of Wallenstein, the only man in the Imperial Army who could conceivably have put an end to the fighting, the war would continue for another fifteen years. The results were still very much present in Germany during Schiller’s day. In Austria, seat of the Habsburg Imperial Family against whom Wallenstein had been prepared to revolt—and the place where Schiller had the greatest difficulty getting his work past the censors—Wallenstein would not be performed until 1814!

Schiller wrestled with Wallenstein for seven years. The drama was of such length that it had to be divided into three parts, each performed on a separate evening. The play dealt with war and warriors. Its first, introductory part, Wallenstein’s Camp, whose metrical form distinguished it from the other parts, took place wholly in an army camp, and the dramatis personae were all soldiers, from general to lowliest private. Here, undoubtedly, Schiller used the familiarity acquired by his many trips with his father. The plays included musical interludes, and some of the poems he composed for this part were set to music. Wallenstein’s Camp would later serve as the model for the camp scene in Giuseppe Verdi’s opera La Forza del Destino.

It was with Wallenstein, more than with any other production by Schiller, that Goethe would make his greatest contribution. During the course of its composition, and particularly as Schiller was coming to the point where the work could be performed, the two regularly discussed the play, scene by scene, deliberating on the meter, characters, and problems of staging. They even took into consideration the actors they would be working with, since Wallenstein placed great demands on their diction, enunciation, and vocal carrying power. Goethe’s work with Schiller on the trilogy was so extensive, that he knew the entire work by heart.

Produced at a time of great turmoil in Germany, Wallenstein became a patriotic rallying point for resistance to Napoleon. The play premiered in Weimar on Oct. 12, 1798, with Wallenstein’s Camp. The second part of the trilogy, The Piccolomini, was staged there in January 1799. When the third part, The Death of Wallenstein, was premiered on July 2, 1799, King Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia himself journeyed to Weimar from Berlin, to see it presented under the direction of its author.
Goethe had prepared reviews for the press in advance of the premieres, to be sent out immediately following the performances. The second staging of *Wallenstein* took place in Berlin, where the director of the Berlin Theater was Schiller’s old friend August Wilhelm Iffland, who had created the character Karl Moor at the Mannheim Theater many years earlier. Iffland was concerned that certain passages would not be acceptable to the Prussian authorities. In particular, he feared that *Wallenstein’s Camp*, which showed a cynical and lawless band of mercenaries so typical of the Thirty Years’ War, would not play well in a “garrison state” like Prussia. But, contrary to Iffland’s concerns, the play was a rousing success. The other two parts of the trilogy were so popular with the Berlin public that, by 1803, Iffland was willing to present *Wallenstein’s Camp*, too.

Lyndon LaRouche once described the effect of great drama as follows: “[You] take within yourself the full cultural experience, by trying to relive, in your own mind, as on a stage. It’s like what a great dramatist does, like Schiller does, or Shakespeare does; or, Shakespeare does with the English histories, for example take these conditions in your mind, re-enact them in your mind. Not as something you comment on, but as if you were reliving it, as a great dramatist does, with a historical drama.”

The effect of this “reliving” of such an event in German history as that described in *Wallenstein* was overwhelming. Schiller’s drama tapped into the deepest emotional recesses of the nation. The play’s message became a rallying cry to defend the nation by arms if necessary, and it had a cathartic effect on the soldiers who would soon be going to war. In October 1805, a number of non-commissioned officers were given free tickets to a performance. There were also many Prussian officers in attendance. The famous “Reiterlied,” one of the poems authored by Schiller, was sung, followed by another popular military air, “In Praise of War.” The latter was taken up by the audience, who knew it well, after which there were hurrahs for the King and the Prussian Army. Later, Schiller’s influence within the military was noted in a different context by the aging General von Yorck, himself a late convert to the cause of the Prussian reforms, complaining that “every young ensign now wants to play the Marquis Posa to his superior officers.”

With *Wallenstein*, Schiller’s reputation as Germany’s greatest writer was now undisputed, and his influence reached into the courts of many countries. In 1802, through the efforts of Dalberg, Schiller was raised to the nobility. The Imperial edict conferring the title stated: “In particular, his excellent poems have given to the German language and to German patriotism new life, so that he has definitely provided great merit to the Germany Fatherland and its reputation.” Schiller was not himself particularly concerned about the title of nobility, but he was not averse to accepting it, because the lack of a title restricted his ability to move freely at the court of Weimar. His wife, although from an aristocratic family herself, had also been restricted from participation in court events, because she was married to a commoner. Schiller was eager to change those circumstances, more for her sake than his.

In 1803, the King of Sweden, Gustaf Adolf IV, travelled to Weimar to see a production of the *Death of Wallenstein*. His real reason for the trip was to attempt to mobilize the German states to resist the encroachments of Napoleon. The King met with Schiller, and presented him with a ring, as a tribute to Schiller’s praise in the *History of the Thirty Years’ War* of his ancestor, the great Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus, who had intervened in Germany to come to the aid of the Protestant states during the Thirty Years’ War. Schiller wrote to Körner
on September 12: “This is the first bird of this type that has ever flown into my house; may others soon follow.” And they soon did.

In May 1803, Schiller was invited to a reception in Erfurt by a group of Prussian officers who had seen Wallenstein. He wrote to Körner on May 12: “The Prussian officers in Erfurt have invited me to a festival in Erfurt, and I have attended. It was for me a great time to find myself in the midst of a grand military group, for there were around 100 officers altogether, among whom I found some of the old majors and colonels most interesting.” Schiller was known to the Prussian officers by more than his poems and theatrical works. Almost the entire von Wolzogen family—Wilhelm, Ludwig, and young August—were in uniform, and they were strong proponents of Schiller’s works. In preparing for the death of the character Max Piccolomini, Schiller had asked Ludwig to describe what it was like to be in the midst of battle, because he wanted to portray the death of his young idealist Max on the battlefield. But Schiller found it impossible to replicate on stage the shooting, and the shouting, and the cannonades, described by Ludwig.

New Vistas at the End

With the success of Wallenstein, Schiller was at the pinnacle of his art. From there, until the end of his life in 1805, he rapidly composed at least one new masterpiece a year—in 1800, Mary Stuart; in 1801, The Maid of Orleans; in 1803, The Bride of Messina; and, in 1804, William Tell. His death cut short work on his last drama, Demetrius. During these years, he was also occupied with productions at the Weimar Theater, reworking dramas by Lessing and Shakespeare for performance there.

Schiller had been fascinated by the story of Mary Stuart ever since his Mannheim days. This drama about the dynastic struggle under the Tudors, allowed him to probe the problems of the religious divisions in the British Isles following the death of Henry VII, and to tread on some of the ground which Shakespeare had trod before him in his history plays. It also enabled him to exhibit some of the liturgical differences between Protestantism and Catholicism, sympathetically portraying on stage both Mary’s confession, and her receiving Holy Communion (which in some places had to be cut to get past the censor!). An English colleague of Schiller’s who was living in Weimar, Joseph Mellish, translated the play for an English audience as it was being written.

When Schiller turned his attention to the problems of France, he focussed not as one might have expected on Henry IV of Navarre, but on Joan of Arc, the heroine of French liberation from the English during the Fifteenth century. This was also Schiller’s way of rescuing Joan from the disrepute into which she had been thrust by a cynical attack on her by Voltaire, that imp of the Enlightenment. Schiller took the poetic liberty of giving Joan a love interest, and a moment of doubt, in order to provide an opportunity for her to overcome real human weakness, in the process of mobilizing her spirit to fulfill its divinely ordained mission. Schiller compared the lyrical beauty of the language in his Maid of Orleans to that of an opera.

In 1803, Schiller produced The Bride of Messina, following the example of Goethe, who in his 1786 Iphigenia at Tauris had attempted to replicate the Greek form most closely with a subject from Greek myth. Then, in 1804,
Schiller produced that masterpiece of republican drama, *Wilhelm Tell*.

Schiller chose these incidents from the historical traditions of the different European nations, because they had particular significance in exposing the psychological problems impeding political change. The unfinished *Demetrius*, a drama from Russian history, was situated during the “Time of Troubles” (1604-1613), when the country found itself without a Czar. Russia had become a focus of attention for Schiller because of its significance as an ally of Germany in the coming conflict with Napoleon. Schiller was also becoming a favorite among many of the members of the ruling Romanov family, thanks to the work of his brother-in-law, Wilhelm von Wolzogen, who was now an aide to the German princesses who had married into the Romanov family. There may also have been some thought on Schiller’s part of preparing the Russian ruling family for the important decisions they would have to make in the coming years. The secret of Schiller’s *Demetrius* was that the dynastic issue was not of primary significance: the “false” Demetrius could achieve legitimacy as a ruler, if he acquired the qualities of a statesman. For Schiller, the requirement for leading a nation was statesmanship, no matter what one’s pedigree.

*William Tell* was an idea that Goethe had long played with, and had discussed often with Schiller. In addition, Schiller was being pressured by the Berlin Theater director Iffland to provide him with something that would have broad public appeal. Iffland had staged Schiller’s *Bride of Messina*, the closest Schiller came to replicating the form of an actual Greek tragedy, but it did not have the same success as Schiller’s other plays. *William Tell*, however, with its folk-like setting, became one of the most popular of Schiller’s works. Schiller determined that *Tell* would be his gift to Iffland, and would premiere in Berlin.

Receiving the first scenes, Iffland was overjoyed. But, as he received subsequent ones, he became increasingly concerned, primarily because of the political content of the play. Indeed, Iffland may even have received word from the Prussian censors—who would, of course, be keeping a watchful eye on anything appearing on the Berlin stage—that parts of the play were unacceptable. Always aware of the viciousness of censorship in the different German states, Schiller agreed to blunt some of the sharper confrontations between the oligarchs and the freedom fighters. But this delayed the opening in Berlin, and therefore the premiere of *Wilhelm Tell* was held in Weimar. Fittingly, the delayed Berlin premiere would be performed on American Independence Day, July 4, 1804.

Of all his plays, *Wilhelm Tell* most clearly expressed Schiller’s republican ideals. It also most strongly reflected the influence of the American Revolution. In the famous Rüti Oath, one sees reflected the views of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, who pledged their lives, their liberty, and their sacred honor, to assert the “inalienable rights” of man. One of the parts of the play which Iffland found most problematic was the famous declaration by Stauffacher at Rüti, “There is a limit to the tyrant’s power!” There was also a limit to Schiller’s patience, however, and this scene remained as written. In a letter to Iffland on April 14, Schiller said: “I couldn’t formulate it in any other way without contradicting the spirit of the work; for once you have chosen a subject like *William Tell*, you must necessarily play on certain strings which don’t always sound pleasant to every ear. If the passages that you now mention cannot be spoken in the theater, then *Tell* cannot be played at all at this theater, since its entire focus, as innocent and just as it is, must cause scandal.”

Earlier, at the end of 1803, Schiller had received an invitation from the King and Queen of Prussia to visit them at the Royal Palace at Potsdam, just outside Berlin. He had spoken with the royal couple before, at the Weimar premiere of *The Death of Wallenstein*. The meeting was part of an effort by friends of Schiller to bring him to Berlin, which was clearly becoming a larger arena for his activity. The recent death of Herder, and Goethe’s occasional flights into a hermit-like existence, made Schiller’s Weimar seem a very small place.

Schiller made the trip in May 1804. While in Berlin, he had the opportunity to meet for the first time some of the Berlin humanist circle descended from the intellectual networks of the philosopher Moses Mendelssohn. He was already acquainted with Mendelssohn’s son Abraham, with the composer Zelter, and with the Humboldts, but many of the Berlin intelligentsia knew Schiller only through his works. In Berlin, he had the opportunity to see performances of both *The Maid of Orleans* and *Wallenstein*—as both were playing over the same fortnight.

Schiller met with the King and Queen, and with Cabinet Minister Karl Friedrich Beyme, during his weeks in Berlin. He also met with Prince Louis Ferdinand, who was already an enthusiastic supporter of resistance to Napoleon. Louis Ferdinand would lose his life two years later, leading his troops in battle against the French at Saalfeld. The King and Queen assured Schiller that arrangements could be made for him to move to Berlin, or, barring that, to have him spend some part of the year in Berlin, and to induct him into the Berlin Academy of Sciences. There was even discussion of appointing him history tutor to the young Crown Prince, later King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. In a letter to Körner on June 16, after concluding his visit, Schiller wrote of a possible
move to Berlin: “I have felt the need to move to a strange and larger city. On the one hand, I am determined to write for a larger public. My dramatic works should influence them, and I see myself here in such a limited environment, that it’s a miracle how I somehow can achieve something for the larger world outside.” His sister-in-law also remarked how Schiller “in later life considered himself suitable for public office, and believed that he could do this with great interest and to some benefit.”

Despite the assurances he had been given in Berlin, however, Schiller never received a reply to his letters requesting clarification of the financial arrangements. Perhaps his republican spirit was too great a challenge to the Prussian aristocracy. It would also be some time before the government, pressed by outside events, decided to mobilize the people for total war against Napoleon, thus permitting the fulfillment of long-planned and much-needed liberal reforms.

There were also pressing personal reasons for Schiller to be hesitant about such a move. Charlotte was not excited by the thought of leaving her native region, and she was pregnant with another child. Schiller’s health, always precarious, was another consideration. The poet who had written so wonderfully about the Swiss mountain folk, had never seen the Alps; the author of the sea-faring Fiesco, had never seen the sea. His physical condition had always made long journeys life-threatening ventures. At the same time, the Duke of Weimar, learning of Schiller’s financial predicament, agreed to raise his stipend. In August, another daughter, Emilie, was born.

In November, Schiller’s brother-in-law, Wilhelm von Wolzogen, accompanied the Crown Princess of Russia, Maria Pavlovna, who had married the son of the Duke of Weimar, to Weimar. There were great celebrations. Schiller composed “Die Huldigung der Kunste” (“Homage to the Arts”) in her honor. Von Wolzogen had introduced both the Crown Princess and her mother, the Queen Dowager, to Schiller’s dramas in St. Petersburg. Even Czarina Elizabeth, a German princess from Baden who had become the wife of the new Czar Alexander I, was now a fervent admirer of Schiller. She had become the wife of the new Czar Alexander I, and Schiller was reviewing the translation. Voss would become the companion of his final days. Both Schiller and Goethe were now seriously ill, and both considered the possibility that one or both of them might soon die. On March 1, the two met for the last time. Voss, who was present, describes the scene: “They fell into a warm embrace, and kissed each other in a warm, tender kiss, before either of them could say a word. Neither of them spoke of their own or the other’s maladies, but both enjoyed with a cheerful spirit the unadulterated joy of being again united.”

On May 8, Schiller fell into a semi-conscious state. At one point, when he was approached by his sister-in-law Caroline, he clasped her hand warmly, saying, “Always better, always cheerful.” Then, on the morning of May 9, Schiller quietly passed away. His wife Charlotte wrote: “He was fantasizing quite a bit about soldiers, about warriors. He mentioned Lichtenberg’s name many times. Then he went into a deep sleep. He awakened once. Then he gently expired—such was his death.”

For Goethe, the loss was devastating. He commented that half of him had died with the loss of Schiller. Although he would live on for many years, revering Schiller’s memory, and would finish his Faust, his existence and, undoubtedly, his productions would be the poorer without the watchful eye and tender solicitation of his noble friend. When his granddaughter, Ottilie, later commented that Schiller’s poetry often bored her, the old gentleman wryly remarked, “You are too wretched and too earthly for him.”22 In 1823, while preparing the publication of the letters between himself and Schiller, Goethe wrote to Wilhelm von Humboldt: “His letters are an unending treasure . . . and as one can by means of them make great progress, so must they be read again and again in order not to fall backward.”23

Schiller was no more, but his works would live on to inspire generations to come. In the following year, 1806, Napoleon annexed a greater portion of the states west of the Rhine, forming a French-controlled Confederation of the Rhine. On October 14, he defeated the Prussian Army at Jena, marching triumphantly into Berlin. It would take years of occupation and further humiliation for the Prussian government, following the destruction of Napoleon’s Grande Armée in its retreat from Moscow, to gather the courage to take up arms against the invader. Faced with ultimate destruction, the King finally gave the Prussian reformers the leeway they needed to make fundamental changes in the oligarchical system, and to mobilize the population in a war of liberation against Napoleon—although these reforms were subsequently overturned when the European oligarchy reconsolidated its power at the 1815 Congress of Vienna. Throughout the War of Liberation, however, when the spirit of freedom would
become a rallying cry for the German people, the words would be Schiller’s.

These words would be translated into all the languages of the world, and would be heard in theaters everywhere. Schiller had given to each European nation a classic to embrace and love, and to hold high as an example of the great ideals to which it might aspire; and to all nations, a corpus of work which each might call its own. The words would be set to music, in Lieder and in choral song. They would be set by Beethoven in his Ninth Symphony, and, thus adorned as the culmination of that grand symphonic ode to human brotherhood, would ring forth in every corner of the world as the universal song of freedom.

Years later, another German poet, Heinrich Heine, who would take up the cudgels against the Romanticist lot which had fought Schiller during and after his life-time, wrote in The Romantic School a tribute to his unequalled predecessor, whose works would be the solace of Heine’s own final days:

“Schiller wrote for the great ideas of Revolution, he destroyed the spiritual Bastille, he raised the temple of freedom, and indeed that very great temple, which should encompass all nations, just like a single community of brethren: he was a cosmopolitan. He began with that hatred against the past which we see in The Robbers, where he is like a little Titan, who has skipped school, drunk some schnapps, and thrown stones through Jupiter’s windows; he concluded with that love of the future, which already blossomed forth in Don Carlos like a forest of flowers; and he himself is the Marquis Posa, simultaneously prophet and soldier, who fights for what he prophesies, and, under a Spanish cloak, carries the most beautiful heart that ever loved and sorrowed in Germany.”

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2. Except where otherwise noted, all quotations are from Schillers Werke Nationalausgabe (Collected Works of Schiller, National Edition) (Weimar: H. Bohlaus Nach., 1943- ), 22 vols. All quotations have been translated from the German by the author.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Schiller was quite taken with the iambic meter. On March 10, 1789, he wrote to Körner: “All sorts of ideas are rolling around although somewhat fuzzy in my head, but there will appear something clear for all this. But what meter ought I to choose for it? Is it difficult to guess which I would definitely choose? None other than ottave rime. Everything else, except for the iambic, I will detest until the day I die, and how pleasantly I will detest until the day I die, and how pleasantly...” Schiller’s friend Streicher wrote in 1784: “He believed that here iambic meter would be the most suited for the dignity of the action as well as that of the characters [of Don Carlos—WJ]. In the beginning this made for some difficulty, since for two years he had not written anything in bound verse. Now he must order his phrasing rhythmically; in order to create a meter that flowed, he had first to think rhythmically. When the first scene of Don Carlos was thus arrayed in metric garb, Schiller saw himself that it was not only the most appropriate for this drama, but, as it even lifted common expressions to a higher plane, so would it even more enhance the sublimity and the beauty of the more significant passages.”
10. Der Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe (Correspondence Between Schiller and Goethe), ed. by Emil Staiger (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1966), Introduction.
11. Schiller authored an historical treatise on “The History of the French Agitation Which Preceded the Reign of Henry IV,” but he never started a dramatic work on this hero of his.
17. Der Briefwechsel zwischen Friedrich Schiller und Wilhelm von Humboldt (Correspondence Between Friedrich Schiller and Wilhelm von Humboldt), ed. by Siegfried Seidel (Berlin, Aufbau-Verlag, 1962), Introduction.
18. Friedrich Schiller, Werke und Briefe in zwölf Bänden (Friedrich Schiller, Works and Letters in Twelve Volumes) (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1998- ).
23. Ibid.
The purpose of this essay is to provide a guide to “the young friend of truth and beauty”1 in his or her reading of Friedrich Schiller’s *Letters on the Aesthetical Education of Man*, which Schiller wrote in 1793 to a Danish Prince, Friedrich Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Augustenborg, who had come to Schiller’s aid some years earlier. The original letters, of which there were only nine, were destroyed by a fire at the Prince’s palace in 1794. Nearly two years later, Schiller rewrote the whole series, nearly doubling their length, and published them by installments in *The Graces*, a journal he founded and edited.

In the *Aesthetical Letters*, Schiller openly attacked the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, an empiricist turned neo-Aristotelian, who had become in Schiller’s day the favorite of the oligarchical reactionaries, for whom his writings provided ideological support.

In the aftermath of the failure of the French Revolution of 1789 to replicate the American Revolution in Europe, Schiller knew that the philosophy of Kant was an even greater danger to the cause of political freedom than the guillotine. For this reason, Schiller referred to Kant in his essay “On Grace and Dignity” as the “Draco of his day.”2 Schiller elsewhere described Draco, who was the dictator of Athens in Greece prior to the political revolution effected by Solon, as “a man bereft of human sentiments, who believed human nature capable of nothing good, who saw all deeds but in the dark mirror of his own cheerless soul, and was utterly lacking in indulgence for the weaknesses of humanity; a bad philosopher, and an even worse judge of man, with a cold heart, a narrow mind, and unwavering in his prejudices.”3 This description fit Kant to a tee.

In attacking Kant, Schiller did not engage in a point-by-point refutation of Kant’s constipated *Critique of Pure Reason*, or his later *Critique of Judgement* on aesthetics, but rather he focussed on Kant’s Achilles’ heel, his notion of the “categorical imperative,” which Kant developed in his *Critique of Practical Reason* as the solution to what he refers to as the “fundamental antimony of practical reason.”

In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant asserts a fundamental antimony or self-contradiction between man’s self regarded from the standpoint of reason and moral law, and man’s sensuous (physical) nature characterized pathologically by the desires of self-love. Since Kant denies the essential goodness of man’s sensuous existence, he can only define morality as the suppression of man’s evil nature. This subordination of man’s sensuous desires to the moral law is effected by means of the “categorical imperative.” And for Kant, to follow the moral commandments “gladly” would be self-contradictory.

In the fight to achieve political freedom, one must not agitate a population by appealing to its irrational passions and obsessions; rather, one must create within individuals a philosophical, or as Schiller puts it, an *aesthetical* state of mind. And the task of political organizing is to replicate such a state of mind in others.
Politically, such a false axiomatic assumption about man’s nature, which denies man’s capacity for agapē love and creative reason, is the ideological basis for the argument in favor of fascist dictatorships, as against the possibility of governments based on political freedom. Hence arose Schiller’s determination to destroy the authority of this evil philosophy.

As we shall see, Schiller’s solution to Kant’s belief that morality can only be achieved by negating man’s negative sensuous impulses, is to educate the emotions of man, in order to bring them into harmony with reason. For Schiller, a human being who has achieved such harmony, by transforming his selfish, infantile erotic emotions into agapē of truth, justice, and beauty, is a “beautiful soul.” Moreover, since only such a person is truly free, durable political freedom can only be achieved by deliberately fostering such an aesthetical education of man’s emotions among the population.

Because Schiller’s writings are such a devastating critique of the philosophical basis for continuing oligarchical oppression of humanity, academic agents of the oligarchy, taking advantage of the abstraction of Schiller’s argument, have gone so far as to attempt to deny his opposition to Kant, even to the point of lyingly portraying him as a Kantian.

As one reads Schiller’s letters, one finds that virtually every letter commences with a paradox. But rather than leaving these paradoxes unresolved as Kant does, Schiller resolves the Kantian antinomies, derived from Aristotelian logic, on the higher level of Platonic, creative reason. And as we shall see, for Schiller beauty is not a matter of subjective, arbitrary taste, as it is for Kant, but rather beauty is his solution to the unresolved contradiction in Kant’s philosophy as a whole, which derives from Kant’s false notion of man’s very nature.

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Thus, what Schiller does, in effect, is to recast philosophy as aesthetics. The Aesthetical Letters are not about “art per se. Rather, what Schiller establishes is that the subject matter of philosophy must proceed from his understanding of beauty, and that the truly philosophical mind is the aesthetical state of mind.

In 1830, twenty-five years after Schiller’s death, Wilhelm von Humboldt published an essay entitled, “On Schiller and the Course of His Spiritual Development,” as the introduction to a book containing the correspondence between the two. In that essay, Humboldt lamented that even then Schiller’s Aesthetical Letters were not frequently read, despite the fact that their treatment of beauty could not be excelled:

I doubt if these works, “On Grace and Dignity” and the Letters on the Aesthetical Education of Man, filled with substantial ideas and expressed in a uniquely beautiful way, are still frequently read, which is regrettable in a number of respects. Indeed, neither work, and, in particular, the Letters, can be absolved of the reproach that Schiller, in order to firmly establish his assertions, selected a method too strict and abstract, and too much neglected to treat the material in a manner admitting more fruitful application, without in so doing, really having satisfied the demands of a deduction purely from concepts. But, concerning the concept of beauty, concerning the aesthetic in creation and action, and thus the foundations of art, as well as art itself, these works contain everything essential in a manner which can never possibly be excelled.5

On the occasion of the 200th anniversary of Schiller’s death, we owe it to Schiller and to ourselves, to ensure that an entire generation of young people who have been deliberately subjected to the culture of ugliness bequeathed them by the Congress of Cultural Freedom, are given the opportunity to fully understand Schiller’s great gift to us: the means to regain our humanity by recreating in ourselves an aesthetical state of mind.

Owing to the abstraction of Schiller’s presentation, it is often the case that those who read these letters fail to work through the argument in detail. This essay is intended to aid “the young friend of truth and beauty” in fully grasping the entirety of Schiller’s argument, by providing such a reader with a guide for working through Schiller’s letters, and hence re-experiencing for himself the process of development of Schiller’s conceptions.

LaRouche on Schiller’s Political Significance

The urgent political necessity of comprehending Schiller’s aesthetical contribution to today’s fight for the political liberation of humanity has been specifically identified by Lyndon LaRouche in two essays, the first entitled “Russia Is Eurasia’s Keystone Economy,” and the second, “The Substance of Morality.” In these essays, LaRouche develops the idea that human progress in the physical domain, or what he refers to as the “n-fold manifold,” cannot only be achieved to the extent that the moral education of the individual’s passions in what he calls the “m-fold manifold,” is accomplished through Classical art. Failure to achieve progress in the n-fold manifold through the physical sciences, results from dysfunctions within the m-fold manifold of culture.

In the first of these two locations, LaRouche writes:

The exemplary case, is Friedrich Schiller’s solution to the problem posed to continental Europe generally by the abomination known as the French Jacobin phenomenon of 1789-1794. Until this French horror-show, the anti-oligarchical forces of Europe had been inspired by the 1776-1783 American War of Independence, as the model upon which the hope of a truly civilized human existence was premised. The Jacobins demonstrated, to paraphrase Schiller’s German, that a moment of great opportunity had, unfortunately, found in the French population, a pathetically little people. Schiller’s remedy followed the Classical tradition of such exemplary, relatively immediate predecessors, and aversaries of Voltaire, as Moses Mendelssohn and Gotthold Lessing. Schiller emphasized the role of great compositions in the Classical art-forms of poetry, tragedy, music, and study of universal history, as the necessary moral education of the individual’s passions. This moral education, supplied by great compositions in Classical art-forms, is required to produce a true citizen of a republic; our m-fold sub-manifold.8

LaRouche’s use of the terminology referring to an n-fold and an m-fold manifold, reflects both his appreciation of the great Russian scientist Vladimir I. Vernadsky, and his correction of Vernadsky’s failure to fully account for the social aspect of human creativity. Vernadsky identifies three domains, the abiotic (non-living), biosphere, and Nöosphere, the domain of human creativity. Vernadsky correctly identifies the responsibility of the Nöosphere to develop the biosphere. This is the equivalent of LaRouche’s conception of the necessity to achieve progress in the n-fold manifold. However, Vernadsky does not identify the role of Classical art-forms in ensuring that individual creativity is socialized—what LaRouche refers to as the m-fold manifold—so as to achieve progress in the physical domain.

In the second essay, LaRouche emphasizes that “when and whether progress, or even retrogression occurs, is never automatic, the actual outcome is a result of what we term ‘cultural factors,’ as much as impulses attribut-
able to progress in discovery of higher physical principles as such.”9

Today we are faced with the same ontological issue which Schiller addressed using the example of the horrible failure of the French Revolution. As LaRouche puts it: “We are faced, thus, once again, with the fact, that the most powerful technological cultures can be doomed by the kind of moral and cultural ‘paradigm shift’ which has dominated the world, increasingly, since the 1964-72 youth counterculture revolt against both technological progress and rationality generally.”10

LaRouche writes that there are two great evils—oligarchism, and the moral degeneracy engendered in subject populations. Schiller referred to these evils in respect to the French Revolution as the “barbarism” of the pro-oligarchic Enlightenment elite, and the “savagery” of the uneducated population.

What is required to save a civilization from its own Hamlet-like self-destruction is, according to both Schiller and LaRouche, the creation of “beautiful souls.” As LaRouche argues, in a Classical tragedy, such as Schiller’s Don Carlos, the leading characters apart from Elisabeth, “are each gripped, like Shakespeare’s Hamlet, by a compelling devotion to some fatal degree of relative spiritual littleness in themselves. World-historical roles are more or less evaded out of small-minded attachments to small-minded family and kindred personal considerations.”11

In contrast, in the case of a beautiful soul, the character is no longer an adolescent personality characterized by selfishness, but is rather a conscious, world-historical personality, living and acting lovingly in the simultaneity of eternity. Such a character is capable of helping a population free itself from the self-degradation imbued within popular opinion (vox populi), and thus of ensuring continued human progress.

With this introduction to the significance of the intellectual journey upon which we are now to embark, we commence our dialogue with the “Poet of Freedom.”

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**Letter One**

The first letter initially seems to support the false assertion that Schiller is a Kantian. Here, Schiller writes that, “it is in greatest part Kantian principles, upon which the subsequent assertions will rest.” However, already in the first letter, Schiller sets the task before him as resolving the paradox or antinomy inherent in Kant’s aesthetic and moral writings. As Schiller writes in the first letter, referring to Kant as the analyst: “Is it any wonder, if the natural feeling does not find itself once more in such an image, and the truth appears in the report of the analyst as a paradox?”

The central difficulty with Kant’s moral philosophy, as expressed in his Critique of Practical Reason, is his concept that the fundamental antinomy of practical reason can only be resolved through the categorical imperative. This concept reduces morality to the negation of a negation. Moral duty is conceived as necessarily in opposition to man’s sensuous inclinations, which therefore must be negated.

Schiller rejects such a concept of morality as lacking in freedom. Thus, in his essay “On Grace and Dignity,” written in 1793, just before he wrote the Aesthetical Letters, Schiller explicitly rejects the Kantian categorical imperative, arguing that such a concept may be appropriate for a servant, but not for the free son of the household.

In his reflection, “On Schiller and the Course of His Spiritual Development,” Wilhelm von Humboldt therefore noted, that with this criticism of Kantian morality, Schiller came forward “as Kant’s opponent.”12

In the first letter, one can easily see that Schiller, by his very choice of language, is setting the stage for resolving this Kantian paradox in the course of the letters as a whole. Schiller stresses that, although the request for him to write on the subject makes it a duty for him, he is merely following his inclination. The request is not a constraint, but rather permits him to fulfill an inner need.

Furthermore, consistent with this perspective, Schiller argues that his ideas are derived from his own mind. He does make the above-cited reference to Kantian principles; however, he warns that he will not maintain his own ideas through any external academic authority. His approach will be to respect the freedom of his reader’s mind by addressing it Socratically.

Schiller does not make reference to Kant’s Critique of Judgment, but rather to his Critique of Practical Reason. And here he indicates that his task is to liberate “the practical part of the Kantian system” from its “technical form,” which “must destroy the object of the inner sense,” “put it in the fetters of rule,” and rend the beautiful “to pieces in conceptions.”

In this first letter, Schiller already suggests his solution to the problem of Kantianism. In the “Kallias Letters” written to his friend Gottfried Körner, Schiller locates his concept of beauty in the imitation of the form of practical reason, which is “to be determined not from the outside, but rather through itself, to be determined autonomously or to appear so.”13 Thus, he writes: “The
Glossary of Terms

**Fundamental antinomy of practical reason.** According to Kant, man’s nature is self-contradictory. On the one hand, man is free through the moral law which derives from his capacity for reason. On the other hand, man as a creature of nature is characterized by pathological sensuous desires.

**Categorical imperative.** For Kant, the only way to resolve the antinomy of practical reason is for reason to impose the categorical demands of moral law by suppressing (negating) man’s heteronomic, pathological nature.

**Barbarian.** According to Schiller, man is a barbarian if his narrowly defined rational principles destroy his capacity for the feelings associated with agapic love.

**Savage.** According to Schiller, man is a savage if his infantile egoistic feelings rule over his reason and capacity for love.

**Naturwissenschaft.** The physical sciences.

**Geisteswissenschaft.** The arts or humanities, in contrast to the physical sciences.

**Beautiful Soul.** A person in whom the emotions are in harmony with reason, owing to the fact that his emotions are no longer those of infantile self-love, but rather have been elevated to the level of agapé. Such a person does his moral duty freely with joy.

**Sublime.** A person has achieved a sublime state of mind when even in the face of death, he freely decides to act on the basis of moral principle, rather than for his own physical self-preservation. This proves that man, as distinct from the animals, is characterized by a “supersensuous” moral independence.

**Schwärmerei.** The mind of a person in a state of schwärmerei is literally “swarming.” Rather than having a clear perspective for achieving his ideals, his mind is so blinded by self-love that his efforts become self-destructive.

**Transcendental.** Kant’s philosophy is usually referred to as “transcendental,” in the sense that it negates the material, since it considers reason and the material as contradictory. However, Schiller uses this term differently, in reference to the derivation of his concept of beauty. Rather than deriving his concept from empirical experience, he derives it from the realm of ideas, which transcends empirical experience. Schiller’s concept of beauty is ultimately derived from his concept of the nature of man, which he in turn derives from his concept of the divine—since man, as Schiller writes, has a “predisposition for divinity in his personality.”

**Sensuous drive.** As a finite (material) being, man is by nature characterized by sensuous desires or drives. Schiller says that the object of the sensuous drive is “life.”

**Formal drive.** At the same time, as a creature of reason, man has a drive to impose a conceptual and moral order upon the sensuous world. Schiller says that the object of the formal drive is “form.”

**Play drive.** Not a third, independent drive, but rather the harmonious, reciprocal combination of the sensuous and formal drives. It is based upon the union of love and creative reason. Schiller says that the object of the play drive—which we call beauty—is “living form.”

**Empty infinity.** Schiller uses this term to describe the condition of the human spirit, before it has been determined by the conditions of its existence; i.e., before acquiring its particular, individual specificity. At birth, before it is shaped by the particular constraining conditions of its upbringing, the human being has a determinability without bounds.

**Fulfilled infinity.** In contrast to an empty infinity, in which the human being has an absolute capacity to be determined (because he has not yet been determined), the aim of man’s “aesthetical education” is to free the individual from particular determinations, which limit his capacity. In that sense, the purpose of beauty is to unite all reality in the person, in order to restore his inner fullness.

**Aesthetical state of mind.** The state of mind of a beautiful soul, a free state of mind, in which the mind has been freed of all forms of compulsion and of all particular determinations. It is the true philosophical outlook. A person with such a state of mind has regained his capacity as a human being “to impart and receive profound ideas respecting man and nature,” in the poet Shelley’s phrase.
ground of beauty is everywhere freedom in the appearance. The ground of our representation of beauty is technique in freedom."\textsuperscript{14}

What Schiller means by “technique,” is the formal skill with which an artist creates a beautiful object. But, beauty is not merely technical perfection in the form of the beautiful object. For, to be beautiful, the object must have an inner freedom or gracefulness.

The solution to the Kantian paradox will therefore be for the technique to “appear determined through the nature of the thing, which one could call the voluntary assent of the thing to its technique.”\textsuperscript{15} To express this concept less technically: one must voluntarily do one’s moral duty with joy.

**Letter Two**

For Schiller, “the most perfect of all works of art” is “the construction of a true political freedom.” However, having witnessed the terror of the French Revolution, Schiller concludes that, “in order to solve the political problem in experience,” one “must take the path through the aesthetical, because it is beauty through which one proceeds to freedom.”

Schiller resists the “alluring temptation” of the day—to focus immediately upon “the political theater of action,” because he realizes that man can not achieve true political freedom unless and until an inner transformation of the population is brought about, counter to the prevailing popular culture or “Zeitgeist” (“spirit of the times”), with its false axiomatic assumptions.

The wants and tastes of the Zeitgeist are contrary to beautiful art. “Utility is the great idol of the time, for which all powers slave and all talents must pay homage.”

Such a culture of the “noisy market” is antithetical to art, because art is “the daughter of freedom” and receives its prescription from the inner necessity of the spirit, and not from the pressing need of matter, which bends humanity under its tyrannical yoke.

Schiller does not propose that one should escape from the political theater into the theater of beautiful art, but rather that art must “elevate itself with suitable boldness above want,” in order to contribute to true freedom in the political realm. If the political question is to be answered not on the basis of Thrasymachian “blind right of the stronger,” then it must be brought “before the tribunal of pure reason.” The latter is only possible to the extent that the individual is able “to place himself in the center of the whole, and to raise his individuality to that of the species.” To achieve such a world-historical species identity, Schiller argues, requires “beauty to walk in front of freedom.”

**Letter Three**

The task before man is to transform his natural condition into a moral one, to eliminate the blind necessity or caprice of his physical existence without undermining his physical existence, which is the condition of his humanity.

Man has the capacity through reason “to transform the work of necessity into his free choice, and to elevate physical necessity to a moral one.” Before he is able to act as a “free intelligence for himself,” he finds himself in a natural condition, which Schiller defines as “any political body which derives its establishment originally from forces, not from laws.” Man rightfully abandons the rule of blind necessity through his freedom, “for the work of blind power possesses no authority, before which freedom need bow.”

Man’s transition to the moral must be achieved without “pulling the ladder of nature out from under his feet.” Physical society must be maintained, even as it is transformed into a moral one. There must therefore be a support for the continuance of society, which makes it independent of the natural state, which one wants to dissolve.”

According to Schiller, this support can not come from the natural character of man, which selfishly and violently aims for the destruction of society. Nor can it come from the moral, because that has not yet been formed. Therefore, what is required is an as-yet-not-defined “third character,” related to both physical and moral characters, which can prepare the transition from the rule of naked force to the rule of law, by making the physical character harmonious with the moral law by eliminating caprice, and by ensuring that the moral law does not merely negate the sensuous, but that it becomes man’s nature. Conceptual development of this “third character” will be taken up in forthcoming letters.

As should be clear from the above, Schiller breaks entirely from Kant’s negative view of man’s natural being.
At the same time, as we shall see, despite the efforts of various British-influenced commentators on Schiller to portray him as influenced by such Enlightenment authors as John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Adam Ferguson in his treatment of the natural and moral states, Schiller’s concept of a third character to mediate the transition clearly rejects both the Lockean and Hobbesian notions of man’s evil nature, and any kind of social contract based on that false conception of man, which these authors share with Kant.

Nor does Schiller share Rousseau’s notion of the noble savage. Although Schiller does not accept Kant’s negative view of man’s natural being, he does not advocate a return to an illusory primitive state, but rather recognizes that man is selfish in a purely sensual condition, and that therefore his physical nature must be elevated by beauty, which he defines as the union of reason and love. In his “Aesthetical Lectures,” Schiller writes: “The pleasure of beauty arises, therefore, from the observed analogy with reason, and is united with love.”

Thus, in “On Naive and Sentimental Poetry,” Schiller writes that the sentimental poet “would not lead us backwards to our childhood, but rather would lead us forward to our majority. . . . He would take as his task an idyll, which realizes that pastoral innocence, even in the subjects of culture and among all conditions of the most active, most ardent life, of the most extensive thought, of the most refined art, of the highest social refinement, which, in a word, leads the man, who can now no longer return to Arcadia, up to Elysium.”

Letter Four

For a transformation of the political state according to moral principles to be both non-injurious and also durable, it will only occur on the basis of such a third character. In a moral state, free will is drawn into the realm of causes. Only in the Absolute Being does physical necessity coincide with the moral. Thus, if the moral conduct of man is to be relied upon, it must be nature, i.e., flow from within. The will of man stands perfectly free between duty and inclination. Therefore, the effects of both of these drives must be expressed perfectly equally; that is, his instincts must be harmonious with his reason.

As Schiller writes, every individual man carries a “purely ideal man” within himself. The great task of his existence is to bring himself, with all his alterations, into agreement with the immutable unity of this “purely ideal man.” This pure man is represented through the state. There are two different ways in which the man “in time” can relate to the man “in the idea,” and parallel to that, how the state can relate to the individual. On the one hand, the pure man can suppress the empirical man and the state abolish the individual, or, the individual can become the state and the man of time enable himself to become the man in the idea. Reason demands unity, but nature multiplicity. Man is claimed by both legislations.

Schiller’s concept of man has nothing to do with the Aristotelian concept of man as a mere rational animal, capable only of deductive logic, and not of cognition. Aristotle denies the very idea of eternal ideas. Schiller, on the other hand, expresses the Platonic idea that since all individuals are created in the image of God, they all have within themselves the capacity for creative reason and agapē, and therefore the capacity to be divine (capax dei).

Schiller stresses here that the paradoxical relationship between the One and the Many can not be resolved through Kantian suppression or negation of multiplicity. The moral character can not maintain itself with the self-sacrifice of the natural; the political state is imperfect, if it attempts to effect unity through suppression of multiplicity.

As Schiller writes in “On Grace and Dignity,” freedom lies in the middle between lawful suasion, as in the case of a monarchy, where the strict supervision of the ruler holds every impulse in check, and anarchy, as in a wild ochlocracy (mob rule).

An artist can do violence to his material, as long as the work of art does not show it, but instead has the appearance of freedom. He is not interested in the whole for the sake of its parts; rather, in the parts for the sake of the whole. It is entirely different with the political artist, who makes man into his material and his task. It is only because the whole serves the parts, that the parts may accommodate themselves to the whole. The political artist must spare the peculiarity and personality of his material; he must guarantee the continued existence of the individual in the state.

Schiller makes this same point in “The Legislation of Lycurgus and Solon”: “Stone suffers the work of the chisel patiently, and the strings struck by the musician answer him without resisting his finger. It is only the legislator who works upon a material, which is active and resistant of its own accord—human freedom.”

As to the distinction between Solon and Lycurgus, Schiller writes that Solon “had respect for human nature, and never sacrificed people to the state, never the end to the
But this totality of character was lacking in Schiller’s day, as it is still today. A majority of people demanded the restoration of their inalienable rights—referring to both the American and French revolutions. “A physical possibility seems given to place the law upon the throne, to honor man finally as an end in himself, and to make true freedom the basis of political union.”

But according to Schiller, that is a “vain hope,” as long as the moral possibility is wanting. Referring to the French Revolution, he writes, “the generous moment finds an unresponsive people.” The same idea is conveyed in his epigram entitled “The Moment”:

A momentous epoch hath the century engendered,  
Yet the moment so great findeth a people so small.21

Schiller then describes how the lower classes have returned to a state of savagery manifested in “brutal, lawless drives,” which hasten to their “animal satisfaction.” On the other hand, the “civilized” classes are characterized by a “depravity of character, which revolts so much the more, because culture itself is its source.” According to Schiller, the son of nature is a raving madman; the pupil of art, a worthless villain.

He then proceeds to critique the Enlightenment, which “shows so little an ennobling influence on the inner convictions, that it rather strengthens the corruption through maxims.” The Enlightenment denies nature on her legitimate field, in order to experience her tyranny on the moral—in the form of a materialistic ethics. “In the very bosom of the most refined social life, egoism hath founded its system.” There is no social heart. Proud self-sufficiency contracts the heart of the man of the world. From a burning city, everyone seeks only to rescue his miserable property. Mockery slanders the noblest feeling. (On this, see Schiller’s poem “The Maiden of Orleans,” where he attacks Voltaire for dragging the noble image of Joan of Arc, and thereby mankind, in the dust.22) Fear of losing stifles the fiery drive for improvement, and maxims of suffering obedience are considered to be the highest wisdom of life. The “spirit of the times” wavers between perversity and brutality, between the unnatural and mere nature, between superstition and moral unbelief, and it is merely the equal weight of evils, which at times places limits upon man.

To the criticism that the above-described condition of humanity is characteristic of all peoples who are engaged in culture, Schiller rejoins that the Greeks, who were “married to all the charms of art and to all the dignity of wisdom,” did so without sacrificing the human heart. “At once full of form and full of abundance, at once philosophizing and creating, at once tender and energetic, we see them unite the youth of phantasy with the manliness of reason in a glorious humanity.” (See Glossary for “formal drive.”)

Among the Greeks, the senses and the mind were not rigidly separated. “As high as reason also climbed, so it yet always drew matter lovingly after it . . . .” Thus, for the Greeks, reason does not mutilate nature, as is the case with the Kantian categorical imperative.

Here Schiller is also attacking the false dichotomy which resulted from the artificial division of Naturwis-
senschaft (natural sciences) and Geisteswissenschaft (arts) during the Enlightenment, under the influence of Kant. In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant goes so far as to argue that we can readily learn science, but we can not learn to write spirited poetry. The artist does not himself know how he has come by his ideas, and can not communicate them. Kant argues, for instance, that Homer can not show how his ideas come together in his head, simply because he does not know, and that therefore he can not teach others. However, according to Kant, in science, the greatest discoverer differs only in degree from the “laborious imitator” and the pupil; but, “he differs specifically from him whom nature has gifted for beautiful art.”

In contrast, among the Greeks, poetry was not corrupted by supercilious wit, nor speculation by sophistry, because both honored the truth. This, Schiller emphasizes, is reflected in the humanity of the Greek gods. As Schiller writes, “the whole of humanity was missing in no individual god.” Contrary to the religious fundamentalist, who might argue that Schiller is making an apology for paganism, Schiller’s argument is simply that the Greek gods expressed the humanity of the Greeks themselves. This humanity is in contrast to the fragmented nature of man in our age, in which the individual develops only one-sidedly, rather than in his full, universal potential. Schiller asks: “Which individual modern steps forth, to contend, man against man, with the individual Athenian for the prize of humanity?”

Lyndon LaRouche has addressed this problem from the standpoint of three Greek archetypes: the Dionysian, the Apollonian, and the Promethean. The first two are the equivalent of the savage and the barbarian, as developed by Schiller in Letter Four: The Dionysian is characterized by sensuous license, the Apollonian by an Aristotelian logicality, which merely negates the Dionysian. The Promethean, on the other hand, represents a higher form of reason than mere Aristotelian logic. Prometheus, who operates on the sublime level of cognition and love of humanity, gives the human species, as a whole, the gifts of art and the sciences.

In his essay “Of the Sublime,” Schiller himself also identified with Prometheus, whom he characterizes as paradigmatic of the sublime: “Prometheus was sublime, since, put in chains in the Caucasus, he did not regret his deed, and did not confess that he was wrong.”

As Schiller says, it was culture itself which ruptured the inner bond of human nature, through, on the one hand, a separation of the sciences and, on the other, a division of ranks and occupations by the state. The disruption which “art and learning began in the inner man” was then reflected in a mechanistic form of government.

“So jealous is the state of the exclusive possession of its servants, that it is easier to be decided thereon . . . to share its man with a Venus Cytherea than with a Venus Urania.” In Greek mythology, the former Venus represents an erotic love not threatening to the state, whereas the latter Venus was the Muse of astronomy and represents an intellectual form of love, which such a state would prefer to suppress.

Such a state remains foreign to its citizens, compelled to relieve itself of the multiplicity of its citizens through classification. Under these conditions, the bond of society falls to pieces; the public power is hated and deceived by those who make it necessary, and respected only by those who can do without it.

The speculative mind becomes a stranger in the sensual world, and prey to an empty subtlety. The spirit of business, on the other hand, becomes prey to a pedantic narrow-mindedness. Thus, the abstract thinker very often has a cold heart, and the businessman a narrow heart.

Nonetheless, Schiller admits that “the species had been able to make progress in no other mode. The appearance of Grecian humanity was incontestably a maximum, that could on these steps neither continue nor climb higher.”

Therefore, Schiller does not propose to return to the past: “One-sidedness in the exercise of its powers leads the individual inevitably to error, but the species to truth.” Such one-sidedness can lead “artificially far beyond the bounds which nature seems to have imposed” on the individual. Schiller cites among other examples of this, Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. But will such a mind be capable of exchanging the severe fetters of logic, for the free action of the power of poetry? This divided cultivation of human powers may have won much for the world, but the individual has been made to suffer the curse of this world aim.

What is missing are freedom and beauty. Gymnastic exercises develop athletic bodies; but only through the free and uniform play of the limbs is beauty developed. Progress was made; but, must it be at the expense of the enslavement and mutilation of our human nature for thousands of years?

Schiller concludes: “It must therefore be false, that the cultivation of individual powers makes the sacrifice of
their totality necessary; or, if even the law of nature yet strove so much thither, so must it stand with us, to reestablish this totality in our nature, which art hath destroyed, through a higher art.”

Schiller’s entire discussion brings to mind the explicitly Promethean method employed by Plato in his *Philebus* dialogue. There, Plato argues that all things are a mixture of the One and the Many, of the limit and the unlimited. The first conception of such a mixture is the imposition of a limit upon the unlimited, in such a way as to suppress multiplicity and individuality. However, Plato develops a second, higher conception, that of an unlimited sequence of higher-order limits, or higher hypotheses.

This concept in the *Philebus* is Plato’s solution to the *Parmenides* paradox, which derives from the false Eleatic notion of a static One, and is coherent with the conception developed by Plato in *The Republic* of a progressive ordering of higher hypotheses.

From this standpoint, as Schiller argues, a one-sided barbarian culture has imposed a limit on an unlimited savagery, thus merely negating man’s sensuous nature. The solution is not to return to an Arcadia, but to reestablish the simplicity experienced by the Greeks, by creating a future Elysium by means of a “higher art,” or as LaRouche would emphasize, a higher $(m+1)$-fold manifold, subsuming a lower-order $m$-fold manifold.

**Letter Seven**

But such a better humanity can not be expected to be imposed from the top down by the state, since the state has occasioned evil. Rather, humanity must be elevated, so as to bring about the moral improvement of the state. Just as in Letter Five, Schiller said that it was a “vain hope” to think that political freedom could be achieved without the aesthetical education of the population, in this letter, Schiller states emphatically that “one must declare every attempt of such an alteration of state as untimely, and every there-upon-grounded hope as chimerical, until the division in the inner man is once again dissolved, and his nature is sufficiently fully developed, in order itself to be the artist and to guarantee the reality of the political creation of reason.”

This is the same paradox as that addressed by Plato in *The Republic*, where the question, “Who will educate the educators?” arises. It is similarly addressed by Nicolaus of Cusa in his *On Catholic Concordance*: On the one hand, government must be by the consent of the governed, in order to be true to man’s nature, as created in the image of the Creator, who Himself is free. However, the number of fools is infinite. Therefore, how can the governed give intelligent consent? Cusanus’ solution to this paradox is that every rational creature, i.e., every citizen, must come into rational harmony with the *Logos* or Word.

Reflecting again on the French Revolution, Schiller therefore argues that only through beauty is it possible to proceed to true political freedom. One must first becalm the conflict of blind drives, before daring to favor multiplicity: “Where the natural man still abuses his caprice so lawlessly, there one may scarcely show him his freedom; where the artificial man still employs his freedom so little, there one may not take his caprice from him.”

For this reason, Schiller, writing over two hundred years ago, argues that this is a “task for more than one century.”

Does this mean either that we should retreat from the political theater altogether, or that the state can not be wielded to achieve good? No, not at all. In this letter, Schiller writes: “Meanwhile, I gladly admit, some attempt in particular can succeed, but nothing will be improved on the whole thereby, and the contradiction of conduct will always be proof against the unity of maxims.”

Clearly, it must be argued that the American Revolution succeeded where the French failed. Moreover, it is certainly the case, as in the American example, that government power can and must be used to effect the General Welfare.

However, as the current crisis in the United States makes clear, unless the population is successfully challenged through Classical art to re-examine its false axiomatic assumptions, there is no guarantee that the constitutional power of the state will be employed to effect the common good, or that the efforts of those government leaders so committed will endure.

Schiller, who wrote such plays as *Wilhelm Tell* and *The Virgin of Orleans*, was not a political quietist, but rather a revolutionary. But as a true revolutionary, he realized, as does Lyndon LaRouche, that true political freedom can only be achieved by means of Classical artistic methods.

Without such methods, which transform the inner man, as Schiller writes, the old principles, wearing the clothes of the current century, will remain, and every attempt to achieve freedom will either throw itself “into the arms of a comfortable servitude” (i.e., “comfort zones”), or “escape into the wild license of the natural condition.”
Letter Eight

Schiller asks, should philosophy retreat from the political domain without hope? In reaffirming that political freedom is the “most important of all goods,” he asks, should it be abandoned to formless chance? His answer: “Not in the least.”

However, true political freedom will never be accomplished by means of reason engaging “directly” in combat with egoism. Referring to the Iliad, Schiller writes that the son of Saturn (Cronos), i.e., Zeus, did not act on his own on the battlefield, but rather “beclothes his grandson [Achilles] with godly arms” to bring about the great outcome.

Thus, reason can promulgate laws for society, but they must be executed by the “courageous will and the living feeling.” If truth is to triumph, it must become “force” and advance a “drive.”

The reason man is still a barbarian, is because there is something subjective in the minds of men, a neurotic distortion of his creativity, which stands in the way. The solution is located in the expression: sapere aude, embolden thyself to be wise.

Energy of courage is needed to combat the inertia of nature, as well as the cowardice of the heart. Schiller alludes to Athena, goddess of wisdom, who emerged in full armor from Zeus’s head. Unfortunately, the more numerous part of mankind is too exhausted by the daily struggle for existence to rally itself against error, so it gladly defers to the state and a priesthood to do its think-

Letter Nine

Next, Schiller poses the following paradox: “All improvement in the political should proceed from the ennoblement of the character—but how can the character ennoble itself under the influence of a barbarous state constitution?” The instrument Schiller proposes to use to resolve this paradox is “beautiful art.”

As Schiller writes in “On the Pathetic”: “Poetry can become to man, what love is to the hero. It can neither advise him, nor strike for him, nor otherwise do work for him; but it can educate him as a hero, it can summon him to deeds, and to all that he should be, equip him with strength.”

It is true, Schiller argues, that the political lawgiver “can banish the friend of truth, but the truth subsists; he can degrade the artist, but he can not falsify art.” True art, like science, enjoys “an absolute immunity from the caprice of man.”

“The artist is indeed the son of his time, but bad for him, if he is at the same time its pupil or even yet its favorite,” Schiller writes. Therefore, the true artist must derive the form of his art not from the prevailing popular opinion (vox populi) of the Zeitgeist, but from a nobler time, “beyond all time, from the absolute immutable unity of his essence.” Thus, he must be a strange form to his own century. His objective should not be to please his contemporaries, but frightful as Agamemnon’s son Orestes, to purify it.

Noble art is capable of inspiring a noble nature in man before it exists in him, and also, even when humanity has lost its dignity, noble art, produced before such a degeneration, has the power to revive that lost dignity and to effect a renaissance. As Schiller writes: “Yet, before truth sends her triumphing light into the depths of the heart, the power of poetry intercepts her beams, and the summits of humanity will glisten, when a damp night still lies in the valleys.”

The artist can preserve himself before the corruptions of his time only “if he despises its judgment.” Schiller polemizes against both an adaptation to the fleeting
moment, and an “impatient schwärmer spirit, which employs the measure of the unconditioned to the miserable offspring of time.” Instead, the artist must strive to produce “the ideal from the bond of the possible with the necessary,” to stamp this “on the play of his creative power,” and to “hurl it silently into infinite time.”

In this letter, Schiller introduces, for the first time, the concept of “play,” and he does so in connection with “creative power.” This critical concept will be developed at length beginning in the Fourteenth Letter.

Otherwise, he introduces a polemic, which was first seen in his “Letters on Don Carlos” and was later developed in “On Naive and Sentimental Poetry.” In the former, he criticizes the character Marquis Posa for an idealism that exceeds enthusiasm. He writes: “Finally, I do not intend to have thoroughly absolved the Marquis of schwärmer. Schwärmer and enthusiasm touch one another so closely, their line of demarcation is so fine, that it can be overstepped, in conditions of passionate excite ment only all too easily.”

In his “On Naive and Sentimental Poetry,” Schiller writes: “We have seen, that the naive genius is indeed not in danger of overstepping this sphere [human nature], but rather not to realize it completely, if it gives too much room to an external necessity, or the accidental need of the moment at the expense of inner necessity. The sentimental genius, on the contrary, is exposed to danger, on account of the endeavor to remove all limits from it, to annul human nature altogether, and not merely, as it may and should, to rise and to idealize, beyond every fixed and limited reality up to absolute possibility, but rather to pass even beyond possibility or to schwärme.”

As Schiller writes in this letter, in contrast to the Schwärmer, who engages in flight-forward out of self-love, his own advice to the young friend of truth and beauty is to give the world “the direction towards the good,” by elevating its thoughts to the necessary and eternal, and transforming the necessary and eternal into an object of its instinct. “The structure of delusion and arbitrariness will fall, it must fall, it hath already fallen, as soon as thou art certain that it inclines; but in the inner, not merely in the outer man.” Thus Schiller advises: “Live with thy century, but be not its creature: give to thy contemporaries, but what they need, not what they praise.”

Finally, he stresses that the earnestness of principles will tend to frighten people away. Therefore, it were better to flank their defenses by engaging them in play. “Their maxims wilt thou storm in vain, their deeds condemn in vain, but thou canst try thy forming hand upon their idleness. Chase away the caprice, the frivolity, the roughness from their pleasures, so wilt thou banish them imperceptibly too from their actions, finally from their character. Where thou findest them, surround them with noble, with great, with ingenious forms, enclose them all around with symbols of excellence, until appearance overcomes reality, and art, nature.”

**Letter Ten**

Schiller has now established that man can deviate from his destiny by two opposing roads, roughness and enervation, and can only be led back to his destiny from this two-fold aberration through beauty. But the question arises as to how beautiful culture can simultaneously “put nature in the savage in fetters, and place the same in the barbarian in freedom”?

Moreover, there are some who think not so badly of the savagery of uncultivated people, and not so quite favorably of the refinement of the cultivated. In fact, in Antiquity there were those who thought beautiful culture was not a benefit, and attempted to prohibit its entrance into society.

Based on experience, they argue that while the beautiful in good hands can effect laudable ends, in bad hands it can effect just the opposite. The seductive power of beauty gives man’s disposition the dangerous direction to neglect all reality, and to sacrifice truth and morality to a charming exterior. Moreover, in well-nigh every epoch of history where the arts blossom and taste rules, mankind is found sunken, and not a single example can be produced, that a higher degree and a great universality of aesthetical culture among a people had gone hand in hand with political freedom and civic virtue.

After citing several examples from historical experience that are most frequently used to support this argument, Schiller writes, “perhaps experience is not the tribunal before which to decide a question such as this.” Moreover, we have to be certain that what is called beautiful in experience is the “same beauty” of which Schiller is speaking. What we need is a concept of beauty that has a source other than experience, by which we can judge whether that which is called beautiful, bears this name justly.

Schiller argues that a pure rational conception of beauty can not be inductively derived from experience, but rather must be inferred from the very nature of man as a sensuous-rational being. He describes the methodological course that must be taken as “transcendental.” Only by starting from the epistemological standpoint of the idea of man, as created in the image of God, can one discover the “absolute and enduring,” and cast away “all accidental limitations” respecting one’s concept of beauty.
Letter Eleven

In the first letter, Schiller had written that his ideas derive primarily “from uniform intercourse with my self.” Through this process of self-conscious reflection, Schiller ascends Socratically above sense perception and logic to the level of ideas, to arrive at “two ultimate conceptions.” In man, there is something which endures, and something which changes incessantly. The enduring is his person, the changing is his condition, the self and its determinations.

In the Necessary Being or God, these are one and the same; however, in man as a finite being, they are two. Only in the Absolute Subject do all the personality’s determinations persist with the personality, because they flow from the personality. “Everything that divinity is, it is for that reason, because it is; it is consequently everything for eternity, because it is eternal.”

However, in the case of man, since he is finite, person and condition are distinct. By “person,” Schiller is referring to man’s immortal soul, his capacity for cognition. By “condition,” he is referring to man’s mortal, and therefore changeable, physical existence. The person can not be grounded upon the condition, because then the person would have to change. Nor can the condition be grounded upon the person, because then the condition would have to persist.

The person must thus be its own ground, for the enduring can not flow from the changeable. This is the origin of the idea of the Absolute Subject grounded in itself, i.e., freedom. Condition, on the other hand, is not absolute, it must result. It is “dependent being or becoming.” Time is the condition of all becoming.

The person, which manifests itself in the eternally persistent I, and only in this, can not become, nor commence in time, because time must, on the contrary, commence in it, because something persevering must lay the basis for change.

Man, as a determinate existence, as phenomenon, arises in time; however, “the pure intelligence in him is eternal.”

Man must first receive his material existence from the Highest Intelligence. This matter, which changes, is accompanied by his never-changing I. “Man, conceived in his perfection, were accordingly the persistent unity, which in the flood of alteration remains eternally the same.”

An Infinite Being, a Deity, can not become, but “man carries the predisposition for divinity in his personality within himself; the way to divinity, if one can name as a way, one that never leads to the goal, is open to him in the senses.”

Schiller thus makes the Platonic distinction between Being and becoming, a distinction reflected as well in the Mosaic concept of God as “I am Who Am,” and in the Johannine concept of Christ as “I am.” Man, despite the fact that he is finite, has the predisposition for divinity, for the infinite, in his personality. He is created in the image of the Creator. Thus, even though he can never become Absolute Being, “the pure intelligence in him is eternal,” or immortal.

However, this personality alone “is merely a predisposition to a possible infinite expression.” It is an “empty capacity.” Without sensuousness, man is mere form. His sensuousness, without the self-activity of the mind, can do nothing further than make him matter, but does not unite matter with him. So long as he merely desires and acts from mere appetite, he is nothing more than world, the “formless content of time.”

“His sensuousness it is alone, which makes his capacity effective power, but it is only his personality, which makes his action his own. Therefore, in order not to be merely world, he must impart form to matter; in order not to be mere form, he must give the predisposition, which he bears within himself, reality.”

In other words, if man is not to be merely the product of external sense perceptions, he must conceptualize the world which he experiences. At the same time, if he does not act on the sensuous world, his conceptual power will remain unfulfilled.

From this ontologically paradoxical concept of the nature of man, flow two opposite demands upon him, the two fundamental laws of sensuous-rational nature. First, he must make everything into world which is mere form, and bring all his predispositions into appearance; second, he should extirpate everything in himself which is mere world. In other words: He should externalize everything internal, and give form to everything external.

Schiller concludes: “Both tasks, considered in their highest fulfillment, lead back to the conception of divinity; from which I have proceeded.”

This is what Schiller means by the “transcendental course” necessary to define beauty. Ultimately, Schiller derives his concept of beauty from his conception of human nature as being in the image of the Creator. That is what he means in the tenth letter, when he says that “beauty had to exhibit itself as a necessary condition of mankind.” And to accomplish this, he argues, we must elevate ourselves to the pure conception of humanity.
From the very nature of man as a “finite infinite” or as sensuous-rational, Schiller derives the existence of “two opposite forces” or drives. The first of these is the sensuous drive; the second is the formal drive (see Glossary).

The sensuous drive places man in the limits of time, and makes him matter. Matter is nothing but alteration or reality which fills time. Everything in time is successive. Thus, where this drive works exclusively, man is nothing but a unity of magnitude, a filled moment of time. Thus his personality is annulled as long as sensation alone rules him. Although the sensuous drive is necessary to “unfold the predispositions of mankind,” alone it “makes their perfection impossible.”

The formal drive proceeds from the “absolute existence of man, or from his rational nature, and strives to set him free,” to “maintain his person despite all changes of condition.” As Schiller writes, “since we are we to all eternity,” the formal drive encompasses the whole succession of time: It annuls time, it annuls alteration.

Here Schiller uses language similar to that employed by Nicolaus of Cusa. The formal drive encompasses or enfolds that which is unfolded by the sensuous drive. Moreover, the formal drive, in annulling time, can be characterized as “timeless time,” to use another term employed by Cusanus.

As Schiller writes, where the formal drive exerts dominion, man arises to a unity of ideas, from the unity of magnitude in which the sensuous drive confined him. The unity of ideas then contains the entire realm of phenomena under itself. We are “no more in time; rather, time is in us with its entire never-ending succession. We are no more individuals, rather species . . . .”

The sensuous and the formal, appear to contradict one another. Moreover, a third fundamental drive, which could mediate between both, is “absolutely unthinkable.” However, as Schiller maintains, these two tendencies do contradict one another, but not in “the same objects.” The sensuous drive does not demand alteration in the person. The formal drive does not insist upon unity and perseverance in respect to the condition. Therefore, they are not opposed to one another by nature, as Kant assumes. Thus, if they appear to oppose one another, it is through a “transgression of nature.”

If one maintains that there is a necessary antagonism between these two drives, then there is no means to preserve man’s unity, other than to subordinate the sensuous to the rational. This is precisely what Kant does with his “categorical imperative.”

Thus, Schiller writes: “In a transcendental philosophy, where everything depends thereon, to liberate the form from the content and preserve the necessary pure of everything accidental, one is easily accustomed to think of the matter itself merely as hindrance and to represent sensuousness, because it stands directly in the way of this business, as in a necessary contradiction with reason. Such a mode of representation lies indeed in no way in the spirit of the Kantian system, but it could very well lie in the letter of the same.”

As Schiller emphasizes: “The subordination must by all means be, but reciprocal . . . . Both principles are therefore at once subordinated to one another and coordinated, i.e., they stand in reciprocity; without form no matter, without matter no form.”

The task of culture is therefore twofold: “firstly: to secure sensuousness against the encroachments of freedom; secondly: to secure the personality against the power of sensations. The former it achieves through the education of the capacity of feeling, the latter through the education of the capacity of reason.” The perfection of the capacity of feeling requires the greatest possible mutability and extensiveness; the perfection of the capacity of reason, the greatest possible self-reliance and intensity. The more many-sided the receptivity, the more potentialities does he develop in himself. The more strength and depth of the personality, the more freedom the reason wins, the more form he creates outside himself. Where both qualities are united, “instead of losing himself in the world, he will rather draw this into himself with the entire infinity of its phenomena, and subject it to the unity of his reason.”

If sensuality predominates, then man will never be himself; if the formal drive annuls the sensuous, he will never be “something else,” consequently he will be naught.

Schiller then notes that the bad influence of a preponderant sensuality is clear to most people, but not so the disadvantageous influence of a preponderant rationality. First, he maintains that progress in the natural sciences has been slowed by the tendency to impose Aristotelean teleological judgments. This reminds one of Lyndon
LaRouche’s criticism of those who attempt to impose Euclidean “blackboard mathematics” on the physical universe, when in fact, as Bernhard Riemann argues in his 1854 habilitation paper, “On the Hypotheses Which Lie at the Foundations of Geometry,” one must abandon such methods, and test one’s hypotheses in “the domain of another science”—“the realm of physics.”

A good example of this would certainly be those who argue that the circle can be squared. Such an approach imposes the notion of linearity in the small upon a surface characterized not by linearity, but by curvature, as argued by Nicolaus of Cusa in On the Quadrature of the Circle. This same approach led to the suffocation of all true discovery in astronomy until Kepler, based on the work of Cusanus, overturned the Aristotelian teleology of Ptolemy.

As Schiller emphasizes, in such a fruitless approach, all nature’s “manifoldness is lost for us, because we seek nothing in her, but what we have put in her, because we do not permit her to move inward towards us, but on the contrary strive with impatiently anticipating reason from within towards her.”

The same problem manifests itself with respect to “practical philanthropy.” As Schiller writes: “How can we, with ever so praiseworthy maxims, be just, good, and human towards others, if the capacity fails us, to include foreign nature faithfully and truly in ourselves, to appropriate foreign situations to ourselves, to make foreign feelings our own? . . . Severity with oneself, combined with softness towards others, constitutes the truly excellent character. But mostly he who will be soft towards other men will also be thus towards himself, and he who will be severe towards himself will also be thus toward others; soft towards oneself and severe towards others is the most contemptible character.”

Letter Fourteen

It is in this letter that Schiller develops his concept of the play drive, not as a separate, third fundamental drive, but rather, as the way in which the sensuous and formal drives act together in reciprocal combination. Such a reciprocal relation of the two drives is “the task of reason.” It is “the idea of his humanity, hence an infinite, to which he can approach ever more closely in the course of time, but without ever reaching it.” Man can not be fully man as long as he satisfies only one of the two drives exclusively or only one after the other successively. He is truly man only when both drives act at the same time. Only then does he have a complete intuition of his humanity. The object which provides him this intuition is a symbol of his “realized destiny.”

Such an experience would awaken a new drive in man, which Schiller calls the play drive, the direction of which is to “annul the time in time, to reconcile Becoming with Absolute Being, alteration with identity.” Here again we see the ideas of Nicolaus of Cusa. When man, as a contracted or finite infinite, is reconciled with God or the Logos, he is “timeless time.”

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant does indeed refer in passing to “free play,” as a state of mind in which one’s cognitive powers are free of any definite concept which limits them to a particular rule of cognition. But Schiller makes the play drive the central concept of his entire aesthetics.

For Schiller, the play drive will annul all compulsion and set man free, not only physically, but also morally. As Schiller writes: “If we embrace someone with passion, who is worthy of our contempt, so we feel painfully the compulsion of nature. If we are disposed hostilely towards another, who compels our respect, so we feel painfully the compulsion of reason. But as soon as he at once interests our inclination and hath gained our respect, so disappears not only the constraint of feeling, but also the constraint of reason, and we begin to love him, i.e., at once to play with our inclination and with our respect.”

This passage is particularly important, because, in it, Schiller identifies play with love (agape). Man is truly free from the one-sided compulsion of nature and reason when he plays, which is to say, when he loves.

In his “Philosophical Letters,” Schiller writes that egoism and love separate mankind: “Egoism erects its center in itself; love plants it outside of itself in the axis of the eternal whole. Love aims at unity, egoism is solitude. Love is the co-governing citizen of a blossoming free state, egoism a despot in a ravaged creation. Egoism sows for gratitude, love aims at unity; egoism for gratitude, love for ingratitude. Love gives, egoism lends . . . .”

Moreover, in the “Kallias Letters,” Schiller advances his own version of the Good Samaritan story, as the empirical proof of his theory of beauty. The truly beautiful soul is the individual who acts out of love to help the man in need, “without being called upon, and without debate with himself.” His moral action is a beautiful action, when he does his moral duty freely, because his “duty has become nature to him.” Schiller concludes: “I call upon thee, to name to me, from among all the explanations of beauty, the Kantian included, a single one which resolves the selflessly beautiful so satisfactorily as, I hope, has taken place here.”

Given that, as he wrote in the eleventh letter, Schiller
derives his conception of beauty from his conception of divinity, and given that God is love, as manifested through the play of his creative power, it should not be surprising that Schiller’s solution to the “letter” of the Kantian system, should also be love (agapé).

For Schiller, as for the Apostle Paul, the letter kills, whereas the spirit gives life (2 Corinthians 3:6). Thus, mere obedience to the law strengthens sin, whereas love overcomes the wages of sin, death. Schiller writes to the same effect in “On Grace and Dignity”:

“[T]he person not only may, in fact he must bring desire and duty into connection: he should obey his reason with joy. . . . Only when it flows forth from his entire humanity as the united effect of both principles, when it has become nature for him, is his moral way of thinking secure from danger. For, as long as the moral mind still applies force, natural impulse must still have power to set against it. The enemy merely cast down can arise again, the reconciled is truly vanquished.

“In the Kantian moral philosophy, the idea of duty is presented with a severity which frightens all the Graces away, and a weak reason might easily attempt to seek moral perfection on the path of a gloomy and monkish asceticism. . . .

“He became the Draco of his time, because to him it seemed not yet worthy and receptive of a Solon. . . .

“But, whereof were the children of the house to blame, that he only cared for the servants? . . .

“It awakens in me no good judgment of a person if he can trust the voice of impulse so little, that he is compelled to interrogate it first before the court of morality; instead, one will esteem him more, if he trusts his impulses with a certain confidence, without danger of being misguided by them. For that proves, that both principles in him find themselves already in that concord which is the seal of perfected humanity, and is that which we understand by a beautiful soul.”31

Finally, one should consider Schiller’s concept of play from the standpoint of Plato, who in Book VII of The Republic wrote that “nothing that is learned under compulsion stays with the mind. . . . Do not, then, my friend, keep children to their studies by compulsion but by play.”32

**Letter Fifteen**

It should be noted that Schiller rejects Kant by the very fact that he derives his idea of beauty from his idea of human nature. For Kant, in his Critique of Judgment, nature alone is a free beauty (pulchritudo vaga), whereas human beings are characterized by dependent beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens).33 For example, in the Critique of Judgment, Kant writes: “Many birds (such as the parrot, the humming bird, the bird of paradise) and many sea shells are beauties in themselves. . . . So also delineations à la grecque, foliage for borders or wall papers, . . . are free beauties.”34

As Schiller writes in his “Kallias Letters,” Kant assumed “somewhat strangely, that each beauty, which stands under the concept of a purpose, is not a pure beauty; that therefore an arabesque and what is like to it, regarded as beauty, are purer than the highest beauty of man.” For this reason, Schiller writes, in reality Kant’s view “seems to me to miss fully the concept of beauty.”35

In the fifteenth letter, Schiller begins by establishing that, whereas the object of the sensuous drive is life, and the object of the formal drive is form, the object of the play drive is living form. Schiller then writes that this concept of living form is what one calls beauty in the broadest meaning.

From this standpoint, even a block of marble, although lifeless, i.e., non-living, can become a living form through the architect or sculptor. One certainly sees this in Classical Greek sculpture, as in the cases of Scopas and Praxiteles, whose sculptures, sculpted from non-living stone, nonetheless are beautiful, because they capture a human being in mid-motion, thus conveying living form. [See Figure 1]

On the other hand, Schiller points out that a man, although he lives and has form, is not necessarily a living form, that is, a beautiful soul: “That requires that his form be life, and his life form. So long as we merely think about his form, it is lifeless, mere abstraction; so long as we merely feel his life, it is formless, mere impression.” Only where he is living form do we judge him to be beautiful.

However, the reciprocal action between “the finite and infinite,” this “fusion itself,” remains inscrutable to us. “Reason sets up the demand out of transcendental grounds: there shall be a communion between the formal drive and the material drive, i.e., a play drive,” because only this completes the conception of humanity. Every exclusive activity of one or the other drive leaves human nature incomplete. Once

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**Figure 1.** Praxiteles, “Hermes and Dionysus,” c. 350-330 B.C.
it is decided that humanity shall exist, the law is established that there shall be beauty. Beauty is the consummation of humanity itself.

From this standpoint, Schiller criticizes empiricists like Edmund Burke (Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Conception of the Sublime and Beautiful), who reduce beauty to mere life. In the “Kallias Letters,” Schiller refers to Burke among others as having a “sensuous-subjective” theory of beauty. Others, such as Baumgarten, Mendelssohn, and Wolff (“the entire flock of perfection men”), he criticizes for making beauty into mere logical form.

In the “Kallias Letters,” Schiller writes in opposition to these two theories and to Kant’s, which he characterizes as “rational-subjective,” that beauty is neither mere life, nor mere form. “Beauty is only the form of a form.” That which one calls its matter, “must by all means be a formed matter. Perfection is the form of a matter; beauty, on the other hand, is the form of this perfection, which stands thus to beauty as matter to form.” Thus, for Schiller, beauty is not formal logical perfection, but rather formed matter, or living form expressed freely.

To the objection that the term “play” puts beauty on an equal level with frivolous objects, Schiller responds that in all conditions of man, it is precisely and only play which makes man complete, and unfolds at once his twofold nature. As a result, play is not a limitation or degradation of man, but rather an enlargement of man’s capacity, of his humanity. As Schiller emphasizes: With the merely “agreeable, with the good, with the perfect, man is only earnest, but with beauty he plays.”

Schiller goes on to say, that the beauty of which he is speaking is “the ideal of beauty, which reason establishes, with which an “ideal of the play drive is also presented, which man should have before his eyes in all his plays.” If we contrast the Greek Olympic games with the Roman gladiatorial combats, this shows us the contrasting ideals of beauty of the two cultures, and for this reason, we “must seek for the ideal form of a Venus, a Juno, an Apollo, not in Rome, but rather in Greece.”

But, from the standpoint of the metric developed by Schiller, such a culture would not be adjudged to be beautiful. As Schiller writes:

“But now reason speaks: the beautiful should not be merely life and not merely form, but rather living form, that is, beauty; in that it dictates to man the twofold law of the absolute formality and the absolute reality. Hence it also makes the decision: Man shall with beauty only play, and he shall only with beauty play.

“FOr, in order to finally say it at once, man plays only, where he in the full meaning of the word is man, and he is only there fully man, where he plays.”

Schiller concludes this letter by stressing that this ideal of beauty existed among the Greeks, who transferred this ideal, which should have been realized on earth, to the Olympian gods, whom they represented in their art. In these gods, both earnestness and futile pleasure vanish from their brows. The Greeks “freed the eternally satisfied from the fetters of every aim, every duty, every concern and made idleness and indifference the envied lot of the godly state; a merely more human name for the freest and most sublime Being.” The material constraint of natural laws, and the spiritual constraint of moral laws, are replaced by a higher conception of necessity, in which the two necessities are unified, and from the unity of these two necessities issues forth to them true freedom for the first time.

Schiller cites the sculpture of the goddess Juno Ludovici, a colossal cast of which appears in the Juno Room in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s town house in Weimar, Germany. [See Figure 2] “It is neither grace, nor is it dignity, which speaks to us from the glorious countenance of a Juno Ludovici; it is not one of the two, because it is at once both. Whilst the womanly god demands our worship, the godlike woman enkindles our love. . . . There is no force, which struggled with forces, no weak point, where temporal power could break in. Irresistibly seized and attracted by that one, by this one held at a distance, we find ourselves at once in the condition of highest rest and of highest motion, and there results that wonderful emotion, for which the understanding hath no conception and language no name.”

What Schiller has thus described, is a blissful or happy state of mind, which transcends Aristotle’s logical law of contradiction. Here we have neither grace nor dignity, but rather both simultaneously. We have the highest rest and the highest motion, a coincidence of opposites, as Cusanus would express it. This is a condition of what Lyndon LaRouche has described as “temporal eternity.” In such a state, man is truly free, he is not subordinated to any utilitarian aim. Not accidentally, this state of mind “enkindles our love,” because the state of mind is love. As St. Augustine wrote: Love and do as you wish. This is possible, because one’s emotions have been brought into harmony with reason, one’s inclination and one’s will have been knitted into “the most intimate alliance.”
Letter Sixteen

We have now seen that the beautiful arises from
the reciprocal action of two opposites drives (sensu-
ous and formal), and from the combination of two
opposite principles (nature and reason), whose
highest ideal is to be found in the most perfect
union and equilibrium of reality and form. Schiller
emphasizes that such an equilibrium remains only an
idea, which can never be fully achieved in reality. In rea-
ality, there is an oscillation between both principles. Beauty
in the idea is eternally one and indivisible, whereas beau-
ty in experience will be eternally double.

This double character is expressed in a “dissolving”
and a “tensing” effect, the dissolving to keep both drives
within their bounds, and the tensing to preserve both in
their strength. In the idea, both should be absolutely one,
but experience offers no example of such perfect recipro-
cal action. Thus, in experience, there is a melting and an
energetic beauty. Schiller is thus once again making the
distinction between the realm of Absolute Being and that
of Becoming. Nonetheless, the task of the aesthetical is to
lead these two beauties, the melting and the energetic,
towards the equilibrium which constitutes Beauty.

Energetic beauty can not preserve man before a
residue of savagery, nor can the melting protect him
before softness and enervation. Since the effect of the first
is to make the disposition tense, the gentler human-
ity often experiences an oppression which should
have befallen only his raw nature, and his raw
nature gains strength, which should have applied
only to his free person. Similarly, the effect of the
melting is often to stifle the energy of feeling along with
the violence of desire, and thus the character experiences
a loss of strength, which should affect only his passion.

“Therefore, one will see in the so-called refined ages,
softness degenerate not seldom into effeminacy, plainness
into insipidity, correctness into emptiness, liberality into
arbitrariness, lightness into frivolity, calm into apathy,
and the most contemptible caricature border upon the
most glorious humanity.”

Thus every contradiction in the judgments of men
about the influence of the beautiful derives from this
twofold nature of beauty. However, the contradiction is
removed, if one distinguishes “the double need of
humanity, to which that double beauty corresponds.”

Schiller concludes this letter by stating his intention to
“elevate myself from the kinds of beauty, to the species
conception of the same.” His purpose will be to “dissolve
at last both of the opposite kinds of beauty in the unity of
the ideally beautiful, just as those two opposite forms of
humanity perish in the unity of the ideally human.”

Letter Seventeen

As in Plato’s analogy of the cave in Book VII of The
Republic, in deriving the ideal of beauty from the ideal
conception of human nature in general, Schiller has
taken off his shackles and abandoned the shadows of
the cave wall, in order to see the source of light above.
Now he must return to the cave, that is, as Schiller writes,
to “climb down from the region of ideas into the scene of
reality, in order to meet man in a determinate condition.”

Here we find that there are only two possible, opposite
deviations man can experience from the idea of humanity—a deficiency either of harmony, or of energy. There-
fore, we shall find man either in a condition of tension or in
a condition of relaxation. Both opposite limits experienced
by actual (as opposed to ideal) man, are lifted by beauty,
which restores harmony in the tense man, and energy in
the relaxed, thus making man whole, complete in himself.

It is not beauty that is responsible for the deficiencies
critics attribute to her, but rather it is “man, who transfers
to her the imperfections of his individuality, who through
his subjective limitation stands incessantly in the way of
her perfection, and reduces her absolute ideal to two lim-
ited forms of phenomena.”

Some say that “melting” beauty is for the tense
disposition, and “energetic” for the relaxed, but
Schiller argues that man is tense if he is under the
exclusive domination of either one of his two fund-
damental drives: “Freedom lies only in the cooperation
of both of his natures. The man ruled one-sidedly by feel-
ings, or sensuously tense, is thus dissolved and set free by
form; the man ruled one-sidedly by laws, or spiritually
tense, is dissolved and set free by matter.” The melting
beauty required to satisfy this double task will reveal her-
self under two different forms.

First, she will appear as a “calm form,” to soften the
savage life and pave the way for a transition from sensa-
tions to thoughts; and second, as “living image,” to equip
abstract form with sensuous force, and to lead conception
to intuition, and law to feeling. The first service she ren-
ders to the natural man, the second to the artificial man.

But to conceive of how beauty can become a means of
removing that double tension, we must seek to explore
the origin of the same in the human disposition.
Letter Eighteen

Since beauty leads the sensuous man to form and the spiritual man to matter, it appears that there must be a middle condition between matter and form. This is absurd, however, because the distance between matter and form is infinite, and can be mediated absolutely through nothing. Beauty combines two opposite conditions, of feeling and of thinking, and there is absolutely no middle between them. Schiller writes that this discontinuity, which Kant treats as an unresolvable paradox, “is the essential point, to which the whole question of beauty finally leads.”

On the one hand, beauty knits together two conditions, which are opposed to one another, and never can become one. And yet, on the other hand, beauty combines two opposite conditions, and therefore cancels the opposition. Only through such cancellation do both conditions disappear entirely in a third.

Schiller then points out that all philosophical disputes about the concept of beauty derive from the failure to rigorously distinguish between these two conditions and to achieve their pure union. Some philosophers trust blindly in the guidance of their feelings. They can achieve no conception of beauty, “because they distinguish nothing individual in the totality of sensuous impressions.” Others, who take understanding exclusively as their guide, never achieve a conception of beauty, “because they never see in the totality of sense impressions anything other than parts, and spirit and matter remain divided eternally.”

“The first fear to cancel beauty dynamically, i.e., as acting power, if they should separate what is combined in feeling; the others fear to destroy the definiteness of its conception through a too-bold union. The former do not consider that the freedom in which they place the essence of beauty is not lawlessness, but rather harmony of laws, not arbitrariness, but the highest inner necessity; the latter do not reflect that the definiteness of beauty consists not in the exclusion of certain realities, but in the absolute inclusion of them all. Beauty is not restriction, but infinity.

Letter Nineteen

In the nineteenth letter, Schiller shows how this definition of beauty derives from the twofold nature of the human mind. By moving the discussion to the “laws according to which the mind operates,” he must focus on areas of philosophical abstraction encountered in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

He begins by noting that in man there is both a passive and an active condition of determinability, and also a passive and an active condition of determination. In this letter he develops man’s initial passive determinability, and his passive determination by the senses. He will then develop man’s active determination by reason, and finally his active determinability as the free or aesthetical state of mind, in which the passive and active determination of the senses and reason act to annul one another.

The condition of the human spirit before all determination is a determinability without bounds. Since nothing is yet excluded, we can call this condition of indeterminability an empty infinity, which Schiller says should not be mistaken for an infinite emptiness (see Glossary).

In the eleventh letter, Schiller said that the personality, considered independent of sensuous matter, is nothing other than form and “empty capacity.” Here he repeats that concept.

When his senses are moved from the infinite number of possible determinations, a single reality is obtained. A conception arises in him. He is no longer empty capacity in the sense of mere determinability, but is now an acting power, which receives content. As mere capacity, he was unlimited. Now he has received a limit. Reality is there, but the infinity is lost. In order to describe a form in space, we must limit the endless space. We arrive at reality only through limits, at actual affirmation only through negation, at determination only through annulment of our free determinability.

In this letter, Schiller totally rejects the Lockean-Aristotelean conception of man’s mind as a blank tablet, and the related notion that human mentation consists only of induction from sense perceptions. Thus he writes: “But from a mere exclusion, no reality would arise in eternity, and from a mere sense perception, no conception would arise in eternity.” Something must be present upon which a
limit is imposed. There must be something positive, an absolute activity of the mind. This activity of the mind is judging or thinking, and the result of the same is thought.

As Schiller argues, before we determine a place in space, there is really no space for us; but without absolute space, we would never again determine a place. Likewise with time. We arrive at the whole only through the part, at the unlimited only through the limit; but we also arrive only through the whole at the part, only through the unlimited at the limit.

Schiller reiterates that beauty can not fill the gap which divides feeling from thought, passivity from activity; this gap is infinite, and requires the intervention of a new and independent capacity. Thought is the immediate action of this absolute capacity. Thought must be called forth by the senses, but it does not depend on sensuousness; rather, it manifests itself through opposition to the senses.

Only insofar as beauty secures freedom for the mental powers to express themselves according to their laws, can it lead man from matter to form, from sensations to laws, from the limited to an absolute existence.

Schiller argues that any weakness in man’s mental powers does not derive externally from sensuousness. Sensuousness is not able to suppress the freedom of the mind. The senses only predominate because of the weakness of the mind, which has freely neglected to demonstrate its own independence.

Does this mean that the mind itself is divided? Schiller answers no. The finite mind becomes active through passivity, achieves the absolute through limits, acts and forms insofar as it receives matter. Such a mind combines the drive toward form or the absolute, with the drive toward matter or limits. However, this indwelling of two fundamental drives does not contradict the absolute unity of the mind, if one distinguishes the mind itself from both drives. Both drives act in the mind, but the mind is neither matter nor form, neither sensuousness nor reason.

Because both drives strive towards opposite objectives, their double necessity mutually cancels itself, and the will preserves complete freedom between both. The will acts towards both drives as a power, but neither one can act for itself as a power towards the other. “There is no other power in man than his will, and only that which annuls the man, death and the theft of consciousness, can annul his inner freedom.”

In “On the Sublime,” Schiller writes that the species characteristic of man is his free will: “The will is the species character of man, and reason itself is only the eternal rule of the same. All nature acts according to reason; his prerogative is merely, that he act according to reason with consciousness and will. All other things must; man is the being, who wills.”38

Schiller continues, that a necessity outside us determines our condition, our existence in time by means of sense perception. This is entirely involuntary: so as it acts on us, we must suffer. A necessity in us reveals our personality, at the instigation of sense perception and through opposition to the same. The will presupposes self-consciousness. But the supersensuous origin of both sensation and self-consciousness lies beyond our will, and beyond the sphere of our knowledge.

Both, however, are real. The sensuous drive awakens with the experience of life, with the commencement of the individual; the rational with the experience of law, with the commencement of the personality. Only after both have come into existence is man’s humanity erected. Until this happens, everything in him ensues according to the law of necessity. As soon as two opposite fundamental drives are active in him, both lose their compulsion, and the antithesis of the two necessities produces the origin of freedom.

**Letter Twenty**

*Freedom* can not be acted upon, but *freedom itself* is an effect of nature, and therefore can be promoted or hampered by natural means. As stated above, it takes its start when man is complete, and both drives have developed. It is lacking as long as man is incomplete.

Both in regard to the human species as a whole, and to the individual man, a moment exists when man is not yet complete, and one of the two drives is exclusively active in him. He commences with mere life, in order to end in form. He is an individual earlier than he is a person. He proceeds from limitations to infinity. Thus the sensuous drive comes into effect before the rational. In this *priority* of the sensuous drive we find the key to the entire history of human freedom.

There is a moment when the sensuous, or life drive, because the formal drive does not yet counter it, acts as nature and as necessity, when sensuousness is a power, because man has not yet begun; for in man himself there can be no other power than the will. But in the state of thinking, to which man passes over, reason is a power, and a logical and moral necessity replaces the physical. The power of sensation must therefore be annihilated. In order to exchange passivity for self-activity, man must be free of all determination, and pass through a condition of mere determinability. Hence, he must return to the negative condition of mere indeter-
minability in which he found himself before receiving sense impressions. However, that condition was empty of content. So now it is a matter of uniting an equal indeterminability and an equal unlimited determinability with the greatest possible contents. The task is therefore to annihilate, and at the same time to preserve, the determinate condition, which is only possible if one opposes another to it. As Schiller writes: “The scales of the balance stand level, if they are empty; however they also stand level, if they contain equal weights.”

The mind passes over from sensation to thought by means of a middle state of mind, in which sensuousness and reason are simultaneously active, but because of this mutually annul their determining power and effect a negation through opposition. This middle state of mind is a free state of mind. If one names the condition of sensuous determination the “physical,” but the condition of rational determination the “logical” and “moral,” then this free state of mind must be called the aesthetical.

The mind in the aesthetical condition acts freely and in the highest degree free from all constraint, but in no way free from the law. This aesthetical freedom is only distinguished from the logical necessity in thought, and from the moral necessity in willing, in that the laws according to which the mind operates are not conceived and, because they find no resistance, do not appear as compulsion, i.e., they have the appearance of freedom.

The concept Schiller develops here of the aesthetical state of mind is totally coherent with the concept of love in Christianity. In a letter to Goethe on August 17, 1795, Schiller wrote: “I find virtually in the Christian religion the disposition for the highest and most noble; and the various manifestations of the same in life seem to be so adverse and tasteless merely for the reason, that they are unsuccessful representations of the highest. If one observes the characteristic trait of Christianity, . . . it lies in nothing other than in the supersession of the law or of the Kantian imperative, in place of which Christianity wants to have established a free inclination. It is therefore in its pure form the representation of beautiful morality or of the incarnation of the Holy, and in this sense the only aesthetical religion . . . .”

**Letter Twenty-One**

**In this** letter, Schiller develops the idea of beauty as man’s “second creator,” because it restores man’s humanity, and answers what Schiller had described in the Eighth Letter as the pressing need of the time, to develop man’s “capacity of feeling,” the capacity to love truth and justice.

As Schiller observed in Letter Nineteen, there are double conditions of both determinability and determination. The mind is determinable in two ways: First, it is determinable insofar as it is not determined at all; and second, it is determinable insofar as it is not exclusively determined, i.e., it is not limited by determination. The former is mere indeterminacy, in that it is without reality; the latter is aesthetical determinability, because it unites all reality.

Similarly, the mind is determined in two ways: First, insofar as it is limited at all; and second, insofar as it limits itself out of its own absolute capacity. The former is the case when it perceives; the latter when it thinks. What thinking is, in regard to determination, the aesthetical composition is, in regard to determinability. The former is limitation from inner infinite power, the latter is negation from inner infinite fullness.

In sensation and thinking, the mind determines man exclusively something, individual or person, otherwise they are infinitely apart. Aesthetical determinability agrees with mere indeterminacy, in that both exclude every determined existence, while otherwise they are infinitely different. Indeterminacy is an empty infinity out of deficiency; aesthetical freedom of determinism is a fulfilled infinity.

Thus, in the aesthetical condition, man is naught, in that he lacks any particular determination. The beautiful is fully indifferent and unfruitful in regard to knowledge and inner conviction. Beauty gives no individual result for the understanding or the will. She realizes no individual intellectual or moral purpose. She finds no single truth, helps fulfill no single duty. She is inept at establishing character or enlightening the mind.

For Schiller, nothing further is achieved by beauty than that it is now made possible for man, on account of nature, to make of himself what he will. His freedom to be what he should be is restored. He now has an infinite capacity. The freedom taken from him by the one-sided compulsion of nature, in sensing, and by the excluding legislation of reason, in thinking, this capacity is given back to him in the aesthetical state of mind. Such a restored capacity is truly the gift of humanity.

Certainly he already possesses this capacity, this humanity, as disposition. But, in reality, he loses it with any determinate condition, and it is given back to him by the aesthetical life. In this sense, beauty is our second creator. She makes humanity possible for us, and leaves it to our free will to make it real. She has it in common with our original Creator, to give us nothing further than the
capacity for humanity, leaving its use to our own willful determination.

This is why, as Lyndon LaRouche has emphasized, in the fight to achieve political freedom, one must not agitate a population by appealing to its irrational passions and obsessions, but rather, one must create within individuals a philosophical, or as Schiller puts it, an aestheticcal state of mind. And the task of political organizing is to replicate such a state of mind in others.

As Lyndon LaRouche has argued, for human society to survive, requires, on the one hand, discoveries of universal principle in respect to the physical universe (which he has referred to as the n-fold domain), so that man is capable of achieving economic progress. On the other hand, since this requires social cooperation to implement, such progress requires artistic discoveries of a moral nature in what LaRouche refers to as the m-fold domain, to free man from those false-axiomatic habits of practice which otherwise lead to his tragic self-destruction.

From this standpoint, a beautiful soul is a true revolutionar, capable of playing a world-historic role precisely because, as Schiller himself would express it, he is greater than his destiny. Such a soul is not appreciated by the oligarchy and its agents. Perhaps that is why G.W.F. Hegel criticized Schiller’s concept of the beautiful soul in his The Phenomenology of Mind. Hegel wrote that Schiller’s “beautiful soul” was empty nothingness with no concrete reality, and thus “is unhinged, disordered, and runs to madness, wastes itself in yearning, and pines away in consumption.”

SCHILLER now emphasizes again that the transition from the passive condition of feeling, to the active one of thinking and willing, occurs through a middle condition of aesthetical freedom. The only way to make the sensuous man rational is to make him aesthetical first.

To have the capacity in each individual case to make his judgment and will that of the species, to find from every limited existence the passage to an infinite one, from every dependent condition to be able to take the upward swing to self-dependence and freedom, man must take care that he be in no moment mere individual, merely serving the law of nature. To be able to elevate oneself from the narrow circle of natural ends, to rational ends, man must have practiced within the former for the latter, and have realized his physical determination with a certain freedom of mind, i.e., according to the laws of beauty.

In a footnote, Schiller writes that a disposition is noble, which possesses the gift to transform the most limited or trivial, through the mode of treatment, into an infinite. A noble spirit is not satisfied to be free himself, he must set
According to Schiller, the three different moments or stages of development of the individual man are also reflected in the entire human species. These stages can be lengthened or shortened, but not leapt over, nor can their order be changed. These stages are: (1) man in a physical condition suffers the power of nature; (2) he frees himself from this power in the aesthetical condition; and (3) he rules over it in the moral.

In the first stage, before beauty and peaceful form calm the savage, man is a self-serving slave and not himself. If man does not proceed through the second stage of beauty to reason, he will not achieve true reason, but rather merely a form of Aristotelean understanding, which remains rooted in the material.

Thus, instead of achieving moral independence based on true reason, man can be directed to physical life in his drive for the absolute. While the infinite rises in his imagination, his heart lives in the individual and serves the moment. He extends his individuality into the endless, instead of abstracting from it. He strives for an inexhaustible matter, for everlasting alteration, for an absolute affirmation of his temporal existence, instead of for the immutable.

What Schiller is describing here are the consequences of the false-axiomatic assumptions of both empiricism and Aristotelianism—the location of reality in the finite particular, and the definition of space and time as a “bad infinite” of linear extension.

Schiller next presents the distinction between cognitive reason (Vernunft) and mere understanding (Verstand). Reason would leave the world of sense entirely, and swing up into the pure realm of ideas, but the understanding “remains eternally within the conditioned, and questions eternally, without coming to a final cause.”

As long as moral law speaks only against the interest of sensuous self-love, it appears as foreign. Man has not yet come to see self-love as foreign, and the voice of reason as his true self. He therefore feels only the fetters, not the infinite liberation. This, of course, is yet another criticism of Kant’s categorical imperative.

In this condition, either reason has not yet spoken, and the physical still rules over him with blind necessity, or reason has not yet purified itself enough from the senses, and the moral still serves the physical. In the first case, he is a reasonless (vernunftlos), and in the second case, a rational animal (vernunftiges Tier).

But, as Schiller concludes, in emphasizing the absolute distinction between man and animal, man should be neither: He should be man. Nature should not rule him exclusively, and reason should not rule him conditionally.

Letter Twenty-Five

Schiller warns that, in seeking an exit from the material world and a passage into the world of mind, to leap over beauty, passing directly from mere life to pure form and pure object, violates human nature by negating the world of sense.

Beauty is form, because we contemplate her, and life, because we feel her. She is at the same time our state and our deed.

Because she is both at the same time, she is our triumphant proof that passivity in no way excludes activity, nor matter form, nor limitation infinity. Consequently, man’s moral freedom is not annulled by his necessary physical dependence. Thus, beauty stands forth as the solution to Kant’s categorical imperative, and as the basis for solving all the Kantian antinomies.

Logic, on the other hand, can not prove that both subsist together, that they act upon one another reciprocally,
that they are to be absolutely and necessarily united. And here Schiller once again attacks Kant’s Aristotelean logic. He writes:

“Rather, on the contrary, from this exclusion of feeling, so long as there is thought, and of thought, so long as there is feeling, an incompatibility of both natures must be concluded, in consequence of which analysts [i.e., Kant–WFW] do not really know to adduce any better proof of the practicability of pure reason in mankind than, that it is imperative.”

“But since, in the enjoyment of beauty or aesthetical unity, a real union and interchange of matter with form, and of passivity with activity, takes place, so is proven thereby the compatibility of both natures, the practicability of the infinite in finiteness, hence the possibility of the most sublime humanity.”

In these two sentences, we have the most devastatingly succinct critique of Kant imaginable. Because he denies the very nature of man as a “finite infinite,” Kant can only issue Draconian imperatives. Is it any wonder, that in Concerning the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany, Heinrich Heine compared him to Robespierre: “If, however, Immanuel Kant, the arch-destroyer in the realm of ideas, far surpassed Maximilien Robespierre in terrorism, yet he possessed many similarities with the latter which invite comparison of the two men.”

In contrast to the utilitarians and pragmatists, who justify all manner of brutality and ugliness on the grounds that beauty is not “practical,” Schiller has established a higher practicability, the “possibility of the most sublime humanity.”

**Letter Twenty-Six**

Having thus decisively resolved the Kantian antinomy of practical reason, Schiller has now freed himself to devote the final two letters to a discussion of man as an artist who creates works of appearance (artworks) in the “joyous realm of play.”

The entrance of the savage to humanity is announced in the joy of appearance, and in the inclination for adornment and for play. Thus, the transition to humanity occurs when man no longer seeks only that which is real. The reality of things is their work; the appearance of things is the work of man.

For Schiller, the aesthetical disposition is a gift of nature. Nature itself leads man aloft from reality to appearance. Since she endowed him with two senses, seeing and hearing, which lead him through appearance to cognition of the real. These two senses are distinct from touch. The object of touch is a force, which we endure; the object of the eyes and the ears is a form, which we create. As soon as man begins to enjoy with the eye, and seeing acquires a self-dependent value for him, he is already aesthetically free, and the play drive has unfolded. As the play drive is aroused, which finds pleasure in appearance, the imitative formative drive will follow, which treats appearance as something self-dependent.

The capacity for imitative art is therefore given with the capacity for form; but the urge to the same rests upon another predisposition, of which, Schiller writes, he need not treat here. But this predisposition is the “predisposition for divinity in his personality,” which Schiller discusses in the eleventh letter. Moreover, when the aesthetical drive for art will develop, depends, according to Schiller, “merely upon the degree of love” with which man can dwell on mere appearance.

Schiller concludes that we can not be reproached for placing value on aesthetical appearance, but for the fact that we have not yet brought it to pure appearance. We will deserve this reproach so long as we can not enjoy the beautiful living nature without coveting it, can not admire the beautiful of imitative art, without asking for an end or a purpose.

**Letter Twenty-Seven**

Schiller ends his letters by asking, Does this state of beautiful appearance exist? He answers: “As a need, it exists in every finely tuned soul, as a reality, one might indeed only find it, like a pure church and a pure republic, in a few select circles, where not the mindless imitation of foreign manners, but rather one’s own beautiful nature guides conduct, where man passes through the most complicated circumstances with bold simplicity and calm innocence, and needs neither to impair others’ freedom in order to maintain his own, nor to cast away his dignity in order to display grace.”

Schiller is no utopian Schwärmer. He does not propose that this ideal can be fully realized in reality. Nonetheless,
this is the ideal which must guide us along the path to political freedom, a path which requires a “total revolution” in the inner man.

Schiller concludes the Aesthetical Letters with a concept that was also central to the “Kallias Letters,” a concept which echoes the fundamental principle of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia: One should act to the advantage of the other. In the “Kallias Letters,” he wrote: “[I]t is striking, how good fashion (beauty of behavior) is developed from my concept of beauty. The first law of good fashion is: Spare others’ freedom, the second: Show freedom yourself.” He then writes that he knows “no more suitable image for the ideal of beautiful behavior, than a well-performed English dance, composed from many complicated figures. . . . It is the most suitable emblem of the asserted self-freedom and the spared freedom of the other.”

In this concluding letter, Schiller describes this as the “joyous realm of play and appearance,” in which the fun-power, is nothing other than Vernadsky’s notion of the Nöosphere, as LaRouche has further developed Vernadsky’s concept.

For Schiller, as for Plato, Leibniz, Nicolaus of Cusa, and Lyndon LaRouche, the universe is not entropic, and man is not a beast. Therefore, human society is not, as Hobbes characterized it, a “war of each against all,” requiring a tyrant to impose order. Nations are not inherently pitted against one another, requiring a supranational empire to impose so-called peace. As Lyndon LaRouche has emphasized, there is no inherent “Clash of Civilizations” of the sort desired by Samuel Huntington, nor is the sovereign nation-state the cause of war; but rather, oppositely, the only possibility for global peace is to construct a family of sovereign nation-states based upon a community of principle. Nicolaus of Cusa had argued similarly in his On Catholic Concordance, that the only way to ensure peace, is to bring all rational creatures into harmony with the Word or Logos.

But the precondition for achieving this, as Lyndon LaRouche would say, is to have fun! Or as Friedrich Schiller would say: Man is only fully man, where he plays!
The Presidents’ Day conference of the Schiller Institute and International Caucus of Labor Committees—meeting bi-coastally near Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles, California—analyzed the process whereby, during the 2004 Presidential campaign and its aftermath, Lyndon LaRouche succeeded in mobilizing and transforming the Democratic Party under his increasingly visible leadership, and discussed how to lead this newly determined party in the battle to make of George W. Bush and his Administration the lamest duck there ever was.

As Franklin D. Roosevelt prevented fascism at home with his New Deal, and defeated it abroad in World War II, LaRouche declared that he intends to do the same—defeating Bush’s domestic fascist attempt to destroy FDR’s New Deal legacy (starting with Social Security), and defeating the imperialist fascism of Dick Cheney’s “perpetual war” faction.

To do that, it is necessary to expose and politically destroy the “godfather” of these twin dangers—George Pratt Shultz, the man who designed the Bush Administration, and the gravest threat of Hitlerism, his protégé, the Austrian-born, Hitler-loving son of a Nazi family, Arnold Schwarzenegger.

Today’s Thirty Years’ War

Speaking on the theme “It’s Time To Put Out the Flames of the Thirty Years’ War: Let’s Create a Beautiful Mankind!,” Helga Zepp LaRouche opened her keynote presentation with a tour d’horizon of the world strategic crisis, concluding: “I think if you look at this picture... Lyn is absolutely right when he says the Thirty Years’ War has already begun. The world is already sitting on a powderkeg, and the name of this powderkeg is World War III. The fuse has already been lit, at five, six, seven, eight points.”

To deal with this, she said, “we have to look at history like tragedy. And we have to learn from Classical tragedy, how to uplift ourselves, how to uplift the population in order to find a way out.”

To illustrate this in practice, she turned to the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) itself, to the historical writings on the period by Friedrich Schiller, the great German poet, and to his Wallenstein trilogy, centered on a leading figure of the war, the General Albrecht Wallenstein who first fought for the Hapsburg Empire, and then turned against it.

LaRouche Assumes FDR Role

In his keynote speech, “The Great Crash of 2005,” Lyndon LaRouche reviewed the past year, his own crucial role in it—and what the future holds: “We are at the last chance to save civilization from Hell, a last chance which I have been forecasting with accuracy over several decades, and most emphatically since the period 1968-1971.”

Our challenge is to save the world, as “the United States saved the world under Roosevelt—otherwise we’d have been in Hell a long time ago. He saved the United States. He saved our system. And he saved the world from fascist conquest.” The threat, and the solution, are similar today: “Nazism was not people wearing swastikas in brown shirts...”
In opening remarks to an April 7 international webcast in Washington, D.C., Lyndon LaRouche confronted his audience with a shocking truth: Although the United States has been destroying itself “yard by yard” since Aug. 15, 1971, Americans can’t simply blame the then-Nixon Administration, or the Administration of George W. Bush today. The destruction of the U.S. has been caused with the consent and complicity of the population of the United States, including the Democrats themselves!

President Franklin Roosevelt had an easier task in the 1930’s than we do today, LaRouche argued. FDR was able to mobilize the resources we still had in the farms, the industries, and the labor force. But today, we have destroyed a large portion of those resources, and we have a generation of Baby Boomers who have lost the fiber of morality which the FDR generation had, and needed, in order to win the war against fascism.

The destruction of the Baby Boomer generation made possible the anti-industrial mentality that poses the threat of fascism today. This threat began to be realized with the Nixon Administration, not so much because of Nixon, but because of George Pratt Shultz, the representative of the financial oligarchy who played the crucial role in getting Nixon to abandon the Bretton Woods system on Aug. 15, 1971. Nixon fell by the wayside, but Shultz is still a powerful player on the political scene, having brought Condoleezza Rice and others into the Bush Administration, and Arnold Schwarzenegger into the governorship of California.

There were three phases to the destruction Shultz set off. First, there was the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system per se, an abandonment Shultz then imposed on the world at the 1971 Azores meeting. Second was the Brzezinski-supervised phase, in which, under the aegis of the Trilateral Commission, the U.S. adopted a policy of “controlled disintegration of the world economy.” This policy was carried over into the Reagan Administration, which contained more Trilateral Commission members than Carter’s. Third, there was the phase beginning with the 1987 financial crisis, which brought in Alan Greenspan as head of the Federal Reserve. Greenspan initiated the era of replacing the real economy with side-bets and speculation, which has brought the world financial system to the point where a chain reaction collapse could happen at any time.

Reorganize the Economy

LaRouche then identified the principles by which the physical economy has to be reorganized. The first aspect is to reverse the shift into “suburbia” begun in the 1950’s, by going back to rail systems, and to a denser utilization of power overall. Mass transit should be increased, and the auto industry largely retooled in order to produce the new rail system which we need.

To carry out such a mobilization, LaRouche said, we have to start from the top, the machine-tool sector, which involves the highly skilled workers who provide the basis for new production. Then, as supports for the high-technology sector, we should bring in semiskilled and unskilled labor to fill out the projects. This would operate in a way similar to FDR’s organizing of the TVA. What’s crucial is the commitment to utilizing the machine-tool sector in the U.S., Europe, and Japan for long-term industrialization worldwide, over the course of the next two generations.

Defeating the ‘Slime Mold’

What must be understood, LaRouche said, is that the financial system has been taken over by a slime mold, an international financier oligarchy which is intent upon imposing a feudal system on the world. To organize a recovery, we have to get governments to stand up to the slime mold, and declare the financial system to be bankrupt. The banking system is a private enterprise, which can be put through bankruptcy reorganization if governments decide to take that action. Then, governments can ensure the creation of 25-year credit at 2% simple interest, for the creation of the physical capital we need to rebuild the economy.
Italian Parliament Calls for New Bretton Woods

On April 6, the Italian Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of Parliament), approved a motion calling on the government to promote “an international conference at the level of Heads of State and Government, to globally define a new and more just monetary and financial system.” The motion, which was adopted following a sometimes heated debate, is a faithful representation of the analyses and proposals put forward by Lyndon LaRouche, to whom legislators supporting the motion referred during the debate as the initiator of the campaign “for a new Bretton Woods.” The measure had been drafted with the assistance of Paolo Raimondi, a representative of the LaRouche movement in Italy.

The vote is just the “first step,” as several legislators stressed, in a process of discussion on the international financial and economic system, which will continue in parliamentary committees in future weeks. Passage came only after a fierce battle, during which an attempt to emasculate the motion by representatives of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s ruling coalition, was defeated.

Must Convene Conference

At the beginning of the debate, the government representative, Undersecretary for Parliamentary Affairs Cosimo Ventucci, proposed to remove five lines from the text, which read: “to reach, as soon as possible, together with other nations, the convening of an international conference at the level of Heads of State and Government similar to that held in Bretton Woods in 1944.” Ventucci’s attempt was crushed by a broad spectrum of legislators, including members of the government coalition. In particular, Representatives Alfonso Gianni, from the opposition party Rifondazione Comunista (PRC), and Luigi D’Agrò, from the government party Christian Democratic Union (UDC), led the pro-LaRouche and anti-globalization forces, to defeat the government attempt. Memory of the just-deceased Pope was invoked in support of a just, new world economic order.

After Ventucci presented the government proposal, Rep. Gianni, a respected economist, took the floor, arguing that the deletion would completely change the substance of the motion, pointing out that the “heart” of the text, as inspired by “American leftist Democratic circles”—a reference to the LaRouche wing of the Democratic Party—was exactly the issue of convening an international conference. “The kernel of this motion is in the fact that we must ‘remake Bretton Woods,’ that is, an international conference, at the level of heads of state and government, to reach an agreement on the financial and monetary system. This is the ‘heart’ of the motion: If we take this part out, as the government cunningly does, there is absolutely nothing left!”

After further back-and-forth between Ventucci and the supporters of the resolution, Berlusconi’s man backed down, and proposed to reintroduce the original five lines, with the face-saving exception that the words “similar to the one held in Bretton Woods in 1944,” be removed. This compromise was accepted.

Remembering the Pope

Representative Marco Zaccera, a foreign policy spokesman for Alleanza Nazionale (AN), a government party, declared, “Today, we remembered the Pope; how many times has the Pope said that the world’s leaders must come together to discuss these problems!”

A colleague of Zaccera’s, Alessandro Delmastro delle Vedove, drew applause from both sides, when he reminded them that, owing to the “global usurcoracy” of the I.M.F., the Argentinian bankruptcy was threatening a “war among the poor”—i.e., those in both Italy and Argentina who lost their savings in the Argentinian bond crisis. “If we don’t want to call it Bretton Woods, then let’s call it something else,” delle Vedove urged, “because the markets are not able to regulate themselves, as the last decade has clearly and evidently proven.”

Representative D’Agrò, who had participated in a conference at the Vicenza Chamber of Commerce a few years ago where Lyndon LaRouche was the keynote speaker, spoke forcefully against introducing any change in the motion. He reminded his colleagues of the devastating effects on the Italian currency in 1992, caused by international speculator George Soros.

The final vote was decidedly in favor, 187-5, with 159 abstentions.

A call issued by Helga Zepp LaRouche for the convening of a New Bretton Woods conference appears on page 4 of this issue.
Berlin Seminar Promotes New ‘Treaty of Westphalia’

An extraordinary meeting of international personalities, including political figures, economists, military, strategic analysts, regional experts, and intellectuals, was convened in Berlin January 12-13, to discuss the current strategic, economic-financial, and cultural world crisis, and the perspectives for solving it through concerted international action for a “New Treaty of Westphalia.”

Lyndon and Helga LaRouche engaged in an intensive two-day discussion with the 40-plus participants from the United States, Russia, China, India, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Egypt, Iraq, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The leading aim of the seminar was to outline the parameters of a new world financial and monetary system, to be brought into being by a transatlantic-Eurasian dialogue on the imminent breakdown crisis. In-depth reports were presented on the internal political process in the U.S., highlighting the role of LaRouche and his movement; the Russian crisis, characterized by internal economic-social dislocations and external geopolitical pressures, as well as enormous scientific and economic potentials; the current situations in China and India; the continuing disaster in Iraq, and the broader Southwest Asian region; and the political and economic situation in Western and Central Europe.

Strategic Alternative

The strategic alternative presented by LaRouche, was a vision of U.S.-Eurasian cooperation over the next fifty years, to guarantee all countries just access to vital raw materials resources, and joint development of new raw materials and technologies. This should be the content of a revised “Peace of Westphalia,” and the true meaning of a dialogue of cultures. LaRouche identified three focal points at the current juncture:

- The solution to the global financial, economic, and strategic crisis must emerge from the United States, despite the insanity prevailing in the George W. Bush Administration. There is, currently, a major shift occurring in U.S. politics: Forces in the Democratic Party, which have been catalyzed by LaRouche’s faction since the 2000 elections, and in particular since the July 2004 Democratic Party Convention in Boston, are challenging the Bush-Cheney regime, notably on the issue of Social Security privatization. This involves important circles, including Republicans, in the U.S. Congress. In parallel, “institutional forces” in the military and intelligence services, and among diplomats and intellectuals, are mounting a major effort to redirect U.S. domestic and foreign policy. These forces will initiate cooperation with the countries of Eurasia.

- We require a new, long-term agreement among sovereign nations for equal and just access to existing raw materials resources, as well as the development of new categories of resources. The greatest deposits of raw materials are in Central Asia and Siberia. In this context, the role of Russia’s scientific sector was defined as key for the elaboration of raw materials, and the development of new categories, beyond the Mendeleyev system.

- The collapse of the post-Bretton Woods monetary system requires abandoning the “independent” central banking system, and replacing it with national banking, through which sovereign governments hold the sole right to issue currency, and are bound by the duty to promote economic development in the interests of the common good. Under such conditions, a cooperative treaty agreement for a New Bretton Woods system can be achieved between the U.S. and the states of Eurasia.

Civil Rights

On the 40th anniversary of the historic Selma-to-Montgomery march for voting rights, four members of the LaRouche Youth Movement were invited by one of the great heroines of the Civil Rights movement, Amelia Boynton Robinson, to participate in the celebrations, culminating in a re-enactment of the famous march across the Edmund Pettus Bridge.

As the members of the LYM described it, their goal was to intervene into these events and elevate them from the level of simple nostalgia for the heyday of the movement; i.e., from “Hey, this is what we did,” to “Where do we go from here?” and “How do we do it?”

The LYM team arrived in Selma on March 3, a day which was to be dedicated to the honor of Mrs. Robinson’s deceased husband, Samuel W. Boynton, her long-time partner in the struggle for voting rights for African Americans. The LYM organizers joined Mrs. Robinson for a TV interview, in which she recounted her experiences in the fight to register Blacks in the South to vote, and described the process by which she met the LaRouche movement in New York City many years ago. She subsequently became a leading spokesman for the Schiller Institute and its vice chairman.

That evening, the group proceeded to the historic Tabernacle Baptist Church, where the first voting rights meeting in Selma took place, for a tribute to Mr. Boynton. The event, which was attended by 400 people, including a number of elected officials and Civil Rights veterans, turned into an impromptu book-signing by Mrs. Robinson of her autobiography, Bridge Across Jordan. Speakers included Mrs. Robinson, her son, Bruce Boynton, Dr. Joseph Lowery, Dr. F.D. Reese, and Dr. Charles Steele. Bruce Boynton recalled the courage of his parents, Amelia and Samuel, in organizing the impoverished Black population to register to vote, despite threats against their lives, in a South where lynchings of innocent Blacks were still common.
Challenge to Congress
The next morning, the LaRouche Youth attended an “Invisible Giants Conference” at Selma High School, where California Democrat Rep. Maxine Waters challenged the students to organize a rally aimed at making sure that members of Congress participating in the Selma commemoration take up the fight against the Bush Administration.

Among that day’s events was a reception at the National Voting Rights Museum, where Amelia and Samuel Boynton were honored. At every event, Mrs. Robinson was given a standing ovation, and greeted with great reverence and respect as the mother of the Civil Rights movement.

Awards Dinner
The LaRouche Youth were the special guests of Amelia Robinson at a black-tie event, the “Freedom Flame Awards” on Saturday night, where among the dignitaries were Civil Rights veterans J.L. Chestnut, C.T. Vivian, Harry Belafonte, and other celebrities, including Jesse Jackson, Rep. Cynthia McKinney, and Rep. Waters. Among those remembered were Classical singers Marion Anderson and Paul Robeson.

The last speech of the evening was given by Harry Belafonte, who had served in World War II; his description of the shift in the population that he found when he came back after the war, was similar to observations often made by Lyndon LaRouche.

There was a sense in the audience of the movement coming back to life, as especially Belafonte, Amelia Robinson, and Dr. Lowery, one of the founders of SCLC, attempted to lift people out of their littleness.

The March
The culmination of the ceremonies took place on Sunday with the march across the Edmund Pettus Bridge. The LYM composed two signs for the march. One sign was: “Say ‘no’ to Bush’s fascist budget cuts; save HUD, CDBG; Save Section 8.” The second sign was, “LaRouche PAC: Lift every voice for economic justice. Join LaRouche to fight Social Security privatization.”

As the march began to form up, groups of Senators, including Republican Majority Leader Bill Frist, and others locked arms, as in the days of Dr. King, and walked from the church, toward Main Street, and across the Edmund Pettus Bridge. In a demonstration of how to move beyond mere nostalgia, the LYM contingent positioned itself in front of the Senators, and marched with its signs held high, singing, “Ain’t gonna let Bill Frist turn us round.”
Conference
Continued from page 105

or black shirts. Nazism was a creation of a group of international bankers, like Felix Rohatyn today, and his co-thinkers; like the co-thinkers of the Bush Administration in economic policy today. Notably like George Shultz, who qualifies as a kind of Schacht of the United States: a real Nazi, a banker behind Nazism, as Schacht was a banker behind Nazism in Europe.

Speaking on that panel were Executive Intelligence Review editor Jeffrey Steinberg; Debra Hanania Freeman, LaRouche’s national spokesman; and Harley Schlanger, LaRouche’s West Coast spokesman.

The passion to win—to stop today’s “Thirty Years’ War,” and to enable the human race to realize its capacity for love and beauty—was expressed not only through conference speeches and the discussion, but through an open rehearsal Saturday night of Johann Sebastian Bach’s motet “Jesu, meine Freude,” with director John Sigerson and the East Coast LYM Chorus; and through a performance Sunday night by the West Coast LYM of the first two acts of Shakespeare’s “Julius Caesar,” under the direction of actor and director Robert Beltran, and assistant directors Cody Jones and Elodie Viennot.

“This is already, in political character—this government, this Administration, is already a fascist government, a fascist regime. Unless it is defeated before it consolidates its position and role in the world, as we’ve seen since Sept. 11, 2001, the world will go into a fascist spiral, worse than Nazism, from which civilized humanity would not emerge for generations yet to come.”

Reviving the Democratic Party

Just before LaRouche’s presentation, a panel on “Bringing Back the Democratic Party of FDR,” explored in the detail the process through which LaRouche came to the fore within the Democratic Party and the Kerry campaign in the course of 2004, and how his interventions helped to pick the party up off the floor after the November 2 election.

‘Bring Back the Democratic Party of FDR.’ Panelists (top to bottom): LaRouche West Coast spokesman Harley Schlanger; national spokesman Debra Hanania Freeman; EIR editor Jeffrey Steinberg.

West Coast LYM present first two acts of Shakespeare’s “Julius Caesar,” under the direction of Robert Beltran.

John Sigerson conducts East Coast LYM chorus in open rehearsal of J.S. Bach motet “Jesu, meine Freude.”
The death of violinist Norbert Brainin on April 10, 2005, came as a shock, and is still difficult to grasp. He died at the age of 82 in London. With him the world loses one of those truly great artists and human beings, who, because of their moral integrity and extraordinary charisma, are able to shape an entire epoch, since they are able to successfully mediate in all cultures precisely that which makes man unique: the joy in creative work. Anyone who has seen firsthand only once, how intensively, precisely, and rigorously—but never ever pedantically, always inspiring, loose, and with a lot of jokes—Norbert Brainin was capable of teaching especially young musicians, how great Classical works are to be performed, so that the listeners can be reached and ennobled in the best Schillerian sense, understands the deeper meaning of Beethoven’s famous challenge *So streng wie frei* (As rigorously, as free). This high moral challenge, which is not only valid in Classical art, but also in all science, accompanied Norbert in his long artistic life; with “his” Amadeus Quartet, he consciously chose to take it on—and fulfilled it.

“To bring out adequately in quartet playing the great art of the four-part setting,” of which Beethoven became an unsurpassed master with his late quartets—the very domain of the legendary Amadeus Quartet—“so that the audience starts to understand this concept, is, for an artist like me, the *raison d’être*, the sense of an accomplished artistic life.” How often in our many discussions and interviews with Norbert did we hear this sentence from him, which he said very deliberately at the end of his last interview with *Ibykus* (the German sister-publication of *Fidelio*) in July 2004—an interview which now unfortunately has become the very last of his life.

“We simply listened into the music. Again and again,” was his typical answer to the question of how the Amadeus Quartet was able to reach this great mastery of interpretation. Similarly, his stating the fact, that he was one of the last living violinists who was educated in that very technique of violin playing, which had been “authorized” by Beethoven himself, and without which “you simply can’t play Beethoven’s late quartets adequately.” Brainin stood in this tradition with two of his teachers: Rosa Hochmann-Rosenfeld in Vienna, as well as Carl Flesch in London, who at the time was by far the world’s most famous violin pedagogue.

After Hitler’s *Anschluss*, the occupation of Austria, in March 1938—right on Norbert’s sixteenth birthday—his family, being Jewish, decided to send their children to England for their
safety. Flesch accepted Norbert as a pupil and everything seemed to develop “normally,” until World War II ended his studies with Flesch. When the Nazis started to bomb England, Flesch fled from London to the Dutch harbor of Rotterdam, which was later largely destroyed in a terrible bombardment.

In London, Norbert initially continued his studies with Flesch’s assistant Max Rostal, but as an “enemy alien,” he soon was put into an internment camp, where he met Peter Schidlof, who was also a young Jewish refugee from Vienna who played the violin. Through joint performances of Mendelssohn’s Violin Concerto in the camp (Schidlof playing the solo part, Brainin “the orchestra”), the two boys became inseparable friends—for life. When Brainin was able to resume his studies with Rostal, his teacher announced that he was ready to teach two Jewish violin students without any means—Peter Schidlof and Siegmund Nissel, who had also emigrated from Vienna—for free. Three of the future members of the Amadeus Quartet became close friends because of their joint fate as refugees and their life in the internment camp; artistically, they became closer in Max Rostal’s chamber orchestra, and while playing string quartets together. In addition, there was another challenge to be mastered: the duty to undertake “war-related activity.” Up to eight hours’ work in an armament factory, and about four hours studying the violin—that was the typical wartime “day of study” for these future outstanding musicians.

After this tough education, Norbert accepted another challenge, a true baptism by fire for the musicians: In 1946 he took part in the Carl Flesch Competition, founded in memory of his recently deceased teacher, with the firm intention to win it. His interpretation of Brahms’ Violin Concerto fully convinced the jury. The first prize being a concert with the BBC Symphony in London, Brainin chose (typically for him) Beethoven’s Violin Concerto, and with that, the door to a great international career as a soloist was wide open. While preparing for this concert, he often played string quartets with his friends Peter and “Siggie,” who were joined by the cellist Martin Lovett—“because through this I wanted to develop myself further musically and artistically. But then something decisive happened, in my head, my soul, and my heart; and this was entirely caused by the music we played. Above all, by Beethoven’s quartets, but also by those of Schubert, Mozart, and Haydn. . . . I couldn’t think about anything else. . . . Already in 1947 I sensed, that playing string quartets would become the purpose of my life.”

And this is exactly what happened. The (unofficial) debut of the “Brainin Quartet” in 1947 was already a huge success; the proper debut of the Amadeus Quartet on April 10, 1948 in London was even a sensation. So, too, its 1950 debut on German soil, in Hamburg, where “the audience in its enthusiasm almost smashed the entire hall.”

Since that time, Norbert Brainin and “his” quartet developed more and more into a powerful musical institution, which set international standards in terms of adequate interpretation of the great Classical works for string quartets—above all Beethoven’s late quartets, the raison d’être of these four musicians. Until the premature death of its violist Peter Schidlof in 1987, the Amadeus Quartet played together with no changes in its personnel, which is a unique record in the history of music.

This part of Brainin’s extraordinarily successful artistic and equally influential cultural-political life, which secures him an acknowledged place in the history of music, is generally known. The London Times, in its obituary on April 12, honored Brainin’s extraordinary artistic and moral qualities, and did not forget to mention his appropriate use of jokes. (Once, in order to loosen up his colleagues, Brainin suddenly interrupted the Amadeus rehearsal of Schubert’s Quintet, and told a joke about the conversation of two street violinists in New York: “What’s your violin?” “Strad, 1699.” “Boy, that’s cheap!”)

But also another part of Norbert’s life deserves to be told, because it demonstrates in an exemplary way, that for him the question of morality and absolutely strict artistic rigor and integrity—his constant truth seeking—was not only a matter of “pure art,” but also of practical everyday life—i.e.,
politics. We are talking about his relationship with the American politician Lyndon LaRouche, with whom he developed a close friendship over the last twenty years.

Friendship with LaRouche

The basis for this was laid, as usual in such matters, with the intensive exchange of great ideas. Before their first meeting in the Spring of 1986, Brainin had read some of LaRouche’s writings on music, philosophy, and—naturally—also politics. When they met in the vicinity of Wiesbaden, Germany, Schubert’s String Quintet—at the time one of LaRouche’s “music projects”—was at the center of discussion. For more than two hours Norbert demonstrated (without a score), with gestures, singing, and at the piano, the connection of all five voices of this great work of art, which he knew by heart. After that, the discussion—over a good dinner—continued with philosophical and political questions, but also with a lot of jokes and anecdotes. Out of that first discussion grew an extraordinarily fruitful intellectual cooperation, which went far beyond “musical projects” as such.

In December 1987, Brainin together with Cologne pianist Günter Ludwig gave their first “solidarity concert for LaRouche” in Boston’s famous Jordan Hall, with sonatas from Mozart, Brahms, and Beethoven, when LaRouche was put on trial for purely political reasons. The concert was reviewed very favorably in the leading Boston newspaper—a testimony to Norbert’s courageous engagement. The U.S. government some months later was forced to declare a mistrial, since the political fallout for then-U.S. Vice President Bush, Sr. threatened to become too damaging. Brainin again stood by his friend LaRouche, when the latter was put on trial a second time—in practically the same case—at the end of 1988 in Alexandria, Virginia, and was sentenced to 15 years in prison, after a “rocket docket trial,” which had nothing to do with a fair trial according to normal legal standards.

Several times in the U.S. capital, but also in many European cities—among them Paris, Milan, Munich, Hamburg, and Wiesbaden—Brainin played solidarity concerts for LaRouche in the years that followed; he also visited his friend twice in prison in Rochester, Minnesota, where the two discussed, in a very noisy environment, questions of Classical composition—above all the principle of \textit{motivic thorough-composition}, which was very close to Norbert’s heart.

Fight for ‘Scientific Tuning’

Norbert was especially interested in cooperating with LaRouche in the field of the \textit{science of music}. At the end of the 1980’s, this meant above all the fight for the “low tuning” of C=256 Hz, the so-called “Verdi A” of 432 Hz, a proposal which the famous Italian soprano Renata Tebaldi had made in a discussion with LaRouche. After long conversations concerning the \textit{scientific relevance—and not only the obvious practical one—of a unified (lower) tuning in opposition to today’s absurdly high “Karajan tuning” of A well above 440 Hz, Brainin, who of course had grasped the meaning of this question for singers immediately, studied this problem intensely. Using the \textit{Adagio} from Bach’s Sonata for Violin solo in G-minor, he demonstrated for the first time in a private setting with LaRouche, his wife Helga Zepp LaRouche, and some friends, in August 1988 in his beautiful summer house in northern Tuscany, the fact that a Classical composition (and also his Strad) sounded much better—i.e., “fuller” and more transparent at the same time—in the “low tuning.” Spontaneously over lunch the decision was made, to repeat this experiment on stage, which occurred in December of that same year with extraordinary success in Munich, Germany.

Before that, though, Brainin “paid his tribute to science.” In order to demonstrate the superiority of the “low tuning,” in a parliamentary hearing in Rome, which became the basis for a parliamentary initiative to pass a law on the “Verdi A,” Prof. Bruno Barosi, the director of the world-renowned International Institute of Violin Making, in Cremona, Italy, invited Brainin to his laboratory, recorded certain tones (and their octaves) both in the low and high tuning, did a spectral analysis, and finally evaluated the findings. At first, Barosi and his assistant were totally baffled at the absolute precision of Brainin’s intonation: “I have had almost all of the world’s top violinists in my lab, but something like this, I have never seen. Brainin is precise to the very Hertz, and that always. Again, and again. That is truly unique.” The other findings were not so surprising, but equally clear: The lower tuning created a larger sum of
The performance of the String Quintet, K. 406. He shut the mouths of many intransigent journalists by telling them with a smile, “My Strad simply sounds much better this way.”

Motivic Thorough-Composition

At this time, Brainin was also engaged in studying an important principle of composition which he had been thinking about “already for many years,” which for an artist who had studied, rehearsed, and performed all the great Classical string quartets again and again for over 40 years is not surprising at all: The principle of Motivführung (motivic thorough-composition), as Brainin called it, was developed by Joseph Haydn. In 1995, while giving a master class at Dolná Krupá, a castle near the Slovakian capital of Bratislava, where Beethoven is supposed to have stayed and composed, Brainin said that so far nobody had understood fully the extraordinary significance of this principle of composition—which Mozart had further developed in a decisive way, and which Beethoven then masterfully exploited to the fullest—when he had brought it up for discussion, “except LaRouche.” His talks with LaRouche in the prison at 

Rochester also dealt with this question, which in 1992 led to the essay “Mozart’s 1782-86 Revolution in Music,” one of many philosophical essays written by LaRouche under extremely difficult conditions during his 1989-94 imprisonment.

A result of this close cooperation were several demonstrations of this principle of composition, which Brainin explained at master classes with young string quartets. With the Munich-based Henschel Quartet, he produced a film for the Schiller Institute, in which he demonstrated this principle using works from Haydn and Mozart. At the master class at Dolná Krupá, he worked for almost a week with the Slovakian Moyzes Quartet, and the Hungarian Auer Quartet, and demonstrated with Beethoven quartets the significance of Motivführung. The intensity—but also case—of Brainin’s teaching is best shown by a caricature drawn by the young primarius of the Auer Quartet.

This sketch was inspired especially by the very first lesson these young students got from Brainin, when he interrupted their playing with a “loud ‘Noooo,’” telling them that playing string quartets is not entertainment, but “a bloody serious affair, science”; and he added: “At least a whole dimension is missing here.” To grasp and adequately perform this scientific dimension of Classical music—i.e., to bring out the real content of the music “behind the notes” (Furtwängler), was Brainin’s primary concern. In this respect, he made no compromises, and could not joke about it, no matter with how much Viennese charm he uttered his inspiring, or critical words.

This uncompromising seriousness in deeply rooted human affairs was, to a very large degree, the basis of the enormous artistic charisma of Norbert Brainin. He gave one of the most moving examples of this in early December 1989, shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when he played a “Beethoven Matinee for German Unity” in Berlin, especially for the people in Eastern Germany, then the German Democratic Republic. The many letters which the Schiller Institute, the
organizer of this concert, received before the event, already made clear that it would become a milestone: "Will come under any circumstances. But need a definite OK, since I still have to repair my Trabi." (That was the little car most East Germans drove at that time.) Or: "Definitely need a ticket, since I have to drive 250 km to the concert," and: "I am 10 years old, but I absolutely want to hear the Maestro." More than 1,000 people came to the concert at the Berlin High School of Arts, among them about 800 G.D.R. citizens, who were not charged admission. The performance of three Beethoven sonatas (Op. 12, No. 3; Op. 96; as well as Op. 47, the "Kreutzer") created real storms of enthusiasm, but the reaction to Brainin’s final encore became the biggest compliment an artist can receive: first, a considerable silence, then a long standing ovation, since Brainin with his interpretation of the Adagio from Beethoven’s “Spring Sonata” in these turbulent times had hit exactly the right tone.

An equally moving example was his concert on March 24, 1993 in Birmingham, Alabama, in honor of Martin Luther King, who had been murdered 25 years earlier. Two days before this concert, Brainin and Ludwig had played the same program—besides sonatas from Beethoven and Handel, they performed Cesar Franck’s A-Major Violin Sonata “because of its deep religious character”—for a mainly African-American audience in Washington, D.C., in the Ebenezer United Methodist Baptist Church, where America’s greatest President, Abraham Lincoln, and the former slave and freedom-fighter Frederick Douglass had spoken. In Birmingham, the concert took place at the famous Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, the center of the activities of the Civil Rights movement there in the 1960’s, which in 1963 had been hit by a terrible bombing attack, killing several children. Many of the listeners, some of whom even brought their babies with them, had never attended a Classical concert at all, but were thrilled, and deeply moved. The Mayor of Birmingham declared this day to be “Dr. Norbert Brainin Concert Day in Memory of Civil Rights,” and presented a certificate of honor to him. Schiller Institute Vice President Amelia Boynton Robinson, who during the 1960’s had fought successfully side by side with Martin Luther King for the Voting Rights Act, declared afterwards: “These concerts laid the seed for the coming together of the Civil Rights movement and Classical culture, which we have to bring to life again in America.”

In every epoch there are sublime personalities in music, who because of their towering artistic capabilities and moral integrity are not only able to actually reach, inspire, and thrill people deep in their souls, but who also have the power to considerably shape their time. In the Twentieth century, among these personalities were undoubtedly Wilhelm Furtwängler, Pablo Casals, Yehudi Menuhin—and Norbert Brainin.

—Hartmut Cramer
T he late Norbert Brainin, first violinist of the legendary Amadeus Quartets, gave many interviews to Ibykus and Fidelio over the past 20 years, but none perhaps so dense as the one below, which may perhaps be seen as his artistic Testament.

The fact that in 1947, Brainin, then a young violinist who looked to make a great name for himself as a virtuoso soloist, deliberately decided to focus uniquely on the string quartet, clearly points to those qualities of musicianship and character that led him to place the musical idea, above all else, as the raison d'être of a true artist.

The countless concerts the Amadeus Quartet gave worldwide, their numerous recordings, many of which have won the highest critical acclaim, most especially for their interpretation of the late Beethoven quartets, are very impressive proof of how Brainin and his colleagues (violinist Sieg mund Nissel, violist Peter Schidlof and 'cellist Martin Lovett) took up the challenge to "get under the listener's skin" with Classical music, and uplift the soul.

In Hamburg in 1950, when the Quartet made its German début with works by Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven, sponsored by the British Government through the organization known as “Die Brücke” ("The Bridge"), the public's enthusiasm was such that the "the walls nigh caved in." So began the worldwide career of this extraordinary group, which ended only with the quite unexpected death of Peter Schidlof in the summer of 1987. Thereafter, the Quartet was dissolved, but Norbert Brainin continued to share his deep knowledge of Classical art through sonata recitals, seminars, master classes for young artists, and more especially, through the Brainin Foundation, which he set up shortly before his death.

Strength of Character
Brainin showed remarkable strength of character from his early youth, when, in 1938, owing to his Jewish background, he fled from Vienna following the Nazi Anschluss. In England, as a refugee, he became acquainted in an enemy-alien internment camp during the war with two of the men who were later to join the Quartet. In the 1980's and 1990's, on learning that Lyndon LaRouche was persecuted by the U.S. neo-conservatives, and sentenced to prison after a show-trial in 1988, Brainin spoke out unreservedly in his defense.

Thus, seconded by the pianist Günter Ludwig, Brainin gave solidarity recitals for LaRouche, including several in the United States itself. He also visited LaRouche in prison, and there, under other otherwise unfortunate circumstances, he discussed with LaRouche his own work on Haydn's fundamental discovery of the compositional principle known as "Motivführung" ("motivic thorough-composition"). LaRouche responded with enthusiasm, and then wrote, from his prison cell, "Mozart's 1782-1786 Revolution in Music"* in which he developed the concept further. This led to a fruitful dialogue, out of which came musical seminars by Brainin and philosophical writings by LaRouche on this precise issue, which is so critical to the future of Classical music.

Unforgotten also is Brainin's involvement in the LaRouche campaign for so-called Verdi concert pitch of A=432 Hz. Brainin gave several lecture-demonstrations, where he demonstrated the superiority of the lower, Verdi pitch, over the higher, and quite arbitrary "Karajan pitch." In December 1989, shortly after the Berlin Wall fell, Brainin gave a "Beethoven Matinee for German Unity" in the West Berlin Musikhochschule before 1,000 people, 800 of whom had come from East Germany, and entered free of charge.

Why Germany, and "German music," forever remained so critical to the Amadeus Quartet, and how this Quartet, whose members remained constant for nearly 40 years, "tracked down" the secrets of interpreting Classical music, is the subject of the interview below, which Norbert Brainin gave Ortrun and Hartmut Cramer in London in July 2004.

Fidelio: Mr. Brainin, relative to a half-century ago, there have unquestionably been major changes in cultural politics. Just after the war, it seemed quite obvious that the task was to ennoble man, as Schiller would put it, through Classical art, and create a climate of cultural optimism throughout society.

That so-called pop music, which is utterly shallow, might ever be taken seriously, as it now is, or that “Crossover” music would become acceptable—by Crossover, I mean “crossing” major Classical works with Rock-slop—would have struck one as simply out of the question in the 1950’s or 1960’s, when the public would have rejected out of hand, any such attempt to make a mockery of art.

Fidelio: The Nazis had banned not only so-called degenerate art, but a number of Classical works that they considered dangerous, such as Schiller’s Don Carlos (“Give us freedom of thought!”), as well as his Wilhelm Tell, as Hitler and Goebbels rightly saw these works as a call to overthrow and murder tyrants. Other great works, such as Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony or his Eroica, were misused by the Nazis for propaganda purposes.

Brainin: . . .The British used Beethoven for their own purposes, too . . . That is why so great a craving for an adequate presentation of Classical art, and—in Germany, especially—for great Classical music, was quite understandable at that time.

But, the enthusiasm unleashed by our Hamburg recital in 1950 naturally also had to do with our being Jews. That certainly played a big role. People thought, “Classical art will create the environment for peace. For peace among all men, and most especially, for peace between the Jews and Germans.”

Apart from ourselves, there were other Jewish artists who, right after the war, committed themselves to reconciliation, notably Yehudi Menuhin. Today, among musicians, Daniel Barenboim has endeavored to do this. Such artists have made an absolutely incredible contribution to understanding among peoples and nations. Barenboim brings Muslims, Jews, and Christians together, especially Israelis and Palestinians; he organizes concerts with them, where he plays and conducts. That’s exactly the right way! One has got to show that Classical music and art belong to all men, irrespective of their cultural background. This understanding, for which Barenboim, particularly amongst the youth, has acted in so exemplary a fashion, is critical. The more so, as these efforts have tended to become rather more feeble these days, compared to what was done just after the war.

Fidelio: The Nazis, and after the war, their Anglo-American sympathizers, were very concerned at the incredible influence of what Schiller refers to as the “Sublime,” a moral power which Wilhelm Furtwängler, with “his” Berlin Philharmonic, was able to get across in a

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Top: The Amadeus Quartet (left to right): Peter Schidlof, Siegmund Nissel, Martin Lovett, and Norbert Brainin.
Top, right: Yehudi Menuhin. Left: Daniel Barenboim.

In your first Ibykus interview—20 years ago now!—you said: “The public was so enthusiastic, the walls nigh caved in!” Why were people so excited then about Classical music?

Brainin: Naturally, it had to do above all with the times, and the political circumstances. Germany had practically been destroyed, and its people had lost all confidence. The horrors of war were all too fresh in people’s minds. Despite all the horror, people understandably had a great hunger for Classical music, beauty, and art, in general.

Fidelio: When, in 1950, you returned to the continent, Germany to be precise, with the newly founded, as yet unknown Amadeus Quartet, your Hamburg concert unleashed an absolute sensation. In your first Ibykus interview—20 years ago now!—you said: “The public was so enthusiastic, the walls nigh caved in!” Why were people so excited then about Classical music?

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This interview first appeared in Ibykus, the German-language sister-publication of Fidelio, in July 2004.
very unique way. Furtwängler represented, beyond any doubt, the “true Germany,” including during the Nazi period, and of course after the war. The Anglo-American “re-educators” knew that only too well; they, then as now, wanted to promote totally different character traits among the Germans, than the Sublime.

Brainin: In respect to the Sublime, which Schiller consciously placed at the center of all Classical art, since only the Sublime is “truly free,” allow me to report an amusing, but quite accurate example, which indicates the high moral standards that still existed in the 1960’s, and the sort of intellectual and moral demands that artists then placed upon themselves.

We were rehearsing a recital for the Aldeborough Festival, with Benjamin Britten, where we were to play a Mozart quartet with piano, as well as Britten’s second string quartet. Britten was at the piano. After we’d practiced the Mozart quartet, Ben put aside the Mozart score, and said with a smile (we were expecting that the composer, being himself present, was about to explain to us how his work should be played): “And now, from the sublime, to the ridiculous!”

Fidelio: When you compare, in general, the moral standard in music in the 1950’s-1960’s, with the situation today, what differences do you see?

Brainin: Things are quite different now of course, as there are many more quartets and ensembles. In the 1950’s, the very well-known musicians were, in the main, pianists and violinists. Some of today’s quartets play extremely well—perhaps not always as I personally would like, but, technically, they know what they’re doing. But the real difference is on what I call the “receiving end”—the listener, and above all, the press.

There is less and less understanding of Classical music, and the fault lies rather less with the public, than with the press and the music critics, who have played a fairly significant role in altering, or perhaps one should say “perverting,” what culture actually is, and the importance of the mission represented by culture in our society.

That is one aspect that the Norbert Brainin Foundation, which I’ve just established, intends to change. The Foundation aims at rootout ing, as it were, the flaws in interpreting Classical works; in other words, flaws that have to do with “making music” and interpreting it, which I would like to shift over into a Classical direction. Plainly, I could not do that alone, so I’ve found several colleagues who will be collaborating on the project.

Fidelio: Could you give an example of what you mean by perverting the understanding of how one should interpret, over the last half-century?

Brainin: It’s hard to put into words. Above all, it has to do with the singing quality, with how one produces the tone. As a singer, the essential question is how one places the voice, failing which one will never be “in tune,” neither the intonation, nor pitch, nor the actual quality of the tone.

The same can be said of violin playing, or, indeed, playing any instrument at all, which one could in fact call “singing through the instrument.” What’s wrong with the way we teach violin technique today, is that the teachers do not have a clue why the student has produced the wrong tone. It has something to do with the current craze for the “big tone,” which a “big” violinist is supposed to be able to produce.

In so doing, a notion which should be critical to any true artist, is ruined—the notion, that what one has got to get across to the public is, first and foremost, the idea behind the composition, through form and development of the overall concept. This means producing a tone with a very precise degree of intensity, which is not the same thing as volume. Pop music, that ghastly stuff, has much to do with this form of perversion; pop music has had a devastating influence on our contemporaries’ “taste,” because pop-musicians, among other things, literally slither into the tone, thereby eliminating all true sense of dynamics.

The same could be said in a related sense, especially concerning the beginning of a work. The best example of how an artist can, in the very first instant, “grab” the listener’s attention, and “tune him in” to the way the entire work will proceed before him, was Wilhelm Furtwängler. The tone was there, straight off, and his famous or, if you will, notorious, “attack,” was the textbook example of how a conductor can awaken that peculiar mixture of emotional tension and lively intelligence in his musicians and in his audience, which is so indispensable if one is to properly interpret a Classical work. (And forget trying to imitate him! One never knows what will come out.)

In general, here is how one could attempt to explain Furtwängler’s brilliant approach to the orchestra: He would seek to bring his musicians to play in the manner he intended them to play (i.e., from the standpoint of the composition as a whole). Never would he allow people to play the way they might have wished. During rehearsals, by the way, Furtwängler rarely spoke, because words are of little use under such circumstances. Apart from the fact that everyone was expected to know the piece, the musicians were expected to focus entirely on the music, and “listen into” the music; musicians must, in the finest meaning of the word, develop a “feeling” for the music. Through his gestures, and his laconic “Take it again,” Furtwängler succeeded. I knew exactly what he was getting at, and I did the same in my Quartet.

The other major problem in the interpretation of Classical works is a tendency towards romanticizing them, with quite arbitrary use of rubato [changes in tempi, and even erratic mood swings—HC] that have nothing whatsoever to do with the work’s actual flow, the way it unfolds from within. That’s something else that my Foundation will set about altering.

Fidelio: How will the Foundation work?

Brainin: I intend to take only truly gifted music students, because I want to foster people of genuine talent. There will be no cost to the student, neither for the lessons, nor for his lodging. We are now
working on financing, as we have not
yet quite made the grade in this respect.
It will be in Italy, at Asolo, a town that
lies between Venice and Lake Garda. A
real school will be set up there, and later,
there will be festivals, master classes,
and so forth. I have already found some
colleagues who are willing to teach
there; but, at least at the beginning, I’ve
got to be there myself. I hope to live long
enough to bring it all into being.

Fidelio: Your long life is a good catch-
word— But why, when you were a
young violinist with so promising a
future as a soloist, did you opt for the
string quartet?

Brainin: That’s right. I was, in point of
fact, on the verge of a solo career, in the
autumn of 1946, after winning the Carl
Flesch Competition at London, which I
had entered essentially as a tribute to my
great professor Carl Flesch, who had
just died. The prize was a concert with
the BBC Symphony Orchestra, and I
played Beethoven’s violin concerto in
London. I’d won the Carl Flesch prize
for interpreting the Brahms violin con-
certo, and as I did not want to play the
same concerto twice, I chose Beethoven.
While I practiced for the concert, which
was to take place one year later, I began
after that Beethoven concert, I somehow
lost interest in a solo career, because I
was so strongly attracted by quartet
playing. Plainly, that was my focus. And
since that time, I became ever more
engrossed in quartet compositions.

Early on, playing quartets was just
an interesting hobby, my purpose being
thereby to develop myself further as a
musician and as an artist. But suddenly
something decisive happened, in my
mind, in my soul, and in my heart, and
the reason for it all, was the music itself.
Above all, it was Beethoven’s quartets,
as well as those of Schubert, Mozart, and
Haydn, that music, that had so colossal
an impact on me, to a degree that I
could think of nothing else. And so it
was that my solo career slipped into the
background.

Fidelio: For almost 40 years, the Quar-
et held together, without ever replacing
one of the players—this must be a
record in the history of music. You have
often explained that the art of interpret-
ing the quartets, especially the late
Beethoven quartets, became your raison
d’être, the purpose for your whole exis-
tence. How did that realization affect
your decision?

Brainin: It was a decision, pure and sim-
ple, neither for, nor against. But as early as
1947, I already had a pre-
monition that the string
quartet would be the actu-
al content of my life. What
that meant, was something
which I recognized in the
great quartets that I had
heard as a young violinist
in Vienna, notably the
Rosé Quartet, headed by
Arnold Rosé, who also
acted as concert master for
the Vienna Philharmonic,
and the Busch Quartet,
which was already a leg-
end in its own time, and
which I’d often listened to
on the radio. The greatest
influence was, I would say,
in fact the Busch Quartet,
and the tremendous per-
sonality of its first violinist
Adolf Busch; it was the intensity that
the Busch Quartet had in playing
Beethoven. In the slow movements, no
other group had ever achieved the
singing quality, and the intensity, of the
Busch Quartet.

But our own Quartet started out
with Mozart and Haydn. We worked
very seriously on Mozart’s KV 499, the
so-called “Hoffmeister Quartet,” which
Mozart wrote after the six “Haydn
Quartets.” That’s how we began. Inci-
dentally, we had to work the hardest on
Mozart, as that is where the major inter-
pretative difficulties lay. The stages
through which Mozart moves in his quartets—his intensive study of Bach while he composed the “Haydn Quartets,” along with the notion of *Motivführung* that Haydn himself had initiated—that was very, very hard for us to grasp. We simply had no inkling of it. Only in the course of time did we begin to understand the actual process of unfolding in each of Mozart’s quartets. Non-professionals will simply not get it; it will be a complete blank to them, because for the layman, Mozart is “just so beautiful.”

**Fidelio:** How did you begin to understand it?

**Brainin:** Paradoxically, at first I found that I understood less and less! But we refused to let ourselves be led down the primrose path, and we were intent on “listening into” the music, again and again. Through playing, very intensely, and listening to one another no less intensely, our essential aim was to grasp how his musical thought unfolded. We could not get enough of playing! Finally, we tried the following: I said: “I shall play, and you must follow. Naturally (at the relevant passages) you must play as you see fit, or better said, as it suits, and I’ll go along.” That was a huge step forward in our understanding of the work, and also, of ensemble playing.

Many would tend to think of Mozart’s music as light and agreeable, a view that one very frequently came across in those days—and one would play his works “softly.” I insisted that one should *not* play Mozart “softly,” but rather with *intensity,* as there is a terrific strength and dynamic in his music. It took *years* until we managed to really bring that to the fore. Of course, in the meantime we had often played Mozart at our recitals, and through performing, we had learned a great deal, partly because at our concerts we gave our fullest attention to the music alone. We played extremely well in recital, which did prevent us from constantly experimenting in rehearsal, to better it. We wanted to really understand Mozart’s music, and at the end of the day, we did.

**Fidelio:** Could one say that the Amadeus Quartet learned how to play from Mozart? Was the study of Mozart the keystone?

**Brainin:** Actually, yes, but not Mozart alone, it was Beethoven as well. We worked very hard on Beethoven’s first quartet, Op. 18, No. 1. One of the reasons being that the public wanted it from us, as well as Schubert’s “Death and the Maiden” and his *Quartettsetz* in C-Minor.

**Fidelio:** In terms of their contents, Beethoven’s quartets Op. 18 are closely related to Mozart’s “Haydn Quartets.” Beethoven had studied the latter very carefully, notably the A-Major quartet, KV 464. Dedicated to Haydn by Mozart (“to his dear friend”), Haydn studied these with great attention, as one sees from his quartets composed after 1785. The two composers were thus in a fruitful dialogue, and learned much from one another.

**Brainin:** Without a doubt. We knew it, in a way, but at the beginning, we didn’t have quite the right approach. We had to work extremely hard until we truly knew what it was, and how it was employed, so as to get it across to the public. In January 1948, when we made our debut at the Wigmore Hall as an ensemble, our entire repertoire consisted of five pieces, of which three were on the program.

**Fidelio:** And what were they?

**Brainin:** Mozart’s D-Minor quartet, KV 421, which is the trickiest of all the Haydn Quartets, and the hardest to interpret. Then the Verdi string quartet, which was less of a problem for us, and the third piece was Beethoven’s Op. 59, No. 3, the last of the three Rasumovsky Quartets. The latter was incredibly well-received, as I imagine that in London, no one had heard it played with such life in it. Needless to say, at our début we hadn’t really understood the piece; nevertheless, we had “listened into” the music so deeply, and we had allowed ourselves to be so uplifted and inspired by Beethoven (and by our audience too), that it became a terrific performance, and the audience was inspired.

**Fidelio:** And what were the other two pieces?

**Brainin:** A Haydn quartet, and Mozart’s quartet in C-Major, the “Dissonant Quartet,” KV 465.

**Fidelio:** And then what happened?

**Brainin:** Our success at Wigmore Hall caused a very big stir, and at our next recital, people queued for tickets. At the time, our fee was £40, so each one of us got £10, less than the cost of lunch in London today. But for those days, it was a right good fee. By comparison, lunch in a simple restaurant used to cost only two shillings, a tenth of a pound.

We worked very hard indeed, as for every recital, we had to rehearse a new repertoire.

**Fidelio:** How were those pieces chosen?

**Brainin:** The choice was in the hands of our agents, and at the end of the day, of the public. Both the perceived need, as well as the “taste of the times,” inclined almost without exception to Classical music. We played many Haydn quartets, Schubert, and of course Mozart and Beethoven.

**Fidelio:** So an intellectual dialogue with the audience was essential to you?

**Brainin:** Absolutely, that was most important for us. Almost to a man, our audiences were music lovers, members of musical clubs and societies, who were extremely keen on good music. Such societies existed in other countries as well, not only in England, of course. Which explains—in addition to our own ability!—the great success we enjoyed within a few short years throughout Europe. After England, we toured Spain, and then as I’ve said, we made our first recital tour to Germany in 1950.

It was that recital at Hamburg that opened doors for us in Germany, where we were then to give so many recitals. The Hamburg recital was organized by the organization called “Die Brücke” ("The Bridge"), which in the postwar period had been assigned by the British government to promote cultural relations between England and Germany.
Fidelio: When did you begin to work on the later Beethoven quartets in depth?

Brainin: Very early on, in the 'fifties; by the late 'fifties, we had already performed a complete Beethoven cycle for the Stockholm radio. It was an enormous effort, playing the entire cycle within a couple of days. Later, we had the opportunity to do the same in Italy. Initially, my colleagues were not so keen on the idea, as they found it too much, and very heavy going. But I insisted upon it, as each and every time, I learned something new, both in rehearsing, and in performing it. We rehearsed very thoroughly—although of course not overdoing it—and when it came time to perform, then we really went for it. Whatever the public might have thought about this being “strong meat,” was irrelevant to me: I wanted to test out the idea we had in mind, and focussed intently on what it was we were actually doing. As a result, the atmosphere became one of great concentration, and the public was held in thrall. The listeners were an inspiration to us.

Fidelio: That was in southern Italy, Sicily?

Brainin: The public—and this is something we found in recitals everywhere in the world—first, was swept up in the very greatness of Classical music, and second, they were moved by how seriously we performed it. My method, aided and abetted by the fact that I have looked up, thanks to the Urtext editions. That means following the indications to the letter; whether piano, forte, crescendo, legato, and so forth, I did precisely what was written. And I “listened into” the music, which gave me a “feel” for the correct manner of expression. Needless to say it was not always right, but we became ever better.

A further hitch was that editions were not satisfactory in the 'fifties, and the Peters editions were notoriously rife with mistakes. There was only one way to deal with this, which was to say, “I'm not entirely sure how it should go, but it most definitely cannot be this way.” As we always attempted to understand the composition as a whole, what we played often proved to be correct. Later, thank God, the Urtext editions came out, against which we could check what we had been playing. And we found that we had often been right, in the way we had “listened into” the music, and that we had interpreted it adequately. This is one area in which things really have looked up, thanks to the Urtext editions.

Fidelio: At one time, the Amadeus Quartet took private lessons with the great violinist Georges Enescu, on the Beethoven quartets?

Brainin: That was sensational. It happened during a festival at the Bryanston School in the mid-'fifties. It all started with the fact that we had interpreted “over-literally” indications for tempi that were thought to have come from Mozart himself. At one recital there, we had played Mozart’s first “Haydn Quartet,” KV 387, in G-Major, for the very first time in public, and it just had to happen, that Enescu himself turned up to listen. We did not play badly, but when we heard that he was in the room, we did become a little anxious.

The next day, Enescu came up to me at lunchtime in the cafeteria, and said to me—in German: “Thank you for yesterday evening’s recital, it was very fine; but to be frank, you took the Minuet far too slowly. To which I retorted: “But it’s clearly marked allegretto.” And Enescu said, “I know, but it’s wrong. Later, Mozart changed, and in fact, improved upon it, and wrote allegro; and the effect is quite different.” To which I replied, “Terribly kind of you to have pointed that out, thank you so much, now I know.” And Enescu said, “Have you got plans for the afternoon?” We’d planned to rehearse, but of course I said, “No, nothing, nor have my colleagues.” Thereupon, Enescu replied that “I’d very much like to show you how to play Beethoven’s quartets, but unfortunately, it will have to be on the piano.”

After lunch, the five of us appeared in the recital hall, and Enescu sat at the grand piano with his back to the “audience,” and began to play. He played by heart; each tone was absolutely precise, and his expressiveness was a sheer phenomenon.

Fidelio: He began with Op. 18, No. 1?

Brainin: Yes, with Op. 18, No. 1, and then he played straight through all the quartets, including the late quartets. He did of course leave out the repeats, and sometimes, when the development process was clear, he left out a few passages, saying, “You know how this bit goes.” He did change the order a little, though. He ended by playing the C-Sharp Minor Quartet, Op. 131. The thing took the entire afternoon, straight through to evening.

Meanwhile, word had got about in the Conservatory that “Enescu is playing the Beethoven quartets on the piano for the Amadeus Quartet, one after the other.” The students tiptoed into the hall, sat down quietly, and listened, without of course Enescu ever noting their presence. As he concluded the C-Sharp Minor Quartet and turned around “to us,” he saw everyone sitting there, and the entire room broke out into wild applause. It was incredible. Enescu knew the four voices of each quartet, and played and articulated them very precisely. As a pianist, he was so unbelievably good, I do believe he was a finer pianist than a violinist!

Enescu played all the voices on the keyboard, and not just correctly, but with the ideal equilibrium, dynamically, and in a word, perfectly. Yehudi Menuhin told me of something similar concerning Enescu; he had been a student of Enescu’s in Paris in the 1920’s. On the occasion of Menuhin’s seventieth birthday, he was often interviewed on the BBC, and when a journalist referred to his “fantastic” memory, Menuhin retorted: “Oh, mine is so-so. Let me rather report on a real feat of memory. When I was a very young lad in the 1920’s, studying with Enescu in Paris, the housemaid came in, and whispered something in Enescu’s ear. He told me to stop, and explained: ‘Excuse me, Monsieur Ravel is at the door; he wants to show me his new violin sonata. Could we break off the lesson for a moment, and carry on a bit later?’ Menuhin said,
Of course, Maestro.

“So Maurice Ravel walked in, and showed Enescu the score for his sonata. It was in manuscript; Enescu glanced at it, played a little, and with the words ‘ja, ja—ach so—ja,’ read through the entire sonata. Then he said to Ravel, ‘Okay, let’s start.’ The two artists played the full sonata, Enescu from memory, and the composer, his own work, with his nose glued to the score! Although Enescu had never once seen the sonata before—phenomenal! And what about that, for a feat!” When I heard Yehudi say that, I nonetheless insisted that Enescu playing the Beethoven quartets at the Bryanston School was yet another notch higher.

Fidelio: And you learned a lot that afternoon?

Brainin: What we learned was colossal. Enescu may have played the quartets “only” on the piano, but there is a great deal to be shown, and learned from that instrument.

It is hard to believe, but no less true. On the piano, one can produce every nuance, whether hard, soft, legato—and one can sing, especially sing! I think it was Schnabel who said that the piano is the most expressive of all instruments. Not the violin, but the piano, truly sings. Beethoven knew that. It so happens that his violin concerto Op. 61 was initially a piano concerto, out of which he made a violin concerto. One can hear that quite clearly, as many passages are not of the type that one would expect to hear in a violin concerto.

In fact, Beethoven never wrote another violin concerto. Either he wasn’t pleased with it, or he found it unsatisfactory. In any event, he never repeated that “experiment.” But he wrote five piano concertos, with passages that rather sound like a violin concerto. Manifestly, Beethoven thought, “I cannot make the violin sing, the way I can do with the piano.”

Fidelio: In the violin concerto, Beethoven actually makes the kettle-drum into a singing instrument. Beethoven wanted to show that the most unexpected instruments can sing.

Brainin: That is so, and above all in the string quartet, where the voices sing with still greater freedom. And how grandiose the manner in which Beethoven has distributed the voices! It is a single, over-reaching composition, where four independent voices nonetheless sing. This becomes particularly notable from Op. 127 on, where Beethoven had come to a complete mastery of the compositional method of Motivführung—the technique of composing, where, from a single motif, a core motif as it were, all themes, the entire movement, and then the entire work unfold. In the later Beethoven quartets, the motifs of the various quartets are even related to one another. This careful perusal of the Haydn and Mozart quartets, discovered the Motivführung principle, and then studied how Beethoven took it further, I could see the connections ever more clearly. One has simply got to give thanks to God, that one can understand such an idea. It is quite literally a gift from God, that we mortals can come to grasp such an all-embracing notion.

Many would tend to think of Mozart’s music as light and agreeable. I insisted that one should not play Mozart ‘softly,’ but rather with intensity, as there is a terrific strength and dynamic in his music. We wanted to really understand Mozart’s music, and at the end of the day, we did.

Fidelio: In the violin concerto, revolutionary technique of composing, which, as I have already explained, began with Haydn’s “Russian Quartets,” Op. 33, developed further, and decisively by Mozart in his “Haydn Quartets,” and then fully perfected by Beethoven in his later quartets, is less pronounced in Beethoven’s works, but rather with intensity, as there is a terrific strength and dynamic in his music. We wanted to really understand Mozart’s music, and at the end of the day, we did.

Brainin: It is a gift from heaven, and I believe that had I not already discovered the notion of Motivführung, I would not have understood that either. As I’ve said, not all of Beethoven’s works are written like that; the quartet Op. 59, No. 1 is written quite differently, literally quite differently. His quartet Op. 59, No. 3 resembles Op. 59, No. 2, but not in all respects. And even in Op. 59, No. 2, Beethoven uses the Motivführung technique only here and there, as he does in the quartet Op. 74. The first time Beethoven uses the revolutionary method of composition straight through—and masterfully—is in fact in Op. 127.
Fidelio: The later Beethoven quartets pose quite a problem to the relativists, who enjoy getting things mixed up; they claim Beethoven was a forerunner of Schönberg, Webern, and Stravinsky, etc., which is simply not the case. But that is what we are teaching people at the conservatories. How do you see this?

Brainin: Very early on, I had some inkling of how development proceeds in Classical music, and perhaps that is why I discovered the principle of Motivführung. As for Beethoven being a forerunner of Stravinsky? Stravinsky’s music is utterly unlike that of Beethoven, it has nothing to do with it.

Here another anecdote, that relates, yet again, to Benjamin Britten, is relevant. Ben told me that when the war ended, he met with Stravinsky in America, and he told me about it, to make it clear that Stravinsky knew virtually nothing of Classical music, and indeed, was acquainted with practically nothing but his own works. During a conversation with Britten, Stravinsky suddenly said, “Incidentally, a few days ago I heard a Mozart Symphony, in G-Minor, what a lovely piece.” What can one do, but shake one’s head in disbelief: Stravinsky became acquainted with Mozart’s great G-Minor Symphony (KV 550) well after the age of 60! What is this? A supposedly great composer hasn’t a clue about Mozart! He discovers one of Mozart’s major works, as an old-age pensioner! Thank God, at least Stravinsky did not claim that he had written the thing himself. I mean, Stravinsky’s rattling and clattering music (“Klappermusik”) is so far afield from Beethoven’s, that they are out of each other’s sight-lines.

Were Mozart ever to hear how his works are often performed on the radio these days—not to speak of this business with “Contemporary Music”—he would laugh his head off; it has nothing to do with new or old music, but simply with good, or bad.

Fidelio: We had a question about the influence of Johann Sebastian Bach: There is a relation to the string quartet, although perhaps not so obvious.

Brainin: It is his method of voice-leading, which was later worked up into Motivführung.

Fidelio: Generally speaking, what role does Bach’s ability—what Haydn called the “science of composition”—have for the art of the string quartet?

Brainin: Naturally, an outstanding role. Bach’s polyphony, his science of voice-leading, is something absolutely unique, and reveals itself essentially in four-voice settings. In every symphony, but especially in the Classical string quartet, one perceives Bach’s polyphonic counterpoint. A good example is Mozart’s G-Major quartet, KV 387, of which we have just spoken. Although very free in design, the final movement is in counterpoint, an “applied counterpoint” so to speak. I was deeply impressed by this quartet, and especially by the final movement, a double fugue.

Fidelio: Very freely composed; but, as Beethoven wrote later in his “Grosse Fuge”: “So streng, wie frei” (“As rigorously, as free”)—double-fugal counterpoint.

Brainin: And what other musician had attempted anything like that before him? While, as a composition, that Mozart quartet is complex and compli-

In Beethoven’s string quartets, the voices sing with the greatest freedom. And how grandiose the manner in which he has distributed the voices! It is a single, over-reaching composition, where four independent voices nonetheless sing. From Op. 127 on, Beethoven had come to a complete mastery of the compositional method of Motivführung—where, from a single motif, all themes, the entire movement, and then the entire work unfold.

Ludwig van Beethoven

Fidelio: That was Mozart’s sphere, as he himself wrote in a letter, often to compose in such a way that “only those who know, will find true delight, while the layman too will be pleased, without, however, knowing why.”

Brainin: That is Mozart’s genius, and that is the genius of Classical music as such. I must admit that when I played that movement for the first time, I literally broke down crying, so moved was I by what Mozart had achieved here. How can one have written that? And then Beethoven presses ahead, with still greater freedom, in his late quartets. It is of colossal importance, it is the sign of genius.

As a string quartet, to bring that out adequately, so that the listeners begin to grasp the actual concept, is for an artist like myself, my raison d’être, the meaning of a fulfilled artistic life.

Fidelio: You have given us much to think about, Mr Brainin, for which we thank you.

—translated from the German by Katharine Kanter
About an hour ago, I received a terse report that Pope John Paul II had died. Some days ago, after I had begun the writing of a review of the English edition of the book *Memory and Identity*, I halted my completion of the review out of a saddening sense that these might prove to be the last days of his mortal life. In a manner of speaking, I paused to give this Pope the last word.

Nonetheless, I have changed nothing of what I had begun to write, except to situate that in an appropriate way as my personal expression of regard for my own mourning and others’, for our common loss. Even then, as the present title I had already given to this review attests, when I had still hoped for some degree of his recovery to continue his work, the intent of my review was to have been a relevant reflection for today of what this Pope’s ministry has meant for the continuity of the apostolic legacy of the Christian Church up through his ministry, to beyond his now-reported passing.

At this moment, as I feared already about the time this report was begun, it is time for me to speak frankly, from the vantage-point of both my special knowledge, and position in world affairs, of certain things concerning the role of the Church, things which have long occupied my innermost reflections. It is an aspect of such matters in which the nature and usefulness of my contribution is both of a unique form, and suitable for my particular personal contribution, as a public figure, to reflections made on this immediate occasion.

At this moment, there is still one earlier criticism of that book itself which I must make here, on even this present solemn occasion. I do this because my criticism pertains to the special continuity of the special legacy of a succession of the relevant three, John XXIII, Paul VI, and John Paul II, of the recent four Popes for the troubled age of nuclear weaponry under whose threat we continue to live. My point, as one outside the formal body of the Church, but with close ties to it, is an ecumenical thesis respecting the living legacy of that Popecy’s continuing, special role for all humanity today. I focus my attention here on certain common achievements of those three Popes’ ministries. It is in that context that I point out the relevant problematic feature contained within the book I have just read for review.

In keeping with the solemnity of this occasion, I limit my report here to a principal subject of a special, but relevant character, on which my qualifications are unique, and of special relevance for speaking of the challenge for today represented by that Pope and his immediate predecessors.

As you shall see below, the criticism which I make is on a certain topic within the book I have held in my hands, on the subject of what is called “The Enlightenment”; a view of that Enlightenment’s character and performance which I know as being that of a virtual Satan of modern times, and the most important in influence of all of those principal forces arrayed against the intention embodied in the ministry of Jesus Christ and his Apostles.

For all Christians, the Jews, and Muslims, most notably, the axiomatic feature of the Enlightenment dogma is equal to a categorical denial of the existence of man and woman as made equally in the image of the Creator. The consequence of that fraudulent axiomatic assumption of the Enlightenment, as launched by such followers of the empiricist Paolo Sarpi as Thomas Hobbes, René Descartes, John Locke, the circles of Voltaire, and of Kant, is the denial of the knowable existence of those creative powers, in the image of the Creator’s, which set the human person apart from, and above all the beasts.

In Defense of Christianity
by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.
April 2, 2005

“Without what the recent Popes have done, it were more than merely plausible that civilization would not have survived until now.” Above: John Paul II on tour.
human individual, is the foundation of the Socratic and Christian conception of the efficient immortality of the cognitive personality of the person in what some theologians term a “simultaneity of eternity.” It is that certain sense of assured immortality, for better or for worse, which is lost to such tragic wretches as the Hamlet and legendary Denmark of Shakespeare’s Hamlet. It is this immortality, which some call spirituality, which gave strength to the martyred Christians from the time of Nero through Diocletian, and which links the individuals in the body of Christianity as a force whose intention surpasses the bounds of mortality for the individual Christian. It is the quality which distinguishes the comic-opera, “fundamentalist” “Christian” of other-world fantasies, from that immortal soul on a mission of good within the domain of mere mortality.

It is what has given me the strength which I have often needed, to do what I have done, for the sake of that which is right, and to be able to carry it forward neither deterred by fear of disapproval, nor by sense of the risk or other abuse which I have thus often incurred as the price of conscience.

The unfortunate fact, however, is that only a tiny fraction among even professed Christians has that kind of inner spiritual strength. In consequence of that short-fall in the progress of our fellow man and woman, on that account, the well-being of mankind, the hope for a good outcome of current history of nations and humanity is, generally, the task of those shepherds who are true leadership, such as that U.S. hero, the late Rev. Martin Luther King. The duty of such persons is to supply the knowledge which only such true sense of immortality can provide, as courage, to do that which needs to be done for the future of humanity.

This is as relevant to the internal affairs of the Christian Church as in all other matters in mortal life.

Most people are self-defined by their mental outlook and practice as “little people.” They are fearfully bound to their sense of mortality, their sense of pleasure and pain within the bounds of what is for them a brief mortal existence. So, they had fled from the real world of the simultaneity of eternity, into the shadow-world against whose alluring deceptions the Apostle Paul’s 1 Corinthians 13 warns us. Thus, for such little people, the spiritual realm which is, in fact, the real source of power in and over the universe, is for them, merely an ineffable “other world,” a fantasy-world to which they imagine they might be transported at death. It is, for these poor fellows, a fantasy-world where pitiable creatures like themselves imagine that “God will provide the health care and pay the rent on their house.” It is an imagined world of poor fools, a non-existent world concocted by their tortured, futile, imaginations, a world in which that pathetic littleness of their fantasy entraps their passions.

While we may yearn for some better times, where most of our fellow human beings are not such pathetic fools as that, today, in the real world beyond mere sense-perception, the welfare of mankind must be aimed at a future in which such pitiable littleness of soul as theirs is no longer the prevalent reality. On that account, of such moral weakness in the majority of humanity, we require a certain quality of leadership in organized society. So, like the modern nation-state republic, Christianity, too, requires the form of a corporate body in which there is a leadership which has an efficient sense of immortality, a sense sufficient to lead mankind as safely as possible from one generation of folly to the next, hopefully to bring us all to a place in the scheme of things in which all men and women each have an efficient sense of their individual immortality.

In their own time and fashion, three Popes whose impact I have admired—of which John Paul II is most recent—have faced the awful implications of the age of thermonuclear weaponry, and have done so in ways necessary and sufficient to maintain the ministry given to them until now. For me, during the recent decades I have found myself in the role of a statesman, this is a fact which was often presented to me personally without much forewarning. I have known that these Popes have not run the world, nor should they; but without what they have done, it were more than merely plausible that civilization would not have survived until now. In that light, the emotion which should overtake us as we think of the impending Papal succession which must continue that mission, is awesome.

The greatest danger before us now, is the Classically tragic possibility that humanity might fail to make those choices of sweeping change from current policy, on which the continued existence of a civilized form of human existence depends, a terrible condition which might be continued for an undetermined passage of time yet to come.

Although resurgent fascism launched by powerful financier circles, is a leading menace on this planet, once again, today, the greatest single source of threat to modern humanity, was never fascism as such, nor communism. It was, and is still today, what is often praised as the pervasive influence of that morbid practice of malignant sophistry commonly called “The Enlightenment,” that is typified by the denial, by such as the followers of Venice’s Paolo Sarpi, of the existence of what the science of the Pythagoreans, Plato, the Fifteenth-Century Renaissance, Kepler, and Leibniz knew as what those ancients and others recognized as the specific form of power which is man’s ability to discover, obey, and deploy efficient universal principles of a living Creator’s universe. This denial, or agnostic evasion of the subject of the soul, as expressed, axiomatically, by what is called “The Enlightenment,”
is in fact the greatest source of evil active among the political and related powers of this world today.

The evil which the standpoint of the Enlightenment represents, often assumes the form of a pseudo-Christianity which by denying man’s creativity, places man’s worship outside the universe where God reigns, into a Gnostic’s universe, such as that of the Mont Pelerin Society’s Bernard Mandeville and his follower Adam Smith, where vice reigns over the conduct of the human individual.

However, although the Catholic Church has rightly warned against the Enlightenment repeatedly, there are those in religious bodies and related circles today, whose fear of the power represented by the pro-imperialist forces of “preventive nuclear warfare” expressed by the allied, financier-oligarchy-controlled circles of President George W. Bush and of Liberal Imperialist Prime Minister Tony Blair today, is greater than their conscience. Fearful people of these times, with their fear of poverty, their fear of persecution, would have the churches capitulate to the mightily feared authority of a corrupting evil of a “faith-based initiative,” or that Liberal dogma which the pro-Satanic spirit of the Enlightenment represents today. This doctrine of capitulation, sometimes described, since 1989-1992, as a utopian “End of History,” has made cowards of today’s Hamlets in government, and churches, and elsewhere, throughout a great portion of the world today.

Evil will secure no victory for its own pleasure from such cowardly corruption as that. I have the proven expertise to show, that the present world system, on which foundation the power of today’s monied evil chiefly depends, is now doomed for rather immediate extinction, in one way or another. We have entered a time when such forms of evil, would, at the least, also destroy themselves.

Therefore, the question before us is, what is the alternative to submission to such fears? There are practical remedies, even at the present, when a general breakdown crisis of the entire world’s present monetary-financial system is already onrushing. There are practical solutions, of which I have excellent knowledge; but, the question is, is there the will to adopt those alternatives?

During much of the 1980’s, I enjoyed a close collaboration with many circles around the world, including many notable Cardinals and other officials of the Catholic Church. Then, our shared hope was that the Soviet government might choose the wiser course, to have avoided its otherwise already imminent economic self-destruction. This evoked view, encouraged by President Ronald Reagan’s March 23, 1983 presentation of a Strategic Defense Initiative, publicly, to the Soviet government, promoted optimism for a peaceful transformation in many leading Church and other circles, especially during the 1982-1985 interval, but also later. Later, the efforts of John Paul II on behalf of a peace among faiths, had a relatively weaker, but nonetheless crucial appeal.

In all these and kindred experiences of my lifetime, and from comparable lessons from earlier history, I know that it is not fear of evil which rescues mankind from a fresh great folly, but, rather, a clear and optimistic view of the relevant, hopeful, and real alternative. It is the duty of true leaders to present that remedy. On this account, the three recent Popes to whom I have referred, were crucial in their time. What, then, shall we do next, now that they, in succession, have been taken from among us?

These, as a great American once said, are times which try men’s souls. I would suggest, that the first step is to know one has a soul. On this account, there is a crucial strategic conflict between those who merely have been taught to wish to believe that they might have a soul, and those who are on a knowing, first-name basis with their own soul. From among the latter, we find our capable leaders for times of grave crisis; unfortunately, they are too few, and even among them, few eligible are permitted to attain the posts from which their necessary leadership can be exerted. That fearful question was posed, again, by the saddening news from the Vatican today.

There is a power in the universe, which the creative powers of the individual human mind can know. I have devoted most of my life to discovering such powers, and that with at least sufficient success to prove the point. Those who have the courage to recognize that power, and employ its instruction, express thus the continuity of the worthy institutions which mortal men and women inhabit. To become such a person within society, is the nature of what Leibniz identified as “the pursuit of happiness,” the principle upon which the U.S. republic was founded. When men and women devoted to the work of such leadership pass, the survivors mourn. That mourning of such great men and women of institutions can be, in itself, a creative act by those who must then mourn; let it be so now.
Your generation is at the beginning stage of its adult life. The next 50 years are before you. And therefore, your generation, combined with some old geezers like me, is the essence of the combination of people who are responsible for the future of the human race. You have the moral high ground. You have the responsibility to begin to assume leadership, to turn this planet back to a Classical tradition, to a point that we escape the immediately onrushing danger of a new dark age.’

—LYNDON H. LAROUCHE, JR.
May 7, 2005

The moral high ground.

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The universe, like Vernadsky’s *Noösphere*, is a *system*, in the sense that the way in which the universe works is not merely acted upon by, but determined by a set of discoverable universal physical principles (*powers*) provided by the Creator. To the degree that we discover those universal principles, we have gained a partial amount of the total power which the Creator’s universe represents.

In that way, *what we know* is also a system, not exactly the Creator’s system, but including some part of that. Of course, this leaves us with some errors we have produced, or adopted; and, insofar as what we actually know, leaves much that we have yet to discover.

—Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.
from *Science: The Power To Prosper*

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Scientists see different Titans through a range of filters sensitive to various electromagnetic wavelengths. **Left:** Approximate true color, few details visible.  **Center:** Near-infrared wavelength increases surface visibility, variations in brightness indicate differing reflectivity of surface materials.  **Right:** False-color composite. Green shows surface; red, Titan’s stratosphere; blue along outer edge, detached layers of haze in upper atmosphere.

**Titan Unveiled**

Saturn’s planet-sized moon Titan has been hidden from scientists since its discovery, shrouded beneath a thick methane haze. Over the past year, the Cassini orbiter has collected close-in data, and in January, the European Space Agency’s Huygens probe landed on Titan’s surface.

The astonishing detail of the images reveals an eroded surface, indicative of weathering; darkened channels, with a distinct boundary resembling a shoreline; and evidence of clouds, and perhaps methane rain, which constantly rework the surface.

By combining data and images from both the orbiter and lander, scientists are closing in on the processes of change within the Saturnian system.

—Marsha Freeman

On February 15, Cassini made an orbital fly-by of Titan at only a few hundred miles above the surface. The crater shown in this radar image is 37 miles in diameter. The bright surrounding blanket is debris, or ejecta, thrown out of the crater after impact.

Image from the Huygens lander shows short, stubby drainage channels running from brighter ridges to flatter regions. The channels merge into river systems, running into lake beds, with ‘islands’ and ‘shoals’ similar to those found on Earth.

The Huygens probe returned this image during its descent to the surface of Titan on January 14. The Mars-like landscape is dotted with pebble-sized rocks or pieces of ice, the largest about 6 inches in diameter.
Friedrich Schiller: A 200th Anniversary Celebration

Under the banner ‘Nun kommt die Schillerzeit!’ — a joyous affirmation of hope for the future — this special double issue of *Fidelio* commemorates the 200th anniversary of the death of the great Poet of Freedom, in the face of the gravest economic and social crisis ever to face humanity — the onrushing collapse of the global, I.M.F.-dominated monetary-financial system.

It was Schiller’s genius to recognize that, despite the ugliness and violence of the world surrounding him, the unbeatable factor in the struggle for human freedom was the essential goodness and beauty of the heart of man — which he analyzed and proclaimed in his poetry, dramas, histories, and philosophical writings.

Championing the ideas and ideals of the American Revolution in Europe, Schiller took on as his life’s work the task of unlocking and educating this inherent potential of every individual man and woman, as the necessary basis for the creation of true political freedom.

We invite you to join us in this celebration — to read, study, and perform the works of our beloved poet, and to arm yourself with beauty for the coming battles ahead.

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Science: The Power To Prosper

‘To overcome the present crisis of our national and world economy,’ writes Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., ‘I have chosen the timely example of urgent need to diagnose and cure the present collapse of the auto industry. What was wrong? What should we now do instead? How must we think about economics if we are to succeed in overcoming this challenge? How must we think about a successful rebuilding of both the U.S. and world economy over the coming fifty years and more?’