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Dialogue of Cultures

What Is God, That Man Is in His Image1
by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

March 18, 1995

This article is reprinted from the Spring 1995 issue of FIDELIO Magazine.

For related articles, scroll down or click here.



Fidelio,Vol.IV,No,1.
Summer 2004

Recently, a document was circulated in the international press, in which a group of Sri Lanka monks attacked Pope John Paul II in a notably strident, menacing way. This complaint focussed upon a short chapter, entitled "Buddha?" from His Holiness' celebrated 1994 book, Crossing the Threshold of Hope.2 No error of fact is to be found in the pertinent passages from the latter book; rather, the monks argued to the effect, that His Holiness's book had been insulting, that he had violated "political correctness."

The subsuming issue of that controversy is the same which confronted us when certain justices of the U.S. Supreme Court argued that evidence of innocence is not sufficient grounds for halting a sentence of death. Have we reached the extreme of moral decadence that the procedures of law are set into opposition to the principle of truthful justice? Similarly, have we reached the point of decadence, that one is encouraged to commit his or her passions to support of a certain choice of religious, or other belief, but without being so insulting to contrary sentiments as to suggest that one's own belief is grounded in a commitment to truth?

To raise that issue of truthfulness as it is posed implicitly by the monks' complaint, begs a hostile review of an academic subject known as phenomenology of religion. For our purposes here, we reference that academic teaching as the latter is presented, implicitly, by William James' notorious Varieties of Religious Experience,3 or, explicitly, by the Nazi philosopher Martin Heidegger.4 The continuing influence of Nietzschean Heidegger within the teaching of theology is most relevant for understanding those present-day forms of terrorist movements spun out of that form of existentialism called "liberation theology." Notable are the so-called "indigenist" movements presently typified by the "Zapatista" branch of international terrorism operating within Mexico's state of Chiapas.5

In each of these aberrations, truth and reason are put aside, to place an irrationalist individual "feeling" in the ruling position. The mind-set of the monks' complaint is thus of the same type as the phenomenology of Heidegger. The often-violated obligation of judgment, to be the faithful servant of truthfulness, and, the fact that existentialism in theology leads toward the kind of terrorism seen in the Chiapas insurgency, are each among the numerous predicates of a subsuming principle. It is that principle which we examine here.

We take up this subject-matter not as a discussion of matters of religion as such. We treat it here from the vantage-point of the statesman; for example: What are the aspects of the religious belief of the citizen whose demonstrable truthfulness has had a positive, even essential impact in shaping the independence, the Federal Constitution, and the development of the United States? We turn, first, to the particular point on which the monks' attack was focussed.

As The Pope Described It

To locate this principle: consider the two paragraphs to which the monks' statement took particular objection. Here is how the relevant English text of John Paul II's work describes Buddhism in that location:
The "enlightenment" experienced by Buddha comes down to the conviction that the world is bad, that it is the source of evil and of suffering for man. To liberate oneself from this evil, one must free oneself from this world, necessitating a break with the ties that join us to eternal reality—ties existing in our human nature, in our psyche, in our bodies. The more we are liberated from these ties, the more we become indifferent to what is in the world, and the more we are freed from suffering, from the evil that has its source in the world.

Do we draw near to God in this way? This is not mentioned in the "enlightenment" conveyed by Buddha. Buddhism is in large measure an "atheistic" system. We do not free ourselves from evil through the good which comes from God; we liberate ourselves only through detachment from the world, which is bad. The fullness of such detachment is not union with God, but what is called nirvana, a state of perfect indifference with regard to the world. To save oneself means, above all, to free oneself from evil by becoming indifferent to the world, which is the source of evil. This is the culmination of the spiritual process.6

With respect to the monks' objections to that passage, the truth of the matter at issue is the following. With some qualification, we say that this notion of existence of God is unique to the doctrines of Moses, Christianity, and Islam. The exemplary qualification is, that this idea of God, as an idea, is rigorously and clearly developed within the dialogues of Plato, and that there are identifiable, if but fragmentary intimations of similar ideas in the ancient heritage of Confucius and among some Vedic traditions. Otherwise, there are no presently known religious beliefs premised upon God as the common heritage of Moses, Christianity, and Islam recognizes the existence of God.

The following statement is a corollary of that same point. Among all notions of deity found in organized religions, presently or from past history and pre-history, only the heritage of Moses identifies a God whose existence is intelligibly provable by the mind of mortal man. In all other religious professions, gods exist only in the pagan's virtual reality of irrational superstition, only in the phenomenology of "blind faith." As we shall show, for related reasons, the method of Christian theology is rooted in that Socratic method which Plato employs in such locations as his Timaeus. That is the vantage-point from which we address the political implications of the monks' complaint.

With the issue so situated, we narrow our point of reference hereafter to those relevant crucial features of the topic which arise within the setting of both nominal and actual Christianity. We examine these matters as they are situated practically within the approximately 2,600-year sweep of European civilization.7 We situate the monks' issue in terms of Christianity's conflict with such forms of oligarchical evil as barbarism (e.g., pagan Rome), the feudalist opponents of France's Charlemagne and Louis XI, and the present-day, anti-Christian British monarchy.8

The Sri Lanka monks should have examined closely the implications of the opening chapter of The First Book of Moses: Genesis, where the crux of the faith of the Hebrews, Christians, and Islam is presented.9 The most crucial, and scientifically provable portion of this chapter is located within verses 26-30: the notion of the individual person as summed up in verse 27: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them." However, repeatedly, through that chapter, Moses reports that God saw that the universe and world he had made are "good."10 In the concluding verse 31, God judges His Creation as a whole, including man: "behold, it was very good."11 This God, who loves the world, is ostensibly unknown to those who would flee from the world in their search for nirvana. Is that not a fully truthful representation of the counterposition of the "lesser vehicle" sects to the heritage of Moses? Is that not the truthful import of the passages which the monks assailed?

Philo's Moses

At the outset here, we referenced the horrifying rejection of truth found among recent opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and his co-thinkers in death-penalty cases, as an error of the same type as the opinion expressed by the monks. We see in those referenced death-penalty opinions' disregard for the sanctity of individual human life an echo of the disregard for the principle of truthfulness which has lately dominated increasingly the criminal-justice and other legal processes of the United States. We see those corrupted trends in recent U.S. legal practice also reflected, in the society in general, as an increasing disregard for the principle of truthfulness. These trends coincide with the success of former Ku Klux Klansman and Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black in introducing a radical misconstruction of the First Amendment's prohibition of an established church, such as the Church of England, within the United States. Black is not entirely responsible for this degeneration in the morals of the U.S., but his influence has been a significant expression of that process.

Black's argument has come lately to signify a banning of Christianity from public life. Ostensibly, Black overlooked the fact, that atheism in general, and its liberal disguise, Thomas Huxley's British "agnosticism" in particular, are forms of pagan religious belief made influential through the Anglo-French "Enlightenment" of Paolo Sarpi's followers. In effect, Black did not separate the state from religion; he worked to establish Enlightenment forms of pagan religion (e.g., atheism) as the official religion of the U.S. state. This implication of Black's fallacious doctrine parallels the monks' attack on that cited passage from the Pope's book.

Contrary to Black, it was the original intent of the first Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, that within each known religious community of that time, the state must allow any belief to be shared among intellects, as long as it does not promote unlawful activity in the real world. On this account, the prohibition of an "established church" does establish a certain appearance of negative legal equality among those kinds of religious beliefs.

I argue on behalf of an historically acceptable reading of that Amendment: that the instant a religious community seeks to impose its opinion on society's practice, a different, positive implication of that equality must come into play. Within each religious community, opinion may be premised upon "blind faith"; when the religious community seeks simply to impose such a legally privileged opinion upon the state, "blind faith" trespasses.

In society at large, the following ecumenical principle must be employed. All particular religious opinion, to be proposed as lawful practice of society in general, must be intellectually transparent: there must be fully intelligible proof, not merely in the form of its argument, but in those axiomatic assumptions which, in every case, underlie the argument proferred.

On these matters, neither the state nor its courts are granted the privilege of being stupid. The oath of officers of the state to uphold the U.S. Constitution, binds those officers to understand the intent of the Constitution, and to take into account those religious principles which have the authority of axioms in shaping that original intent. Notably, the references to God in the language of the framers addressed to the electorate and world of that century, are such that even an illiterate or stupid person must be considered culpable if he or she fails to honor the oath of office in light of those axiomatic expressions. Manifest disregard for those axioms, whether through malice, or apparent ignorance, are equally constitutional grounds for impeachment. One could not nullify those axioms without by that same stroke nullifying the Constitution and all of the present institutions and laws of Federal government, as if at a single stroke.

Two aspects of the Mosaic heritage bear directly upon the proper law of the United States, and bear in a way which directly contradicts the erroneous death-penalty opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist et al.

Most immediately, the United States was founded upon principles of government established first in Fifteenth-Century Europe: the "commonwealth" as defined by France's King Louis XI and Jean Bodin later, the modern form of nation-state. This state's creation was premised upon certain specifically Christian principles, as reflected in Louis XI's principle of the "commonwealth." These principles are embedded vividly in the 1776 U.S. Declaration of Independence and the Preamble of our Federal Constitution.12

That, in turn, compels us to consider the deeper axiomatic features of the Mosaic heritage generally, and Christian heritage in particular: the axiomatic13 implications for statecraft of Genesis 1:26-30: man as "man in the image of God," the Latin imago Dei. To wit: if a person comes before a body of the legislature, to present a proposition rooted inclusively in the axiomatic notion of such a God, how might that person supply a transparent substantiation of that notion of God? Blind faith, referencing tradition of taught doctrine, and so forth, will not suffice. Is the existence of such a God, that man were made in His image, knowable to an individual person by means which are neither "blind faith" nor simply the citing of tradition? Is this an intelligible notion?

One might say, "I believe ... ," or "We believe that ... ," quite truthfully, without yet rendering the definition of God intelligible. Indeed, to state that, the believer need but report the doctrine accurately; no more is required. Indeed, it is perfectly admissible to place such evidence on the public record, for whatever relevant purpose it might serve.

However, if one seeks to impose upon the state a proposition derived from that axiom, the axiom must be rendered intelligible. For Christian theologians in the tradition of the Apostles John and Paul, and Augustinus, for example, this does not present an unreasonable burden. Two clues identify the basis for meeting that challenge; reference the specific case of the celebrated Philo of Alexandria, and then Plato's ontological proof of the existence of God. Once this standpoint is demonstrated, the practical error of the monks' complaint, and the horrifying fallacies of Rehnquist's and Black's referenced opinions are shown immediately.

In addressing the first chapter of Genesis, Philo of Alexandria, a friend of the Christian Apostle Peter in their common struggle against the gnostic Simon the Magician, focussed his attention on the meaning of verses 26-30, upon the notion of the individual person as "made in the image of God."14 This is not the bodily image, but the image of the individual human intellect's creative potentials, with emphasis upon the term creative.

The crucial feature of Philo's case is readily mastered from the vantage-point of Plato's Socratic method. Each person is given the intellectual potential which no animal has, the power not only to imagine states of nature which have never before existed in the universe, but, under certain restrictions, to impose those ideas efficiently upon the universe generally. The condition to accomplish this is, that that imagination is brought into accord with universal lawfulness. It is creativity so defined which represents the individual person's intellect cast in the image of God's efficiently creative intellect.

By this means, one is enabled to recognize, among one's own efficient forms of intellectual states, a quality which is a reflected image of God.

This argument was developed by Plato, who defines what Philo later described as human creativity, as composed of four successively higher states of intellect. These four states are named by him hypothesis, higher hypothesis, hypothesizing the higher hypothesis, and the knowledge of the certainty of the efficient existence of the unhypothesized Good, or God. Using modern language, Plato's dialectic is summed up as follows. For those familiar with the author's original discoveries in science, this may be seen as old ground revisited. For those not familiar with that, it is essential that it be reproduced once again, here.

The Principle of Hypothesis

Begin the argument with a reference to a deductively consistent formal geometry, such as that of Euclid.15 Any such geometry is represented by what is termed a "theorem-lattice," an open-ended list of theorems, none of which is inconsistent with any among the others. This common lack of mutual inconsistency depends upon the recognition of an implied, integrated set of interdependent axioms and postulates. The simplest chore of Plato's Socratic method is to adduce the efficient presence of such underlying assumptions: such a set of axioms and postulates.

From this vantage-point one might usefully apply the term misused by Bertrand Russell and other positivists: "hereditary principle." This term, even as used by Russell et al., signifies that the integrated set of axioms and postulates is a kind of "genetic" principle; if a proposition is not inconsistent with that set of axioms and postulates, it should not be inconsistent with any among the open-ended array of those theorems which are also consistent with that same set. Plato's term for that which corresponds to any such set of axioms and postulates is: an hypothesis.16

To make clear the remaining three terms which Plato employs to define the human intellect's ideas categorically, it is more efficient to leap ahead in time, from the fourth century B.C.E to the University at Göttingen, in June of A.C.E. 1854. The most brilliant protégé of both Carl F. Gauss and Lejeune Dirichlet, Bernhard Riemann, is presenting the most fundamental discovery in science since the greatest work of France's 1794-1814 Ecole Polytechnique and of Gauss himself, perhaps the most fundamental scientific discovery of the recent two hundred years, the foundation for all competent scientific work thereafter. The young Riemann is presenting this discovery as his qualifying dissertation for habilitation as a professor.17 To appreciate more fully Plato's scientific method, review the most crucial, axiomatic fallacy of both geometry in particular and also all of today's generally accepted classroom mathematics, as Riemann does. Permit this author to state the case in his own terms.

In the greatest part, the naive geometry associated with modern classroom Euclidean geometry has no direct correlation with any physical reality, nor is it a creation of our senses. It is a creation of the naive imagination. Call it the geometry of the naive visual imagination.

Unlike the world of vision, the geometry of the naive visual imagination presumes to map the universe of space-time with perfect continuity in four directions: backward and forward, up and down, and side to side, in space, and backward and forward in time. The Berlin philosophical empiricist Leonhard Euler attacked Leibniz's Monadology,18 by insisting that extension in space and time was "infinite" and also infinitely perfectly divisible; Euler's argument is consistent with the naive view destroyed by Riemann's work. As Leonardo da Vinci demonstrated, among others, actual vision is not linearly extensible in that way, nor is it perfectly continuous. This geometry is not the image of visual perception, but an intellectual creation, the geometry of the naive visual imagination.

According to this naive imagination, as Paolo Sarpi's Galileo, and Francis Bacon, and also René Descartes, and Isaac Newton typify that view, mathematical physics should be constructible by locating the simply mappable (linearly measurable) existence and motion of objects within the space-time of the visual imagination. However, as Leibniz and Jean Bernoulli showed a century and a half before Riemann, once we introduce the physical considerations of "least time" and "least action," the simplistic, algebraic physics of Galileo, Descartes, Newton, et al. breaks down. The case for those features of Riemann's discovery relevant to Philo's doctrine of creative intellect, then comes into view in the following way.

Once we introduce notions of "least time" and "least effort," as requirements to be taken into account in defining notions of physical function, we discover that there exist phenomena in reality which are unquestionably true, but which cannot be stated as consistent theorems within generally accepted mathematical physics. Stating the point in formalist terms, these types of apparent anomalies compel us to revise the set of axioms and postulates in use, to generate a new set of axioms and postulates which is consistent with all of the evidence, including the import of the anomaly considered. This action represents the supersession of an old hypothesis, as Plato defines the term, by a new, better one.

That discovery of the needed change in hypothesis typifies the most elementary expression of creative discovery, as distinct from the inferior, non-creative form of intellectual action, formal-logical argument. Although we have employed reference to mathematical physics to illustrate the point, it is readily demonstrated that this argument also shows that the same creative principle pervades the great creations in Classical art-forms of poetry, music, tragedy, and painting.19

In this case, and in the instance of the remaining three categories of creative intellectual knowledge, the act of discovery of a more truthful view of universal lawfulness is typified by the solution to the ontological paradox which Plato defines, with ruthless reduction of formal logic to absurdity, in the Parmenides dialogue. The One, which is to be discovered, is the unity of the type of action which subsumes each and all of the changes defining a set of facts as the members of a functionally coherent collection. For example, the inclusion of a proven, but anomalous proposition in the set of related facts similarly proven earlier, obliges us to define the new, better generating principle which accounts for the generation of both the old and new facts.20 The discovered new principle is a new hypothesis, a One which subsumes all of the facts considered as a Many.21

Repeatedly re-experiencing the original such creative discoveries of minds from the past, makes us familiar with our own creative potentials, which we must employ to regenerate the original discovery. This enables us to make the act of creative discovery an object of conscious thought: it is demonstrated to us, thus, to be an actually existing phenomenon, because it is efficient in its effect upon the real world, yet it is not a sense-phenomenon, but a purely intellectual one. It is a "thought object," a Leibniz "monad," an "idea" in Plato's work, or of the type of Geistesmassen in Riemann's own usage.

From this vantage-point, we are enabled to discover a higher order of intellectual object, higher hypothesis, or an efficient principle of successive creative discoveries (i.e., hypotheses). This appears as Reason in Johannes Kepler, for example. It appears in the guise of a new kind of geometrical idea, curvature of physical space-time, in Riemann's discovery.

We are thus given access to the notion of relatively superior notions of such efficient principles generating successive valid discoveries of hypothesis. This overview of the process of generating improved higher hypothesis is termed simply "hypothesizing the higher hypothesis." This poses the certainty of the existence of God. Not just any sort of deistic entity, but the God of Moses as Philo views Moses.

Simply. Take all creative development by all mankind, and all analogous development within the universe at large. "All creative development" signifies a single efficient creative intelligence which exists in all time, all space, as if all time and space were compacted into a single, indivisible event. The Manyness of Creativity, Plato's "Becoming," is thus defined implicitly, ontologically, as the One which is Plato's "Good," or "God."22

What Is Real?

"Truth" is reality; "truthfulness" is efficient dedication to the discovery of that reality. In the entire history of science, that quality of truthfulness is best typified by Plato's Socratic method. Over the centuries, opponents of Plato's notion of reality have relied upon insisting that Plato's dialectic is merely very clever, but that just because Plato locates reality primarily in the domain of ideas, it is false to the reality of the senses. Hence, we have the sundry varieties of formalist's illiterate condemnations of Plato's "Idealism."

Contrary to those Marxist and other critics of Plato's "Idealism," all valid knowledge in the domain of physical science depends absolutely upon the experimental proof which is to be obtained uniquely from the domain of the physical economy. It is here that the arguments of the monks, of the phenomenologists of religion generally, of Hugo Black's admirers, and of Plato's critics generally, become demolished shipwrecks: are shattered, with delicious irony, upon the hard reefs of mathematical, physical-economic certainty.

"Metaphysics!" the best-informed opposition would argue against what we have just outlined. To materialists and empiricists alike, "physical" pertains to that which is known to the senses. They are victims of their own "blind faith" in sense-certainty; they are devotees of the space-time of the naive visual imagination. For them, the argument that some agency known to the intellect, but not to sense-certainty, might be an efficient cause of changes within the domain of the senses, is "mere metaphysics."

Isaac Newton's famous slogan, "hypotheses non fingo," is an example of this. Newton accepted no "metaphysics" but that of his most beloved arts of black magic.23 As Bernhard Riemann pointed out nearly two centuries later, the kindest judgment on Newton's slogan was "self-delusion"; he recognized Newton's notion of inertia as a direct product of an assumed hypothesis superimposed upon the portrayal of motion in the space-time of the naive imagination. Newton's illiterate's use of the term "hypothesis" is consistent with his axiomatic fallacy on that account.24

In practice, hypothesis correlates with the greater efficiency, over nature, of ideas which are known only in the intellects of God and man: fully efficient ideas which direct movements within the inferior domain of sense-phenomena as sheep obey the intent of the shepherd. It is those ideas, which Plato's critics deny an efficient existence in nature, which prove the truthfulness of verses 26-30 of Genesis. This crucial proof, which this author has supplied in various published locations and elsewhere during the recent half-century, is summarized now as follows.

Were man as H.R.H. Prince Philip describes him, merely a species of higher ape, then the human population never could have exceeded, at any time during the recent two millions years of the late Cenozoic, a higher density than is characteristic of that family of food-gathering omnivores which features the higher apes: not more than several millions individuals. The point is illustrated by considering studies of those degenerate cultures in which population densities have collapsed into so-called "aboriginal" states most nearly approximating ape-like "food-gathering" modes of existence.

Consider the accompanying two figures, the chart of population curves from "How Bertrand Russell Became an Evil Man" , and the table of sample historical and pre-historical demographies which appeared in "Phil Gramm's 'Conservative Revolution in America' " .25 Whereas all "animal ecologies" are characterized by a fixed range of variability in potential relative population-densities for individual species, the demographic history of the human species is a long wave of successive rises in the population potential of mankind's dominant cultures: through, and above an entire series of such successive ranges. As the most recent development, since Europe A.C.E. 1440, shows most clearly, the rate of advancement of human potential relative population-density apparently describes an hyperbolic function. In these terms, man appears to behave as a self-evolving succession of species, from lower to higher qualities of existence.

Prior to A.C.E. 1440, mankind had already reached vastly above the level of any species of omnivore mammal, to several hundred millions persons. More notably, during the more than five and a half centuries since the establishment of King Louis XI's France as the world's first modern nation-state (commonwealth), the human population has been increased by about seventeen times the entire increase of human population during all human existence prior to A.C.E. 1440.

Another, closely related crucial fact of this past five centuries, is that during all human existence prior to the appearance of the modern nation-state, in every culture, more than ninety-five percent of the total population subsisted in a condition of life comparable to serfdom, slavery, or even worse. The increase in life-expectancy, well-being, standard of consumption, and productivity coordinate with the recent centuries' rise in urban development, corresponds to a rising potential standard of life-expectancy and family life never before available to humanity in general.

The picture is clearer if we acknowledge the most obvious qualifications to be made respecting the recent five centuries of European culture: first, the pernicious role of those old oligarchical institutions which modern civilization never succeeded in eradicating from political power; second, the role of the "New Age" during the recent thirty years, in reversing the centuries-long upward trend of technological progress. With those two qualifying observations, it is said fairly, that in all prior human existence there has never been anything comparable to the modern nation-state's rates of improvement in mankind's power over nature, per capita of labor-force, per household, per square kilometer of land-area employed.

Yet, the unique accomplishments of the modern nation-state also bring into sharper focus the same principles which were responsible for all human progress during the approximately two millions years which some paleontologists estimate to be the inferrable span of human existence upon this planet. What is often broadly identified as "culture" reflects a complex of changes in human knowledge and behavior accumulated over many millennia. To this purpose, "culture" signifies, inclusively, the categories of knowledge we associate with science, technology, language, and what European tradition since ancient Greece recognizes as the Classical art-forms. Insofar as these changes may be effectively correlated with improvements in the potential human condition, they embody discoveries which are ultimately of the same type as axiomatic-revolutionary changes in hypothesis within the domain of physical science.

Against this historical background, truth pertains primarily not to what is known, but, rather, to the process through which successive advances in knowledge are achieved. In short, the ontologically primary form of our knowledge of truth pertains not to any belief concerning a particular sense-phenomenon, but to the principles of discovery which demonstrably increase mankind's power over the universe, by changing radically the way in which belief about particular phenomena is formed. It is this change in belief which determines the increase of man's power over nature: per capita, per household, and per square kilometer of land-area used.

One may hear an echo of Heraclitus' famous "nothing is constant but change"; one's thoughts should proceed to the ontological paradox defined by Plato through his Parmenides: the key to solving that paradox is to shift the notion of reality, from the individual phenomenon of the series, to the adducible, principled type of change which defines the generation of the phenomena of that series. Ontological reality is expressed not as the individual member of the series, but the type of "transfinite" ordering principle which subsumes each and all of the known and other members of that series.

Higher hypothesis typifies this notion of change as the ontologically relatively primary expression of truthfulness.

In the prejudices of those who follow Paolo Sarpi, Bacon, Galileo, Newton, et al. down the pathway of blind religious faith in a naive visual imagination, what is primary is the isolated fact of existence of an individual sense-phenomenon. According to such heathen varieties of religious "blind faith" in generally accepted classroom mathematics, physical science is movement of such sense-phenomena within naive, linear visual space-time. To account for such movements, actual or virtual, these poor heathen investigate forces of percussion and action-at-a-distance among such arrays of such individual sense-phenomena, regarding interaction within such an array as implicitly susceptible of pair-wise analysis.

In the real universe, matters proceed much differently. Neither the existence of the particle, nor its motion of linear displacement in space-time, are primary. What is primary is change in our axiomatic notions of the entirety of the space-time within which processes unfold. These changes in conception are compared with one another as they result in relatively greater or diminished power of mankind over nature, per capita, per household, and per square kilometer of land-area employed. Thus, whereas empiricist superstition relies upon the particular phenomenon as the starting-point for its methods of analysis, science starts as do Plato, Johannes Kepler, and Riemann (for example). Science begins with those kinds of discoveries which, as ideas, both increase mankind's power over nature, discoveries whose formal representation is that absolute discontinuity separating a superseding from a superseded "theorem lattice," a superior hypothesis from the inferior one which was previously generally accepted.

Thus, science begins from the top, down, starting with the axiomatic character of physical space-time as a whole. Empiricist superstition begins from its assumptions respecting the perceived individual smallest parts. Empiricism focusses upon the relationship of the individual's impulse to the sense-phenomenon; in contrast, science focusses upon those continuing forms of progress through which man's power over nature is increased. It is the principle of "change" which typifies that demonstrable progress in human power over nature, which is the primary subject of scientific inquiry, the aspect of physical space-time which is ontologically primary. Thus, what is real is that which is shown in an intelligible, Socratic way to be ontologically primary.

That latter is known intelligibly to the mind of mortal man in the form of efforts to hypothesize the higher hypothesis.

God's Love

Consider two among the crucial facts about truthfulness which we have identified up to this point: (1) Truth is not subject to deductive modes of proof, since truthfulness of any subject is located in the succession of discontinuities which destroy the presently accepted set of axioms and postulates; (2) Truthfulness is demonstrable in an experimental way, but truthfulness itself does not exist as a sense-phenomenon. Reality never exists as a sense-phenomenon, but only as a principle is a demonstrably efficient intellectual object, an object which exists in the form of a metaphor. By "demonstrably efficient" is signified that man's power over nature is intelligibly increased by the discovery and employment of that principle.

Consider as illustration, a student's effort to replicate the measurement of the size of the Earth by the celebrated Eratosthenes.26 The crucial point to be emphasized by the teacher in guiding the student's work, is that prior to the modern aerospace age, no person had ever seen the curvature of the Earth. Yet, following the method of Aristarchus, Eratosthenes, during the latter part of the Third Century B.C.E. estimated the length of the arc of a great circle (meridian) of the Earth with the gratifyingly small margin of error (considering the means available) of less than one percent [see: Figure ]. The most crucial point here, is the discovery, that not only can one measure something which one cannot see, but one can show that that object has a type of existence efficiently opposite to what our senses seem to permit us to believe.

Even though, under other circumstances—provided by modern aerospace technology—one might be enabled to see that object, Earth, with one's senses, Aristarchus, Eratosthenes and others were able to show this to us without direct aid of our senses. Therefore, this provides an efficient, and more readily accessible demonstration of the existence of efficient thought-objects whose existence in our minds is independent of the direct evidence of our senses.27

Treat this case as typical of a large class of lessons within the proper education of the pupils. This class has two distinguishing features: (1) That the student is impelled to demonstrate the existence of an idea which is efficient, but for which the student is provided no direct evidence of the existence of that idea by the senses; (2) That this idea demonstrates the folly of that contrary opinion provided by naive confidence in the evidence of the senses. This defines a class of discoveries which the student can effect only by replicating, in the student's own mind, the original discoverer's process of discovery of a non-sensory, metaphorical thought-object (conception).

In each such case, the student begins with the state of hypothesis (the implied set of axioms and postulates) which identifies the student's state of belief prior to this experience. In each case, success produces a new hypothesis, replacing, and demonstrably superior to the old. The transformation in hypothesis so effected, is demonstrably truthful, and corresponds intelligibly to an increase in the student's implicit power over nature.

That is the method of classical-humanist education, as opposed to those mind-dulling "textbook methods" which are, unfortunately, usually preferred in today's educational programs generally.

Now, let us focus attention upon three characteristic features of an accumulation of replicated discoveries of this type so illustrated. (1) That conception which is the crucial subject of the lesson, cannot be communicated by textbook description28; (2) That all such acts of discovery are associated with a special quality of mental (emotional) state, a state which has the quality of agape: "love of neighbor"; (3) That this is the class of discoveries which characterizes all Classical forms of fine arts, and also those forms of technological progress associated with increase of the productive powers of labor: potential relative population-density of the human species.

Briefly, on the first of these three points: Every true creative discovery adds to the repertoire of a language a meaning which did not previously exist in that language. Every initial replication of an earlier such discovery by a student adds to the student's use of the language a meaning which previously existed nowhere in that student's use of the language. Such ideas cannot be communicated by literal intent of any construction in terms of the previously established usage of a language.29

Next, on agape. The spectacle of a young child's original act of creative discovery is approximately an everyday occurrence in the experience of a child's happy home-life. Happy and emotionally healthy development of the child during the first years of life is dominated by a relatively high rate of replication of creative discoveries from the repertoire of the culture's history. They are each original discoveries for that child at that time. In those moments, there is a virtually visible "glow of discovery" in the state of the child's personality, a "glow" which is recognized in a similar way by insightful, onlooking adult members of the household, or by teachers in school. That "glow" manifest so during such moments, has the quality which Christian apostles such as John and Paul identified as "agape": "love of neighbor."30

This second phenomenon bears directly on the most crucial issue of the defense of Christianity which the Pope presents within the referenced chapter of his book: love of God, love for mankind, love for this world. This phenomenon requires special attention here. It is in the nature of the subject-matter being addressed, that the interpolation of an autobiographical note makes the working point clearer.

Unfortunately, the frequent appearance of such happy moments seems to vanish early during the school-years experience of that same child. This writer recalls the growing combativity he acquired on that account throughout his educational years, from about the time he entered the first grade, through his later contempt for an insufferable university experience. Most readers, even if their own experience was different, should be able to recognize the issues which the author addresses in this way.

At first, the relevant problem appeared to this writer as a perceived habit of dishonesty among his parents' circles and among his school-age peers. Even to a young child, it was apparent that what these peers and adults expressed as their opinion publicly, was usually not consistent with what they stated in private; it was apparent that their opinions on the same subject would vary according to the social setting in which the opinions were expressed. Since this writer was very well-read for his age, with more access to and use of reference texts than most among his peers, it was clear to him already during early grammar school years that the opinions taught in classrooms and textbooks, for example, were often contradictory or outrightly incompetent, and were sometimes imposed out of greater concern for maintaining the appearance of authority than for truthfulness.

One must doubt that many parents among that World War II generation were willing to consider the impact of their own, typically-American, "other-directed" adult hypocrisy upon the moral sensibilities of their children. During the course of the late 1960's and early 1970's experience at several university campuses, teaching children of his own war-time generation, the relevant connection was made pitiably clear. The hypocrisy permeating the fearful obsession with popular political and other fads which gripped most of the returning World War II generation during the "McCarthyism" period of the late 1940's and 1950's, had foreshadowed the moral shallowness and cynicism permeating their children's university-age generation of the mid-1960's and early 1970's.

The central intellectual and moral concern of the present writer's own adolescent years, beginning the age of twelve, had been systematic readings in works from the leading English, French, and German philosophers of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, from Bacon through Kant. During that adolescence, this writer adopted his life-long commitment to the methodological standpoint of Gottfried Leibniz, and opposition to Bacon, Descartes, Newton, Hume, Kant, et al. Thus, during adolescence, the acquired habit of examining propositions from the standpoint of their implicit underlying axiomatic assumptions, affected more and more his opinion on the topics of textbook and classroom, and of discussions more generally. In this setting, the writer recognized a deeper, uglier dimension to the habits of untruthfulness commonplace among most of the elders and peers of his acquaintance.

Imagine the following type of dialogue between an adolescent and his parent, or teacher. The student says, "I cannot accept that assumption."

The elder rebukes the student: "Wait until you have mastered the field, and then you will have the right to question assumptions. Until then, your job is to learn what you are told to learn; you have no right to question such matters until then." The latter sort of rebuke expresses the axiomatic assumptions implicit in today's generally accepted classroom mathematics, for example; years after adolescence, by the time the student has acquired his or her graduate degree in the subject, the student has lost the mental capacity to remember the suppressed Socratic question of years earlier.31

During the 1950's and 1960's, the Yale psychoanalyst, Professor Lawrence S. Kubie published the results of some relevant studies, on the issue of the role of modern classroom and textbook methods in destroying the creative ability of what had been promising young intellects.32 Kubie emphasized the destructive influence of academic "drill and grill" as responsible for this. He might have equated such pathological characteristics of modern higher education (in particular) to the moral disease of Kantianism's "negation of the negation,"33 or, simply, to the pernicious effect of tolerating the superstitious Isaac Newton's irrationalist dogma of hypotheses non fingo.

The essence of good education, is the commitment of the educator and the educated neither to teach nor to believe anything which one does not know to be truthful: arbitrary assumptions are not tolerated; naive assumptions are hounded Socratically into confessing their falsehood. Once that moral principle is betrayed, as in the course of propitiating authority, the powers of intellect are dulled, perhaps forever. Few appear to have the inner moral strength to resist the mortal poisoning of the moral faculty of reason in that textbook-like way. Certainly, very few among typically "other-directed" contemporary Americans.

There is a special quality to that dulling of the intellect which is accomplished by the type of moral fraud we know as "textbook education." On first impression, one might speak of a dry-as-dust sterility of formalism, like that characteristic of today's university instruction generally, a deadness of the intellect typified, as an experience, by reading through the desert-like expanses, the mind-dulling monotony of the Russell-Whitehead Principia Mathematica.34 More deeply, one recognizes that there is none of that agapic "glow" which we know from memory of our happy childhood moments of a genuine creative discovery.

The notion that reason and passion are separable qualities of mental life, is popular, but absurd. The true exercise of reason occurs primarily in a search for the "glow of reason," the peculiar, "agapic" passion which we associate with all valid insights, axiomatic-revolutionary mental acts of discovery most emphatically. Such is the motive force, the passion which supplies power to the force of reason. One may speak in this sense of a passion for truth. It is that passion for truth which is enervated by the formalist methods of "academic drill and grill," or by analogous methods of "obedience training" in the name of child-rearing generally. "I will speak truthfully what I know," is replaced by the courtesan's, "I will speak that which is truly to my advantage, and try to bring myself to believe what my whorish lackey's lips are thus prompted to utter on behalf of my perceived personal practical advantage."

Without this passion for truth, the life passes from that which is named knowledge. There is no joy in knowledge, but only a disgusting, thoroughly un-Christian, mewling, Uriah-Heepish, guilt-ridden Kantian thing: the duty to appear of acceptable opinion ("negation of the negation").

As the Apostle Paul writes in I Corinthians 13, without agape, "I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not agape, I am nothing. ... Agape ... rejoiceth in the truth."35 Without such love for the truth, there is no truth known or expressed.

For want of love for the truth, lawyers, witnesses, and judges lie to whatever each imagines his or her personal practical advantage at that moment; this is so in the practice of what is called justice, and in the schools, the science textbooks, the legislatures, and in the voting-booth where citizens go to stab their nation, and their posterity, and themselves in the back. There is no remedy for such deplorably decadent moral conditions, but that men and women once again love God, love mankind, and love this world.

This quality of agape, which permeates creativity, mirrors the unhypothesized God, as the agapic quality of that personality which embodies perfected creative intelligence beyond the bounds of Becoming, beyond space and time, that God without Whom the universe could not exist.

Love for Technological Progress

Ordinary technological progress exposes this connection between agape and man's practical comprehension of the existence of this universe.

This ordinary technological progress can be represented as a collection of practical propositions, each subsumed implicitly, and that efficiently by an evolutionary development of a general notion of hypothesis. In this manner, each technological innovation is one among a series of propositions whose advantageous principle of design is subsumed by a specific hypothesis, by a creative discovery of principle of that type.

For the typical such case, the sequence of events is fairly represented as follows.

The process of discovery leading to that improved technological principle begins, not with a sense-perception, but rather with an intellectual object, the conception of the existence of an anomaly. Typical of this is a phenomenon in the domain of physics demanding a proposition which itself violates the existing mathematical physics, such as Max Planck's implicit obliteration of the imaginary world of Galileo, Newton, Euler, and Maxwell by the discovery of the Kepler-echoing quantum principle.

If we apply the implied solution-principle of Plato's Parmenides to the ontological paradox to this perception of such an anomaly, this leads toward a new mathematical physics, a new physics based upon an hypothesis which is wholly inconsistent with the hypothesis underlying the previously accepted mathematical-physics dogmas. Planck's discovery was coherent with the general principle of Bernhard Riemann's habilitation dissertation, and with the achievements in chemistry centered upon Mendeleyev's discovery of the Periodic Table of elements. The Ku-Klux-Klan-style lynch-mob attack upon Planck, by the defenders of the discredited Maxwell, especially by the followers of Ernst Mach and kindred positivists, during the pre-1918 period, illustrates the axiomatic, epistemological character of the controversy unleashed.

This new hypothesis demands a proof-of-principle demonstration, a demonstration which is independent of the particular anomaly prompting these developments. Albert Einstein recognized that the showing of the quantum principle in the photoelectric effect had such crucial experimental significance.

Once proof-of-principle demonstrations are made, these must be repeated in a more refined way, exploring thus the manifold new questions posed by the apparent success of the new hypothesis. Next, such improved, refined varieties of such experimental designs have a proper impact upon the society's machine-tool industry as a whole. From the crucial experiment, there is derived a series of improved principles of design of machine-tools and of processes more generally.

If we combine the relevant use of such machine-tool-design principles with productive labor's mastery of the same new technology, the result is an increase in the productive powers of labor.36

This is typical of the process by means of which creative discoveries in natural philosophy lead to increase of the potential relative population-density of the human species. It is that increase, as caused uniquely by this work of the creative principle, which sets mankind absolutely apart from, and above the beasts. It is through this specific, agapic quality of creative potential, universal to the human individual, that man knows the reflected image of God in the individual member of his species.

This is not a quality "special" to some individuals, but not to others; nor, is this a quality of some gnostic's imaginary "collective soul," such as a "people." This is a universal quality located in all human individuals as individuals. That is: creativity occurs only within the sovereign domain of the individual mind, never as a transaction among persons. One cannot communicate a creative mental act within a medium of communication; one can only use communication media to provoke another person to replicate the intended creative act within the sovereign domain of his or her own mind; one can then recognize the evidence that that transition has occurred.

Thus, humanity is sacred: only because each individual human life's sovereign creative potentiality is a sacred image of God. Except for that agapic quality universal to the sovereign mental potential of each human individual, no man nor woman would have any more lawful right than a beast. With that agapic quality of creativity comes love of God, love for mankind, and love for this world. Without that loving quality of creativity, there would be nothing for man but bestiality, nothing better than each individual life terminating in the hesychastic nothingness which is characteristic of "withdrawal from the temptations of this world."

Agape in Classical Art-Forms

Most among the modern doctrines of aesthetics which are generally accepted in today's universities and related professional circles, are fairly classed as outright frauds, hoaxes rooted in one or more of those irrationalist traditions known variously as empiricism, romanticism, positivism, and "ethnicity."

The exemplary argument to be made is that which Friedrich Schiller and Heinrich Heine supplied, in their exposures of the Nazi-like evil implicit in the aesthetical doctrines of Immanuel Kant.37 The focus of Schiller is on the debased aesthetical dogma which Kant presents in his last major writing, his Critique of Judgment. Heine's argument, which has the advantage of his witnessing the banning of Schiller's writings by the fascistic Prince Metternich's Carlsbad Decrees and the role of Metternich agent G.W.F. Hegel as Germany's "state philosopher," is consistent with Schiller's.

In music, the immorality of the Romantic tradition of Liszt, Wagner, et al. is derived from the central feature of all of Kant's Critiques: Kant, like the positivist Sigmund Freud later, and like all of the empiricists, denies the existence of an intelligible principle of creative discovery. From that central premise of his Critiques, Kant derives the irrationalist aesthetical dogma of the Romantic school, his insistence that in art there exists no intelligible standard for truth or beauty.

All of the Romantics, like the Richard Wagner of the famous Liebestod scene in his Tristan und Isolde, like Liszt, like Berlioz, et al., oppose the agapic quality of passion in J.S. Bach, Josef Haydn, Wolfgang Mozart, Ludwig van Beethoven, Franz Schubert, and Johannes Brahms, and demand that music be premised upon erotic desires, instead. One-time Mazzinian bomb-thrower Richard Wagner, like his terrorist confederate Bakunin, hated Beethoven, and avowed himself dedicated to destroy Beethoven's influence.

Worse, the apologists for such plain moral degenerates as the proto-Nazi terrorist Wagner succeeded in obliging those who write most among the musical programs and record dust-jackets, to enshrine as official dogma the lying myth, that there is a "Classical Period" in music, followed by a "Romantic" one, and so on. This baseless, arbitrary ideological concoction is frequently used to attribute to all music composed after the 1815 Congress of Vienna, either the irrationalist quality of romanticism, or, at a minimum, the influence of "the emerging Romantic period."

In the course of this continuing corrupting influence, the later works of Beethoven, which are rigorously Classical, anti-Romantic in quality, are often interpreted by perverted music critics to manifest Romantic qualities; Schubert is claimed to be virtually a Romantic in entirety; the fraud goes so far in utter shamelessness, that although Johannes Brahms was composing in a strictly Classical mode of motivic thorough-composition after the last leading Romantic composer of the Nineteenth Century was dead, Brahms is claimed by these scoundrels of the aesthetics mafia as a "Romantic."38

Pitiably, just as musicians made hysterically irrational by fearful desires for careers will defend Nazi Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels' pre-World War II success in elevating the internationally legislated "A" to 440 cycles, many propitiate contemporary fads in criticism by seeking to perform Classical works in a Romantic way. On this account, Classical works performed by some among the most celebrated modern performing artists are virtually unlistenable.

Why is virtually all contemporary aesthetical teaching pure fraud, not only in music, but in respect to poetry, drama, painting, and so on? Or, directly to the point in this present location: what is the absolute moral superiority of the Classical art-forms to all alternatives; what is the effect of creativity in these Classical art-forms to the increase of the potential relative population-density of the human species; how does creativity, in Classical art-forms, as in physical science, increase the power of mankind over nature, per capita, per household, and per square kilometer? What, therefore, is the role of Classical forms of music in religious life as such?

The kernel of the answer to those nested questions, is this. The same principle of valid creativity, as we have described this in terms of superseding discovery of principle in natural science, is the distinguishing characteristic of all Classical forms of composition and performance in music. This principle of composition and performance is the same for all art-forms: music, poetry, drama, painting, and so on; the essence of Classical art is the evoking of agape in the composer, the performers, and the audience, through evoking in each a summoning of the creative powers of reason to address a problem which cannot be addressed successfully in any other mode. It is this evocation of agape (not the erotic impulse) which is the substance of artistic beauty; it is the validity of the solution produced in the mind of the audience, which expresses the principle of artistic truthfulness. Classical art is, thus, truth and beauty, beauty and truth.

For most, the more generally accessible illustration of this principle is found in Classical forms of tragedy, notably those associated with Aeschylus, Marlowe, Shakespeare, and Schiller.39 In light of those examples for purposes of reference, answer the question: Why is a sorrowful outcome essential to production of the greatest drama?

All art proceeds from what Schiller defines as a "pregnant moment," a jumping-off point. At this point, all of the tension which is to be unfolded in the elaboration of the artistic composition is implicit. The audience may not anticipate this fully at the outset, but, as the work of art unfolds, the members of the audience experience an eerie sense that this is the case. The spark of genius which distinguishes art from more pedestrian qualities of entertainments is lodged in the fact, that within the pregnant moment as conceived by the composer, there is buried an anomaly, precisely analogous to the quality of scientific anomaly which leads to overturning an existing mathematical physics.

In tragedy, the anomaly is presented by choosing a form of pregnant moment which contains an embedded life-threatening, or kindred quality of problem. If the characters in the drama respond to events according to their customary behavior and belief, they will be destroyed. Only if they recognize that a certain change in axiomatic beliefs can provide a solution, could they escape the peril. So, the great tragedian presents the real-life principle which is applicable to the problem presented within the drama; but, although this solution is placed within the reach of the characters of the drama, they cling stubbornly to their old ways, and are therefore doomed: the second crucial point in the tragedy, the "rising action," the punctum saliens.

Recall an exemplary passage from Shakespeare's Hamlet. From within Hamlet's most famous soliloquy, from Act III, these crucial words stand out as most exemplary of the point:

But that the dread of something after death,—
The undiscover'd country, from whose bourn
No traveller returns,—puzzles the will,
And makes us rather bear those ills we have
Than fly to others that we know not of?
Thus conscience does make cowards of us all;
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought;
And enterprises of great pith and moment,
With this regard, their currents turn awry,
And lose the name of action.

From that point onward, Hamlet, clinging, with fear so described, to the certainty of his customary views, proceeds to his doom. This passage from the soliloquy forewarns the audience of the character flaw in Hamlet, from Hamlet's own lips. The audience then watches the drama unfold so. Horatio says, in epilogue, of the drama which has just been ended:

But let this same be presently perform'd,
Even while men's minds are wild; lest more mischance
On plots and errors happen.

It is the audience's watching how the characters' stubborn avoidance of the solution leads to their doom, which is the artistically crucial feature of the tragedy, that morally uplifting quality of tragedy which sent Schiller's audiences from the theater better people than they had entered it.

The same principle pervades all Classical poetry, whether the poem is tragic in form, or not. An anomaly is presented; a metaphor is developed in the mind of the audience by the poet, through which the audience captures the inexpressible idea in the anti-formalist medium of perceived metaphor. A grammarian's attempts at poetry must always end as a wake for art; art and Aristotelianism are immiscible qualities.

Classical music is the purest mode of expression of agape. The highest form of Classical musical composition is the form of motivic thorough-composition begun by Haydn's Opus 33, No. 3 string quartet, and elaborated as a general principle by Wolfgang Mozart's reworking of J.S. Bach's 1747 A Musical Offering.40 In this form of composition, a pair of intervals cited at the outset of the composition serves as the pregnant moment for the composition as a whole. There is nothing permitted within the composition as a whole which is not coherent with the implications of that pregnant moment; the entire composition is a continuing development from that starting-point, through numerous creative revolutions in the implied axiomatics of the composition.

In such music, the quality of emotion governing the shaping of tones and intervals, and counterpoint generally, is the agape associated with a high density of such creative transitions within the composition as a whole.

In painting, the work of Leonardo da Vinci, such as his "Virgin of the Grotto," and Raphael, such as his "Transfiguration," express applications of the same creative principle as Bernhard Riemann's habilitation dissertation.

It is that principle, the total subordination of the process of composition to creative reason, under the impulse supplied by agape's passion for truth, which distinguishes Classical art-forms from such trash as Romanticism or Modernism. In Classical music, in particular, this is best expressed by the Haydn-Mozart-Beethoven principle of polyphonic, motivic thorough-composition. In Classical art in general, it is agape as such which is the driving force of artistic creativity; it is that commitment to agape, as the apostles John and Paul understand it, which imparts to such art the highest proximity to truth: truth is beauty, and beauty is truth.

Creative Reason As Truth

Through the relative successes of Paolo Sarpi's faction, in taking control of the leading intellectual life of the Netherlands and Britain, and later France, true science began to die of suffocation by formalist mathematics; gradually, science died—or, almost died; its place was filled up, for the most part, by mere engineering. Engineering is very useful, except that it, in and of itself, is not science.41 Then, about thirty years ago, with the introduction of mass-proselytizing for the irrationalist "New Age," engineering began to be suffocated, as science had been nearly snuffed by the pro-Bertrand Russell Solvay conferences of the 1920's.42

It is characteristic of this process of suffocation of science as such, that the idea of Reason, as understood by the great Johannes Kepler, was supplanted by the notion of Causality, as that latter term was understood by such poisonous dwarves as Francis Bacon, Galileo, Robert Fludd, René Descartes, and Isaac Newton.43 The ontological distinction between the two is readily shown. Kepler's Reason has the form of Plato's principle of Higher Hypothesis; Galileo's and Newton's Causality presumes linear measurement within the space-time domain of the naive visual imagination: the latter is ontologically two orders of magnitude below the level of the former.

Given, the addition of an object, with an impulse, how will the entire domain react to this? Or, introduce an anomaly into existing notions of physical space-time: what will be the result? Scientific truth does not lie within any one hypothesis, but rather solely in those principles of discovery which yield successively valid changes in a succession of hypotheses. Kepler locates Reason in that notion of higher hypothesis.

To restate the immediate working-point of this particular location, the cause of motion is not percussion or radiation occurring as transactions among particular phenomena. The cause of the resulting changes is the way in which the effects of attributable impulses are shaped by what Riemann identifies as the curvature of space-time. This curvature, which belongs ontologically to the domain of higher hypothesis, is a reflection of God's law governing the allowable succession of successively higher hypotheses; it is this which is the intelligible representation of law within physical space-time. That is Reason for Kepler, and for Leibniz. That is scientific truthfulness.

Science and Classical Art Together

To illustrate a crucial point, let us return our attention to tragedy, this time to the pregnant moment of Aeschylus' Prometheus. Perhaps no drama ever written addresses more directly the interconnected issues of truthfulness affecting both statecraft and theology.

By legend, Prometheus was fettered to a rock, ostensibly punished by the Zeus-led Gods of Olympus for hubris against those heathen gods. In the course of Aeschylus' drama, an anomaly appears: it is Zeus himself who is foredoomed by a higher power, a doom which Zeus shall bring upon himself.

Who is this Zeus? Who are these so-called gods of Olympus? All of the legends associated with them, in Aeschylus' writing and elsewhere, indicate a mortal origin, possibly a kingdom of sorts established by the "Peoples of the Sea" in the more fertile region of modern Morocco. By some apotheosis, they appear to have become the immortals, the gods of Olympus. In that ensconcement, they have become the mortal enemies of mankind, a mankind defended by the Titan Prometheus, a Prometheus who brings the art of fire and other technologies humanity requires to survive the oppression of the evil Zeus' Olympic oligarchy.

Superficially, it might appear, Prometheus is being punished for this offense against Zeus' will. As the drama unfolds, Prometheus is being tormented to supply to Zeus the secret of Zeus' own destruction, in Zeus' vain hope that by knowing this secret, he will be able to avert it. Here, then, lies the tragic fate of Zeus: he will be destroyed by the fruit of his own capricious lusting. At the conclusion of the first part of Aeschylus' Prometheus, Prometheus is relegated to immortal torment, to await the day he is rescued through the foreordained destruction of Zeus, through the "Twilight of the Gods of Olympus."

In this, there appears out of the corner of the mind's eye, the sensed, efficient presence of what the Apostle Paul references as the "Unknown God" of the Greeks, the presence of the Logos of Heraclitus, and the consubstantial God of Plato's Timaeus.

There is another dimension to this drama. In real history (and pre-history), until the revolution in statecraft born out of the influence of the A.C.E. 1440 successes of the Council of Florence,44 over ninety-five percent of the people of all cultures, in all human existence, existed in an oppressed state of serfdom, slavery, or (as under the evil Aztecs) worse; there were no "good" ancient societies, no aboriginal or otherwise primitive cultures which were not evil on this account. The remainder of those cultures, less than five percent of the total population, was composed of chiefly two classes. At the top, a relative handful of powerful ruling families, akin to the Venetian nobility of relatively modern European times. Underneath the oligarchs, with the status of lackeys, were the military, the priests, the clerks, the merchants, and so on. It is the shadows of this ancient real-life drama which are encapsulated in Aeschylus' Prometheus.

This aspect of the drama has another axiomatic dimension. Prometheus is the Classical Greek figure of scientific knowledge, and thus also the figure of truthfulness. The preliminary charge against Prometheus is that he introduced science and crafts to mankind, to enable mankind to survive Zeus' whimsical decision to exterminate the human race.

Aeschylus' Prometheus drama, otherwise fairly subtitled "The Tragic <i>Death of</i>Zeus," lies in a line which links the best of the Ionian Greek culture, through Solon's reforms at Athens, to Plato's Academy. It represents that side of the division of ancient Classical Greek culture between the evil of the slave-society which was Lycurgus' Sparta, and the principle of human equity embodied in Solon's reforms. It represents the division between the aspiration for the form of society implicit in the Council of Florence and Louis XI's French commonwealth reform, and the depravity which is oligarchical society. It reaches out to a God who is above the evil oligarchs of Zeus' Olympus.

In this way, Classical poetry, Classical drama, Classical music, and Classical painting such as that of Leonardo da Vinci and Raphael, are the great teachers of that law and morality upon which the proper organization of society depends. Classical art is premised upon the same agapic creative principle which the higher hypothesis embodies in natural science and technological progress. Art is the mother of science, the spirit without whose nourishment scientific endeavor would fall lifeless. Art is the means by which men and women gain insight into those principles by which a successfully developing society must be ordered.

That agapic devotion, as expressed in art and science, is the quality of truthfulness.

Look, in contrast, to Oriental society, in South, Southeast, and East Asia. This is the domain in which Shakti and Siva roamed, in which most of the history of Buddhism is situated. Except for the influence of the Mosaic tradition, the history of the Middle East is as bad as, or even worse, than that in other parts of Asia. But for noble moments resonating from ancient Confucianism and the Vedic tradition, the bitter heritage of historical Asia is oligarchism, perhaps not as evil as the Aztecs, but approaching that quality of indifference to the fate of the individual in particular, and the great mass—the more than ninety-five percent—of the subject populations in general.

This is not to deny humanity's debts to ancient Asian cultures. Like India and Persia, the language culture of European civilization is rooted in the same Central Asian cultures dating from much earlier than 4,000 b.c.: which is typified by the language of the ancient Vedic hymns. There were great periods in the life of ancient China, from which all humanity has benefitted. Yet, even in those cultural strains, more than ninety-five percent of the population lived as serfs, slaves, or worse.

Such cruel monotony, generation after generation, numbs the soul of the privileged and oppressed alike. To love, one must look into the eyes of another and know that behind those eyes there is a true soul; not to be loved in that fashion, is to be as if nothing in one's society. To live in a society in which cruelty imposed upon all but a tiny minority is the rule, and capricious whims of murderous tyrants hover over even the privileged, is no true life for any human being. Without hope of change, the kind of numbness otherwise achieved with sedative psychotropic substances comes as a perceived relief from endless torment of the real world. Hesychasm is a flight from reality, not a philosophy, nor a religion, but only an anodyne.

The Fifteenth-Century Christian renaissance, centered in the Council of Florence, and reflected in the establishment of Louis XI's pioneer commonwealth form of society, brought hope of escape from oligarchism to all mankind. Unfortunately, victories won by the feudalist oligarchy during the Sixteenth and later centuries have placed this great new form of civilization under the control, at least predominantly, of forces hateful to mankind, forces which use the advantages of science and technology at the same time that they, like the evil Zeus of mythical Olympus, are determined to destroy future progress in this direction.

Despite that bitter conflict, the evidence is clear, that the new form of modern constitutional nation-state established first in Louis XI's France opens the gates of true freedom for mankind in general, as this was never possible in any form of society in the entire existence of mankind before these past five centuries. Once we are rid of the rule of the present oligarchical power, as might occur during the coming decade, freedom, although not paradise, is available for all mankind; the Age of Reason will begin.

This true freedom is not liberty for the evil Adam Smith's immoral will, but rather the right to participate in lifting mankind to a higher condition, both through reliving the most crucial creative artistic and scientific discoveries of all mankind before us, but also the joy of adding to that stock of discoveries through the cultivation of our own creative-mental powers in this way. To live so, is to love this world too much to relinquish it easily, to love mankind even more, and to serve thus a loving God the Creator.

Without the God of Moses' Genesis 1:25-30, and without the Christianity reawakened to life by the A.C.E. 1440 Council of Florence, this would not have become possible. That, dear friends, is a scientific fact, the truth; the contrary is not truthful.

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Footnotes

1.. On Dec. 21, 1994, the Buddhist Sangha (the national leadership body of Buddhists in Sri Lanka), warned that they would boycott a meeting with Pope John Paul II when he visited their nation, unless he apologized for comments in his recently released book, Crossing the Threshold of Hope. The Buddhist monks described the comments as "mischievous, misleading, and maliciously misinterpreted."

2. Pope John Paul II, Crossing The Threshold of Hope (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), ed. by Vittorio Messori. A book of replies to queries presented to him by Vittorio Messori, and transmitted by Dr. Joaquin Navarro-Valls. See pp. 84-90: the monks reference emphatically the two paragraphs beginning at the bottom of page 85, and concluding at the top of page 86.

3. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience; a Study in Human Nature (1902) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).

4. On the standing of Hannah Arendt's former intimate Martin Heidegger as a Nazi, see Víctor Farías, Heidegger and Nazism (1987), ed. by Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). On Heidegger as student of Edmund Husserl, see Edith Stein, [... ( :, )]. [see: Helga Zepp-LaRouche, "The Case of Martin Heidegger," p. 4, this issue]

5. On the terrorist insurgency in Chiapas, see EIR Special Report: 'Shining Path North' explodes in Mexico; Zapatista narco-terrorists are part of the plot to annihilate the nations of Ibero-America, January 1994 (Washington, D.C.: Executive Intelligence Review News Service, 1994).

6. Pope John Paul II, loc. cit.

7. This dating coincides with Friedrich Schiller's identification of the conflict between the heritages of Solon's reforms and the slave-holding tradition of Lycurgus' Sparta as the punctum saliens of European civilization. Two of Schiller's writings on this available in English are Schiller's 1789 inaugural Jena University lecture, "What Is, and to What End Do We Study, Universal History," and, from the same 1789 series of lectures, "The Legislation of Lycurgus and Solon," both found in Friedrich Schiller, Poet of Freedom, Vol. II, ed. by William F. Wertz, Jr. (Washington, D.C.: Schiller Institute, 1988), pp. 253-305.

8. Queen Elizabeth's Consort, H.R.H. Prince Philip Mountbatten (von Battenberg), has repeatedly expressed his adoption of the ancient pagan earth-mother goddess Gaia as preferred to the faith of Moses, Christians, and Islam. Gaia was the form of worship of Shakti-Siva, Ishtar, Isis-Osiris, Cybele-Dionysus, Satan, et al., which was local to her temple-site in ancient Greece's Delphi. She was the patroness of the cult of Apollo-Python-Dionysus located at that site; the worship of her consort, the satanic, phallic serpent Python, was continued by the priests of Apollo in the assignment of the name Pythia to the priestess performing the functions of the oracle there, at the grave-site of Python-Dionysus. Thus, the Prince's avowed religious preference is not only pagan generally; it is also as satanic as the polymorphous Gaia-Python-Dionysus-Apollo signified for over a thousand years.

9. The citations employed here are from the King James Version of the Bible.

10. Note verses 10, 12, 18, 21, and 25.

11. The Pope echoes Genesis' report of the essential goodness of man and the world when he writes on this point of difference with Buddhists in particular, and also, implicitly, hesychasts among erring nominal Christians: "For Christians, the world is God's creation, redeemed by Christ." Compare the Gospel of John 3:16 (King James Version): "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." The God of Moses and the Christians is not known to the hesychasts.

12. Lately, since 1964, there has been a curious coincidence between the degree of absurdity of new customs among us, and the popular appeal of those putative preferences. Inside the United States, the "New Age," post-Kennedy period of 1964-1995, were fairly best described as "The Age of Perversity." Such disgusting behavior finds a precedent in such popularized academic myths as the flatly false assertion that the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution were premised upon the influence of the British empiricist John Locke. Only an illiterate person could believe such nonsense: "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" identifies a notion directly contrary in every way to Locke's construction of his slogan "life, liberty, and property." The "general welfare" clause of the U.S. Constitution's Preamble is in the tradition of Louis XI's establishment of the first modern nation-state; it was introduced into the United States, more immediately, through the influence of the Gottfried Leibniz who opposed Locke on these matters.

13. To supply a clarifying illustration of this point to some readers: Bertrand Russell would prefer "hereditary principle" of theorem-lattices to "axiomatic."

14. Philo ("Judaeus") of Alexandria, "On The Account of The World's Creation Given by Moses," in Philo: Vol. I, trans. by F.H. Colson and G.H. Whitaker, Loeb Classical Library No. 226 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).

15. This proof cannot be developed competently from the standpoint of formal logic, arithmetic, or a formal algebra. The starting-point of a constructive geometry must be used, for reasons to be identified more readily below.

16. This is the correct use of the term "hypothesis," as opposed to the popularized, British-empiricist misuse of the term in the classroom today.

17. Bernhard Riemann, "Über die Hypothesen, welche der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen (On the Hypotheses Which Underlie Geometry)" in Bernhard Riemann's Gesammelte Mathematische Werke, ed. by Heinrich Weber (Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner, 1902); sundry reprint editions, including Collected Works of Bernhard Riemann (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1953), pp. 272-287. For an English translation of the text, see Henry S. White, trans., "On the Hypotheses Which Lie at the Foundations of Geometry," in David Eugene Smith, A Source Book in Mathematics (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), pp. 411-425.

18. Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., The Science of Christian Economy, Appendix XI, in The Science of Christian Economy and other Prison Writings (Washington, D.C.: Schiller Institute, 1991), pp. 407-425. Euler was for twenty-five years a lackey of the Venice oligarchy's Prussian monarch, Frederick the Great, working as an apologist for the infamous hoaxster Maupertuis at Frederick's Berlin Academy.

19. Contrary to the degenerate aesthetical dogmas of Immanuel Kant and other Romantics.

20. This defines such a principle as representing a type, as in George Cantor's use of that term.

21. In the theory of mathematical functions, the relationship of One to Many is typified by Georg Cantor's general notion of transfiniteness, a notion which has no kinship with the relative intellectual crudities of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, et al.

22. Georg Cantor defines a correspondence between his own notion of the Transfinite and Absolute to Plato's Becoming and Good, respectively. The summation of all transfinite functions in time, he equates to Plato's notion of the Becoming. Eliminate the conditionalities of space and time, and all Becoming, a Many, corresponds to a One which is the Absolute, or Plato's Good. In formal terms, Cantor's notion of this equivalence is a valid comparison. That far, so good; however, Plato's God is no deist construct. There are two additional considerations which are not addressed by Cantor, but which are crucial for rendering Plato's notion of God adequately. Those are addressed below.

23. The opening of Isaac Newton's chest of laboratory papers, by Lord Maynard Keynes, et al., during this century, showed nothing of scientific merit, but rather a sordid obsession with experiments in black magic.

24. Riemann Werke, op. cit., p. 525.

25. Reprinted, respectively, from Fidelio, Vol. III, No. 3, Fall 1994, p. 25, and Executive Intelligence Review, Vol. 22, No. 8, Feb. 17, 1995, p. 28.

26. Eratosthenes estimated a single degree of a great circle (meridian) of the Earth as 700 Egyptian stades, yielding an estimated diameter of the Earth at about 7850 miles. See Greek Mathematical Works: II. Aristarchus to Pappus, Loeb Classical Library, trans. by Ivor Thomas, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1941-1980), pp. 260-273. See also Aristarchus.

27. Compare the case of the hoaxster, the so-called astronomer Claudius Ptolemy, who worked a century after Aristarchus and Eratosthenes. Modern evidence shows that the crucial features of Claudius Ptolemy's work on astronomy were not based upon actual sightings, but a deliberate falsification of astronomical data from the sources which he pretended implicitly not to have known [see Robert R. Newton, The Crime of Claudius Ptolemy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977)]. On the basis of this and related evidence, not only was his famous system false to known scientific evidence readily available to him during his time, but he made reference to the evidence which showed a heliocentric solar system, and constructed fraudulent parodies of that data to purport to eliminate the "solar hypothesis." There never was a "Copernican Revolution"; there was only the politically venturesome exposure, by such Renaissance figures as Cardinal Nicolas of Cusa, Copernicus, and, especially, Johannes Kepler, of the intellectual and moral fraud of all devotion to support for an anti-heliocentric dogma. The issue of method involved, is that Claudius Ptolemy's fraudulent dogma, although dependent upon falsified evidence concocted by him, purports to show that astronomy is to be premised upon naive sense-perception, and that according to a naive sort of visual imagination. Thus, Ptolemy is to be seen as a forerunner of Padua's Pietro Pomponazzi, and such followers of Venice's Paolo Sarpi as Galileo, Francis Bacon, Descartes, and the British empiricists and French materialists generally.

28. This illustrates the class of evidence which exposes modern "information theory," such as that of Professor Norbert Wiener, as a pseudo-scientific hoax.

29. Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "On The Subject of Metaphor," Fidelio, Vol. I, No. 3, Fall 1992.

30. E.g., I Corinthians 13.

31. For the child of school-age, beginning earlier than the first-grade level, there is usually a way in which the child can be assisted in conceptualizing the kind of objection he or she poses half as objection, half as question. At worst, the proper reply takes the following general form: "Let me show you an example which should help you understand better the question you are asking." Admittedly, one cannot expect every parent, every teacher to produce such examples de novo on demand; however, if curricula, reference-texts, teacher-training, and lesson-plans were competent (as most are not), every crucial conceptual problem of this sort which students might face at various points in the curriculum would have been noted in advance. That would be the case but for the fact that the profession is dominated at all levels of education by silly teaching geese who are devotees of Newton's hypotheses non fingo, and therefore refuse to acknowledge that what they are teaching children is riddled densely by axiomatic presumptions which the mind of any intelligent child might recognize as an implicit fallacy of assumption in what the textbook or the teacher is arguing.

32. Lawrence S. Kubie, Neurotic Distortion of the Creative Process (Lawrence, Kansas:Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1958). See also his "The Fostering of Scientific Creative Productivity," Daedalus, Vol. 91, No. 2, Spring 1962. The ironical feature of Kubie's contribution is the fact that the putative founder of Kubie's psychoanalytical profession, radical-empiricist Dr. Sigmund Freud, was a rabid opponent of the proposition that creativity even existed. Witness the notorious case of bisexual Sigmund Freud's invidious libel against Leonardo da Vinci; on the relevant matter of Freud's homosexual life, see Don Ennio Innocenti, Fragilità di Freud (Milan: Pan Editrice, 1975), pp.

33. See "The Dialectic of Practical Reason," in Immanuel Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: a homolog for, and precursor of, the Freudian "super-ego." This is an echo of the reliance upon the empiricist principle of random irrationalism within an "n-person game" in the social contract of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, et al., and in the "free trade" model commonly adopted by the Physiocrat Quesnay, by Adam Smith, by Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill's notion of utility, and in the pseudo-scientific systems analysis of John Von Neumann. In Smith, this appears both as the central principle of his "moral philosophy" (i.e., his 1759 Theory of the Moral Sentiments), and the mystical dogma of "free trade," or "Invisible Hand," in his The Wealth of Nations.

34. Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, Principia Mathematica (1910) (2nd ed., 1927) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968-1973).

35. This is from the King James Version, but for the restoration of the original agape in place of what empiricist tradition supplies as the customary misreading of the word "charity." Hence, for reason of that customary misuse, it is essential to reverse the derivation of "charity" from the Latin "caritas," and to resume the original agape, assigning to that latter term the proper, original meaning affirmed afresh here.

36. The term, "productive powers of labor," as adopted by U.S. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's Report On The Subject of Manufactures (December 1791) to the U.S. Congress, is derived from the founding of economic science by Gottfried Leibniz. This is the science of physical economy, as distinct from the empiricist trash taught in universities around the world today. Measure "productive powers of labor" in the following terms of good first approximation. Given, a certain level of technology, of life-expectancy, and so on. Account for all of the content of the bills of consumption required to sustain these levels of quality of reproductive existence. Three sets of measurements of such "market baskets" must be made: (1) In production: production costs and investment expenses, per capita; (2) Household requirements: per household and per capita; (3) per square kilometer of surface-area directly and indirectly used for production, physical distribution, and habitation. The categories of components of these "market baskets" are four: (1) Basic physical economic infrastructure: water-management and land improvements, general sanitation, general transportation, production and distribution of power, general communications systems, basic urban infrastructure; (2) Basic "soft" infrastructure: health-care, education, science; (3) Physical components of production and human consumption; (4) Essential-service components of households' and producing-units' consumption: health-care, education, and science. Measuring both inputs and outputs of the self-reproduction of the society in these units of market-basket measurement (per capita, per household, and per square kilometer), the required input represents the "energy of the system" of social reproduction; the increase of output over that input, might be termed the "free energy" of the process. Changes in the productive powers of labor are properly measured in these terms of approximation.

37. See Friedrich Schiller, "From the Aesthetical Lectures (1792-93)," in Friedrich Schiller: Poet of Freedom, Vol. II, op. cit. See Heinrich Heine, on romanticism, <i>The Romantic School</i>, and also his Concerning the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany (2nd. ed., 1852), both trans. by Helen Mustard, in Heinrich Heine: <i>The Romantic School</i> and Other Essays, ed. by Jost Hermand and Robert C. Holub (New York: Continuum, 1985). The British propaganda ministry used Heine's Religion and Philosophy in Germany liberally during World War II, fairly arguing that the axiomatic assumptions underlying the philosophy of both Kant and Hegel are fascistic in their practical implications. The British omitted mention of the fact that Kant's fascistic tendencies are derived from his training as the leading proponent of British empiricism in Germany.

38. Critics of this statement might suggest the names of two notable Romantic composers who did live into the present century, Hugo Wolf and Richard Strauss. Both of these, admittedly, despite their adaptations to the Romantic genre, had qualities of true musical genius, a quality expressed by their accomplishments in vocalization of poetry, accomplishments rooted in a rearing within the German Classical tradition of motivic thorough-composition of song begun with Wolfgang Mozart's "Das Veilchen," "Abendempfindung," and "Ave Verum Corpus," and continued through the thorough-composition of Beethoven, Schubert, Schumann, and Brahms. (See A Manual on the Rudiments of Tuning and Registration, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: Schiller Institute, 1992), pp. 199-228. Wolf went insane (which is a kind of death) before Brahms wrote his own "Four Serious Songs." It is fair to say that Strauss' best works are found among his songs. Those qualifications noted, the statement respecting Brahms in the text, is fair short-hand for the topic addressed there.

39. Specifically, Aeschylus' Prometheus fragment, Marlowe's Dr. Faustus, and all among the tragedies of Shakespeare and Schiller.

40. See Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "Mozart's 1782-1786 Revolution in Music," Fidelio, Vol. 1. No. 4, Winter 1992.

41. E.g., Isaac Newton's assertion of hypothesis non fingo is sufficient proof that he was no scientist. The substance of science, which sets it upon a qualitatively higher plane than engineering, is the scientist's adoption of the standpoint of higher hypothesis, whereas the standard for competence in engineering practice is hypothesis. The case of France's Ecole Polytechnique under Gaspard Monge and A.M. Legendre is to the point. Monge, like his former student Lazare Carnot, was a member of France's "national party," in the tradition of Louis XI, Jean Bodin, Henri IV, Richelieu, Mazarin, and Colbert. Specifically, Monge had been a leading figure within the same Oratorian order which had earlier featured such graduates of the Brotherhood of the Common Life as Erasmus of Rotterdam, and, otherwise, the great artists Raphael and François Rabelais. This is crucial for understanding the Ecole Polytechnique under Monge (as distinct from the degenerated Ecole under Laplace and Cauchy). The Jacobins, who were a joint creation of the treasonous Orleans-Fronde tradition in France and of Jeremy Bentham's British foreign service, had destroyed the Oratorians in France. The Ecole Polytechnique of 1794-1814 was a revival of that Oratorian tradition. The Ecole's program, built around Legendre's text in geometry, was designed to effect the rapid mass-production of brilliant French engineers from selected adolescents of promise; those who Monge et al. recognized as too good to become merely engineers, were selected for development as scientists.

42. To his credit, Albert Einstein's reaction to the great hoax perpetrated by Russell cronies such as Niels Bohr was to utter "God does not play dice," and to depart the discussion thus. Einstein's weakness, in both his circumstances and his commitment, was shown in his failure to damn these hoaxsters among his colleagues for the rotten, corrupt thing in which they had made themselves accomplices. It is to Einstein's credit, that he recognized in significant, if imperfect degree the crucial importance of B. Riemann's 1854 habilitation dissertation, and that he, in a similar vein, gave credit to Johannes Kepler, as against such opponents of Kepler as the followers of Galileo et al.

43. See Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "The Fraud of Algebraic Causality," Fidelio, Vol. III, No. 4, Winter 1994.

44. The emergence of the first modern form of nation-state, the commonwealth established by France's King Louis XI, occurred within Jeanne d'Arc's France through the influence of the Council of Florence, and the influence of that Brotherhood of the Common Life which educated Thomas à Kempis, the young Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa, and Erasmus of Rotterdam later.

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