Highlights | Calendar | Music | Books | Concerts | Links | Education | Health
What's New | LaRouche | Spanish Pages | Poetry | Maps
Dialogue of Cultures
How Bertrand Russell
|This article is reprinted from the Fall, 1994 issue of FIDELIO Magazine. Footnotes to Part 2 and 3 are on a separate page. Click here for Footnotes to Part 2 and 3. (Window will stay open.)|
|Part 3 (
Educating For Creativity
Before describing the influence of Conti upon modern science and political philosophy, it is essential to focus attention directly upon the issue of formal intelligibility of that creativity which Kant abhorred and which the radical empiricists savagely deny to exist. Plato's Socratic method, the only known standpoint from which creative processes were ever rendered intelligible, is made comprehensible through focussing attention upon what ought to be the obvious implications of a Classical Christian humanist form of education, such as that of the Brotherhood of the Common Life and the Schiller-Humboldt reforms of education in Nineteenth-Century Germany.
From a study of the history of science against the points of reference touched upon in the preceding portions of this section, those approximately two-hundred years of Classical Greek culture, which span approximately the time from the trial of Socrates through the time of the deaths of Eratosthenes and Archimedes, are among the most excitingly productive intellectually in all history of science190 . It is against the influence of that Classical background that we must view the Christian Renaissance of the Fifteenth Century.
The other notable feature of the Renaissance, is that it was led by geniuses. The source of that supply of geniuses is typified by the teaching methods and influence of Groote's and Thomas à Kempis' Brotherhood of the Common Life, establishing a tradition which persisted beyond the middle of the Sixteenth Century through such offshoots of the Brotherhood's influence as the Oratorians around Erasmus of Rotterdam and the School of Raphael.191
The characteristic of this Christian humanist method of education is emphasis upon studying the most important discoveries in all human knowledge by aid of emphasis upon primary sources, preferably the account of the discovery written by the discoverer. The centerpiece of that program is the study of Classical Greek geometry, from Pythagoras through Archimedes and Eratosthenes, from this standpoint, with heaviest emphasis on the writings of Plato and the work of his Academy.
The characteristic feature of this method of education, is that the student must relive the experience of the original mental act of discovery, rather than learn to recite and apply a formula from the banalities of, for example, today's typical sort of textbook. The mastery of a Classical constructive approach to geometry by this means is the foundation of all successful such education; this approach to the study of geometry provides the student with a sense of scientific rigor, an attainment which can not be duplicated by any alternative means.192
Placing a constructive view of geometry at the center of such an educational program, introduces the pupil to the intelligibility of history as shown in terms of the history of ideas. The more readily accessible intelligibility of the internal history of geometric ideas serves as the cornerstone for conceptualizing the historicity of ideas generally. The mathematician may represent this by comparing Euclid's Elements193 with Legendre's Eléments de Géométrie (1794),194 and Legendre's and Monge's work with that of Jacob Steiner thereafter.195
The first conception to be adduced from such a scrutiny of geometry is the notion of ordering: "necessary predecessor," "necessary successor." Such a scrutiny should begin with the simpler case, the discovery of new theorems within the same theorem-lattice; this is the case in which no change in axioms or postulates occurs in the passage from one theorem to another. The case of Euclidean plane geometry is the appropriate choice of first step. After completing Euclidean geometry, examine the second class of discoveries, beginning with examination of the transition to the so-called non-Euclidean geometries, such as the Nineteenth-Century changes introduced by Gauss, Bolyai, Lobachevski,196 and Riemann197 ; but, before drawing conclusions on this basis of this, examine Leonardo da Vinci's introduction of the notion of geometries of bounded systems,198 and Kepler's thorough reliance upon this principle.199
In the discovery of the simpler type, the proof of one theorem of the lattice is a (more or less) necessary formal antecedent to the proof of the second.200 In the discovery of the second type, the relative cardinality of the theorem-lattice defined by their differences in axiomatics is the ordering principle: e.g., rational, algebraic, transcendental, Alephs. In the second class of discovery, this relative difference applies not only to the issues of ontology and form of mathematics as such, but to the axiomatics of physics. In the second case, as in the instance of the author's 1952 discoveries, it is the mathematical-physical anomalies which are the point of reference to cardinality.
In both classes, the notion of cardinality is preserved under the ordering of "necessary predecessor," "necessary successor." This is a crucial feature of the formal representation of the intelligibility of discoveries in general.
To begin, compile a partial listing of a fairly narrowly defined set of types of discovery in mathematics and physics, limiting the physics to those cases in which the physical anomaly forces directly an axiomatic issue of mathematics, such as Bernoulli's and Leibniz's 1697 use of the general case of refraction of light to prove the necessity of nothing less than the transcendental domain in mathematics for physics.201 Consider then the most relevant expression of the general case, as follows.
Under the implied rule for Classical Christian humanist forms of secondary education, the student is presented with the personalized historical identity of a discoverer, preferably accompanied by a sculpted, drawn, or photographed image, and a visual insight into some circumstances in which one or more of the crucial discoveries which that historical person effected. The student is induced to relive the experience of discovery; the teacher's function is, most essentially, to situate fairly the elements arrayed at the onset of the discovery. The teacher says: "X solved the following problem, in place P, in the year T; you have the prerequisites to repeat the mental experience of that act of discovery." The source materials, preferably primary ones, are set before the student. The experience begins.
Once the pupil has relived that experience, in that way, the imagined face and setting of that original discovery will remain with the successful student through the remainder of his life. The student has made, thus, the transition from observant layman into the world of science.
Through such repeated experiences, the pupil's mind becomes populated with an assembly of such images of discoverers, the student's private School of Athens.202 The content of each such image is a reconstructable memory of the experience of reliving the discovery, or discoveries which the student associates with that image, or set of images. The discoveries so represented by the inhabitants of the student's private "School of Athens" constitute a "Many," in the sense of Plato's Parmenides. What is the "One" which corresponds to this "Many"?
This is the point, beyond which, Venice, and a modern positivist such as Russell, forbids you to tread! There is the source of that prohibition, whose terror crushes the intellects of promising young scientists into an algebraicized state of Newtonian "political correctness."203 This is a process which should be seen as like the use of threat of a colonial power's musketry, for the dumbing-down of wild herds of captive human beings, over several successive generations, into a breed like dumb cows.
The establishment of such an isochronic relationship with a discoverer's original discovery, spanning a distance in calendar time of decades, centuries, and sometimes millennia, is the means for transforming the mental act of reliving such a discovery into an intelligible object of conscious reflection. There is thus the sharing of this experience, not only between the individual student and the original discoverer, but among all those who, from all centuries, have shared such reliving of that same original experience in this isochronic way.
This is what Francesco Zorzi prohibited,204 what Paolo Sarpi's asset Francis Bacon forbade,205 what Newton implicitly banned with his "hypotheses non fingo,"206 and what Immanuel Kant abhorred in Leibniz's Monadology.207 That prohibition and abhorrence are directed explicitly against the practice of apprehending as intelligible objects of conscious reflection the provably creative processes of mentation.
All these Aristotelians, whether as materialists, empiricists, or modernist logical positivists, demand that the subjects of conscious reflection be delimited to two classes of experience: sense-perceptions and the emotions which are more or less mysteriously attached to those sense-perceptions.208 From this is derived the empiricism of Zorzi, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, and the radical empiricism of Ortes, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Malthus, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, and Bertrand Russell, the "information theory" of Norbert Wiener, and the pseudo-scientific economics of John Von Neumann.
In defiance of such Venetian and kindred prohibitions, continue with our subject of this moment, the indicated humanist method of education. Continue to focus upon a constructive geometry as the model topic for such a method. Through the method indicated, the secondary school pupil is becoming acquainted personally with the experience of two types of discovery indicated: those which extend a theorem-lattice, and those which are true Platonic hypotheses, which overturn a lattice of reference.
Most of today's relatively better formal education209 functions somewhat well on the lower level: extending the lattice. This is good, of course. The pupil is taking the historical examples as a model of a method for elaborating propositions which are hewed, if possible, into consistency with a recognized set of underlying axiomatic assumptions. As long as the propositions are rooted in the notion of actual or anticipated measurement of actually occurring processes, this is an indispensable part of the educational process.210
Henceforth, the reader should continue to read what is written here, on this subject of humanist methods of education, with the presumption that we are referencing as "humanist" an emphasis upon the use of primary sources as a guide to reliving the original experience of a specific discovery. The essential connection between the two classes of discovery in all uses of this method, is that the pupil is rendering the quality of those mental processes which generate (and regenerate) that discovery an intelligible subject of conscious reflection. The difference, is between the species of mental activity which are taken as the subject of conscious reflection. This is the kernel of Nicolaus of Cusa's method of learned ignorance (De Docta Ignorantia), upon which the emergence of modern science was founded.211
In both cases, the result of successive acts of reliving original discoveries is the implied establishment of a proposition in the form of Plato's argument in his Parmenides. Let us represent the mental events upon the first level of discovery by L1, L2, L3, ... , and on the second by A1, A2, A3, ... . In each case, what is the recognizable (intelligible!) common difference the change between them?
In all scientific work passably worthy of that name, the intelligibility of the first quality of discovery is indispensable to comprehension in exchanges among the collaborators, or disputants. However, in differentiating among the different types of theorem-lattices within which changes of the first order of discovery occur, we are compelled to distinguish among these types according to the second order of changeA1, 2, A3, ... , the discontinuities (singularities) which are the recognizable mental acts through which the transition from one species (type) from one theorem-lattice to another is effected.
Let us supply the appropriate glossary for what has been just so described. The conceptions are those taken from Plato's works:
Hypothesis: Any term of the series A1, A2, A3, ... .
The same method of (Platonic) Socratic hypothesizing obliges us to recognize a correspondingly higher quality of mental existence: the Good (Plato) or the Absolute (Cantor).212 Change is knowable (recognizable, intelligible) for the mind of mortal man in the form of Becoming. The generalization of man's knowledge of change is therefore hypothesizing the higher hypothesis. However, the same principle of knowledge obliges us to recognize the efficient existence of an ontologically higher state than Becoming. In this latter higher state of existence, all possible hypothesizing the higher hypothesis is subject to the defining of a One corresponding to a Many. This is Plato's The Good.
This Good has necessarily two knowable (intelligible) qualities. First, all Becoming is condensed into a One: all time and all place are condensed into a One. Since this is comprehended only through that quality of creative mental power by means of which hypothesizing the higher hypothesis is intelligibly knowable for mankind, by the quality of imago Dei/capax Dei, this One has the universal quality of creative intelligence.213
Through submitting to the development principle which is implicit in perfection of and obedience to knowledge in this way, we, as each individual mortal persons, rise above the bounds of time and place to participate efficiently in all history, the history of those ideas which set mankind, as imago Dei, apart from and above, with dominion over, all other forms of life. This has been known since before the time of Plato, when the powerful Egyptian Moses214 wrote the first chapter of Genesis.215
What some might deprecate as but Plato's (or, this author's own) "speculation" upon the Good, is readily shown to be a crucial factor in defining knowledge. The following synopsis of that proposition should be sufficient here.
Once the form of intelligibility of Plato's principle of hypothesis is shown, as we have indicated the case for that, we have shown how a result may be reached, but without yet supplying the motive for the occurrence of that possible result: Why should one seek to reach that result? Is the fact that it is attainable, a sufficient motive, in and of itself, for such an effort?
What is being stated here implicitly, is that, in some sense, individual action is motivated essentially by an effort to affirm one's identity as something more than that of just another individual member of a species of beast.216 Plato's notion of the Good puts that motive into not only an intelligible form, but provides us an intelligibly truthful conception of our individual identity as mediated through that principle of an efficient, intelligent Good, as capax Dei, if you will.
Every serious scientist, every serious Classical artist will concede this to be the nature of his or her motivation, if that proposition is represented to them in the way which corresponds to their inner experience.
As reference to Classical humanist education in geometry already illustrates the general case for scientific education, becoming a scientist can occur only through first establishing a very intimately personal, isochronic relationship with discoverers, a relationship which often spans centuries or even millennia. It is a relationship which, by its nature, transcends the mortal bounds of space and time. It not merely transcends such bounds, but transcends them essentially. It is a relationship to nature through these isochronic social relations, in terms of ideas of discovery. It is a commitment to truthfulness, and implicitly a commitment to participate in Plato's Good.
In music, it is the same, but more intimately so. How does one learn music, but through replicating Bach, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Schumann, Brahms?217 The attempt to replicate the mental experience of discovery of the composer is the essential basis for one's relationship to music as an historical process of development.218
The motive is expressed by the happy child's "Why?"
The ability to address mental acts of valid axiomatic-revolutionary and other valid discovery as objects of conscious reflection, is the means by which the higher features of human mental life are made intelligible to us. This can be done only in a social way, and must include a replication of the living experience of discovery by the "dead white European males" who are, for historical reasons, responsible for at least a proverbial ninety percent of the storehouse of scientific knowledge indispensable for continued human survival today.
Yet, as we view the sum-total of human knowledge, we are able to look at the matter more broadly, outside those areas of scientific and musical developments in which the standard of knowledge today was built up chiefly either by Europeans or by others in reaction to European civilization's contributions to universal culture. Take ancient Indo-European language, for example.
The solar-sidereal calendars embedded within the system of ancient Vedic hymns afford us a sense of the antiquity of a highly developed Indo-European language. This connection was actively under study as early as Kepler's attention to those calendars.219 That content of the hymns, and related information concerning astronomical fragments in the Zend Avesta from an earlier time,220 dates the kernel of those hymns surviving into literary times. The dating is within the period the Vernal Equinox was in the constellation of Orion; as Tilak argues from his sources, this would be between 6,000 and 4,000 b.c.: 221 Similarly, in the case of pre-historic China, the standing analysis on the antiquity of China's solar-sidereal astronomical calendars is that given by Edouard Biot and Gustav Schlegel, which places those at about the beginning of the melting of the glaciation (c.17,000-18,000 b.c.).222
A literate form of spoken language, as the school of August Boeckh, the von Humboldts, et al.,223 elaborated the Indo-European case, is already a highly sophisticated development, more advanced in design than any formal mathematics yet developed. The point can be made clear, on the condition this matter is examined from the vantage-point of what we have stated here, using mathematical formalism as an example.
The use of a name or phrase to signify a mental object (as distinct from a mere sense-perception) is the essential quality of metaphor.224 In the case of mathematical ideas, as treated above, all ideas are of this quality of metaphor: a mathematical representation of a discovery is a metaphor for the mental object which is the original (or replicated original) act of discovery. Nothing shows the applicability of this to language in general better than Classical forms of poetry.225 The function of the so-called "non-plastic" Classical art-forms, which are premised entirely upon this principle of metaphor in language,226 in successful types of cultures illustrates the point: the role of these in both the education of leaders, and in the broader social life in general.
The relevant argument may be summarized briefly as follows.
We have noted above: the characteristic of human existence, the conclusive proof setting mankind absolutely apart from and above the beasts, is the role of a certain quality of ideas through which our species is uniquely enabled to generate increases of potential relative population-density.227 These ideas belong, in each particular instance, to classes which may be symbolized by formal theorem-lattices or analogous forms. The passage from one such class to another class of higher relative "power," is known as cultural progress. These classes are otherwise describable as "cultures." That supplies the significance of "cultural progress."
The phenomenon of "cultural progress" is not a sidewise movement from right to wrong. Any change which increases the potential relative population-density of a people can not be entirely "wrong." Rather, that which supersedes is derived from superseding its predecessor, which latter is the launching-pad from which the creative leap is effected. "Wrongness" is an idea which must be associated with stubborn "backwardness," or even with Thoreauvian, Spenglerian, or other variety of existentialist regression to a "Walden," or analogous sort of cultural cesspool.
Among "ideas," we must distinguish between conditioned habits for intellectual interpretation of sense-perceptions, as distinct from ideas which correspond entirely to mental objects. It is the mental objects which reflect immediately the set of axiomatic assumptions defining that class of ideas as a whole, that culture, which are of primary interest to us. It is this higher class of ideas which must be placed at the center of our investigation of any specific culture, such as our own.
Consider one of the author's long-standing classroom favorites: the cultural transformation of the perception of a rock from a mere "rock," to "ore."228 The object of perception remains the same; the perception changes. Culturally determined judgment is integral to perception. Nonetheless, despite such changes, something of the old is passed to the new. Since all of this aspect of culture appears in knowledge solely as metaphor, all human knowledge must be viewed as an accumulation of metaphor. It is metaphor which shapes language, although the degree of literacy in form of language delimits the quality of ideas which can be identified by means of language. It is this accumulation of "Alephs," metaphors, which is the increase of power of a language achieved through increased literacy.
The point to be stressed here, for purposes of limiting the body of the text, as much as possible, to the object in view, is the notion of the intellectual potentialities of a literate form of modern language, such as the Indo-European group: the "power set" thus represented by the accepted use of that language per se. This, a literate language, the author wishes to stress, is a heritage of awesome import, which embodies within it the included handiwork of long-lost generations from the very beginnings of human existence.
As we must presume Dante Alighieri would have concurred, a literate form of such a language, expressed as true Classical poetry, is already the highest form of mathematics the human species has ever possessed. All ideas are metaphors, and language is the mathematics of metaphor. The greatest calculus is that of the tragic dramas of Aeschylus, Marlowe, Shakespeare, and Schiller.
(f) Antonio Conti & His Salon (see end note)
Our attention here is focussed primarily upon approximately a century of British history, beginning Abbot Antonio Conti's rise to great influence over England's destiny, at the beginning of the Eighteenth Century, and concluding a decade after the 1790 death of Giammaria Ortes. The conclusion of that Eighteenth-Century interval is marked chiefly by three relevant events: (1) the 1798 publication of Thomas Malthus plagiarism of Ortes' 1790 Riflessioni229 ; (2) Napoleon Buonaparte's dissolving the existence of Venice as a state; (3) the emergence of post-Italian-campaign Napoleon to power, in search of his Caesarian dynasty in a new Roman world-empire.230 It is a period which begins with the maturity of Conti, and which ends more than a decade prior to the key role of Venice's plenipotentiary agent, Count John Capodistria, at the Congress of Vienna. This is the century during which British government replaced English self-rule, the century during which the ideological and political institutions of an emerging world-empire were set into place. This is the pivotal century of modern history to date, approximately two centuries after the League of Cambrai and about two centuries prior to the looming collapse of today's global, Venetian-style financial system.231
It is upon these connections, of this period, on which attention must be focussed, to define the origin and influence of those radical-empiricist conceptions which have defined the British Empire, its founding, and its aftermath, from the accession of George I as the first British monarch, to the present date. Therefore, first, briefly, situate that British century, 1700-1800, within the six centuries' span as described earlier.
The history of modern England and its successor, Britain, begins with the defeat of England, Burgundy, and Spanish opponents by the King Louis XI who established modern France as the first nation-state. Louis XI's victories, and his stunning successes in economic development, inspired imitation of his successful venture among crucial circles in Spain and England, notably the circles around King Henry VII. This established a common interest and collaboration among France, England, and Spain, which was later broken, during the interval 1517-1527, by Venice's intrigues inside the court of Henry VII's successor, King Henry VIII.
That process, which begins with the presentation of the Howards' bait to the susceptible King, marks a discontinuity within the history of England, and of Europe as well.
In shorthand, the setting for the study of the Eighteenth Century, the five centuries' history of European civilization since the collapse of the League of Cambrai, can be conceptualized in terms of the following highlights.
From circa 1517-1527, until the 1815 sessions of the Congress of Vienna, all of European history is dominated by a Venice-orchestrated circumstance of general warfare, both civil warfare, such as that within England over the period from Henry VIII's Venice-sponsored marriage to Anne Boleyn through the Essex affair and political assassination of Christopher Marlowe, and international wars, such as the Hapsburg looting of Rome, the Venice-orchestrated "Peasant War" in Germany, and the wars among Hapsburg Spain, France, and England, and the Netherlands.
The reflection of this process into England itself defines five relatively distinct periods, to the present date, in the history of England-Britain since a.d.: 1517. The first, from c.1517-1527, Venice's takeover of Henry VIII, through approximately the time of the 1589-1603 coups orchestrated by Paolo Sarpi's circles, to secure the succession of James VI of Scotland to the English throne. The second, from the accession of James I (and Francis Bacon's mob) through the interval 1666-1689, culminating in the "Glorious Revolution" and accession of William of Orange. The third, the transition from the accession of William of Orange through the victory of the British Empire (in fact) at the 1815 Congress of Vienna. The fourth, the rise of London's world-empire, 1815-1914. The fifth, to the present, London's post-1914-1918 drive to dissolve the British Empire into the safe haven of a larger, global world-federalist dictatorship controlled by Venetian-British radical ideology: a utopian goal first sought through the abortive League of Nations, and, later, the United Nations Organization.
Conti emerges as a figure prominently involved in the shaping of future history approximately at the outbreak of the Venice-orchestrated "Marlborough Wars" of the "Spanish Succession." Here, we are focussed upon the historical significance of those radical-empiricist conceptions which Ortes' influence established as the reigning doctrine of British global policy, from the last quarter of the Eighteenth Century down through the present-day proposal for the adoption of Ortes' 1790 population dogma as the enforceable law of a worldwide imperial tyranny known as the U.N.O..
The kernel of this inquiry is: how did the radicalism of Conti's Eighteenth-Century circles differ, and to what effect, from the earlier forms of Venetian empiricism, such as the Aristotelianism of Pomponazzi, the Kabbalistic empiricism of Francesco Zorzi, the empiricism of such Rosicrucian cultists as Francis Bacon, Robert Fludd, Thomas Hobbes, Elias Ashmole, John Locke, and Isaac Newton, or the early-Eighteenth-Century empiricism of David Hume?
The topics addressed in the preceding five sections have prepared us to attack now those kernel-questions which we have just posed.
The common trait of the Canaanites of Tyre, of the Roman Empire and its Byzantine successor, of medieval Venice, and of such Venice-controlled corporations as the Portuguese, Dutch, and English trading companies, is traffic in slaves. This was the pedigree and heritage of England's Levant Company and of its successors, the Bank of England, the Eighteenth-Century British East India Company, and the Barings bank of the evil William F. Petty, the Second Earl of Shelburne. This is the heritage of the author of Aristotle's overt apology for evil, his Ethics and his Politics. The practice of, and apology for, the practice of slavery or kindred forms of usury, is the common attribute of a form of society which is truly evil, a form of society common to ancient Tyre, Lycurgus' Sparta, the Roman Empire, Venice, and the thoroughly Venetian Anglo-Dutch "India" companies.
The essence of the methods of "dumbing down" slaves, of subject nations, and of U.N.O.-designed "Outcome-Based Education" applied to would-be victims of a U.N.O. world-dictatorship,232 is the vicious suppression of the creative powers of reason, those distinctively human mental capabilities which are expressed typically in the form of valid axiomatic-revolutionary discoveries in physical science.
That has been the role of Delphic Aristotelianism since the time of Plato's Academy, and the role of Parmenides' Eleatic and the Sophists' schools of anti-Pythagorean formalism earlier.233 That is the significance of the Venetians' creation of the fame of Galileo and his English parody, the Kabbalist Isaac Newton;234 that is the significance of the Critiques of Kant. That is the precise significance of Newton's hypotheses non fingo.235 That is the method of Norbert Wiener, John Von Neumann, and other founders of the pseudo-scientific "artificial intelligence."236 That is the significance of the Conti circles' radical use of the algebraic methods associated factionally with Galileo and Newton as the basis for delimiting all forms of allowed human behavior.
An insight into the crucial sociological features of the slave-trade is key to understanding the philosophy of the United Nations Organization's utopian efforts at world government today, and is key to understanding the motivating world-outlook of Conti, Ortes, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Bertrand Russell, and their like.
Remember! How does one transform a corral filled with yesterday's raw crop of captured slaves into a relatively docile collection of tamed human cattle? Societies based upon the practice of slavery employ the same methods required for breeding down wild herds into domesticated dumb beasts prized for their milk, meat, and docility. Colonialism, such as that of the Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Centuries' British Empire, applies these methods of slave-breeding to the taming, the dumbing-down of entire subjugated nations. The same colonialist methods were applied to the defeated, as both occupation and post-occupation policies, by the victors at the 1815 Congress of Vienna, and of the two World Wars of this century. This was the method applied to Argentina in 1982, by Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (and her Lord Carrington), the same method applied to Iraq, by her and her familiar George Bush, in 1990-1991.237
The Eighteenth-Century radical empiricists' use of "the methods of Galileo and Newton" to retard creativity in all fields, not only physical science, is the central feature of British imperialism's Venetian strategy for "dumbing down" the human species globally to a level of readiness for world-government. Once the implications of this detail of the radical-empiricist method is made clear, the rest of British imperialist and related policy is readily understood, including the methods of "dumbing down" slaves and for British brainwashing of other subject populations, such as that of the Twentieth-Century United States.
Consider in this light the principal successive changes, from the mid-Fifteenth-Century attack on Nicolaus of Cusa by John Wenck,238 into Ortes' injection of radical empiricism into London. Here lies the key to Bertrand Russell; here is the detail in the devil.
Pomponazzian Francesco Zorzi's 1525 Harmonia Mundi, a Kabbalistic attack upon Cusa's De Docta Ignorantia, is the first known point of origin of empiricism per se inside England.239 From this point on, from Zorzi through Bacon, Locke, Francesco Algarotti,240 Ortes,241 Adam Smith, and British foreign-intelligence chief Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, the British and Vienna utilitarians, the French positivist followers of Abbot Moigno, and Bertrand Russell, all empiricism and its existentialist derivatives is based upon this argument set forth by Zorzi.242
It was not until Paolo Sarpi that we see a consistent effort by Venetians to erect a systematic empiricism as an anti-science against the modern science established by Cusa, Pacioli, Leonardo, and Kepler. Briefly, summing up the case: Toward the end of the Sixteenth Century, Venice moved in against the Classical current in Renaissance music, co-opting the son of the musician Galilei in the same general time-frame that the talented Claudio Monteverdi was transformed into a pre-Wagnerian pagan.243 In this batch, Venice picked up and "turned" a former student of Johannes Kepler's work, Galileo Galilei, whom Kepler had come to know through Kepler's own earlier studies in music under Galileo's father. Sarpi protégé Galileo reworked information he had received from Kepler, perverting it to remove all traces of the Platonic method which Kepler had employed to make these discoveries.244 Thus, under Sarpi's patronage and direction, was born the mechanistic or empiricist school in algebraic physics.
The open assault upon science by Sarpi's protégés is centered most prominently in three published writings of the early-Seventeenth Century: Francis Bacon's New Organon (Novum Organum)245 , Robert Fludd's Rosicrucian parody of Zorzi's Kabbalistic Harmonia Mundi,246 and Galileo's Dialogues....247 All of these have in common two features: (1) They reaffirm the Aristotelian standpoint of empiricism, that of Wenck, Pomponazzi, and Zorzi, insisting that only "induction" from sense-perceptions is permissible; that mental objects must be excluded from consideration. (2) They insist that arithmetic and algebraic methods of Aristotelian deduction (and induction) are the exclusive basis for measurement of the cause-effect relations inferred from simple sense-perception.248
Out of this Jacobite crew of Rosicrucians, Bacon, Fludd, Thomas Hobbes, and Elias Ashmole, the original Ashmolean cult of British speculative Freemasonry was spawned during the 1640's.249 Out of the same British branch of the Stuart Rosicrucian cult250 came the London Royal Society of John Locke, Kabbalist Isaac Newton, et al. The Society was established by these British Rosicrucian heirs of Bacon and Fludd, to combat the forces of "continental science," the latter a catch-all term for the work of Cusa, Leonardo da Vinci, Kepler, and, later, Desargues, Fermat, Pascal, Huyghens, Leibniz, Johann Bernoulli, Legendre, Monge, Gauss, Riemann, Weber, et al. Newton's hypotheses non fingo is the tell-tale symptom; the method of discovery is banned. Wherever that tell-tale symptom is presented, the methods of the slave-master are at work: the dumbing-down of scientists is in process.
That is the general development of empiricism up to the appearance of Conti's circles. First, it appears as the corrosive Aristotelianism of Wenck, Pomponazzi, and Zorzi: an anti-science attack upon the Renaissance's philosophical flank and theological flank in general. Then, following Zorzi's influence in Henry VIII's England, toward the end of the century, under Paolo Sarpi, there is the attempted political takeover of existing science, using the empiricist methods of Bacon, Fludd, and, later, Newton. Then, enter Conti et al.
Conti comes on stage251 during the last gasp of Venice's military power under such notorious houses as the Mocenigo and Morosini. There is no apparent reason to quarrel with the commonplace view that the 1699 Peace of Karlowitz was the high-water mark for Venice on this account. In the wake of these wars of conquest in the Peloponessus, although Venice stagnated in its own decadence at home, its intelligence apparatus abroad is estimated to have increased in power and influence into the middle of the Eighteenth Century. In this circumstance, Venetian nobleman Antonio Conti emerges as a growing power in the internal life and foreign affairs of France, England, and Germany.
It is Conti, eventually a member of the London Royal Society, who organizes the attempts to defame Leibniz, and, in that connection controls the British side of the famous debate-by-correspondence among Leibniz, Samuel Clarke, and Newton. It is Conti's circle which deploys the famous Venetian boudoir agent Giacomo Casanova against the court and person of France's Louis XV. It is Conti who coordinates the Venetian agent Abbot Giuseppe Riva in operations against Leibniz inside the circles of Hanover's Venetian dupe, George Ludwig, that Venetian dupe who became the first British monarch, George I. It is Conti who controls agents such as Francesco Algarotti and Giammaria Ortes; it is Conti's network, continuing after his death, which deploys the notorious Count Alessandro Cagliostro against the monarchy of France's Louis XVI and the King's wife, Marie Antoinette.
As noted earlier, Conti and his salon had two primary adversarial targets, the nation of France, and the person of Gottfried Leibniz. Otherwise, Conti and his mob of agents had one principal undertaking, revolutionary transformation of already existing empiricism into a truly radical form of counterculture, basing the form of this transformation upon general application of the algebraic mechanistic methods of Galileo and Newton.
This was the circle of Venetian agent-controllers which produced the French Physiocrats and the networks of Voltaire. These were the coordinators of the Orléans faction of Jacobin leader Philippe Egalité. Conti's circle were the necromancers who took the deceased Galileo from his cozily warm repose in Hell,252 and apotheosized a Newton out of that gentleman's richly deserved obscurity. These were, in fact, the creators of Jacobinism itself, as Karl Marx would have been most pleased to learnif Marx's British-intelligence controller Urquhart did not indeed confide this somewhat delicate information to him.253 Apart from these details, the primary historical significance of Conti's circles today, is their successful hoax, their fraudulent apotheosis of Galileo and Newton, as a central figure of their initiation of Shelburne's apparatus into the mysteries of radical empiricism: the hedonistic calculus.
We have indicated the nature of the distinction between the overtly anti-science philosophical and theological bias of the early-Sixteenth-Century Venetian Aristotelians, and the use of the same empiricist method to take over political control of institutions of science, under Paolo Sarpi et al. at the beginning of the Seventeenth Century. The emergence of radical empiricism represents a similarly well-defined change from the form of empiricism characteristic of the preceding Seventeenth and early-Eighteenth Centuries. One aspect of this difference, the radicals' break with cautious deference to custom, has been addressed earlier here; the second, the Conti circle's growing emphasis upon the mechanistic algebra of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton has been identified, but wants to be stressed a bit more for purposes of clarity now.
The simplest way in which to demonstrate the practical implication of the difference, is to examine the modern history of "Malthusianism."
It should be conceded that the history of population control is very ancient, and very pagan. Typical, is the method of the Canaanites of Tyre, the worshippers of Moloch and kindred images of self-degradation. There is the Tyre-like conduct of Herod, as summarized in the Gospel According to St. Matthew, Chap. 2. During the recent two thousand years of European history, the first "Malthusian" law similar to what is proposed for the U.N.O. Cairo Population Conference, was the "socialist" decrees of the Roman Emperor Diocletian.254 In modern European history, the center of population-control policies of this sort has been consistently Venice. The beginning of Malthusianism in Britain was imported from Sixteenth-Century Venice, in the form of the 1606 English translation of Venetian Giovanni Botero's "Delle cause della grandezza e magnificenze della città." (1588).255
As Schumpeter notes, Botero's population policy was adopted by the most influential, Venice-linked grandfather of Jeremy Bentham's and Thomas Malthus' Shelburne, William Petty, in his 1682 "Essay Concerning the Multiplication of Mankind."256 Through the influence of this Petty and such radiations of that as through Adam Ferguson,257 this form of the Malthusian dogma was already in circulation in Britain prior to the arrival of the writings of Ortes.
That Thomas Malthus parodied Ortes' Riflessioni is beyond doubt. More significantly, Charles Darwin's work in biology was premised explicitly upon Malthus' An Essay on Population. The social and political philosophy of the eugenicist movement, including the political philosophy of the Harriman and appended Bush families in their 1930's support of Adolf Hitler, and in U.S. political and juridical life generally,258 is premised upon blind adulation of Darwin as a "Malthusian." Malthus-adulator Darwin has been superimposed arbitrarily, officially, and widely upon the theory and teaching of biology. Yet, the elaborated conception of "carrying capacity" embedded in the Hitler-like pro-genocidal U.N.O. proposals for the 1994 Cairo Population Conference is adduced not from Malthus' text, but rather that of Ortes. What is specially significant about Ortes on this latter and related accounts?
Schumpeter typifies the lack of elementary scientific literacy among those who imagine that Petty's suggestion of a "law of geometric progression" shows that this notion was implicit in the work of Botero.259 The notion of geometric progression was established by Leonardo of Pisa's Liber Abaci (1202). With the work of Luca Pacioli and his student Leonardo da Vinci,260 the importance of work such as Leonardo of Pisa's "Fibonacci Series" was fully superseded. The special significance of Ortes' role in modern Malthusianism came about as a continuation of the war against Leibniz by Conti and Venice's agent Voltaire. Ortes' "Malthusian" work developed out of the following sequence of events.
A follower of Leibniz, Süssmilch, in 1740, produced a work promoting population growth, which provoked one among the "Encyclopedist" confederates of Conti and Voltaire, Pierre Maupertuis, then working at the Berlin Academy.261 This produced a work which Ortes reported as being influential for his own work on population theories. Among the notable retorts against Maupertuis' dogma is one produced by Benjamin Franklin, a North American associate of the international Leibniz networks.262 Maupertuis' reaction against Süssmilch is the key to the specifics of Ortes' Riflessioni and its influence.
From a great statistical distance, the most conspicuous correlative of the post-a.d.: 1400 increase of population is urbanization. On closer inspection, the process is as described, somewhat prophetically, by U.S. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's 1791 Report to the U.S. Congress "On the Subject of Manufactures".263 The productivity of agricultural labor, per capita, per household, and per square kilometer, is increased by the development of infrastructural public works, and by the benefits of urban manufactures for the technology and productivity of agriculture. Globally, the urban-rural relationship within the nations of Western European civilization is replicated to a significant degree in the relationship between the relatively more, and relatively less industrialized regions of the planet.
This urban-centered global development required nurture of the cultural potentials of the average person, and also required an accelerating emphasis upon the division of labor, especially in the urban regions. In military terms, this combined economic and social development increased not only the per-capita productivity of labor, but also the superior military potential of the technologically more advanced states. Thus, all in all, without the kinds of intervention which Venice launched in the attempt to slow down the rates of economic and scientific progress, especially economic progress, the states based upon commitment to scientific and technological progress would become dominant in life throughout the planet.
That would signify the death of oligarchism. Nations which foster the creative-mental development of their populations produce a people which will not tolerate oligarchical forms of rule indefinitely. Illiterate, technologically backward populations will; indeed, illiteracy and technological backwardness are contributing causes for the emergence of oligarchical rule. The very existence of the young U.S.A. as a Federal Republic is a demonstration of this point. The average American was culturally and economically superior to the average Briton of the Eighteenth Century: over ninety percent of the U.S. citizens were literate, as contrasted with a poor forty percent of the Britons. Moreover, since nations which did not compete technologically would be strategically inferior, even the states committed to oligarchism, such as Eighteenth-Century Britain, were compelled to adopt from Colbert's France and Leibniz that same technological progress which they hated to see in French hands.
Consider the case of population policies within Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Venice itself. As a measure to prevent the parcelling of family wealth into relatively smaller units, the leading Venetian families had imposed strict measures of birth control upon their own ranks. This, not an excess of religious fervor, accounts for the proliferation of monks and nuns, as well as powerful abbots (with practice of vows in abeyance) among these noble Venetian households. This did not originate in Venice; the collapse of the Eastern Roman Empire was a result of the same policy, under the "Malthusian" decrees of Diocletian.
For the Venetian nobility and their oligarchical clones throughout Europe, the interdependent advance in science, culture, technology, the division of labor, and population generally was a great catastrophe: for them, a virtually apocalyptic catastrophe. From their standpoint, one could not choose not to take that route; the nation which chose abstinence from progress, while other nations advanced, was choosing its own political oblivion. In the oligarchy's view, therefore, no nation must be permitted to continue these practices; these practices must be banned from the planet.
By the middle of the Eighteenth Century, the Venetian oligarchy throughout Europe had become alerted to what Leibniz's circles understood: that there is an interdependency between levels of technological progress and potential population-density. The work of Süssmilch, which excited Maupertuis' frenzy, illustrates that connection explicitly. Without scientific and technological progress, the level of population could not be sustained; however, with technological progress, oligarchism would not be tolerated much longer anywhere. So, "the Venetian Party's" commitment to a Malthusian utopia, an oligarchical "one-world" imperial government developed around Venice's British option, became an hysterical commitment during the course of the Eighteenth Century.
By this time, Europe's Venetian oligarchy264 had had its "racial memory refreshed" on the subject of Plato's principle of knowledge, the principle of Socratic hypothesis. It "remembered" collectively why the Apollo cult's oligarchy had hated Socrates and Plato so bitterly, why the Rome branch of the Apollo cult had hated Jesus Christ so bitterly.265 When men and women come to base their social relations upon taking creativity (hypothesis) as the object of conscious reflection, and placing that above bare sensuality in rank, society knows in that way the meaning of Genesis 1:26-28. Then, man cannot be as a beast to man, leaving no room for the continued existence of societies degraded by submission to oligarchical forms of the family.
It was not so much science as such that the Venetian oligarchy feared, as the reciprocal relationship between Christianity and the forms of scientific and artistic progress typified by axiomatic-revolutionary acts of scientific discovery. To express this Venetian enmity, the apotheosized methods of Galileo and Newton served a double purpose: these methods virtually outlawed creative thinking, and were also useful for administering a society according to what came to be recognizable as Malthusian principles. Thus, the hatred of Nicolaus of Cusa, of Leonardo da Vinci,266 of Kepler, of Pascal, of Colbert, and of Leibniz.
In this fashion, the form of Aristotelianism known as the empiricism of Galileo and Newton became a religion for these haters of Plato and Leibniz. That religion of Voltaire, of the Encyclopedists, of Ortes, of Adam Smith, of Bentham, of Thomas R. Malthus, and of Bentham agents Robespierre, Danton, and Marat, was the late-Eighteenth-Century "Enlightenment."
In this same fashion, under the leadership of Venice's Abbot Antonio Conti, the otherwise obscure Galileo and Isaac Newton were elevated to virtual sainthood in Venice's hagiolatry. The strict imposition and enforcement of the mechanistic world-outlook and algebraic methods of these two, and their like, became articles of faith which the Venetians sought to impose upon every area of scientific inquiry, including social relations in general and economics in particular, outlawing all contrary conceptions and methods from science wherever they could. Conti's and Voltaire's campaign against Leibniz, under the banners of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton, launched the Venetian oligarchy's worldwide campaign to impose this "political correctness" upon the institutions and practice of science worldwide. The fraudulent claims for Newton's discovery of a calculus, a project concocted by Conti and furthered by Voltaire and his minions, were the beginning of this campaign. With Ortes' work, this radical empiricist view was established under the Union Jack.
Wherever the Venetian party won a war, the subject folk were compelled to expel all scientific thinking not submissive to the religious worship of Galileo and Newton. So, in 1815, it went with France under the Restoration Bourbons. So, to a large degree, it went in the divided Germany of Gauss and the Humboldts, as the cases of Clausius, Helmholtz, Kronecker, and Felix Klein attest.
(g) The Case of Felix Klein
Earlier here, we identified Nicolaus of Cusa's crucial discovery of the transcendental domain, circa a.d.: 1440. If the work of Conti's salon were not known, one would find it virtually inexplicable that one of the most famous figures in modern mathematics, Göttingen's Professor Felix Klein, should have claimed in 1895 that the transcendental character of the magnitude π had been first proven by Lindemann in 1882.267
That is not the only such folly by Professor Klein. Three other, closely related cases are directly relevant here: his misrepresentation of a crucial feature of Riemann's Hypothesen dissertation,268 his incompetent regard for the work of Georg Cantor, and his shameless efforts to represent Professor G.W.F. Hegel as the man who prevented the suppression of the teaching of calculus in Prussia.
In the first three cases, Klein falsifies by resort to fallacy of composition. That is to say, there is nothing objectionable in what Klein actually shows; he shows something, narrowly, which is truthful as far as his demonstration goes, but pretends that what he shows also demonstrates something more fundamental, which he knows it does not. In the fourth instance, his defense of Hegel, his argument is flatly contrary to the truth. In fact, the introduction of Nineteenth-Century mathematics at Berlin was accomplished by Alexander von Humboldt and the Prussian military, virtually over the protesting dead body of Professor Hegel.269 The latter issue must be mentioned because reference to the fact of this matter is helpful for understanding the first three.
In other words, in the first three matters referenced, he is lying Delphically. Why does he lie so? He is engaged in political lying about scientific method; his mind has become, if not explicitly a British-occupied territory, a region under Conti's influence. His praise of Hegel exposes his political motive for the false representations in the first three instances cited here.
Remember Soviet science under Stalin? The public papers of the best scientists in Russia, Ukraine and so forth, often began with paeans to the scientific genius of Stalin himself, or to the Friedrich Engels of "opposable thumb" notoriety. An analogous display occurred sometimes under Adolf Hitler. One wished to believe that none among those scientists could have believed a word they were saying in such ritually required obeisances. It is not necessary to do such things in Russia today. One may be inspired by that example to hope that in the not-too-distant future, professors of mathematics and physics generally will be given a similar freedom, so that they are no longer obliged to make themselves disgusting by politically correct ritual obeisance (Gleichschaltung) to the names of Galileo and Newton.
Professor Klein was not prostrating himself before a Stalin, who was not available for that part then, or British intelligence's Engels, who was; he made do with occasional allusions to Hegel. His behavior is an example of the Conti phenomenon; it is a bellwether of what has happened to science and culture in the United States and other nations today.
This is not limited to the area of physical science, but since mathematics is a more primitive language than the spoken ones, the case is made more readily by reference to such examples. The phenomenon which Klein's case illustrates is a general one today, a phenomenon which could not be understood unless it were viewed historically.
Look at Klein's case from the standpoint of the Friedrich Schiller whose historical genius provided his survivors the key to freeing Europe from Napoleon Buonaparte's tyranny.
It was Schiller's studies of the struggle for the freedom of the Netherlands and of the Thirty Years War, which afforded the circle of von Wolzogen, Scharnhorst, vom Stein, and von Humboldt the key to the military defeat of the Emperor Napoleon. It was to a large degree the inspiration of Schiller's poetry and tragedies which enabled the volunteers to conduct themselves in the manner which pleased Blücher so grandly. When Europe was then free from Napoleon, as she would not have been but for these Germans acting upon the lessons provided by Schiller, how was Germany rewarded by the Vienna Congress? Vom Stein was sent into internal exile, and Schiller received the posthumous boot of tyranny under the Holy Alliance's Carlsbad decrees. In this circumstance, there came to the top of Prussian celebrity the Metternich spy G.W.F. Hegel, and, at Hegel's side, the prophet of Nazi law, the Romantic neo-Kantian F. Karl Savigny.270
Meanwhile, as we have noted earlier, repression also came to French science. At the Ecole Polytechnique, Gaspard Monge and his program were uprooted from that institution, which was given over to the neo-Newtonian creations of Abbot Moigno, LaPlace, and Augustin Cauchy. Alexander von Humboldt, working to snatch real French science from under the hooves of Cauchy and his crew, faced the difficulty that the university at Berlin, which should have been nominally under the direction of Alexander's brother and Schiller's follower, Wilhelm, was actually under the veto-control of a pair of tyrannical, anti-science rogues, Hegel and Savigny. Hegel was determined not to allow men who would appear, later, as the world's greatest gathering of scientists, to be habilitated at the university. To get around Metternich-asset Hegel, Alexander was obliged to establish advanced mathematics instruction in the philology department, and to rely upon the Prussian military to habilitate professors at their academy, who could not be prevented then from teaching at Berlin.
For an extended period, there was a similar, perhaps worse situation of political repression at Gauss' Göttingen University, under the tyranny of the British House of Hanover. Gauss' letters to the Bolyais, father and son, on the matter of his own suppressed discoveries in non-Euclidean geometries, reflect the degree to which this political terrorism by reigning authorities was able to suppress science.271 In that time, there was a notorious case of mass suppression of academic freedom there, the case of the "Göttingen Seven."272
Beginning 1850, even before Gauss' death, London launched a major onslaught against the influence of Leibniz's and Gauss' science in Germany. Kelvin performed a critical role in this. London's exemplary assets in German science during the middle of the century were at that time Rudolf Clausius and Hermann Helmholtz.273 By the close of the century, when Klein delivered his "Famous Problems" lectures, German science was in significant political decline, under increasing onslaughts from the radical positivists, such as Ernst Mach.
One must look back to the early decades of Nineteenth-Century Britain to put the political decline of German science into proper historical perspective. As of close of the Napoleonic wars, when John Herschel and Charles Babbage wrote their celebrated "D-ism and Dot-age" paper, ridiculing Newton's influence and the London Royal Society,274 John's father (and Carl Gauss' friend) Wilhelm Herschel the astronomer from Hanover, was the only first-rate scientist in Britain. Almost reluctantly, Britain crawled out of these decades of lapse into scientific illiteracy, junked Newton's pseudo-calculus for a bowdlerized version of Leibniz's, and established the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS).
Then, Britain concentrated upon attempting to wreck scientific progress in the nations, including Germany, from which it had borrowed so much for its own recovery: Conti would have been pleased with the performance. Why was Gauss afraid to reveal his work in discovery of non-Euclidean geometry? To what purpose did Thomson (Kelvin) direct Clausius? Why did the British steer Helmholtz's fraud against music, and in other matters?275 Why did so many Nineteenth-Century German scientists feel obliged to begin serious works with a literary genuflection to the "Engels" (Newton) whom they repudiated implicitly in every part of the work which this disgusting genuflection prefaced? Such considerations do not justify Klein's contested behavior, but they do render it historically comprehensible.
This brings us again to the detail in the devil, the crux of Klein's fallacy of composition in the matter of π.
Circa a.d.: 1440, Nicolaus of Cusa discovered that the circle is that higher species of function which we term "transcendental." The crucial advances in science accomplished by Pacioli, Leonardo, Kepler, Desargues, Fermat, Pascal, Huyghens, Leibniz, Gauss, Riemann, et al. after that, are all derived from the radiated influence of this discovery by Cusa. Consistently, since Pomponazzi and his Kabbalistic follower Zorzi, the Venetians have fought to suppress not only the fact of Cusa's discovery, but also the method by means of which the discovery was accomplished. The empiricist method of Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Russell is premised upon that Aristotelian fraud of Pomponazzi, Zorzi, Conti, et al. That is the key to each and all of the four listed frauds of Professor Felix Klein.
It is sufficient to focus on the one selected example, Klein's false statement that the transcendental nature of π was first proven by Lindemann in 1882, approximately 440 years after that discovery and proof of it were actually supplied by Nicolaus of Cusa. Klein is arguing from an Aristotelian standpoint; the issue was well known in Germany at that time; Klein ran up against this frequently during the 1882-1895 interval preceding the lectures on "Famous Problems." All of Cantor's fundamental discoveries were publicly represented by him as premised on an anti-Aristotelian basis in Plato as viewed by Cusa.276 Klein is also aware of the same issue in the center of the so-called Leibniz-Clarke controversy and sundry attacks upon Leibniz's Monadology.277
Dr. Samuel Clarke's performance in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence is immediately crucial for identifying the pretext underlying Klein's hoax on the subject of the discovery of π's transcendental character.278 Clarke is not engaging in a dialogue with Leibniz; he is behaving like today's literary hoodlums from the ranks of mass-media journalism, such as the London Daily Telegraph, Washington Post, New York Post, or NBC-TV News; he is carrying the "party line" of the Abbot Antonio Conti, who manufactured the issues being debated from the British side; no fact swerves Clarke from mindlessly repeating Conti's "party line." The issue posed by Leibniz there is clearly stated: Newton's "fluxions" is not a calculus, but simply a rewarming of familiar stunts with infinite series.
This is the crux of the formal argument in exposing the fraud of a Venice-directed Leonhard Euler in 1761,279 a Cauchy of the Bourbon Restoration, or a Felix Klein of 1895: a refusal to admit that an infinite series of a lower species of function can not become congruent with a higher species of function. One of our given illustrations of this issue was the refusal of some to acknowledge a species-difference between the integer "5" and the similar quadratic root. Consider, as briefly as possible, the nature of the issue as Klein identifies it in the given text-reference.
Consider carefully the elements of witting fallacy of composition which Klein employs to avoid touching upon facts which would reveal his sleight-of-hand in choosing the 1882 dating. Begin with a crucial instance of this, on pp. 55-56.280 He begins by stating the proposition in the following ambiguous terms: "... if the number π is not algebraic, it certainly cannot be constructed by means of straight edge and compasses. The quadrature of the circle in the sense understood by the ancients is then impossible." [italics in originalLHL] On p. 56, he proceeds to the following statement, which includes a revealing omission and a falsehood:
The Greeks rose above this empirical standpoint [of the Rhind papyrusLHL], and especially Archimedes. ... His method remained in use until the invention of the differential calculus... .The crucial intervening development was the rigorous definition of the class of incommensurables by Plato's Academy at Athens, notably the method of Eudoxus, on which Archimedes' attempted quadrature was premised; Klein's witting omission of that fact is an important fallacy of composition, permitting Klein to falsify his argument further, by also omitting reference to the ontological issue addressed successfully by Nicolaus of Cusa.
Those choices of starting-points set the stage for Klein's crucial, false assumption, set forth on pp. 58-59:
3. The period from 1670 to 1770, characterized by the names of Leibniz, Newton, and Euler, saw the rise of modern analysis. Great discoveries followed one another in such an almost unbroken series that, as was natural, critical rigor fell into the background. For our purposes the development of the theory of series is especially important.With that silly bit of pedagogical hand-waving there, you have Klein's hoax set into place on stage. Henceforth, everything said by Klein is an extension of that whopper, that fallacy of composition.
The crucial code-words from that citation are "analysis" and infinite "series." Those code-words' appearance rightly implies that Klein is not addressing the ontological problem of species-distinction, which he only pretends to be attacking; he is engaged in a sleight of hand, pretending to address an ontological problem, while considering only a formal one.281 He is addressing a problem in infinite series; he is using the credibility of Hermite's and Lindemann's work on this problem of infinite series, to deflect the viewer's attention from the fact that he is not addressing the ontological problem at all. That is the formal nature of his fraud.
Review very briefly some relevant points identified earlier.
1. Klein is addressing a matter addressed by Cusa more than 450 years earlier: to demonstrate that the domain of incommensurables is divided into not less than two distinct species: the one, the notion of squaring the circle, and the magnitude which can not be squared. The proof of this distinction's discovery rests upon the method for defining incommensurables developed by Plato's Academy at Athens.
Without referencing, or replicating those well-known methods of that Academy which were emulated by Archimedes, no treatment of this matter can be regarded as scholarly or scientifically rigorous.
2. The definition of species of numbers or of magnitudes, or functions which serve as substitutes for numbers, is that the higher species is axiomatically incommensurable in terms of the lower one. Thus, Eudoxus, and Archimedes after him, knew that an infinite series in lower terms could not be congruent with, but only approximate closely values which are higher or lower than the magnitude of the incommensurable.3. Cusa's "De Circuli Quadratura" is the classic method for determining the fact that circular action in space-time is a higher-order of species than simply extended magnitudes in space.Work on infinite series is not useless; as in the case of Hermite and Lindemann, it represents a continuing effort to refine the methods available for giving less inexact, far more rapidly acquired numerical approximations of complex curves and surfaces in the complex domain, for manipulating different kinds of such series as sub-types, and so on. But ... a well-cooked meal is a good thing, but not an appropriate motive for marrying the stove.
Such useful mathematical development as that of Euler, Hermite, and Lindemann, for example, has the ironical quality, that the more it succeeds on the one side, the formal side, the more problematic it becomes on the other side, the ontological side. This is the problem addressed by Riemann in the passages we cited earlier from his Hypothesen; that entire work is dedicated to the same problem. This is the issue of that formal side of the ontological problem of the "immeasurably small," the formal issue which was greatly simplified for comprehension by the work of Cantor on the matter of transfinite types. From the vantage-point implicit in these references to Riemann and Cantor, the significance of Klein's sleight-of-hand is that he is attempting to bury this ontological problem of mathematics out of sight, under a dung-heap of formalism; that is the essential fraud typified by his Famous Problems.
Formally, Klein's presentation of his Famous Problems is an attack upon Leibniz and Riemann from the standpoint of Euler,282 Clausius, et al.283 This is by no means a mere classroom issue of mathematical formalities.
Most readers are probably aware, that one of the results of the popularization of the word "relativity," into the 1970's, was significant discussion, among scientific circles, in college classrooms, and in some daily newspapers' "Sunday Supplements," of whether our universe were "curved," and what sort of "curvature" it might have. In time, many have debated that issue without first troubling themselves to discover the nature of the evidence being debated to this effect. The better educated among persons from those generations may recall, that Albert Einstein referred to Riemannand also Kepleras an important forerunner of the present century's discoveries of Einstein et al. Riemann's Hypothesen paper is the location in which those deeper implications of relativity were first addressed publicly.284 Let us compare the import of that aspect of the dissertation with our ongoing presentation of the method of history applicable to the exemplary case of Bertrand Russell. In that way, the broader historical significance of Klein's fallacy of composition is made clear.
The key here is Riemann's method, the same Platonic method of hypothesis employed by Nicolaus of Cusa for the discovery of that which we term today the transcendental domain. The same method was employed by Gauss, by Bolyai, by Lobachevski, and by Riemann for the discovery of both so-called "non-Euclidean" geometry, and for the development of the notion of the hypergeometric domain. By questioning the generally accepted assumptions of geometry and of mathematics generally at that time, these Nineteenth-Century discoverers did to geometry generally what Cusa did to the quadrature theorems of Archimedes: Riemann, like Cusa, focussed upon the presumptuousness of the axioms (Riemann: "hypotheses") which underlay generally accepted classroom mathematics of that time.285 This led to the result upon which Einstein made his referenced general comment, on a small but important aspect of Riemann's dissertation as a whole.
As Einstein understood this corner of the business, the question is posed: What are the differences which might be observable by people living within our physical space-time domain, by means of which we might discover whether our universe has a predominantly negative, positive, or zero curvature? Einstein read the relevant literature as showing, for example, that Gauss and Riemann inferred a spherical curvature, and Lobachevski a negative (hyperbolic) curvature. By contrast, the mathematical method of Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Bertrand Russell belongs to a universe which has implicitly a zero curvature.286 Riemann reports that he addressed this proposition with help of concepts suggested by two of Gauss' crucial writings, the first on biquadratic residues, and a second on curved surfaces,287 and, as noted above, by some promptings from the work of a one-time student of Schiller's work, the anti-Kant philosopher Herbart.288 With aid of the suggestions taken from Gauss' work, and an intensive study of the work of Newton, as well as Legendre, et al., in addition to studies under Jacob Steiner, Riemann effected what he correctly understood to be a revolution in mathematical physics, that which centered around the possibility of measuring the curvature of the physical space-time in which our species acts.289
This was a Platonic revolution, which Riemann's posthumously published papers on Herbart, combined with the evidence of his Hypothesen itself, oblige us to view in no other way but that.
In reviewing professional opinions on Riemann's rigorous original and profound contributions to the formalities of mathematics and mathematical physics, it should be recognized that these aspects of his work are often referenced to the (sometimes intended) effect of misleading our attention away from the well-springs of his genius.290 The center of Riemann's discovery of the 1853-1854 interval lies not in the mathematical formalities of the subject-matters principally addressed; Riemann's genius lies in emphasizing the subjectivity of all scientific work, as his posthumously published critical items on Herbartian method corroborate the explicit guidance provided within the dissertation itself.
The key to understanding the essential subjectivity of Riemann's revolution is the present author's "Metaphor" series, including the relatively most recent "The Truth About Temporal Eternity."291 Apply the more general implications of the Riemann argument referenced by Einstein. The argument to be made is as follows.
In earlier portions of this present report, as in the referenced "The Truth About Temporal Eternity," the case is made that the absolute distinction which sets mankind apart from and above all other species is mankind's manifest capacity to alter willfully, successfully, our species' potential relative population-density. The quality of this capacity is shown to us chiefly in two ways.
First, we can look at all of discoverable human existence from the standpoint of the recent six centuries of the combined physical economy and demographic characteristics of European civilization. This enables us to recognize not only the benefit of replacing the old feudal and other forms of imperial social organization by Dante's and Cusa's notion of the sovereign nation-state republic based upon subjection to a Christian definition of natural law, but also willful fostering of the forms of technological progress in infrastructure and production which depend, in turn, upon progress in science and in Classical forms of art. This enables to recognize the efficiency of precursors of such progress in earlier forms of society, including the evidence of the continuing development of language itself.
Second, the young child learns the concepts of his or her civilized culture by reliving the act of discovery of those conceptions. "Why?," the mentally healthy child asks. As we have indicated, respecting the Classical alternative to textbook education, once we are able to replicate willfully what we can recognize as an act of original and fundamental discovery of a new principle of science, we are thus enabled to make ourselves conscious of that specific type of mental activity which we have replicated within our own minds. By recognizing such creativity as being a type of activity, rather than an isolated act, through replicating numerous such original discoveries, creative mentation becomes an object of which we are conscious as we might be conscious of any sensory event.292 By employing the same method for discovery of new theorems consistent with an established theorem-lattice, and also discoveries which overturn such theorem-lattices axiomatically, the conscious mind of the student is enabled to distinguish between ordinary discovery and axiomatic-revolutionary discovery, the latter Plato's notion of Hypothesis.
From the combining of these two points of reference (as we have outlined those standpoints above here), we are able to define human creativity as a mental object, and this in the same sense that we use the term "object" to identify the conception we associate with any empirical phenomenon. It is only by doing precisely that which Pomponazzi, Zorzi, Francis Bacon, and so on explicitly prohibit, including "mental objects" (e.g., metaphor) as scientific phenomena, that we are able to adduce that efficient quality which defines mankind as a species set absolutely apart from and above all other species.
So, as we have emphasized at an earlier point, relative to science (e.g., Riemann's principle underlying his fundamental breakthrough of 1853-1854), in mathematics and related aspects of physics we encounter two general classes of what Riemann identifies as Geistesmassen,293 the metaphors which the present writer has termed "thought-objects."
From the initial vantage-point referenced by Riemann, that of Classical constructive and formal geometries, the lower of these classes is the notion of the Cantorian transfiniteness of any formally consistent theorem-lattice: that, for the array of both known and yet-to-be-discovered theorems in a given lattice, we may substitute the set of axioms and postulates underlying that lattice as a whole. By conceptualizing that latter array of axioms and postulates as a "generating principle,"294 we are to present to ourselves the solution-principle of Plato's Parmenides; in place of the Many theorems of the open-ended lattice, we substitute as a One the unified conception of the array of axioms and postulates as a single mental object.295
However, it is impossible to conceptualize such a set of axioms as a "One" from within the confines of reference to but one such theorem-lattice. To overcome that difficulty, one must either generate a valid new theorem-lattice, more powerful (in cardinality) than the first, or one must relive someone else's original discovery to that effect. This difficulty, of conceptualizing the One which is a generating-principle for a Many, cannot be solved by merely comparing two axiomatically distinct theorem-lattices; one must experience the generation of the higher from the lower, either an original experience, or as a replication of that original discovery within one's own mental processes.
One can then name that discovery "Pythagoras," "Plato," "Eudoxus," "Eratosthenes," "Archimedes," "Nicolaus of Cusa," "Leonardo da Vinci," "Kepler," "Desargues," "Pascal," "Huyghens," "Leibniz," ... , "Riemann," "Cantor," or "Gödel," as all good literate scientific practice has learned to do. If one of these has effected several discoveries of principle, or qualitative improvements of such a discovery, we use the names of the discoveries, separately, or hyphenated, as "person-species" of discovery, or assign a sub-name to each of the discoveries of that person.
It is only in such social relations, premised in the domain of such mental objects (Riemann's Geistesmassen), that real science proceeds. By looking into the mind of others, through reliving their acts of axiomatic-revolutionary discovery, and their experience in reliving, in their turn, the axiomatic-revolutionary discoveries of others, we are able to look similarly into our own minds. Otherwise, without that specific, and very immediate quality of social relations with othersin terms of relatively valid axiomatic-revolutionary discoveries,296 including many long dead, science were impossible.
Without experiencing the generation of successively higher cardinalities of species-distinct theorem-lattices (or, the equivalent experience), it were impossible to conceptualize the set of axioms of a single species of theorem-lattice as a generating-principle, as a Platonic One. The lesson of Plato's Parmenides may be restated, therefore: Human knowledge through mere sense-perception alone were impossible; except as man acts, through thought-objects, to change human behavior axiomatically, man were incapable of that quality of distinction from the mere beasts for which we assign human significance to the term "knowledge."
That returns one's study of Riemann's work to the opening outline of his referenced dissertation: the task is to examine, in a general way, the presumptions, called axioms, which underlie (as "generating principles") the various forms (theorem-lattices) of geometry (and physics) which have existed from Euclid through Legendre.
Only from the standpoint of physical economy, as this writer has defined that relevance here and elsewhere,297 is a rigorous science possible. The question, "What is knowledge?," must first be restated, "What is human knowledge?" Animal behavior is put out of consideration axiomatically; any person who extends comment on human behavior from the behavior of animal types, such as the late Professor B.F. Skinner, is a blundering incompetent or a dangerous quack.298 Human knowledge is that process of development which distinguishes the human species absolutely from all types of beasts. The physical-economic, demographic history of mankind is the starting-point for the study of knowledge; that history is defined as the comparison of (changes) increases of potential relative population-density with implicitly axiomatic-revolutionary changes in ways of thinking, from sets of ideas with relatively lower cardinality, to those with relatively higher. The truth lies not within any term of that series, but rather in the principle of change which orders the succession to ever-relatively higher cardinality.
That notion of change, termed by Plato the principle of hypothesis, is what the Venetians have banned. The attempt to restrict thought to sense-objects, and to ban thought-objects from scientific work, is the essence of empiricism, and the essence of a principle of evil. Thus, Galileo's method is an embodiment of evil; the insistence upon substituting infinite series for a principle of discovery (hypothesis), is the most common reflection of the influence of evil institutionalized within academic and related life over the course of the recent five centuries. That is the evil within Klein's fallacy of composition respecting π. The connections indicated are key to understanding the evil embodied by Bertrand Russell.
From the standpoint of the science of physical economy,299 the generalized geodetic required by Riemann's discovery, is not as Einstein mistakenly imagined: universal physical space-time is bounded externally, not by some conjecturable "fence" around the universe, but transfinitely, as Cantor understood that Plato's notion of the Good bounds the Becoming, as hypothesizing the higher hypothesis is so bounded by that One which subsumes the Many-ness of all hypothesizing. The generalized geodetic required is the characteristic of efficient human activity within the universe. From the standpoint of the universe, the only truly efficient expression of human activity is that successive rise to relatively higher orders of cardinality of knowledge which is representable by a corresponding series of axiomatic-revolutionary discoveries.
That geodetic defines the true curvature of our universe, because it reveals the laws of the universe as that One which corresponds, as an externally bounding principle of universal change, to man's successfully increasing mastery of the universe in per-capita, per-household, and per-square-kilometer terms.
That geodetic is also that map of the human intellect which is our indispensable guide to scientific knowledge, including what we term "moral knowledge," or "natural law." Without it, scientific progress in the larger sense were impossible. Science has progressed despite the Aristotelian-empiricist attempt of the Venetian Party to halt it. The dogma of Galileo's method, and the related insistence that apparent convergence in terms of infinite series eliminates the existence of singularities, is the devil's own work, a product of the Venetian efforts to bring human knowledge to a halt by outlawing anything but the empiricist method of Aristotelians and neo-Aristotelians such as Pomponazzi, Zorzi, Bacon, Locke, Newton, and Ortes.
To understand the recent six centuries of European civilization's process of emerging as the dominant characteristic of a planetary culture, we must return to reconsider a point identified here earlier. Consider the principles of the Renaissance as one type of geodetic, the opposing principles of the Venetian Party as an opposing type of geodetic, and the actual course of the internal history of the recent six centuries of European civilization as a third type of geodetic.
The case of Klein's frauds illustrates the scope of the "brainwashing" of institutionalized science by rendering obeisance to an axiomatically empiricist form of argument typified by what is often identified as "generally accepted classroom mathematics." Klein's relevance to the case of Bertrand Russell is essentially that Klein's moral corruption typifies the environment which rendered possible the toleration of an influence as patently evil as Bertrand Russell efficiently has remained to date, live or deceased.
Thus, science itself has been a victim of British colonial methods.
Remember! How did the "Venetian Party" of Britain build its empire?
First, came gun-boats, muskets, and Venetian-style diplomacywhich of the three weapons is more despicable, remains uncertain, though the evidence tends to suggest the latter. Thus, the people are subjugated, more or less in the fashion one herds wild animals into a corral.
Then, comes the business of taming the captive herd. Forceful restraint is still obligatory. Those captives tending to rebelliousness must be detected, and either eliminated or reduced to a moral condition of old jello. The flock must be bred, to evoke in the cultivated descendants the desired attributes of milkiness, meatiness, and docility. In this way, the captive breed is brought into a state of self-government, in which the ruling bureaucracy is more savagely British than the Brutish Empire itself. At that latter point in the dumbing-down process, come the "winds of change," and the captives are entrusted with the duties of fettering themselves at night, or whatever else the I.M.F. or the London financial market suggests.
So, it was with the Venetian Party's taming of science. The insistence upon the methods of Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Helmholtz, John Von Neumann, Norbert Wiener, and Russell has turned the leaders of science into an irrationalist pagan priesthood, tyrannizing those who teach in classrooms, spewing their obiter dicta through sewer-pipes such as Nature and Science. So, for the purposes of dumbing-down the captive herds still further, the "New Math" was introduced during the late 1950's and 1960's. So, today, to transform the children of once-civilized people into disgustingly rutting Yahoos, the imperial bureaucracy of the United Nations' one-world dictatorship introduced to the U.S. schools "Outcome-Based Education," well designed to transform a human being into a dumb cow.
So, the time has come, when the London Venetian Party has put on its World Federalist mask. The time has come to cull the dumbed-down human herd "by methods which are disgusting, even if they are necessary." Evil Russell; poor, duped Felix Klein!
3. The Coming of Age of Humanity
We have now reached the point at which to set forth summarily the conclusions which we propose ought to be reached through the types of evidence which have been sampled in our presentation of the foregoing, lapsed-time portrait of recent history.
We might have chosen to title this summary "Of Principalities and Powers." The past six centuries, taken in the context of the two thousand years preceding the Fifteenth-Century Renaissance, illustrate the point that history is shaped by ideas. These are ideas which shape the rise and fall of entire civilizations, entire cultures, over period of not less than centuries. This shows us how impotent and ineffectual men and women are whenever they limit their exertions to matters of flesh-and-blood, practical social relations over such relatively insignificant intervals of time and place, as the span of a generation or two within some local area of this planet.
Only as we act efficiently in steering, altering and developing those ideas which shape a half-millennium or so of history, either throughout this planet, or in a large region of it, do we have any willfully significant effect upon the fate of nations, of entire civilizations. The paradigm for this fact is the past six-centuries' history of what we call physical science. The kind of conscious and efficient influence which an individual person might have on the outcome of an entire period of history, is typified by the individual who relives those moments of the past, which correspond to axiomatic-revolutionary types of scientific discoveries, and who reacts to that by correcting those discoveries, and bequeathing so an improved body of science to future generations.
In the case of so-called physical science, one can willfully shape the history of science efficiently according to one's intention; the key is to master consciousness of the principles governing valid axiomatic-revolutionary types of discoveries, as we have indicated above. That requires mastery of Plato's method of hypothesis; no alternative method for this purpose is yet known to exist.
All of the bodies of ideas which shape history over the span of centuries are analogous to the case for the ideas of physical science. The individual person participates efficiently in shaping willfully the outcome of his own existence only to the degree he or she participates consciously, efficiently in mastering those qualities of history-shaping ideas.
One cannot learn the principles which shape history from only the facts of the immediate social relations personally experienced within the span of a single person's lifetime. Many have proposed to premise alleged principles upon just that limited experience; inevitably, what they propose always turns out to be utopian rubbish, or worse.
Such misconstrued "experiments" are justly put into the same class as "flat-earth" dogmas generally; they are the delusions of persons who imagine themselves to be dwelling in a universe of "zero curvature": they do not wish to recognize that they have been experiencing history of a certain "non-zero curvature," have been living in a manifold in which direction is determined in accord with the position in the stream of history in which one is located at a particular moment, a direction which could not be the same if one were in a different position within that stream, a result which would not be the same had the action transpired in a different position.
Alas, we live on a planet peopled largely with Don Quixotes and Sancho Panzas. Most persons dwell either in the mists of some academic or related sort of ideological fantasy, like Cervantes' Don Quixote, or they are so busy with their personal pleasures and family affairs that "I have no time to waste on history." The Don Quixote is willing to govern society, but governs it madly. The more numerous Sancho Panzas cannot rule society, because they cannot even govern themselves. Until we can bring mankind into the Age of Reason, which we might wish were the Coming Age of Humanity, history will be shaped in actuality, not by the wills of masses of humanity, but by the mere handfuls who, for purposes of good or evil, steer the fate of mankind generally as herds of cows are steered to and from the pastureand, occasionally, also to the slaughter-house.
The Age of Reason signifies a world in which the typical individual is no longer a Don Quixote or Sancho Panza, but rather a person who is efficiently conscious of the proper role of the brief mortal moment of the individual's mind in shaping the millennial spans of human history: national, regional, planetary, and interstellar. This Age of Reason will be no utopia, no perfectly designed order of things; by the very nature of things, such a goal could never be attained. The very idea of a utopiaany utopiaalways has, and always will do no better than to drive the credulous into lunacy. It will simply be an Age in which most adult persons understand that history is ruled not by flesh and blood, but by principalities and powers, powers whose existence is typified by the recent six-centuries' struggle between Good and Evil in the domain of development of physical science. It will be an Age in which most adult individuals recognize that the meaning of life is to be found in participating in shaping those ideas which, in turn, shape history over the span of not fewer centuries. It will be an Age in which adults generally recognize the nature of the human species, as in the image of Godby virtue of physically efficient, valid axiomatic-revolutionary creativity in ideas. It will be an Age in which most adults act according to that knowledge.
What do we do in the meanwhile, given the prevalence of Don Quixotes, Sancho Panzas, and even worse? How do we get through the present mess? The proper answer to that is as ancient as Plato: the so-called "philosopher kings." The "philosopher king" is a person who has accepted Miguel Cervantes' plea to the poor wretches of Sixteenth-Century Spain, that he or she rise above being a Don Quixote, or Sancho Panza.
The professor would say, "That is a good question." Only a few of us are likely to participate in the Age of Reason; most citizens, even in the nations which are relatively best off, will remain Don Quixotes or Sancho Panzas. Not only would they fail to become "philosopher kings," they would, for the most part, reject rather angrily any demand that they cease being Don Quixotes, or Sancho Panzas. Most nations will remain for the present moment as Lazare Carnot found France at the moment Carnot accepted what appeared to be the "lost cause" position of organizing France's defense against all-conquering enemy invaders. That is to say, there is no nation on this planet qualified to enter directly into an Age of Reason earlier than several generations yet to come. We must be content to seek nothing more ambitious than a modest intermediate condition, a condition fairly described as the Age of Survival.
The best we can desire from the present moment of all humanity's great peril, is that we have leaders in whom the people place their trust, and who are morally qualified to be such leaders. The people generally will continue to seek simple things, the possibility of immediate survival for their families, personal freedom, and the expectation of the development, and security, of their posterity: those simple, but just possessions whose existence is now increasingly in jeopardy throughout the entirety of this planet. The people will find survival as a crowd of confused persons would find escape from a burning building; they will seek escape from the intolerable under the guidance of qualified leaders whom they have chosen as worthy of their trust.
The Age of Survival is one in which the people have such qualified leaders, and in which the citizens have enough sense to have chosen them. Those people will recognize such leaders chiefly by three qualities: (1) That the prospective leaders have a record of success in forecasting the effects of a few crucial policy-choices. (2) That the prospective leaders do not shilly-shally in face of pressures of "political correctness." (3) That the prospective leaders have recognized, and have earned murderous hatred from, those powerful forces who aretodaybehind the traditions of such "Venetian Party" figures as Bertrand Russell.
Five-and-a-half centuries after the Council of Florence, Venice and its outgrowth, the "Venetian Party," has come to dominate not only the financial institutions of the world, and most of the political ones, but also dominates the institutions of science, arts, and education generally. Under this reign, the world has been brought to the verge of a general collapse of an apocalyptic quality like that of the Fourteenth Century, but much worse. Time is running out rapidly.
There are three foreseeable alternatives for the next several years before us. Either we reverse the Venetian rule, or the Venetian faction will establish the kind of global, one-world dictatorship which the proposal for the U.N.O.'s Cairo population conference portends, or, the failure of both efforts results in a planetary chaos far worse than that of Fourteenth-Century Europe.
The people will survive that peril before us in but one way: By mobilizing themselves against those forces of Evilthose "principalities and powers"merely typified by the case of the late Bertrand Russell. If the people are to survive, they will recognize that adversary to be such rather soon. There is little time to waste if they are to survive; it is already very late. When they do react so, they will be disposed to choose appropriate leaders. Our task is to ensure that they find enough of them.
Note: The researches of the author and his associates into the following and related material on the Venetians involves dozens of persons over the recent two decades, in some cases longer. All of the conceptual analysis of the relationship among the work of the Venetian Aristotelians and European science and theology is the author's original work. The documentation of the historical details and documentation added to the author's files on the Venetians themselves was done principally by Classical scholars and others literate in Italian and Latin over much of these past twenty years. Since the documentation is so dense, we have elected to note the documentation only in the instance it has direct bearing upon the mainstream of the argument in progress, and is not commonplace documentation of the history of Venice and its agents given in other published locations. back to article
The Schiller Institute
Thank you for supporting the Schiller Institute. Your membership and contributions enable us to publish FIDELIO Magazine, and to sponsor concerts, conferences, and other activities which represent critical interventions into the policy making and cultural life of the nation and the world.
Contributions and memberships are not tax-deductible.
Home | Search | About | Fidelio | Economy | Strategy | Justice | Conferences | Join